Parliamentary Oversight in Russia and Ukraine 2006

Whitmore, Sarah (2015). Parliamentary Oversight in Russia and Ukraine 2006. [Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive. 10.5255/UKDA-SN-851671

The focus of the research is the experience of developing parliamentary oversight capacity in new, non-consolidated democracies, using as study cases Russia and Ukraine.
Both legislatures have been developing mechanisms to check the executive's behavior – hearings, interpellations, parliamentary investigations, audit chambers and so on. The research seeks to explore the nature of oversight conducted in these states, assessing how far parliamentarians engage in oversight activities and their motivations for doing so.
The research is based on a recognition of the broader neo-patrimonial political context in the post-Soviet space, and the concomitant gap between the pays legal and the pays reel. Therefore, it is important to investigate actual day-to-day activities as opposed to formal institutions, and to explore the meanings actors attach to oversight practices, which may be similar or quite distinct from those in established Western democracies.

Data description (abstract)

This project sought to broaden understanding of the role of legislatures in contemporary states by investigating oversight in two post-Soviet cases, Russia and Ukraine, where the state can usefully be conceptualized as neopatrimonial because of the fusion of patrimonial relations (such as clientelism, patronage and rent-seeking) into the legal-rational state structure.

The objectives were to:(1) explore and compare the practical application of oversight in Russia and Ukraine, considering both process and output; (2) investigate the incentives for deputies to engage in oversight activities and the responses such activities engender from the executive organs and to identify meanings attached to such oversight by political actors; (3) evaluate the trajectory of parliamentary oversight – is it becoming more or less important for the operation of the legislatures; (4) broaden understanding of the nature of parliamentary oversight by adding new case studies outside ‘the West’ and contribute to theory concerning deputies’ motivations for engaging in oversight in post-Soviet contexts.

Data creators:
Creator Name Affiliation ORCID (as URL)
Whitmore Sarah Oxford Brookes University
Sponsors: ESRC
Grant reference: RES-000-22-1132
Topic classification: Politics
Keywords: russia, ukraine, parliament, democratization
Project title: Parliamentary Oversight in Russia and Ukraine 2006
Grant holders: Sarah Whitmore
Project dates:
FromTo
1 April 200531 December 2007
Date published: 20 Feb 2015 16:47
Last modified: 20 Feb 2015 16:48

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