



ISSN: 0799-3897
eISSN: 0799-4346

cjc

ARIBBEAN JOURNAL OF
RIMINOLOGY

VOLUME 3:1, DECEMBER 2021

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES PRESS

Caribbean Journal of Criminology

VOLUME 3:1

2021

Special Issue: International Research Collaborations

Guest Editors

Edward R. Maguire and Charles M. Katz

Published under the Journals of the Caribbean Programme

by

The University of the West Indies Press

The University of the West Indies, Regional Headquarters

Published by The University of the West Indies © 2021
in association with the University of the West Indies Press
and the University of the West Indies Institute of Criminal Justice and Security.
7A Gibraltar Hall Road Mona Campus, Kingston 7, Jamaica, West Indies.
www.uwipress.com
uwipress.journals@uwimona.edu.jm
ISSN: 0799-3897
eISSN: 0799-4346
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.37234/CJC>

Copyright reserved. Reproduction without the permission of the
publisher is forbidden

Caribbean Journal of Criminology is normally published once per year.

Print-Only Subscription Rates for 2021-2022:

Territories Rates Shipping & Handling

North America/Canada: US\$50	US\$10
Europe/United Kingdom: US\$60	US\$15
Latin American & Caribbean: US\$40	US\$20
Rest of the World: US\$65	US\$20
Individuals: US\$40	US\$20

All correspondence and contributions should be addressed to:

The Editor, Caribbean Journal of Criminology
Institute of Criminal Justice and Security
Regional Headquarters
The University of the West Indies
Hermitage Road, Kingston 7, Jamaica, W.I.
Telephone (876) 977-6275 or (876) 970-0438
Email: cjc@uwimona.edu.jm/icjs@uwimona.edu.jm

Editorial Board

Editor

Tres-Ann Kremer PhD

Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, The University of the West Indies

Managing Editor

Tarik Weekes MSc

Research Fellow, Institute of Criminal Justice and Security

Associate Editors

- Shazeeda Ali PhD
Professor and Dean
Faculty of Law
The University of the West Indies, Mona
- Corin Bailey PhD
Senior Fellow
University of the West Indies
Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies
The University of the West Indies, Cavehill
- Richard R. Bennett PhD
Professor and Department Chair
Department of Justice, Law & Criminology
American University
- Christopher Birkbeck PhD
Professor
University of Salford, Manchester
- Benjamin Bowling PhD
Professor
King's College, London, England
- John B. Braithwaite PhD
Professor
Australian National University
Regulatory Institutions Networks, College of Asia & the Pacific

- Derek Chadee PhD
Professor
Department of Behavioural Sciences
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
- Marlyn Jones PhD
Professor
California State University, Sacramento
- Janice Joseph PhD
Professor
Stockton University
- Charles M. Katz PhD
Professor
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice
Arizona State University
- Dacia Leslie PhD
Research Fellow
Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies
The University of the West Indies, Mona
- Ineke Marshall PhD
Professor
College of Social Sciences and Humanities
Northeastern University
- Slawomir Redo PhD
Visiting Lecturer
Faculty of Law
University of Vienna (Austria)
- Randy Seepersad PhD
Lecturer and Coordinator of the Criminology Unit
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
- Peter St Jean PhD
Associate Professor
North Park University, Chicago
- Phillip Stenning PhD
Professor
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice
Griffith University

Table of Contents

Editorial: International Research Collaborations in the Caribbean
Edward R. Maguire and Charles M. Katz 1

Confronting Silences Haunting Guyana’s Juvenile Justice System
*Kristy Warren, Kellie Moss, Dylan Kerrigan,
Tammy Ayres, Clare Anderson, and
Queenela Cameron* 10

Cut and Paste Policing? An Assessment of Compstat’s Importation
and Implementation in a Developing Country
Aleem Mahabir and Robert Kinlocke 40

Interrupting Gang Violence in Urban Trinidad through Conflict
Mediation
*Ericka B. Adams, Patrice K. Morris, and
Edward R. Maguire* 69

Policy Note: Enhancing the Capacity for Data-Driven Decision-Making
on Citizen Security across the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Case Study
of CariSECURE
*Charles M. Katz, John Walcott, Kayla Freemon, and
Paolo del Mistro* 93

Review of the Book: *Recidivism in the Caribbean: Improving the
Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners*. Dacia Leslie
Regan Reid 124

Farewell from Former Editor
Anthony Harriott 129

Notes on Contributors / 138

Submission Guidelines / 142

Editorial: International Research Collaborations in the Caribbean

Edward R. Maguire¹ and Charles M. Katz², Guest Editors

¹Director of Public Safety Innovation Lab,
Arizona State University

²School of Criminology and Criminal Justice & Center for Violence
Prevention and Community Safety, Arizona State University

Abstract

The volume of criminological research in the Caribbean has exploded over the past decade. Scholars from numerous disciplines have carried out this research using a variety of methods. Moreover, this research has examined various topics across the criminological spectrum. Some of the criminological research in the region has been carried out by teams of scholars from different nations. These International Research Collaborations have resulted in many valuable insights about crime and its causes, as well as societal responses to crime. For that reason, we chose International Research Collaborations as the theme of this special issue. We view this special issue as an opportunity to highlight these international partnerships and the insights and other benefits that can result from them.

Keywords: Caribbean; criminology; criminal justice; international partnerships; International Research Collaborations.

The volume of criminological research in the Caribbean has exploded over the past decade. Scholars from numerous disciplines have carried out this research using various methods. Moreover, this research has examined a wide range of topics across the criminological spectrum. Some of the criminological research in the region has been carried out by scholars from different nations. These International Research Collaborations (IRCs) have resulted in a variety of valuable insights about crime and its causes (e.g. Harriott and Katz 2015), as well as societal responses to crime (e.g. Katz, Harriott and Hedberg 2020; Maguire and Gordon 2015).

IRCs emerged as a method for enhancing knowledge production in the late 1950s (Chen, Zhang, and Fu 2019). Early on, IRCs offered partners

several benefits, including increased research opportunities and increased educational opportunities for students, but were also known to be highly challenging because of the time and cost of travel and problems associated with verbal and written communication among other factors (Harder, Wingenbach, and Rosser 2007). By the mid-2000s IRCs, and the study of IRCs, began to "take off" (Chen et al. 2019: 219), especially in smaller countries (Thorsteinsdottir 2000). The reasons for the growth of IRCs have become more common for a variety of reasons, including insufficient access to local colleagues with similar research interests (Thorsteinsdottir 2000) and improvements in communication technologies (Wagner, Brahmakulam, Jackson, Wong, and Toda 2001). There have also been increases in the adoption of policies by wealthier countries to promote IRCs as a mechanism for addressing structural inequalities (which necessarily negatively impact knowledge production) experienced by less wealthy countries (Zingerli 2010). IRCs have increased perhaps the most among those working in interdisciplinary fields of research (such as criminology), where basic and applied fields have converged (Coccia and Bozeman 2016) and in places where researchers with recognized and needed expertise can collaborate to build capacity to address pressing problems of mutual interest regardless of location (Wagner, Brahmakulam, Jackson, Wong, and Toda 2001).

The issues mentioned above are particularly salient among Small Island Developing States (SIDS), such as those in the Caribbean. Many Caribbean nations experience high violence and crime rates, invest a disproportionate share of national resources in responding to crime, yet have less well-funded institutions dedicated to advancing criminological knowledge and associated solutions. For example, the Criminology Unit, housed in the Department of Behavioral Sciences at the University of the West Indies – St. Augustine Campus, employs only three academic staff¹ and is responsible for training the region's undergraduate and graduate students and engaging in research and evaluation in a region comprising more than two dozen nations and dependencies. IRCs enable local and foreign researchers to better understand crime and responses to crime that might not be otherwise understandable or solvable given limited capacity.

Needless to say, there is immense value in international collaborative work, which is why we chose *International Research Collaborations* as the theme of this special issue. While we recognize that research collaborations come in different forms (i.e. research collaborations between

¹<https://sta.uwi.edu/fss/behaviouralsciences/%C2%A0criminology-and-criminal-justice>

nations, universities, departments), we focus here on the simplest collaborations – between individuals. We view this issue as an opportunity to highlight these international partnerships and the insights that can result from them. Below we summarize the articles in this issue, indicating the nation of origin for each author in parentheses. After that, we reflect on some of the cross-cutting themes that emerge from this collection of articles.

Summary of Contributions

In the first article, Kristy Warren (Bermuda/UK), Kelly Moss (UK), Dylan Kerrigan (Trinidad and Tobago/UK), Clare Anderson (UK), Tammy Ayers (UK) and Queenella Cameron (Guyana) report findings from their historical analysis of changes in youth offending and responses to youth offending in Guyana from the 1930s to the present. They note that Guyana's juvenile justice system still contains vestiges of its colonial and oppressive past, including various forms of exploitation, victimization and discrimination. According to these authors, the system is more oriented towards a desire for social order rather than social justice and does not meet the developmental needs of the children in its midst.

In the second article, Aleem Mahabir (Trinidad and Tobago) and Robert Kinlocke (Jamaica) discuss the importation and implementation of Compstat by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). Compstat is a performance management system developed by the New York City Police Department in the 1990s, and police agencies worldwide have since adopted it (O'Connell 2001; Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2007). Mahabir and Kinlocke highlight some of the issues that arise when law enforcement agencies in the Global South import reforms from the North.² They show how resource constraints and difficulties in collecting, processing and sharing data limited the implementation of Compstat in Trinidad and Tobago. They close by highlighting the importance of adapting innovations borrowed from elsewhere to local contexts.

In the third article, Ericka Adams (Trinidad and Tobago), Patrice Morris (Jamaica) and Edward Maguire (USA) discuss qualitative findings from their evaluation of a community-based violence reduction initiative in Trinidad and Tobago known as *Project REASON*. This initiative

²The phrase "Global South" refers to politically, economically or culturally marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. According to Dados and Connell (2012, 13), the concept of the Global South references the history "of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained".

represented a local adaptation of Cure Violence, a public health approach to gun violence reduction first established in Chicago (Ransford and Slutkin 2017). Using an analysis of semi-structured and focus group interviews conducted with Project REASON employees, they examine the strategies these employees used to intervene in gang violence, as well as the situational dynamics that enabled them to intervene successfully in potentially violent situations.

In the fourth article, Charles M. Katz (USA), John Walcott (Barbados), Kayla Freemon (USA) and Paolo delMistro (Canada) discuss CariSECURE, a project implemented by UNDP and funded by USAID that seeks "to reduce youth involvement in violence and crime in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean".³ The authors reflect on lessons learned from CariSECURE's efforts to improve the institutional capacity for evidence-based decision-making about crime and violence in participating nations by bolstering their data collection and analysis capacities. The authors describe these nations' capacities for data-driven decision-making prior to CariSECURE. Then they discuss the policies and procedures deployed through CariSECURE to strengthen evidence-based decision-making for citizen security in the Caribbean.

Finally, Regan Reid (Jamaica) provides a book review of *Recidivism in the Caribbean* by Dacia Leslie. Reid refers to the book as "a compelling and thought-provoking book that gives the readers an inside look at the complexities of imprisonment, recidivism, rehabilitation, and reintegration of ex-prisoners into the receiving Jamaican society".

Emergent Themes

The articles presented in this issue volume raise interesting and provocative questions about a variety of issues. One theme that emerges across the articles is the extent to which criminological theories and practices from the developed world are necessary, appropriate or valid in the Caribbean. This issue is reminiscent of a long-standing debate over the future of Caribbean criminology, some of which was featured in previous renditions of this journal. For instance, Pryce's (1976, 3) classic essay noted that the unique characteristics of the Caribbean region warranted "the scientific study of crime and deviant behavior in the Caribbean as an independent field of inquiry in its own right". Cain (1996, ii) echoed this theme, cautioning scholars against having "a deferential relationship with

³<https://www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/rblac/en/home/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/regional-projects-carisecure.html>

western theory which assumes it to be right even when it does not fit local experiences, which presents it as received wisdom even when it has no relevance". Birkbeck (1999) noted that existing theories could be modified to incorporate unique characteristics of the Caribbean, such as creolisation and its effects on crime and criminal justice.

