Berg, Erlend and Ghatak, Maitreesh and R Manjula, R and Rajasekhar, D and Roy, Sanchari
(2020).
Motivating knowledge agents: Can incentive pay overcome social distance? 2010-2015.
[Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex:
UK Data Service.
10.5255/UKDA-SN-854126
Data description (abstract)
In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. The resulting article studies the interaction of incentive pay with intrinsic motivation and social distance. It analyses theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have not only pro-social objectives but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another.
Data creators: |
Creator Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
Berg Erlend |
University of Bristol |
|
Ghatak Maitreesh |
London School of Economics |
|
R Manjula R |
Institute for Social and Economic Change |
|
Rajasekhar D |
Institute for Social and Economic Change |
|
Roy Sanchari |
Kings College London |
|
|
Sponsors: |
Economic and Social Research Council
|
Grant reference: |
ES/H021248/1
|
Topic classification: |
Health Economics Education
|
Keywords: |
public services, information, incentives, knowledge transfer, Social stratification, Information transfer
|
Project title: |
Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)
|
Grant holders: |
Nicholas Crafts, Andrew Oswald, Sharun Mukand, Sascha O Becker, Sayantan Ghosal, Kimberley Scharf, Stephen Broadberry, Anandi Mani, John Whalley
|
Project dates: |
From | To |
---|
4 January 2010 | 3 January 2015 |
|
Date published: |
15 Apr 2020 16:06
|
Last modified: |
15 Apr 2020 16:07
|
Collection period: |
Date from: | Date to: |
---|
4 January 2010 | 3 January 2015 |
|
Country: |
United Kingdom, India |
Data collection method: |
A field experiment conducted across 151 villages in Karnataka, India, in the context of a government-subsidized health insurance scheme aimed at the rural poor. In a random subsample of the villages (the treatment groups), one local woman per village was recruited to spread information about the scheme. These ‘knowledge agents’ were randomly assigned to either a flat-pay or an incentive-pay contract. Under the latter contract, the agents' pay depended on how a random sample of eligible households in their village performed when surveyed and orally presented with a knowledge test about the scheme |
Observation unit: |
Individual |
Kind of data: |
Numeric, Text |
Type of data: |
Experimental data
|
Resource language: |
English |
|
Data sourcing, processing and preparation: |
The data and documentation is available from Wiley Online Library, along with the publication "Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?" (link under Related resources); the data files can be found under 'Supporting Information'.
|
Rights owners: |
Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
Berg Erlend |
University of Bristol |
|
Ghatak Maitreesh |
London School of Economics |
|
R Manjula R |
Institute for Social and Economic Change |
|
Rajasekhar D |
Institute for Social and Economic Change |
|
Roy Sanchari |
Kings College London |
|
|
Contact: |
Name | Email | Affiliation | ORCID (as URL) |
---|
Berg, Erlend | erlend.berg@bristol.ac.uk | University of Bristol | Unspecified |
|
Notes on access: |
The Data Collection is available from an external repository. Access is available via Related Resources.
|
Publisher: |
UK Data Service
|
Last modified: |
15 Apr 2020 16:07
|
|
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