van Dolder, Dennie
(2017).
Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show.
[Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex:
UK Data Archive.
10.5255/UKDA-SN-852884
This network project brings together economists, psychologists, computer and complexity scientists from three leading centres for behavioural social science at Nottingham, Warwick and UEA. This group will lead a research programme with two broad objectives: to develop and test cross-disciplinary models of human behaviour and behaviour change; to draw out their implications for the formulation and evaluation of public policy.
Foundational research will focus on three inter-related themes:
understanding individual behaviour and behaviour change; understanding social and interactive behaviour; rethinking the foundations of policy analysis.
The project will explore implications of the basic science for policy via a series of applied projects connecting naturally with the three themes. These will include: the determinants of consumer credit behaviour; the formation of social values; strategies for evaluation of policies affecting health and safety.
The research will integrate theoretical perspectives from multiple disciplines and utilise a wide range of complementary methodologies including: theoretical modeling of individuals, groups and complex systems; conceptual analysis; lab and field experiments; analysis of large data sets.
The Network will promote high quality cross-disciplinary research and serve as a policy forum for understanding behaviour and behaviour change.
Data description (abstract)
We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter.
Data creators: |
Creator Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
van Dolder Dennie |
University of Nottingham |
|
|
Contributors: |
Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
van den Assem Martijn J |
VU University Amsterdam |
|
Camerer Colin F |
California Institute of Technology |
|
Thaler Richard H |
University of Chicago |
|
|
Sponsors: |
Economic and Social Research Council
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Grant reference: |
ES/K002201/1
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Topic classification: |
Economics
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Keywords: |
bargaining theory, matching theory, consumer economics, empirical analysis, entertainment, media
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Project title: |
Network for Integrated Behavioural Science
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Grant holders: |
Chris Starmer, Nick Chater, Daniel John Zizzo, Gordon Brown, Anders Poulsen, Martin Sefton, Neil Stewart, Uwe Aickelin, Robert Sugden, John Gathergood, Abigail Barr, Robin Cubitt, Daniel Read, Enrique Fatas, Shaun Hargreaves-Heap, Graham Loomes, Simon Gaechter, Robert MacKay, Theodore Turocy
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Project dates: |
From | To |
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31 December 2012 | 30 September 2017 |
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Date published: |
24 Dec 2017 12:01
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Last modified: |
24 Dec 2017 12:01
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Collection period: |
Date from: | Date to: |
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31 December 2012 | 30 September 2017 |
|
Country: |
United Kingdom |
Data collection method: |
In the present study, we use data from the British TV show Divided. This game show combines high stakes and a diverse subject pool within a controlled setting. Each game is played with three contestants who are strangers to each other. There are two stages: one in which the contestants team up to accumulate a communal jackpot through answering quiz questions, and one in which they have to divide this jackpot between them. The first stage lasts for a maximum of five rounds. Round 1 has five questions that are worth up to £3,000 each. In the subsequent four rounds the number of questions and the maximum value per question are 4, 3, 2, and 1, and £7,500, £15,000, £30,000, and £75,000, respectively. How much a question actually contributes to the jackpot depends on the team’s speed of answering. Incorrect answers halve the jackpot and after three mistakes the team is out of the game. At the end of each round, the team can decide to stop and divide the jackpot, but only if they make that decision unanimously. The online Appendix includes a schematic overview of this first stage. |
Observation unit: |
Individual |
Kind of data: |
Numeric |
Type of data: |
Experimental data
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Resource language: |
English |
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Rights owners: |
Name |
Affiliation |
ORCID (as URL) |
van Dolder Dennie |
University of Nottingham |
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|
Contact: |
Name | Email | Affiliation | ORCID (as URL) |
---|
van Dolder, Dennie | d.van.dolder@vu.nl | VU University Amsterdam | Unspecified |
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Notes on access: |
The Data Collection is available to any user without the requirement for registration for download/access.
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Publisher: |
UK Data Archive
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Last modified: |
24 Dec 2017 12:01
|
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