This question about the universality or applicability of theories and practices from developed nations arises either directly or indirectly in all of the papers appearing in this issue. For example, issues of colonialism and the extent to which it continues to "haunt" Guyana's juvenile justice system are prominent in the analysis by Warren and her colleagues. They argue that criminal justice systems in the Caribbean continue to reproduce colonial institutions and legacies that were "created to contain and control people conceptualized as "barbaric" and "uncivilised," such as the indigenous, enslaved, indentured, immigrant, poorly, and mentally ill". Colonial legacies continue to exert an indelible influence on many sectors of Caribbean life, including agriculture, law, sports and tourism (Barry, Gahman, Greenidge, and Mohamed 2020; Malcolm 2001; Stirton and Lodge 2020; Wong 2015). The wide-ranging influence of colonialism on Caribbean people and institutions raises important questions about the extent to which contemporary theories of crime and justice must account for colonial dynamics when applied to the Caribbean. Another possibility, as suggested by Pryce (1976) more than four decades ago, is that the unique characteristics of Caribbean societies may require original theories that can account for the effects of these phenomena.

Mahabir and Kinlocke's analysis of Compstat in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service directly takes on these issues. These authors draw heavily from the political science research on "policy transfer" in discussing how developing nations import innovations from developed nations, often finding these imports a poor fit (see Jones and Newburn 2007). This work adds to an emerging body of research on policy transfer within criminal justice agencies in the Caribbean (Bissessar 2000; Maguire and King 2013). Mahabir and Kinlocke note that a "faulty information pipeline" is partially responsible for limiting the capacity of Compstat to achieve its stated objectives in Trinidad and Tobago. Handwritten crime reports, difficulties in obtaining accurate geographic coordinates for crime locations and delays in processing crime data led to officers not having accurate and timely information on the locations of emerging hot spots for various offense types. Compstat is premised on the availability of timely and accurate information on the location of crimes. However, police agencies in developing countries may lack

the technological infrastructure to produce the types of data that are needed for the successful application of the Compstat process. Mahabir and Kinlocke argue that reforms cannot simply be copied from one setting and transplanted in another without making appropriate accommodations for the unique context in which the reform is being "pasted".

Adams and her colleagues examine Project REASON, a violence reduction intervention implemented in Trinidad based on the Cure Violence model developed in Chicago (Ransford and Slutkin 2017). A separate quasi-experimental impact evaluation found that the intervention was associated with "a significant and substantial drop in violence" in the communities where it was implemented (Maguire, Oakley, and Corsaro 2018, p. 36). Adams and her colleagues examine qualitative data from interviews with Project REASON stakeholders to determine what specific activities project staff undertook to reduce violence. Their findings reveal that violence interveners drew upon a suite of informal methods for preventing violence, including direct intervention with potential offenders and victims and their loved ones.

Adams and her colleagues speculate that "community-based intervention efforts may be especially suitable policy options in developing nations". They note that public trust and confidence in the police are low in many developing nations, due to incompetence, unfairness, corruption, brutality or some combination of these issues (Goldsmith 2005; Haugen and Boutros 2014). These legitimacy deficits make it more difficult for police to control violence and solicit the types of cooperation from the public that enable them to prevent crime and solve cases (Clancy, Brookman, and Maguire 2019). For this reason, properly implemented community-based violence reduction efforts may be an especially potent option in developing nations. Much of the discussion of policy transfer from North to South argues that Northern policies fare worse in the South. This is an intriguing case where a Northern policy may fare *better* in the South, though more research is necessary to test this hypothesis.

Katz and his colleagues find that even in a relatively well-funded project such as CariSECURE, introducing organizational change is fraught with challenging implementation issues. After four years of programme implementation, only two of the eight participating nations had implemented the new electronic crime recording practices nationwide. Moreover, a data audit by the authors revealed problems related to the validity of the officially recorded crime data in one of those two

nations. To be clear, the findings by Katz and his colleagues show that CariSECURE stimulated a variety of valuable benefits for participating nations. However, the findings also reinforce an issue raised in Mahabir and Kinlocke's study of the implementation of Compstat in Trinidad and Tobago: that policy transfer is complicated, particularly policy transfers from the North to the South. Ambitious efforts such as CariSECURE raise various structural, cultural and technological issues that must be navigated when seeking to implement reform. The hope is that international development programmes such as CariSECURE can begin planting the seeds of reform and nurturing those efforts over time until they become sustainable.

Conclusion

Taken together, the papers in this special issue reinforce the importance of international research partnerships for generating knowledge about crime and justice issues in the Caribbean. These partnerships result in a diversity of perspectives that can benefit the growth and development of research in the region. These partnerships are also useful for the growth and development of the partners carrying out the research. Research partners from within and outside of the Caribbean can learn from one another's unique experiences and see these issues from new perspectives. We ourselves have benefited from ongoing partnerships with our colleagues from the Caribbean and other nations, and we are grateful for those enriching and informative experiences.

We offer our heartfelt thanks to Anthony Harriott and Tarik Weekes at the University of the West Indies for making this special issue possible. We view Anthony Harriott as a monumental figure in Caribbean criminology, and we are delighted to see his continuing contributions since retiring from the University of the West Indies at Mona in 2020. We also thank the authors whose insightful work appears in this special issue and the external reviewers whose constructive feedback helped improve our work. We hope readers find the articles in this issue enlightening.

References

- Barry, T., L. Gahman, A. Greenidge, and A. Mohamed. "Wrestling with Race and Colonialism in Caribbean Agriculture: Toward a (Food) Sovereign and (Gender) Just Future." *Geoforum* 109 (2020): 106–110.

- Birkbeck, C. "By Your Theory You Shall be Known: Some Reflections on Caribbean Criminology." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology* **4**, no. (1/2) (1999): 1–31.
- Bissessar, A. M. "Policy Transfer and Implementation Failure: A Review of the Policy of Domestic Violence in Trinidad and Tobago." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology* **5**, no. (1) (2000): 57–80.
- Cain, M. "Introduction: For a Caribbean Criminology." *Caribbean Quarterly* **42**, no. (2–3) (1996): i–xvii.
- Chen, K., Y. Zhang, and X. Fu. "International Research Collaboration: An Emerging Domain of Innovation Studies?" *Research Policy* **48**, no. (1) (2019): 149–168.
- Clancy, A., F. Brookman, and E. R. Maguire. "Gang-Related Homicide and Police Corruption in Trinidad and Tobago: A Rapid Evidence Assessment." United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (2019). <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/gang-related-homicide-and-police-corruption-in-trinidad-and-tobago/>
- Coccia, M., and B. Bozeman. "Allometric Models to Measure and Analyze the Evolution of International Research Collaboration." *Scientometrics*, **108**, no. (3) (2016): 1065–1084.
- Dados, N., and R. Connell. "The Global South." *Contexts* **11**, no. (1) (2012): 12–13. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504212436479>
- Goldsmith, A. "Police Reform and the Problem of Trust." *Theoretical Criminology* **9** (2005): 443–470.
- Harder, A., G. J. Wingenbach, and M. Rosser. "Developing International Research Partnerships." *Journal of International Agricultural and Extension Education* **14**, no. (3) (2007): 77–84.
- Haugen, G., and V. Boutros. *The Locust Effect: Why the End of Poverty Requires the End of Violence*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Harriott, A. and C. M. Katz. *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*. Edited by A. Harriott and C. M. Katz. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2015.
- Jones, T., and T. Newburn. *Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice: Exploring US Influence Over British Crime Control Policy*. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2007.
- Katz, C. M., A. Harriott, and E. C. Hedberg. "Mediating Violence in Jamaica through a Gang Truce." *International Criminal Justice Review* (2020), 1057567720975631.
- Maguire, E. R., and W. R. King. "Transferring Criminal Investigation Methods from Developed to Developing Nations." *Policing and Society*. **23**, no. (3) (2013): 346–361.
- Maguire, E. R., and Gordon, C. J. (2015). Faith-based interventions for reducing gang violence in the Caribbean: Reflections from a professor and a priest. Pp. 309–338 in *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of state and society*, edited by A. Harriott and C.M. Katz. University of the West Indies Press.
- Maguire, E. R., M. Oakley, and N. Corsaro. *Evaluating Cure Violence in Trinidad and Tobago*. Inter-American Development Bank, 2018.

- Malcolm, D. "It's Not Cricket': Colonialism Legacies and Contemporary Inequalities." *Journal of Historical Sociology* **14** (2001): 253-275. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6443.00146>
- O'Connell, P. *Using Performance Data for Accountability: The New York City Police Department's Compstat Model of Police Management*. Arlington, VA: PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2001.
- Pryce, K. "Towards a Caribbean Criminology." *Caribbean Issues* **11**, no. (2) (1976): 3-21.
- Ransford, C. and G. Slutkin. "Seeing and Treating Violence as a Health Issue." In *The Handbook of Homicide*, edited by F. Brookman, E. R. Maguire, and M. Maguire, 601-625. Wiley, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118924501.ch34>
- Stirton, L. and M. Lodge. "Constitutionalism and Colonial Legacies in the Caribbean." In *The Oxford Handbook of Caribbean Constitutions*, edited by R. Albert, D. O'Brien, and S. Wheatle, 1-24. Oxford University Press, 2020.
- Thorsteinsdottir, O. "External Research Collaboration in Two Small Science Systems." *Scientometrics* **49**, no. (1) (2000): 145-160.
- Wagner, C., I. Brahmakulam, B. Jackson, A. Wong, and T. Yoda. *Science and Technology Collaboration: Building Capacity in Developing Countries*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Science and Technology, 2001.
- Willis, J. J., S. D. Mastrofski, and D. Weisburd. "Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments." *Law and Society Review* **41**, no. (1) (2007): 147-188. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623368>
- Wong, A. "Caribbean Island Tourism: Pathway to Continued Colonial Servitude." *Études Caribéennes* (2015): 31-32. <https://doi.org/10.4000/etudescaribeennes.7524>
- Zingerli, C. "A sociology of international research partnerships for sustainable development." *The European Journal of Development Research* **22**, no. (2) (2010): 217-233.

Confronting Silences Haunting Guyana's Juvenile Justice System

Kristy Warren¹, Kellie Moss², Dylan Kerrigan³,
Tammy Ayres³, Clare Anderson², and
Queenela Cameron⁴

¹School of History and Heritage, University of Lincoln

²School of History, Politics and International Relations,
University of Leicester

³School of Criminology, University of Leicester

⁴Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Guyana

Abstract

Following abolition in British Guiana, laws were passed to control the movement and labour of the formerly enslaved and the indentured. Children were among those convicted of breaking these laws, with some being detained in reformatories. Independence in 1966 saw the extension with modifications of these colonial laws. Into the twenty-first century, children were still being detained for colonial era crimes such as "wandering". Yet the connections between the colonial and post-colonial treatment of juveniles in Guyana are hardly known. Framed by hauntology and Caribbean feminist criminology, this paper addresses those silences by drawing on little used archival sources.

Key words: juvenile justice; Guyana; hauntology; Caribbean feminist criminology; archives.

Introduction

In broad terms, children in contact with criminal justice systems do not leave behind archives. Children are rarely asked their opinion on the processes of moralizing and criminalization that can impact them. When we do catch glimpses of their experiences, their voices are most often mediated through the opinions or moral panic of others, including

police officers, truancy officers and court officials.¹ The omission of their voices leaves us with a conundrum: how can we write about juvenile offending from a child-centred perspective? In this paper, we address this problem by confronting a number of silences in the archives concerning Guyana, from emancipation in 1834 through Independence in 1966 to the present. Our goal is to explore and assess continuity and change in the representation of juveniles in the context of offending. Using a Caribbean feminist criminology lens (Evans and Kerrigan 2019) alongside concepts of coloniality (Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2000) and hauntology (Gordon 1997), we suggest and reveal new links, continuities and transformations between the colonial past and post-colonial present to provide insights, context and understanding around issues such as work, educational reform and rehabilitation in the context of child and youth justice.

Our argument is that the ghosts of the colonial past continue to haunt Guyana, its infrastructure, institutions, culture and people (Ayres and Kerrigan 2020).² The resources and training needed by young people to develop more fully in society in the past, and today, were and are limited. Assistance offered to children is often restricted to finding ways to make them fit better in society, rather than understanding the historicity of the juvenile justice systems which envelop them. Conversely, centring a child's needs to take a whole society approach would improve their chances at having richer lives. Our theoretical framework allows us to appreciate how powerfully the past has shaped the present. Criminal justice systems in the Caribbean both historically and today continue to protect, enforce and extend slavery and colonialism (Childs 2009; Saleh-Hanna 2015). They reproduce colonial institutions and legacies, including through infrastructure that was created to contain and control people conceptualized as "barbaric" and "uncivilized", such as the Indigenous, enslaved, indentured, immigrant, poor and mentally ill. This included children as well as adults. Only by examining the ghosts of

¹Roper (2019: 187) describes the construction of the category of childhood as being "pliable" in response to existing social systems. As we will see throughout the paper, who is considered a child for the purposes of criminal prosecution, conviction and detention changes over time.

²Hauntology explains how the lingering influence of the past – coloniality, violence and trauma – and their silences plague the present in spectral and ghostly ways, which can be present or absent. Hauntology facilitates and gives body to such absences and their afterlives. It acknowledges that omissions and disappearances are not the same as death, but instead emphasizes how the psychological and emotional impacts of the disappeared, the omitted and the hushed endure both in the social and individual bodies of a nation. This concept allows the authors to examine the gaps in archival repositories to re-imagine Guyana's juvenile justice system now and historically. As Gordon (1997: 197) outlines, hauntology enables us to see the "unseen forces, their harm, and the constricting parameters within which they force us to live".

the past, we suggest that the complexities of the contemporary social life of children in Guyana can be understood.

In colonial Guyana (known as British Guiana), legislation on children initially focused on the care of orphans or the destitute and was remarkably blind to the processes and practices connected to slavery. Following abolition in 1834, the treatment of youth offenders incorporated newly racialized and gendered tropes of the colonial system. In this sense, young people were another group to be demonized, controlled and utilized for the good of the economy (De Barros 2002). The emphasis on social control and the preparation of children and young people for productive labour can be seen in the introduction of laws to restrict children's mobility and to enforce attendance at school or work. These focused on "wandering", a capacious category that could be used to pick up young people living on the streets or apparently neglected by their parents and families. At first the 1838 Act did not stipulate age (TNA CO 113/1 1838). However, from 1852, children under the age of 14 deemed poor and destitute (whose parents had died or deserted them) could be put in the orphan asylum and school of industry (TNA CO 113/2 1852). Then in 1879, the Onderneeming School was used for those under the age of 16 years found to be wandering or with no place of abode (TNA CO 113/6 1879). The age of committal was later raised to those under the age of 17 (Guyana Juvenile Offenders Act 1931 Cap 10:03). Such legislation has proved remarkably enduring, spanning the colonial and independent era and its history across 150 years. It continues to haunt contemporary Guyana and is a central focus of this article.

Built on stolen lands and stolen bodies and operating on constructions of crime and criminality that were racialized and gendered (Saleh-Hanna 2015), Caribbean criminal justice systems are forged from the injustices of colonial genocide, theft and exploitation (Childs 2009). As Saleh-Hanna (2015: 3) explains: "Chattel slavery and criminal justice are both at the beginning of this system, one and the same, haunting, replacing, reforming and rebirthing one another". This important insight forms the background to our focus on the emancipatory potential of archival material despite its ghostly omissions. We propose that it can be used to better contextualize and understand the process of developing new approaches to youth offending (e.g. probation and separate institutions) during the post-Independence period (Saleh-Hanna 2015).

Though framings of hauntology and coloniality are key to our analysis, we are also influenced by the power of Caribbean feminist criminology, which also acknowledges such contexts and entanglements between the past and present, the global and local. While Caribbean feminist

criminology is still in its nascent stages, research in the Anglophone Caribbean on areas of concern to the broader field (Renzetti 2013) is well established (e.g. DeShong and Haynes 2016; Lazarus-Black 2003; Morgan and Youssef 2006; Robinson 2000; Trotz 2004). Adopting a Caribbean feminist criminological approach to archival materials grounded in ideas of coloniality and hauntology allows us not only to address their silences (Warren and Kerrigan 2021) but also to ask and explore key questions. These include: how in difference-making terms do social structures of control impact Guyana's response to youth offending across eras and into the present? How does colonialism linger in new approaches to youth offending in Guyana? And, how do contemporary criminal justice systems potentially extend forms of exploitation, victimization and discrimination intrinsic to the colonial encounter? Answering these questions is important for the construction of improved conceptual frameworks for child and youth justices, relevant to Guyana and other former British colonies. The article does so by exploring colonial constructions of juvenile delinquency and connecting them to the post-colonial period, thus revealing how their legacies and afterlives are of ongoing relevance to the representation, treatment and punishment of children and youth offending.

Methodology

From our broader research on the history of Guyana's prisons, it became apparent that the experience of juveniles in Guyana was often absent in the archives. This is despite children being at the centre of discussions relating to potential sources of labour and the need to create "useful citizens", particularly from the post-emancipation period. In addition to the limited archival data, the inherent bias of the archives frequently skews the experiences of children in colonial Caribbean societies. In particular, the enduring nature of the devastating effects of enslavement on intimate and family relations alongside the desire to control the freedom of the formerly enslaved ensured that juveniles were frequently labelled as delinquents lacking in parental guidance.

By examining the records of varying colonial institutions, including the orphan asylum, girls' reformatory and Onderneeming school, alongside annual reports from the Inspector General of prisons and the police, we have been able to reveal a more nuanced, yet still wanting, understanding of the lives and experiences of juveniles. Annual reports, along with Blue Books of Statistics, contain a host of qualitative and quantitative

data including rates of admission, crimes committed, nationality, religion and the condition of the facilities from their establishment in the nineteenth century to Guyana's independence. However, dealing with the administration and running of institutions, these reports often forfeit any consideration of individual children. Reliance on official records to uncover the everyday realities of individuals has rightly been criticized as presenting them as depersonalized objects of institutional action (Bredberg 1999). It was important, therefore, for us to remember that colonial bureaucrats wrote these reports for the consumption of other government officials.

There is considerable continuity in the source base from the period around Independence in the 1960s, though some changes to record-keeping occurred soon after Guyana became a republic in 1970. Thus, gathering information about juvenile offenders after this time becomes difficult (Warren and Kerrigan 2021). There are considerable gaps, but the sources we have access to from Guyana offer us valuable material which includes the views of those working in the police force and probation services as well as academics. They produced and commented on collections of statistics, made observations on teenagers in general and drew conclusions on what caused young people to become "delinquent".

We have found very few sources concerning children and teenagers for the 1980s and 1990s. This follows our wider experience of attempting to locate documents in the post-independence period (Warren and Kerrigan 2021). One possible reason is the general lack of resources that the country faced during this period. Another is the "low esteem" attached to record-keeping and archiving (Warren Kerrigan 2021: 3). Critically, we first hear the voices of children and young people in a study conducted with street children in 1992 (Danns 1992). This is followed by a few in-depth studies in the 2000s alongside further police and prison reports.

Constructions of Juvenile Delinquency in the Colonial Period

Social dislocation and dysfunction were endemic in British Guiana following emancipation in 1834, the abolition of apprenticeship in 1838 and the subsequent arrival of indentured immigrants. The extractive conditions of colonialism underpinned processes of criminalization, particularly in relation to restrictions on labour movement and related constructions of "vagrancy" (UKPP 594 1848:190-192; Smith 2014: 6). The colonial government established several institutions, dedicated to

containing and controlling vagrants, "criminals" and the poor, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (UKPP 594 1848: 190–192). These included alms-houses and asylums, district prisons and a penal settlement, as the colonial government increasingly took responsibility for the population management that had previously fallen to plantation owners. This included a newly expanded judicial system to deal with the increased freedom of the formerly enslaved.

The planters' concerns centred on the scarcity of labour, as the formerly enslaved opted to leave their former owners and move to urban centres. The colonial government attempted to induce labourers to stay on the plantations by exploiting tenancy arrangements and introducing high taxes. Even as indentured labourers replaced the formerly enslaved as the predominant form of labour, the planters continued to believe they were involved in a desperate struggle against habitual idlers, absconders and vagrants (Mohapatra 2004). Within this context, the colonial authorities also established institutions for children, with the goal of ensuring they became "useful" members of society. From 1852, children under the age of 14 years faced restrictions on their mobility and could be brought before the magistrate and criminalized for a range of misdemeanours, which included begging, receiving alms, wandering, being destitute and frequenting the company of thieves (TNA CO 113/2/1 1852; Francis 1895: 150–151).

Vagrancy offences in particular were notorious for providing local authorities with the ability to detain those deemed to be objectionable (Matthews and Robinson 2019). An orphan asylum, to deal with the new and growing problem of destitute juveniles, was also established in 1852 (TNA CO 113/2/4 1852). This reflected metropolitan patterns whereby, as criminal proceedings during this period reveal, poverty was at the root of most criminal offences involving children. The role of juvenile justice, therefore, became increasingly contradictory as British reformers advocated for institutional solutions for juvenile offenders and those deemed at "risk" (Shore 2004). In Great Britain, efforts to address concerns regarding juvenile delinquency received legislative sanction in 1854 with the establishment of reformatories for convicted juvenile offenders under the age of 16 years (May 1973). This was followed in 1857 by a law to establish industrial schools for destitute children and criminals, which was later amended (1866) to include young children considered to require "care and protection" (De Barros 2005; May 1973). Thus, by the 1850s, juvenile offenders, orphans and destitute children were far more likely to be institutionalized than ever before

(Shore 1999). However, while legislation regarding juvenile institutions was transferred to Britain's Caribbean colonies it was the colonial environment that ultimately determined the form these institutions would take (De Barros 2005). In particular, the new and expanded system attempted to deal with concerns related to the increased freedom of movement of the formerly enslaved. Furthermore, debate about juvenile delinquents in British Guiana was overwhelmingly concerned with boys due to the belief that they could be reclaimed to serve the colonial economy. Consequently, the arrangements and aims of institutions for boys were more distinct than those for girls who were more targets of criminalization on "moral" issues such as sexuality and dishonesty (Zedner 1991).

Although colonial legislation initially focused on the care of children who had lost, or been deserted by one or both parents, concern quickly shifted in 1868 to include all offenders under the age of 16 (TNA CO 113/5/12 1868). From this point, both groups were sent to a single institution, the Government Reformatory and Industrial School, alongside children under the age of 12 years who had been charged with punishable offences, but not convicted. The aim of the Industrial School was to educate and reform juveniles, including through apprenticeships for anyone with a "trade or calling". This change in the law represented the colonial administration's desire to encourage the return of men to the agricultural sector.

