Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Sefton, Martin (2018). Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games. [Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive. 10.5255/UKDA-SN-852959

This network project brings together economists, psychologists, computer and complexity scientists from three leading centres for behavioural social science at Nottingham, Warwick and UEA. This group will lead a research programme with two broad objectives: to develop and test cross-disciplinary models of human behaviour and behaviour change; to draw out their implications for the formulation and evaluation of public policy.
Foundational research will focus on three inter-related themes: understanding individual behaviour and behaviour change; understanding social and interactive behaviour; rethinking the foundations of policy analysis.
The project will explore implications of the basic science for policy via a series of applied projects connecting naturally with the three themes. These will include: the determinants of consumer credit behaviour; the formation of social values; strategies for evaluation of policies affecting health and safety.
The research will integrate theoretical perspectives from multiple disciplines and utilise a wide range of complementary methodologies including: theoretical modeling of individuals, groups and complex systems; conceptual analysis; lab and field experiments; analysis of large data sets.
The Network will promote high quality cross-disciplinary research and serve as a policy forum for understanding behaviour and behaviour change.

Data description (abstract)

We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. In share contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In lottery contests information feedback has an opposite, and even stronger, effect: when subjects only get feedback on own earnings we observe high levels of rent dissipation, usually exceeding the value of the rent, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings has a significant moderating influence on expenditures. In a follow-up treatment we make information feedback endogenous by allowing contestants in a lottery contest to make public or private expenditures. Subjects make the vast majority of expenditures privately and overall excess expenditures are similar to the lottery contest with own feedback.

Data creators:

Creator Name	Affiliation	ORCID (as URL)
Sefton Martin	University of Nottingham

Contributors:

Name	Affiliation	ORCID (as URL)
Renner Elke	University of Nottingham
Fallucchi Francesco	University of Nottingham

Sponsors:

Economic and Social Research Council

Grant reference:

ES/K002201/1

Topic classification:

Economics

Keywords:

Contests, Rent-seeking, Information feedback, Learning, Experiments

Project title:

Network for Integrated Behavioural Science

Grant holders:

Chris Starmer, Daniel John Zizzo, Nick Chater, Gordon Brown, Anders Poulsen, Martin Sefton, Neil Stewart, Uwe Aickelin, John Gathergood, Robert Sugden, Abigail Barr, Graham Loomes, Simon Gaechter, Shaun Hargreaves-Heap, Robert MacKay, Robin Cubitt, Enrique Fatas, Theodore Turocy, Daniel Read

Project dates: