Law and Agency: The micro-foundations of institutional change in national corporate governance systems

Schnyder, Gerhard and Kern, Philipp (2017). Law and Agency: The micro-foundations of institutional change in national corporate governance systems. [Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive. 10.5255/UKDA-SN-851977

Much debate has taken place concerning the link between the 'quality' of a country's company law, its financial development and the nature of its corporate governance system. It has been argued that countries with strong legal minority shareholder protection will have well-developed financial markets. This claim has not only influenced the policy recommendations of IMF and World Bank, but arguably directly inspired the legislators in at least one EU country (the Draghi law adopted in Italy in 1998).

Surprisingly, few researchers have systematically investigated the impact of changing legal rules on corporate governance practices at the firm level. We therefore know comparatively little about what impact recent legal changes had on companies' behaviour and how this affects a country's corporate governance regime as a whole.

The aim of this research is to compare the evolution of corporate governance practices of the largest companies in four European countries (UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) to legal changes over the last twenty years. The study creates a Shareholder Orientation Index (SOI) of corporate governance practices that is comparable across countries and within countries over time. This will generate new insights into the relationship between law and agency in corporate governance reform.

Data description (abstract)

This data collection contains the data generated by the Law & Agency project (ESRC award number RES-061250518). It constitutes the basis for a firm-level Shareholder-Orientation Index (SOI).

The project aimed to collect data for a sample of approximately 100 large listed companies for four countries (The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) for the time period 1990-2010.
The data are longitudinal in nature (1990-2010) and contain firm-level corporate governance practices and mechanisms as well as financial control variables.

We distinguish 8 different categories of variables, which correspond with different dimensions of corporate governance: First transparency and 'communicational' aspects; Second, structural and legal control devices including the nature and composition of the board, but also anti-takeover devices; Third, ‘economic components’, which include ownership structures and finance practices; fourthly, incentive structures, which compromises the pay-for-performance schemes; Fifth, ‘outcome variables’. We distinguish analytically ‘outcome variables’ from ‘choice variables’. ‘Outcome variables’ are defined following Höpner (2003) as variables that are not entirely determined by managerial decisions and do hence not directly measure organisational behaviour. This comprises for instance share price, which can certainly be influence (even manipulated) to a certain extent by the company. Yet, a plethora of exogenous factors influence this variable too. Therefore, such variables cannot be used as direct indicator of a given organisation’s shareholder orientation in the sense of a conscious strategy. This is different from variables such as ‘capital structure’, which is almost a pure choice variable, i.e. the company chooses to adopt a certain capital structure. It should be noted that certain variables not classified as ‘outcome variables’ here, could arguably be placed in this category. E.g. the ownership structure of a firm is certainly not 100% under management’s control, once a company is publicly listed. Yet, the fundamental decision to go public and to have a significant amount of listed equity is (Höpner 2003). Also, some of what we define as ‘choice variables’, i.e. variables that measure organisational characteristics that are the result of strategic choices within the firm, may actually be legally imposed on a company. The choice is then reduced to one between compliance or non-compliance with laws and regulations. Nevertheless we consider it useful to analytically distinguish variables that are closer to choice from variables that are closer to outcome. Sixth, ‘regulatory commitment’ contains variables that measure to what extent a given firm complies with legal or regulatory rules. This dimension essentially measure whether a company commits to higher CG regulatory standards than it would be required by law by opting into stricter regulatory regimes by cross-listing in New York or London. The seventh category contains information about the main company officers (CEO and Chairman). Eight, we also collected some additional variables as control variables.

Data creators:
Creator Name Affiliation ORCID (as URL)
Schnyder Gerhard King's College London
Kern Philipp King's College London
Sponsors: ESRC
Grant reference: RES-061-25-0518
Topic classification: Law, crime and legal systems
Economics
Trade, industry and markets
Keywords: corporate governance, united kingdom, sweden, switzerland, netherlands, shareholder value, shareholder orientation
Project title: Law and Agency: The Micro-Foundations of Institutional Change in National Corporate Governance Systems
Alternative title: Law and Agency: The Micro-Foundations of Institutional Change in National Corporate Governance Systems
Grant holders: Gerhard Schnyder
Project dates:
FromTo
21 November 201120 May 2015
Date published: 04 Sep 2015 16:21
Last modified: 14 Jul 2017 12:22

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