As the century progressed, concern about youth crime, locally referred to as "centipedism" or "hooliganism", significantly increased (BL C.S.F 351 Report of the Inspector of Prisons 1907–8; De Barros 2002, 2004). As in Britain, this was centred in urban areas where authorities encouraged the idea that there was a growing sense of lawlessness among the young (De Barros 2005; Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973), connected to claims of high levels of illegitimacy among the labouring population. Blinded to the disruptions to family and kin induced by the demands of colonial labour, contemporary reports reasoned that illegitimate children fell into crime because their parents were irresponsible (Kirke 1898). Towards the end of the century, these views had significant implications for the juvenile population as they were used to justify the establishment of new kinds of reformatories (Roper 2018). In 1879, for example, the Onderneeming Plantation in Essequibo became the site of a school (Onderneeming School) for the instruction and training of male vagrants and criminal offenders under the age of 16 (TNA CO 113/6/5 1879). The school was initially built to accommodate 54 boys; however, this

increased to 204 in 1893, as conviction rates continued to rise (UKPP Cd. 416 1900: 805).

Though in part an educational establishment, work primarily dominated the boys' time as they were expected to labour for six to seven hours a day. To minimize the effect of the colony's declining labour force, the school sought to find employment for the juveniles and where possible, contribute towards diversifying the colony's dependency on sugar (UKPP Cd. 1768–18 1904: 26; UKPP Cmd. 1–37 1919: 6). Most inmates were trained in agriculture, cultivating coffee, cacao, rubber, limes and nutmeg, while a small number learned skills as carpenters, tailors and bakers (UKPP Cd. 7622–24 1914–6: 22). To expand the reach of the institution, the maximum age at which the boys were able to remain increased in 1883 from 16 to 18 years. Colonial officials believed the additional time would help to establish the boys as agriculturists in the country districts (TNA CO 116/252 1883: 4; TNA CO 113/7/9 1883). From this point, colonial officials adopted the idea of industrial schools and reformatories as an alternative to imprisoning children. One element to consider here is the gendered nature of the colonial historical record and a general lack of archival material on historical institutions connected to girls (Hosein 2019). For example, we are less certain about provisions for girls, as changes instituted by the 1868 legislation referred specifically to delinquent boys (De Barros 2002). This reflected the contemporary belief that the role of women was limited to that of a domestic servant, wife or mother, while males could be reclaimed for their potential labour.

While colonial officials initially argued that there was no need for an institution for delinquent girls, a reformatory was eventually established in 1888 (TNA CO 116/260 1891: 19; De Barros 2002). Built in Georgetown, it was founded to instruct and train those deemed too young (9–16 years old) to be committed to prison for minor offences (TNA CO 116/257 1888: 11). Unlike delinquent boys, who were frequently described as unwilling to work, terms such as "dirty", "foul-mouthed" and "dishonest" were instead used to evoke girls' "impropriety" and alleged propensity to prostitution (De Barros 2002; Kirke 1898). In particular, the reformatory aimed to end practices of cohabitation, by reinforcing the cultural perceptions of a woman's role, either as a wife or in domestic service (TNA CO 116/258 1889: 9; TNA CO 116/259 1890: 13; Kirke 1898). As such, training at the reformatory encouraged girls to adhere to colonial gender norms by developing their ability to undertake various domestic tasks, including needlework and washing (BL C.S.F 351 Report on the Girls' Reformatory 1892–3, 1894–5). However, while the focus was on "immorality", rather

than "criminality", the overriding rationalization for the girls' reformatory remained the same as for boys, namely that Afro-Guianese parents provided poor training and guidance for their children (Kirke 1898). This stereotype had significant implications for the colonial government which increasingly sought to remove, and criminalize, those they felt were unwilling to contribute either economically or socially to the colony (De Barros 2002). However, by the early twentieth century, these institutions not only propagated evolving gender norms, but they also served as the foundation of juvenile welfare policy in British Guiana.

Despite efforts to distance these children from the alleged criminal elements of Guianese society, contemporary sources continued to highlight the negative effect of "old associates" on their release (TNA CO 116/261 1892-3: 12; Kirke 1898). Furthermore, efforts by officials to secure suitable employment for juveniles frequently failed due to the children's reluctance to work on the land (CO 111/740/22 1939: 2; BL C.S.F 351 Report on the Onderneeming School 1903-4). This also no doubt reflected Afro-Guianese unwillingness in a post-slavery society to be controlled by colonial officials (Brereton 1999: 81-82). Indeed, a 1939 report noted: "the grand-children of the African migrants suffer from a memory-association of soil and slavery and will not willingly work on the land" (TNA CO 111/740/22 1939:2).

However, while the reformatories were often unsuccessful in producing workers for the agricultural sector, colonial officials justified their existence by pointing to declining rates of juvenile conviction. In 1896, for instance, just one boy was committed to the Onderneeming School, compared to 115 two years earlier, and the Girls' Reformatory recorded just two-thirds of the number it housed in 1894 (TNA CO 116/264 1895-6: 11). The reality was that the reduction in juvenile convictions simply reflected a drop in committals throughout the prison system, as large numbers of Afro-Guianese males departed for the gold fields. Nonetheless, despite the decrease in convictions, "hooliganism" and "idle women" continued to be the focus of moral panic and held responsible for outbreaks of crime (UKPP Cd. 3026 1906: 73; BL C.S.F 351 Police Report 1907-8; BL C.S.F 351 Police Report 1914-5).

To consolidate legislation and amend the laws relating to offences and procedure in respect of summary convictions, two ordinances were introduced in 1893 (TNA CO 113/8/15; TNA CO 113/8/21 1893). They were used to expand the range of behaviours deemed unlawful (Paton and Romain 2014; TNA CO 113/8/21 1893). In particular, the ordinances sought to legitimize the need for social control over "undesirable" and

"threatening" populations, which was heavily focused towards the unemployed. As a direct result, legislation to regulate the movement of juveniles was intensified. This included the ability to send anyone charged with having committed an offence against the provisions of any ordinance relating to vagrants, rogues and vagabonds to the alms-house, Onderneeming School or the Girl's Reformatory (TNA CO 113/8/15; De Barros 2002). The ordinance also sought to control the behaviour of juveniles by providing local authorities with the ability to convict those carrying a "deadly, or dangerous weapon", including sticks, with the intent to cause terror or alarm. Under this act, men and women could be charged for having "no lawful excuse" to carry cutlasses despite being on their way home from the cane fields (TNA CO 113/8/21; UKPP Cd. 3026 1906: 63).

In response to international interest regarding the treatment of children, legislation for the establishment of juvenile courts was introduced to British Guiana in 1931 as part of the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance (TNA CO 113/19/11 1931). In addition to the ongoing criminalization of those under the age of 14 for wandering, a status offense that allowed for the detention of youths left unsupervised in public spaces, the act further fostered the stereotype that Afro-Guianese parents provided inadequate guidance and support for their children with the issue of parental fines (TNA CO 113/19/11). However, despite the long-held belief that reformatories and industrial schools were the ideal space to train children, concerns regarding their ability to produce industrial labourers for the agricultural sector remained in question throughout much of the early twentieth century (TNA CO 111/740/17). These were highlighted in 1937 following a visit from Alexander Paterson, Commissioner of Prisons for England and Wales, who was sent to investigate Onderneeming,³ (TNA CO 111/749/14 1937; TNA CO 113/12/8 1907). In addition to the use of excessive caning following a "wave of indecency" (sexual activity), he noted that the school suffered from several defects which "handicapped, rather than helped" the boys. Indeed, the function of reformatories was to inculcate the values of a heteronormative family, hard work and discipline (NLS Essequibo Annual Report 1945). In particular, Paterson drew attention to the school's lack of training; out of the 80 boys in the school, only 25 were engaged in "useful" work, while the remaining were left to carry out menial tasks such as fetching firewood. This, Paterson felt, stemmed from the difficulty in trying to train

³Following the introduction of the 1907 Training Schools Act, Onderneeming was renamed the Government Industrial School. However, the name Onderneeming continued to be used in official documents.

boys from urban backgrounds, who would inevitably return to town, for agricultural life (TNA CO 111/740/17: 22–24). Instead, Paterson suggested resituating the school so that the boys could be trained in more relevant skills, such as carpentry, tailoring and building (TNA CO 111/740/17: 25), and called for youth clubs to stop boys from being led astray in their leisure time (TNA CO 111/740/22 1937: 3). Despite Paterson's radical proposals, the treatment of juvenile offenders continued to be influenced by those who perceived young offenders as a social threat and source of free labour. As a result, juveniles, many of whom were victims of poverty, faced increasingly retributive and extended forms of punishment for minor offences, such as petty theft (NLS Essequibo Annual Report 1945).

By the late 1930s, crime and disorder had become dominant political issues throughout the British Caribbean due to disputes over wages and working conditions following the decline of the sugar industry (Nehusi 1992). Concerned by these disturbances, and what was termed a "large loafing population", in 1938, the British government appointed the West Indian Royal Commission to investigate and make recommendations on the various territories (UKPP Cmd. 3705 1930–1). In addition to exposing deficiencies in the education system, referring to the passing of the Children and Young Persons Act (1933), the report called for the alignment of Caribbean reformatories and industrial schools with parallel institutions in England and Wales (UKPP Cmd. 6174 1939–40; UKPP Cmd. 6607 1944–5; UOLL CO D4250 1940–2). Based on the recommendations of the commission, British Guiana applied for assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940, to remodel the Onderneeming site on the lines of an "approved school". The aim of these schools was to break down the barriers between "neglected" and "delinquent" children of school age and abolish the associated stigma (UOLL CO D4250 1940–2: 244).

In 1944, the colony also secured financial assistance for means to train "destitute and delinquent" girls at a place called Belfield, under the administration of the Salvation Army (UKPP Cmd. 6656 1945; SAIHC 1948–9: 208–09; Sandall 1947). Reflecting the gender bias of the colonial state, institutes for boys frequently took priority in discussions regarding the allocation of resources, while facilities for girls were primarily left to the organization of charitable organizations, missions and social groups (Calixte 2015; Boa 2005). This reflected a larger transnational tradition of keeping girls outside of public state facilities, but it can also be explained by competing definitions of maturity which meant that girls were often judged, and sentenced, as women. In particular, there was a perception in race and class terms among colonial authorities that

Afro-Caribbean girls matured more quickly than girls in Europe (Boa 2005: 65–86).

Despite these initiatives, tensions between rehabilitation and punishment continued in British Guiana and the Caribbean more widely (UOLL CO D4250 1940–2: 239; TNA CO 111/749/14 1937: 3). Indeed, Paterson himself noted that it would be fairer to move the boys' school at Onderneeming and give it a new name due to the stigma attached to it (TNA CO 111/749/14 1937: 4). This meant that juvenile institutions continued to lack clarity in their aims. For example, as the only alternative to jail, the renamed Essequibo Boy's School (previously Onderneeming) often took in boys over the age of 14 (TNA CO 111/787/9 1945). Nonetheless, by 1945, the number of boys being sent to prison had increased (TNA CO 111/787/9 1945). Despite efforts to segregate young offenders, overcrowding meant that juveniles, first offenders and prisoners on remand were often housed with dangerous criminals and old offenders. One superintendent of prisons wrote that these conditions "bordered on mutiny" (TNA CO 111/771/9 1939; CO 111/787/9 1945; BL C.S.W.A.C. 50/44 1943: 4–7). Efforts to hear juvenile cases in magistrates' courts were attempted during the 1940s; however, they were overstretched, and the initiative failed (Briggs 1947: 102). A 1943 report suggested numerous alternatives to prison for young offenders such as the levying of fines, the improvement of the probation service and the use of extra-mural sentences (BL C.S.W.A.C. 50/44 1943: 4–7). However, these were not immediately adopted. Moreover, as we will see in the next two sections, the colonial ideologies that pathologized the behaviour and criminal offending of boys and girls in Guyana, including gendered forms of moralization that promoted heteronormative family forms, continue to haunt contemporary Guyana and its criminal justice system.

