Fischer, Greg
(2017).
Experimental microfinance data on contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice.
[Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex:
UK Data Archive.
10.5255/UKDA-SN-851466
Microfinance has been heralded as a revolutionary development tool. But while the provision of small, uncollateralised loans to poor borrowers in poor countries may help mitigate poverty, there is little evidence that microfinance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. Few hire employees outside their immediate families, formalise, or generate sustained capital growth. This research seeks to understand why.
To understand this phenomenon and in turn encourage growth beyond subsistence entrepreneurship, this research project addresses the following questions.
How do microfinance groups form and how does group composition affect investment choices?
Are there gender differences in response to different forms of microfinance contracts?
What is the role of local information in these contracts?
Can alternative contracts, such as microequity, encourage more efficient risk taking and hence accelerate poverty alleviation?
This project fills an important void in our understanding by approaching these questions along two front. It develops new theory that embeds the group formation and investment choice problem in an environment with both formal and informal financial contracts. It uses a series of experiments conducted with actual microfinance clients and micro-entrepreneurs in India and Bangladesh to test, extend, and refine the theory.
Data description (abstract)
Experimental data from a "lab in field" experiment with microfinance clients in Chennai, India to study the relationship between contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. This dataset provides the replication data for the associated paper "Contract Structure, Risk-Sharing, and Investment Choice".
Data creators: |
Creator Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
Fischer Greg |
London School of Economics |
|
|
Sponsors: |
ESRC
|
Grant reference: |
ES/H010742/1
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Topic classification: |
Economics
|
Keywords: |
investment choice, informal insurance, risk sharing, contract design, microfinance, experiment
|
Project title: |
Group Formation, Contract Structure, and Investment Choice
|
Alternative title: |
Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice: Experimental Data
|
Grant holders: |
Gregory Fischer
|
Project dates: |
From | To |
---|
1 October 2009 | 30 September 2013 |
|
Date published: |
09 Oct 2017 07:36
|
Last modified: |
09 Oct 2017 07:37
|
Collection period: |
Date from: | Date to: |
---|
1 March 2007 | 31 May 2007 |
|
Geographical area: |
Chennai, India |
Country: |
India |
Data collection method: |
Lab experiment with microfinance clients in Chennai, India using the joint liability game with imperfect monitoring. Detailed methodology information is available in the replication files. |
Observation unit: |
Individual |
Kind of data: |
Numeric |
Type of data: |
Experimental data
|
Resource language: |
English |
|
Rights owners: |
Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
The Econometric Society |
|
|
|
Contact: |
Name | Email | Affiliation | ORCID (as URL) |
---|
Fischer, Greg | g.fischer@lse.ac.uk | London School of Economics | Unspecified |
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Notes on access: |
The Data Collection is available to any user without the requirement for registration for download/access.
|
Publisher: |
UK Data Archive
|
Last modified: |
09 Oct 2017 07:37
|
|
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