Eye movements in strategic choice, experimental data

Stewart, Neil (2018). Eye movements in strategic choice, experimental data. [Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive. 10.5255/UKDA-SN-852947

This network project brings together economists, psychologists, computer and complexity scientists from three leading centres for behavioural social science at Nottingham, Warwick and UEA. This group will lead a research programme with two broad objectives: to develop and test cross-disciplinary models of human behaviour and behaviour change; to draw out their implications for the formulation and evaluation of public policy. Foundational research will focus on three inter-related themes: understanding individual behaviour and behaviour change; understanding social and interactive behaviour; rethinking the foundations of policy analysis. The project will explore implications of the basic science for policy via a series of applied projects connecting naturally with the three themes. These will include: the determinants of consumer credit behaviour; the formation of social values; strategies for evaluation of policies affecting health and safety. The research will integrate theoretical perspectives from multiple disciplines and utilise a wide range of complementary methodologies including: theoretical modeling of individuals, groups and complex systems; conceptual analysis; lab and field experiments; analysis of large data sets. The Network will promote high quality cross-disciplinary research and serve as a policy forum for understanding behaviour and behaviour change.

Data description (abstract)

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level-k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance-solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level-k and cognitive hierarchy models do not.

Data creators:
Creator Name Affiliation ORCID (as URL)
Stewart Neil University of Warwick http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2202-018X
Contributors:
Name Affiliation ORCID (as URL)
Gaechter Simon University of Nottingham http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7182-8505
Noguchi Takao University College London
Mullett Timothy L University of Warwick http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4082-2813
Sponsors: Economic and Social Research Council
Grant reference: ES/K002201/1
Topic classification: Psychology
Keywords: eye tracking, process tracing, experimental games, normal-form games, prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, hawk-dove, level-k, cognitive hierarchy, drift diffusion, accumulator models, gaze cascade effect, gaze bias effect
Project title: Network for Integrated Behavioural Science
Grant holders: Chris Starmer, Nick Chater, Daniel John Zizzo, Gordon Brown, Anders Poulsen, Martin Sefton, Neil Stewart, Uwe Aickelin, John Gathergood, Robert Sugden, Abigail Barr, Graham Loomes, Simon Gaechter, Shaun Hargreaves-Heap, Robert MacKay, Robin Cubitt, Enrique Fatas, Theodore Turocy, Daniel Read
Project dates:
FromTo
31 December 201230 September 2017
Date published: 04 Jan 2018 12:37
Last modified: 07 Feb 2018 15:21

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