Transitional Period: 1950s to Mid-1960s

The volume of "young prisoners", consisting chiefly of first offenders (aged 16–21), rose significantly during the 1950s (TNA CO1031/610 1953), and their separation from adult prisoners was virtually impossible due to overcrowding (TNA CO 1031/2644 1958). Colonial officials argued that prison was no real deterrent for them as prison sentences were often much shorter than stays in approved schools. Indeed, youths under the age of 16 were known to claim that they were older to avoid the latter (TNA CO 1031/2644 1958). While clear changes had emerged in the treatment of juvenile

offenders by the middle of the twentieth century, attempts at reform remained inadequate due to financial limitations, which frequently resulted in a dependence on incarceration (TNA CO 1031/2644 1958).

Concerns about juvenile delinquency continued to frame responses to children and young people locally in the 1950s and became a focal point internationally from the mid-1950s. In particular, it was a main agenda item for the first three United Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1955, 1960 and 1965) (UNDL A/CONF.6/L.17 1955: 37–40). Despite considerable effort being devoted to arriving at a universally applicable definition of juvenile delinquency, this proved impossible because as the 1955 Congress found there were wide variations in custom, law and philosophy. Instead, in a continuation of the methods already used to deal with the prevention of delinquency in British colonies, the Congress concluded that attention should be directed primarily to pre-delinquency; the prevention of offending where no prior legal violation had occurred (UNDL A/CONF.6/L.17 1955: 37–40). Based on this decision, it was proposed that services, both official and unofficial, should be organized and drawn together to ensure that children and young people in danger of committing offences were discovered and guided towards social conformity. It was also at the 1955 Congress that the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were agreed. The rules did not mention juveniles specifically but stipulated that young prisoners should be kept separately from adults both before and after conviction (UN 1955).

One of the three main items on the agenda at the second UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1960 was "new forms of juvenile delinquency: their origin, prevention and treatment" (UN 1960: 2). The concept of juvenile delinquency was linked to issues with the "social structure of the state" (UN 1960: 61), for it was noted that increases in juvenile criminal offending were connected to "a better organization of prevention and treatment" as well as its definition. Indeed, the report noted that while some states identified a "series of minor acts of indiscipline or social maladjustment" as delinquency, these were often exaggerated (UN 1960: 61). Furthermore, there was concern at the international level that, in increasing access to "unsuitable material", mass media was contributing to an increase in juvenile delinquency (Williams 1961: 258). Such arguments often had a religious basis and the link between media and crime remained questionable (Morris 1961). However, overall there was a lack of agreement about how to deal

with juvenile offending, including whether education, or the family, was the most important factor.

It was recommended at the 1960 meeting that the issue not be "unnecessarily inflated" and that the term should be restricted to the contravention of criminal law. This would mean that juveniles could not be detained for offences for which adults would not be prosecuted. Also, recommendations were made for: increases to existing and trials of new forms of prevention and treatment; support after release for those who were put in correctional institutions; and the commission of studies to ascertain the nature of "new" forms of juvenile delinquency. It was suggested that the latter should focus not just on the alleged crimes but also on the "personality and social history of young offenders" (UN 1960: 61).

In Guyana, the 1961 Report of the Treatment of Offenders shows that, in the wake of the 1960 UN Congress, the number of boys admitted to the Essequibo Boys' School increased to 72: the highest figure for two decades (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1963: 10). Vocational training and work in agriculture remained the main emphasis of the school. The Report explained that "[b]oys were given training in Woodwork, Metalwork, Shoemaking and repairing, Tailoring, Bread making, Animal Husbandry and Agriculture, and ... Masonry" (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1963: 11). The work boys undertook furnished the school with meat, bread and dairy products with the surplus being sold to nearby Suddie hospital and the public (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1963: 12). Most boys received a basic education, and those deemed to be of "more than average intelligence" were sent to nearby St. John's Anglican School. They had access to recreational activities such as participation in the Boy Scouts, a brass band and both indoor and outdoor games. In what was to become a reoccurring theme, teachers were in short supply due to a combination of continual resignations and absence of training (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1963).

Again, reflecting on the absence of girls from the historical record and the relative lack of attention bestowed on them, girls were barely mentioned in the report. This may have been because they were seen as less of a problem (of the 1,136 youths found guilty of an offence, only 125 were girls) (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1963: 33). As the gender of offenders was not noted, it is impossible to say what girls were convicted of and for which offences they were likely to be detained. However, there were 45 cases of wandering and 11 cases of vagrancy – offences that would later come to be associated with girls. Further, of those convicted, six were

admitted to Belfield Girls' School,⁴ which continued to be run by the Salvation Army showing that the colonial state continued to outsource girls to a non-governmental organization.

Aftercare was also assigned to the Salvation Army. An Army officer had sole responsibility for the supervision of boys released within Georgetown, where most came from, and received assistance from probation officers for boys outside the city. Helping boys gain employment was a key aim, but this was challenging when unemployment rates in British Guiana were high. The Army also acted as "a link between some of the boys and their homes" (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1965: 36). Despite this aftercare, recidivism was high, with at least one-third of boys being convicted of new offences while under supervision (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1963: 13; Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1967: 44). By the 1960s, there was an attempt to shift towards rehabilitation. However, the old emphasis on vocational and agricultural training remained. Most boys came from urban areas where unemployment remained rife. Those who reoffended within two years were said to be failures (Murray, Rohlehr, and Aitkens 1967). However, failure could be said to lie with the school, probation services, Salvation Army and, most significantly, the colonial state. Boys were released from institutions and returned to a society not adequately equipped to address the challenges they faced.

Part of this framing was reliant on ideas of who was considered a child and who was not. A working paper from the third UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1965 noted significant national variance (UN Secretariat 1965). In British Guiana, the Juvenile Offenders Act and the Training School Act applied to young people up to the age of 16 sentenced to detention in a training school (Cameron 2019; Reynolds 2011). Those over 16 but under 18 – thus still minors – were not covered by these laws. Therefore, the ways in which childhood and adolescence were viewed and understood towards the end of the colonial era in British Guiana had a direct and consequential relationship to the ways in which young people were treated, not least in the justice system.

These observations around framing suggest that the same concerns around youth delinquency from the colonial period, alongside the colony's differential treatment of boys and girls, haunted the foundations of independent Guyana. The legacy of control around youth that began

⁴It is possible that some of this number were younger boys. Boys under 10 and up to 11 were sometimes sent to Belfield Girls School (Murray et al. 1967: 8). The reason for this is not stated in the available document but, based on what we know concerning prisoner classification more broadly, presumably this was to prevent their mixing with older youths.

in the colonial period extended with modifications into the post-colonial period including in international debates. The evidence provided on youth delinquency paints this transitional phase of the colonial state in British Guiana as one maintaining patriarchal structures via systems of control that were exploitative and discriminatory. This can be seen in the relative importance accorded to boys' development for employment and the neglect of state support and financing for girls. The gendered afterlife of colonialism in this regard may also partially explain why the voices of children are rarely found in the archives. Until relatively recently, children's needs, presences and voices in both colonial and post-colonial justice contexts have been either significantly under-represented (Ame 2018) or dominated by the question of what is considered "juvenile" (Abrams, Jordan, and Montero 2018). As we will see in the following section, this is also reflected in the records and archives of contemporary Guyana, which illustrates young people's ghostly and marginal existence within a society in which, like most modern states, they are excluded from decisions concerning their lives.

Post-Independence Colonial Hauntings in the Criminalization of Children

As noted in the introduction, the laws concerning wandering that were formed in the post-emancipation period changed little after independence. It remained one of the main offences for which young people were arrested and subsequently detained. In the year following Independence in 1966, the main offences for which juveniles were reported to the Police Force's Juvenile Branch were "simple larceny, larceny from the person, assaults and wandering" (CRL GPF 1967: 25). Two years later, about half of all the cases in which guilt was established were "directed against the person and against property" (Murray and Davis 1970: 2). Of the remaining cases, the greatest number of youths were picked up for mainly "trivial" traffic offences and wandering. Thus alongside the more common crimes of assaults and larceny, echoes of the colonial past could be found in the continued criminalization of wandering. Moreover, while the state sought redress for victims of crime in the prosecution of these offences, they centred punishment over social care in the treatment of their perpetrators. This was especially the case in the ongoing criminalization of wandering for which there was no clear victim other than the detained children.

A noticeable increase in the arrest of young people occurred after independence. There were over 1,000 convictions in each of 1966 and 1967

with a further 844 arrested in 1968 for an average of 1,084 (CRL GPF 1967: 16; CRL GPF 1968:17).⁵ There was then a drastic drop in convictions of 43% in 1969 (CRL GPF 1969: 3). Probation services suggested that the increase that occurred in the mid-1960s had been due not to a rise in "juvenile delinquency as such, but rather, an increase in vigilance against juvenile offenders" (Murray and Davis 1970: 3). Wandering remained a key colonial holdover for why young people were arrested.⁶ Police noted that those arrested for wandering were "juveniles in need of Care and Protection" (Murray and Davis 1970: 2). Such statements bring into question whether delinquency was rising or if the focus on the behaviour of young people was being partially framed in this way due to the perception of what young people should be doing.⁷ Almost nothing is said in the police reports about why children were participating in certain activities or the extent to which the rate of crime was impacted by increased police focus on the movements and activities of young people. Moreover, in the continued arrest of young people for an offence created to control post-emancipation labour mobility, and women's and girls' "propriety", we see clear echoes of the colonial past.

Though reports do not reveal much about what the police thought of the young people they apprehended, we do learn that the social element of this work was not missed altogether. For, in addition to working closely with the Probation Service and Schools Welfare Department, three officers completed "a three-month introduction to Social Development Course sponsored by ... the University of Guyana" while a senior officer started a two-year social work course (CLR GPF 1973: 11-12). The attempt to enhance understanding of the wider context within which young people were criminalized continued over the next two decades. Into the 1990s, the juvenile section of the police force's methods of operation was described as "reflect[ing] the reality of sociological and economic factors that adversely affect the lives of our young people" (Liverpool 1996: 3).

Roper (2019: 188) suggests the need to consider the changes brought about by the process of decolonization and introduction of political

⁵The average for the three preceding years (1963-1965) was 615.

⁶Numbers for wandering are hard to identify after independence as they become subsumed in statutory offences. We are limited to specific statements made about wandering by police and probation services.

⁷Matthews and Robinson (2019: 125) also reflect on the distinction between "being" and "doing" in the ways the vagrancy acts operate. They explain that such laws "produced expansive and imprecise categories of impugned conduct" which supported attempts of social control both during and after colonial rule.

independence in how children and their place in society were understood. It is with the creation of the Republic in 1970 that we see the biggest shift in both language and approach to children and young people. However, there were also continuities. As was shown earlier in the paper, the Juvenile Offenders Act and Training School Act were passed in the colonial era. The first post-independence amendments to the acts were made in 1972, but these retained many of the aspects of colonial law, including the ability to detain young people for wandering. Tracy Robinson (2020) explains this as "legislative inertia". But she also notes that such colonial era laws had come to be claimed by the newly independent nation. Some of them, vagrancy laws in particular, were useful because of their "vagueness and wide enforcement discretion [which made them] ... a flexible and almost limitless resource for policing undesirables" (Robinson 2020: 61).

The New Opportunity Corps (NOC) was one branch of national service created during this period of change.⁸ Part of the Ministry of Education rather than the Guyana Prison Service,⁹ it was established for children and young people up to the age of 16 who were in reform schools. The NOC sat alongside school and "special correctional training", with Guyana's first Prime Minister Forbes Burnham emphasizing its rehabilitative aims through an emphasis on young people's "worth and value as citizens" (Burnham 1973: 9). Alongside this, Burnham noted the need to install the values of Guyanese society, encourage a love of country and show the need for all citizens to be productive and contribute to society.

During a parliamentary debate in early 1974, the prime minister differentiated between colonial reform schools and the NOC by explaining that the government would emphasis correction rather than punishment (Hansard 1974: 23). He went on to explain that many young people were "maladjusted" rather than "wicked" or "sinful". He further noted, in quite gendered terms, that some did not know their fathers, while others knew their mothers but were negatively impacted because they worked long hours and "return[ed] too late at night to exercise ... maternal functions" (Hansard 1974: 23). It was suggested that such children needed care beyond "teaching the three R's" including help from mental health

⁸The other branches of the National Service included the Young Brigade for those aged 8-14; the National Cadet Corp for those aged 12-18; and the Pioneer Corps that was aimed at those aged 18-25 but took in those aged 14 and over who were not in a school or training institution.

⁹It is currently under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Since its inception, it has come under a number of other ministries including Culture Youth and Sports, Social Protection and Public Security (Cameron 2019).

professionals (Hansard 1974: 24). Thus in what appears to be a change from the colonial systems of the past, the prime minister wanted the NOC to address the "social", "mental" and other issues faced by children. However, simultaneously, he reveals ghosts of the colonial past in his expression of ideas of the "broken" family and a mother's "maternal functions".

Questions around the nature of the treatment of juvenile offenders would be raised later that summer when Guyana held the first crime conference in the region. A number of the papers presented addressed the issue of juvenile delinquency, either as part of a wider focus or specifically. For instance, Professor Howard Jones made reference to youths in general observations on crime in Guyana. Along with Guyanese sociologists Michael Parris and Tara Singh, he had carried out a two and half year study into Guyana's "crime problem" (Jones 1974: 1). He explained that much of the crime that occurred in "developing countries", including Guyana, was committed by those under 30 with those aged 16–20 representing a significant proportion. This was in part because they made up a large percentage of the population, but high levels of unemployment among young people were also a factor: "the feeling of worthlessness and rejection, of resentment, caused by unemployment, must not be overlooked" (Jones 1974).

The detention of children up to the age of 16 was not only blamed on the lack of family care but also on the inability of the state to offer proper alternatives. Chief Probation and Welfare Officer Cecil N. Murray suggested that there was a correlation between the entry of young people into the approved school and the lack of support for those who did not have a guardian or whose "guardians [did] not exercise adequate control" (Murray and Davis 1970: 3). Murray explained that attempts to find a "fit person" or utilize foster homes to take in children required better legislation and funding to prevent the exploitation of "wandering or unwanted children" for labour (Murray and Davis 1970: 3).

The connection between children who needed care and detention at a juvenile facility was well understood into the 1990s. Surveys conducted by Danns (1992: II; 2003: 22) show that most of the children who ended up in the NOC were street children who had "engaged in survival strategies such as working, begging, gambling, or prostitution". By this time, the continued detention of young people for wandering contravened international rules. In the 1980s and 1990s, several new protocols and guidance were introduced by the UN for the protection and care of children, which applied to arrested, convicted and detained young

people. Provisions in Guyana's Juvenile Offenders Act were not always in line with these rules. For instance, the UN had repealed status offences (connected to particular groups) in the 1990 Riyadh Guidelines (Hamilton 2011; Riyadh Guidelines 1990). Wandering is such an offence because only children could be charged with it. Moreover, as Director of the Children's Legal Centre Carolyn Hamilton explained, wandering was "a social welfare issue under the child protection system" (Hamilton 2011: 19; UN 2007). Nonetheless, courts continued to decide whether children could be detained or placed with someone other than their "natural parents" for a period (Reynolds 2011).

The scale of the issue in Guyana was revealed in 2015 when former UN Country Representative for Guyana and Suriname, Marianne Flach, noted that about 75% of individuals in the NOC had been detained for wandering (Kaieteur News 2015). Thus into the twenty-first century, children were being arrested for crimes first instituted to keep order in the wake of emancipation in the 1830s. These were primarily Afro-Guyanese children, and their home lives were said to be one of the causes of their detention (Danns 1992; Reynolds 2011).

Education, Vocation and Rehabilitation at the NOC in the Twenty-First Century

The beginning of the twenty-first century saw more of the same at the NOC with education, preparation for work and other forms of rehabilitation continuing to be under resourced. Additionally, many of those being confined were there because of social issues rather than for committing offences that would have seen them jailed if they were adults. We can thus see that for just under 20 years into this new century, things continued much the same as they had in the colonial era and the first four decades of Independence.

During her visits to NOC in 2007, sociologist Bertlyn Reynolds (2011: 178) observed that the focus of the programme centred on "vocational and physical training" which reflects the focus found in the colonial period. She cautioned that this was inadequate and needed to be complemented by "literacy training" to ensure that young people had a better chance of acquiring employment after release. However, ten years later, Queenela Cameron reported that there had been some improvements. She explained that the education and vocational training provided by the NOC were aiding many of those detained in the facility as they were able to use "the skills and knowledge acquired to seek meaningful

employment and/or to further their education on release" (Cameron 2019: 134). Yet, she also noted that a lack of resources impacted the young detainees. One example given was the lack of appropriate books and other materials in the library (Cameron 2019: 133).

The lack of adequate staffing and resources also shaped the availability and nature of rehabilitative programmes at the NOC. In an echo of colonial times, in 1992, Danns highlighted that as vocational training was advocated by the NOC, detained children were made to work but were not receiving adequate rehabilitation. He stated that this was largely attributed to NOC staff who were mainly untrained and as a result were not able to provide instruction (Danns 1992; 2003: 22). Reynolds also concluded that better staffing was needed, but her ideas of what constituted a successful rehabilitative programme differed. She started from a point which accepted that the detainees were "delinquent" and needed to be taught to conform to societal norms. In this vein, Reynolds (2011: 183) pointed out "NOC's need for more skilled staff members who could determine what causes juveniles to become delinquent in each case". Additionally, she called for rehabilitative programmes which helped young people "understand their situation, modify their bad habits, suppress their tendencies to delinquency and to better their self concepts" (Reynolds 2011: 177). Subsequently, Cameron focused on the need to better support young people's mental health. She observed that while detainees were provided with basic health care, there was no drug treatment programme, and general psychological and psychiatric care was inadequate suggesting that "the mental health of detained juveniles is not a priority" (Cameron 2019: 133). She further explained that better drug treatment and counselling facilities were needed to improve rehabilitation rates.

The consequences of the failed approaches within the institution were reflected in aftercare. Reynolds (2011) observed that the provisions in the early 2000s were inadequate, with many young people returning to the environments from which they left without any follow-up. Cameron's research shows a significant shift in approach over the next decade. There were moves towards better social reintegration, and these met with some success (Cameron 2019: 134). Such support was shown to be wide-ranging, including sourcing accommodation, providing cash and clothing, organizing enrolment in technical schools and other forms of further education and assistance with employment (Cameron 2019).

Further change came with the introduction of the Juvenile Justice Act in 2019, when status offences such as wandering were abolished. Cameron's research has revealed the way in which the use of the law had changed over time as well as the profound impact of reform: all the girls in the NOC were let go as they had all been remanded for wandering. No mention is made of boys being released at this time showing the extent to which this offence had become gendered (Cameron 2019). The proximity, time wise, of Cameron's research to the passing of the Juvenile Justice Act offers a marker for reflection of what occurred up to that point and what is needed to encourage practice that meets local and international standards of care. Under scrutiny here is the future purpose of the NOC. Some of Cameron's recommendations point towards creating systems of oversight to ensure better care of young people within the NOC. For instance, although NOC administrators are committed to ending the use of solitary confinement, it was up to the Juvenile Justice Committee and other authorities to implement this change.

It is also necessary to consider the possibility of a further reduction in the use of the NOC. In this, the release of girls for wandering can be seen as a critical step. Colonial approaches to juvenile offending were embedded in strategies of governance that ignore the deleterious effects of economic extraction on family and society and was overtly punitive. Its ghosts linger, and this should be of concern to those who make policy.¹⁰ As the section on British Guiana shows, issues of estrangement from families resulted in a higher number of children who were wards of the state. This is also of concern to those who make policy. The 2019 Juvenile Justice Act called for institutionalization to be made a "last option"; this in turn led to the call for more foster placements and homes for children and teenagers as alternatives to being held by the NOC (Guyana Chronicle 2019). The formation of the Juvenile Justice Department, which predated the introduction of the Act by a year, showed a move towards protecting and assisting rather than criminalizing young people found in trying circumstances (UNICEF 2020). There have been reports of the early success of these interventions (Cameron 2019), but there remains a need to ensure the various agencies responsible for the processing of children who encounter the law work together more harmoniously to ensure they are treated fairly and humanely (UNICEF 2020). Those within the Juvenile Justice Department have stated their commitment to this ambition (UNICEF 2020).

¹⁰While we do not have the space to explore the policy implications in this paper, we plan to engage with them elsewhere.

Reflecting on Coloniality and Hauntology

Using historical archives and sources spanning over 150 years, this paper has illustrated how a contemporary system of state social control in the context of criminal justice and youth offending, no matter its best intentions, extended forms of exploitation, victimization and discrimination intrinsic to the colonial encounter. It has shown that colonial regimes and the building of empire produced and represented the Guyanese "other", largely premised on race, gender and socio-economic status (e.g. poverty). They also policed the social and cultural protocols surrounding children and juveniles that reflected the racialized and gendered tropes of the colony. Moreover, colonial legacies continue to produce/reproduce inequalities in contemporary Guyana, while the colonial institutions created to educate and control children and juveniles have taken on new forms. In colonial times, as today, they are often indistinguishable from each other and from plantation slavery regimes and have been used "to rescue young citizens and subjects in the making to shape young bodies and minds, [and] were central to imperial policies and their self-fashioned rationalities" (Stoler 2006: 43).

Juvenile justice institutions – just like slavery and the plantation – captured children's bodies and time as they endeavoured to create productive citizens undertaking purposeful education and labour while restricting "wandering" and vagrancy. Indeed, it was believed that idle young men and women were responsible for outbreaks of crime, particularly violent crime. However, the general lack of resources – consistently over the past two centuries – has impacted on efforts to create truly rehabilitative regimes.

Deficiencies in the education and support services available to young people under state care, both then and now, increased dependence on strategies of confinement. This is not to say that the post-colonial state and its various actors did not attempt to develop and build across eras a new more progressive system of control for young offenders. However, the judicial system of the colonial authorities failed to tackle the various injustices on which it was built, and this was replicated in the post-colonial era. The new system retained the injustices of the past, many of which continue to haunt the contemporary Guyanese criminal justice system, including the representation, treatment and punishment of children. Thus, colonialism and empire are continually rebirthed and perpetuated in Guyana's criminal justice system, systems showing clearly that decolonization and independence

were established through the same political structures (Saleh-Hanna 2015; Stoler, 2006; Quijano 2000).

The legacies of colonialism pervade contemporary Guyana, its systems and its people, and this includes children. Whether we are looking at the institutions created to control and punish young people, or at the archives that record these histories of governmentality, they are imbued with the ghosts of empire and its colonial afterlives. Children are the phantoms of history, omitted from but also entombed within the archives. The preceding discussion shows how archival material can be used to try to capture their lived experiences. However, the archives themselves are also "spectral" – "neither present nor absent 'in the flesh', neither visible nor invisible, a trace always referring to another whose eyes can never be met" (Derrida & Prenowitz, 1955: 53). This means that certain forms of knowing are prioritized over others, including a regimented monopoly over race/ethnicity, criminality, childhood and youth, which have created racialized and gendered regimes that operate within contemporary Guyana (Saleh-Hanna, 2015; Stoler, 2006; Quijano 2000). These gendered norms and other tropes of the colony have left their legacy in Guyana, particularly on the representation, treatment, criminalization and punishment of children through the juvenile justice system, its agents and institutions. The omission of children from the archives – unless mediated by an adult – is also a legacy of colonialism.

Adopting a Caribbean feminist criminological approach alongside ideas of coloniality and hauntology not only facilitated an understanding of these colonial afterlives, but also how colonialism has and continues to structure the world around us, which includes foundations of knowing and forgetting (Quijano 2000; Stoler, 2006). Indeed, every text contains "phantoms" (Royale 1995: 35). Despite their spectrality, the archival materials have allowed us to fill some of these silences and to ask and explore key questions surrounding juvenile justice in Guyana. Maintaining the afterlives of colonialism, the punishment and rehabilitation of children have been achieved through a combination of education and labour, themselves closely related. The relationship between "work" and "rehabilitation" is a recurrent theme in our analysis of the past and the present as is the highly gendered educational opportunities afforded to young Guyanese, none of which are sufficient to enable them to build a life for themselves beyond the institutions. However, this has been excluded from official discourse as well as the archives, as most records ignore the wider political economy or how capitalism limits the options available to some children. It is these which result in

"survival strategies" and committing crimes of poverty just to get by (Danns 1992). Thus, this article illustrates how the legacies of empire – both visible and invisible – are replicated in contemporary Guyana and how they reproduce gendered, socio-economic and racialized inequalities in youth justice.

References

- Abrams, L. S., S. P. Jordan, and L. A. Montero. "What Is a Juvenile? A Cross-National Comparison of Youth Justice Systems." *Youth Justice* 18, no. 2 (2018): 111–130.
- Ame, R. K. "The Origins of the Contemporary Juvenile Justice System in Ghana." *Journal of Family History* 43, no. 4 (2018): 394–408.
- Ayres, T., and D. Kerrigan. "The Gaols of Guyana: Hauntology and Trauma in the Soundscape of Prison." *LIAS Working Paper Series* 4 (2021).
- Boa, S. "Discipline, Reform or Punish? Attitudes towards Juvenile Crimes and Misdemeanours in the Post-Emancipation Caribbean, 1838–88." In *Contesting Freedom: Control and Resistance in the Post-Emancipation Caribbean*, edited by G. Heuman and D. V. Trotman, 65–86. Oxford: Macmillan Caribbean, 2005.
- Bredberg, E. "Writing Disability History: Problems, Perspectives and Sources." *Disability & Society* 14, no. 2 (1999): 189–201.
- Brereton, B. "Family Strategies, Gender, and the Shift to Wage Labour in the British Caribbean." In *The Colonial Caribbean in Transition: Essays on post emancipation social and cultural history* edited by B. Brereton and K. Yelvington. Kingston: The Press University of the West Indies, 1999.
- Briggs, F. J. "Probation and Social Work of the Courts in British Guiana." *Probation* (1947): 1946–1949.
- British Library (BL) Reports. "These are: C.S.F 351, British Guiana, Report of the Inspector of Prisons." Report of the Inspector General of Police. Report on the Onderneeming School. Report on the Girls' Reformatory. Georgetown: C. K. Jardine, 1890–1961.
- British Library (BL) Reports. "Colonial Social Welfare Advisory Committee (C.S.W.A.C)." Mr Simey's Report on Extra Mural Labour in the West Indies, 1943.
- Burham, L. F. S. "State Paper on National Service for the Co-operative Republic of Guyana by the Prime Minister The Hon. L.F.S. Burham OE, SC, MP, Thursday 20th December, 1973." Guyana Sessional Paper No. 3, 1973.
- Calixte, S. L. "Beyond "Us" Versus "Them": Transnationalizing Girlhood Studies." In *Difficult Dialogues about Twenty First Century Girls*, edited by D. M. Marie and A. E. Ginsberg. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015.
- Cameron, Q. "Conditions of Juvenile Confinement in Guyana." Unpublished Report, 2019.
- Caribbean Research Library, University of Guyana (CRL). "Annual Report of the Guyana Police Force (GPF) by the Commissioner of Police for the Year 1967."

- Caribbean Research Library, University of Guyana (CRL). "Annual Report of the Guyana Police Force (GPF) by the Commissioner of Police for the Year 1969." Childs, D. "'You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet": "Beloved," The American Chain Gang, and the Middle Passage Remix." *American Quarterly* **61**, no. 2 (2009): 271-297.
- CRL GPF (1968) – Caribbean Research Library, University of Guyana (CRL). 1968. "Annual Report of the Guyana Police Force (GPF) by the Commissioner of Police for the Year 1968.
- Danns, G. K. *Situation Analysis of Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances in Guyana*. UNICEF/Government of Guyana, 1992.
- Danns, G. K. "Guyana The Situation of Children in the Worst Forms of Child Labour: A Rapid Assessment, International Labour Organization Subregional Office for the Caribbean," 2003.
- De Barros, J. "Metropolitan Policies and Colonial Practices at the Boys' Reformatory in British Guiana." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* **30**, no. 2 (2002): 1-24.
- De Barros, J. "Urban British Guiana, 1838-1924: Wharf Rats, Centipedes, and Pork Knockers." In *Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain & the Empire, 1562-1955* edited by D. Hay and P. Craven. London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- De Barros, J. "'Working Cutlass and Shovel': Labour and Redemption at the Onderneeming School in British Guiana." In *Contesting Freedom: Control and Resistance in the Post-emancipation Caribbean*, edited by G. Heuman and D. Trotman, 39-64. London: Macmillan, 2005.
- Derrida, J., and E. Prenowitz. "Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression." *Diacritics* **25**, no. 2 (1995): 9-63.
- DeShong, H. and T. Haynes. "Intimate Partner Violence in the Caribbean: State, Activist and Media Responses." *Global Public Health* **11**, no. 1-2 (2016): 82-94.
- Evans, L., and D. Kerrigan. "Crime, Gender and Sexuality in the Anglophone Caribbean." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology* **1**, no. 4 (2019): 1-28.
- Francis, C. *A Criminal Code and Constabulary Manual for British Guiana*. Essex, Alexander Lamb, 1895.
- Gordon, A. *Ghostly Matters*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Guyana Chronicle. Safeguarding the rights and welfare of children. 31 March 2019, 2019.
- Hamilton, C. *Guidance for Legislative Reform on Juvenile Justice*. New York: Children's Legal Centre and UNICEF, 2011.
- Hansard. Proceedings and Debates of the First Session of the National Assembly of the Third Parliament of Guyana Under the Constitution of Guyana. 25th sitting, 9 January 1974, The Parliamentary Debates Official Report Volume 1, 1974. <https://parliament.gov.gy/chamber-business/hansard>, sourced 16 April 2021.

- Hosein, G. "What Caribbean Feminist Political Anthropology does with Blind Men and an Elephant." *Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies* 44, no. 2 (2019): 65–90.
- Jones, H. "The Crime Problem in Guyana, Paper presented at the Conference on Crime and the Penal System in Guyana, University of Guyana, Turkeyen, Guyana, 1974.
- Juvenile Offenders Act. Cap 10:03. British Guiana, 1931.
- Kirke, H. *Twenty-Five Years in British Guiana*. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1898.
- Kaiteur News. 75% of children in NOC for wandering, says UNICEF Rep. 14 September 2015.
- Lazarus-Black, M. The (Heterosexual) Regendering of a Modern State: Criminalizing and Implementing Domestic Violence Law in Trinidad. *Law and Social Enquiry* 28, no. 4 (2003): 979–1008.
- Liverpool, F. E. C. Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 1995, Co-operative Republic of Guyana, 1996.
- Matthew, J. Z. and T. Robinson. "Modern Vagrancy in the Anglophone Caribbean." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology* 1, no. 4 (2019): 123–154.
- May, M. "Innocence and Experience: The Evolution of the Concept of Juvenile Delinquency in the Mid-Nineteenth Century." *Victorian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1973): 7–29.
- Mignolo, W. D. "Introduction: Coloniality of Power and De-Colonial Thinking." *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2–3 (2007): 155–167.
- Mohapatra, P. P. "Assam and the West Indies, 1860–1920: Immobilizing Plantation Labor". In *Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain & the Empire, 1562–1955*, edited by D. Hay and P. Craven, 455–480. London, University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Morgan, P. and V Youssef. *Writing Rage: Unmasking Violence through Caribbean Discourse*. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2006.
- Morris, T. P. "United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Section 1: New Forms of Juvenile Delinquency; Their Origin, Prevention and Treatment." *The British Journal of Criminology* 1, no. 3 (1961): 261–262.
- Murray, C. N., H. J. Rohlehr, and R. Aitkens. *Annual Report on the Treatment of Offenders for the Year 1961*. Georgetown: Government Printery, 1963.
- Murray, C. N., H. J. Rohlehr, and R. Aitkens. *Annual Report on the Treatment of Offenders for the Year 1962*. Georgetown: Government Printery, 1965.
- Murray, C. N., E. H. Kendall, and H. J. Rohlehr. *Annual Report on the Treatment of Offenders for the Year 1964*. Georgetown: Government Printery, 1967.
- Murray, Cecil, and H. A. Davis. *Annual Report on the Treatment of Offenders for the Year 1969*. Georgetown: Government of Guyana, 1970.
- Nehusi, K. S. K. *A People's Political History of Guyana 1838–1964*. Hertford: Hansib Publications Ltd., 1992.
- National Library of Scotland (NLS). *Essequibo Boy's School Annual Reports, 1945–1950*.

- Paton, D, and G. Romain. "Gendered Clothing Legislation & Trans Experience in Guyana." *Histories of the Present. History Workshop*, 2014.
- Pinchbeck, I. and M. Hewitt. *Children in English Society Volume 11: From the Eighteenth Century to the Children Act of 1948*. London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1973.
- Quijano, A. "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America." *International Sociology* 15, no. 2 (2000): 215-232.
- Renzetti, C. M. *Feminist Criminology*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.
- Reynolds, B. G. "Preparing the Young Offender for Return to Society: A Theoretical Evaluation of Guyanese Juvenile Delinquents' Narratives Based on General Treatment Models." PhD diss., Wayne State University, 2011.
- Robinson, T. S. "Fictions of Citizenship, Bodies Without Sex: The Production and Effacement of Gender in Law." *Small Axe* 7 (2000): 1-27.
- Robinson, T. "Sticky Colonial Criminal Laws." *University of Miami Law Review* 75, no. 58 (2020).
- Roper, S. "Creating Good Colonial Citizens: Industrial Schools and Reformatories in Victorian Jamaica." In *Victorian Jamaica*, edited by T. Barringer and W. Modest. London: Duke University Press, 2018.
- Roper, S. "Introduction, Histories of Childhood in The Caribbean: New Perspectives and Methodologies." *The Journal of Caribbean History* 53, no. 2 (2019): 187-191.
- Royale (1995)—Royle, N. (1997) "This is Not a Book Review: Esther Rashkin: Family Secrets and the Psychoanalysis of Narrative", *Angelaki*, 2(1): 31-35.
- Saleh-Hanna, V. "Black Feminist Hauntology: Rememory the Ghosts of Abolition?" *Champ pénal/Penal Field* XII (2015): 1-33.
- SAIHC. All the World. *Guiana Girls Work and Play*. London: Salvation Army International Heritage Centre, 1948-1949.
- Sandall, R. *The History of the Salvation Army: Social reform and welfare work, 1883-1953*, Volume 3. London: T. Nelson, 1947.
- Shore, H. "Crime, Policing and Punishment." In *A Companion to Nineteenth Century Britain* edited by C. Williams Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
- Shore, H. *Artful Dodgers: Youth and Crime in Early Nineteenth Century*. London: Boydell Press, 1999.
- Smith, L. *Insanity, Race and Colonialism, Managing Mental Disorder in the Post-Emancipation British Caribbean, 1838-1914*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.
- Stoler, A. L. *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
- The National Archives, London (TNA). Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: West Indian Department (CO 1031). Registered Files (WIS Series), 1948-1967.
- The National Archives, London (TNA). Colonial Office and predecessors: British Guiana, formerly Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, Original Correspondence (CO 111). Governor of British Guiana Correspondence, 1781-1951.

- The National Archives, London (TNA). Colonial Office and War and Colonial Department: British Guiana (CO 113). Acts, 1837–1955.
- The National Archives, London (TNA). Colonial Office and predecessors: British Guiana, formerly Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, Original Correspondence (CO 260). Blue Books of Statistics: British Guiana, 1821–1943.
- Training Schools Act, Cap 11:06. British Guiana, 1907.
- Trotz, A. "Between Despair and Hope: Women and Violence in Contemporary Guyana." *Small Axe* 15 (2004): 1–20.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. C. (1st series) (1833–69). Despatches from Governor of British Guiana, on State of Dispute between Combined Court and Governor, respecting Estimates for Public Service, 1849, C. 594.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cd. (1900–1918) Special Reports on Educational Subjects, 1899–1900, Volume IV. Cd. 416.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cd. (1900–1918) Colonial Reports Annual. No. 413. 1904. British Guiana, Vol 56. Cd. 1768–18.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cd. (1900–1918) British Guiana. Further Correspondence Relating to Disturbances in British Guiana, Vol. 77. 1906. Cd. 3026.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cd. (1900–1918) Colonial Reports Annual. No. 833. British Guiana, Vol. 43. 1914–6. Cd. 7622–24.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cmd. (1919–56) Colonial reports – annual. No. 1014, Vol. 35. 1919. British Guiana. Cmd. 1–37.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cmd. (1919–56) Correspondence relating to the position of the sugar industry in certain West Indian colonies, British Guiana, and Mauritius, 1930–1. Cmd. 3705.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cmd. (1919–56) Labour conditions in the West Indies. Report by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, O.B.E. to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1938–9. Cmd. 6070.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cmd. (1919–56) West India Royal Commission 1938–9. Recommendations. 1940. Cmd. 6174.
- U.K. Parliamentary Papers (UKPP) Online. Command Papers. Cmd. (1919–56) West India Royal Commission 1938–9, Statement of Action, June 1945. 1945. Cmd. 6656.
- UNICEF (2020), - UNICEF 2020. Alternative sentencing for juveniles: They are simply children, we should hardly think of them as offenders. "<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.unicef.org%2Fguyanasureiname%2Fstories%2Falternative-sentencing-juveniles&data=04%7C01%7Cdylan.kerrigan%40leicester.ac.uk%7Cb4960a99da854d6b05a508d9e18afa8c%7Caebeed6a31d44b0195ce8274afe853d9%7C0%7C0%7C637788809492989151%7CUnknown%7CTWFPbGZsb3d8eyJWJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C3000&>

- sdataJt0tQ0B7nw3hitoiU7qqH2ApMVG56JqGex0%2F%2FsSZErg%3D &reserved0" <https://www.unicef.org/guianasuriname/stories/alternative-sentencing-juveniles>
- United Nations. 1955. First Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Congress, Part Five, Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency. December 1, 1955. 37-40. A/CONF.6/L.17.
- United Nations Resolutions. General Assembly resolution 40/33, Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules), 29 November, 1985.
- United Nations Resolutions. General Assembly resolution 45/131, Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, 14 December, 1990, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/juvenilesdeprivedofliberty.aspx>.
- United Nations Resolutions. General Assembly resolution 45/113, Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines), 14 December, 1990. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/PreventionOfJuvenileDelinquency.aspx>.
- United Nations Resolutions. General Assembly resolution 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November, 1989, (entry into force 2 September 1990). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>.
- United Nations Secretariat. 1960. Second United National Congress of the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment offenders, A/CONF.17/20.
- United Nations Secretariat. 1965. Special Preventative and Treatment Measure for Young Adults, working paper prepared by the secretariat, Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. A/CONF.26/6.
- United Nations Secretariat. 2007. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10, paras. 8 and 9. As found in Hamilton, Carolyn. 2011. Guidance for Legislative Reform on Juvenile Justice. New York: Children's Legal Centre and UNICEF. 19
- University of Leicester Library (UOLL). Colonial Office (CO), Development and Welfare in the West Indies (D4250) 1940-1956. 1940-1942.
- Warren, K. and D. Kerrigan. "Recordkeeping and the Management of Prisons in Guyana." LIAS Working Paper Series 4 (2021).
- Williams, J. E. H. "Two International Congresses." *The British Journal of Criminology* 1, no. 3: 254-261, 1961.
- Zedner, L. *Women, Crime, and Custody in Victorian England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Cut and Paste Policing? An Assessment of Compstat's Importation and Implementation in a Developing Country

Aleem Mahabir¹ and Robert Kinlocke²

¹(Corresponding Author) PhD Candidate-Department of Geography and Geology, The University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica aleem.mahabir@mymona.uwi.edu

²Lecturer- Department of Geography and Geology, The University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica robert.kinlocke02@uwimona.edu.jm

Abstract

Crime and policing policies derived from the Global North are being imported by law enforcement agencies in the Global South. It may be pertinent to question the adaptability of these policies to different development contexts that may not fall in the realm of an "ideal operational environment". Using Compstat's implementation by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service as a case study, the paper aims to highlight the possible issues that may arise when law enforcement agencies in the Global South attempt to replicate this Northern practice, describing some remedial measures that can be undertaken to improve Compstat's adaptability in a Southern context.

Keywords: Compstat; North-South policy transfer; Global South; Latin America and the Caribbean; Trinidad and Tobago.

Introduction

"Computer Comparative Statistics", more widely known as Compstat, refers to a systematic approach for managing police operations. Its popularity has grown tremendously in recent years as law enforcement agencies throughout the world have adopted Compstat as a foundational organizational management strategy and guiding philosophy to achieve goals of crime prevention and reduction (Eterno, Silverman and Berlin 2020). The Compstat process and its constituent practices and procedures are

generally considered universally applicable, capable of being compatible in any organization or environment, and its success replicated (Henry 2002).

A core tenet of the Compstat process is the idea of regular and consistent monitoring and evaluation of the organization's efforts to achieve its stated goals using empirical analysis by way of quantifiable statistical indicators. In the context of police operations, this typically involves accumulation of a wealth of crime data such as overall crime counts as well as the spatial and temporal distribution of criminal activities, offenders and victims. All these data are collected and analysed in an effort to find crime hot spots, that is, a clustering or concentration of criminogenic activity in certain geographic locations and time periods as opposed to other locations and times (Brantingham and Brantingham 1993a, 1993b, 1999).

Compstat also emphasizes accountability at all levels of the organization. In actual practice in policing agencies, this typically involves regular meetings, normally held at weekly intervals. These meetings serve as performance reviews, using different statistical indicators to critically determine whether objectives of crime reduction are being met, identify any flaws in current plans, as well as vet ideas or new initiatives in order to propel continued improvement in meeting the goals of a given agency, department or smaller sub-group (Silverman 1999; Walsh 2001).

The innovative strategies and dynamic management process that became the core of the Compstat method were originally pioneered in the mid-1990s by former police commissioner of the New York City Police Department William Bratton, with further refinement of the process provided by his immediate successor Howard Safir (Bratton and Knobler 1998; Safir 1997). Early on in its implementation, Compstat proved to be a successful strategy for reducing crime. NYPD precincts reported double-digit decreases in levels of criminal activity, with statistics for seven major offences decreasing by more than 50% from the period 1993 to 1998 (Silverman 1999). Several prominent policy institutes took notice of its success, including the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Ford Foundation. Compstat quickly spread to other police departments with responsibility over large municipal populations, such as Boston and New Orleans, which also saw similar decreases in crime when Compstat was adopted there (Walsh 2001).

Compstat continues to rise in popularity as it becomes adopted by increasing numbers of law enforcement agencies internationally (Eterno, Silverman and Berlin 2020). Given this surge of adopters worldwide, it may be important to critically examine whether Compstat is indeed always an appropriate organizational philosophy and tool.

Special attention should be given to any possible weaknesses and challenges associated with it and its implementation to determine if it can work as effectively in a range of contexts that may look far different from the typical operational realities of Northern police jurisdictions where it was pioneered. Like other organizational philosophies, it may be adopted, not because of any potential benefit to be derived, but because of political motivations or even because of its popularity as a dominant discourse in policing (Marsh and Sharman 2009). Certainly, it is evident both in the literature and in practice that Compstat can have significant benefits in the reduction of criminal activity, but this may be tempered by the fact that its success is not always universal.

Several studies have provided a critical analysis of Compstat and other evidence-based geospatial crime management strategies. These have predominately been done in police departments of the developed world, namely the United States and the United Kingdom (see Eterno and Silverman 2010a, 2010b; Bratton and Malinowski 2008; Walsh 2001; Willis, Weisburd and Mastrofski 2003). However, the need for such critical assessments may be even more important in the context of developing countries, where few studies have delved into how it is adapted there. There are also unique challenges associated with Compstat's implementation in police jurisdictions of the Global South, which often have to contend with the double whammy of rising crime rates (especially violent offences) and limited budgets that constrain access to mission-critical resources.

This paper aims to critically explore the possibilities and pitfalls associated with Compstat's implementation in the city of San Fernando, Trinidad and Tobago. In doing so, the study emphasizes potentially significant structural and systemic shortfalls in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) which present as possible barriers in the successful implementation of Compstat in an operational environment that differs vastly from those typical of the developed countries where it was first adopted. Acknowledging the unique circumstances of policing in the Global South can therefore allow for more nuanced approaches to Compstat that are applicable in a wider range of development contexts, better enabling local law enforcement agencies there to pursue their overall goals.

Transnational Transfer of Criminology Policy and Practice

Policy transfer occurs when policies, structures, institutional arrangements, technologies, programmes, practices and ideas are taken from

one place or time (either in the past or present) and are adapted to another setting (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). The development of a cross-national and cross-jurisdictional policy transfer discourse initially emerged from comparative politics discourses (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996), with the phenomenon being initially described as "policy diffusion" (Clark 1985; Walker 1969). For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, the literature on policy transfer remained fragmented across disciplines, with a number of different terminologies and labels being used interchangeably, including "lesson drawing" (Rose 1991), "policy convergence" (Bennett 1991; Marsh and Sharman 2009), "policy transfer" (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dommel 1990) and now most recently, "policy mobilities" (Peck 2011).

Although the policy transfer literature has been principally explored in the field of comparative politics, research pertaining to the transnational transfer of crime, security and justice policies began to see increasing scholarly attention in the early 2000s (Bissessar 2000; Jones and Newburn 2002, 2007; Robertson 2005). Although there have been comparatively fewer studies focusing specifically on North-South policy transfer of criminological theories and models, it is important to mention that work in this sub-field is burgeoning as more scholars are beginning to recognize and highlight problems related to the imposition of generalized Northern models in unique Southern contexts (see Bowling 2011a, 2011b; Carrington, Hogg and Sozzo 2016; Jones and Newburn 2019; Maguire and King 2013; Steinberg 2011).

Jones and Newburn (2019) analysed the history of the development of policy transfer discourse, specifically in the realm of security and justice, exploring the motivations and mechanisms that have spurred the cross-national adoption of models of crime control. Drawing on previous work by Marsh and Sharman (2009), Jones and Newburn (2019) identified four primary mechanisms in which policy transfer typically occurs: (1) learning, (2) competition, (3) coercion and (4) mimicry. Each mechanism of policy transfer is driven by different motivations and with different degrees of autonomy exhibited by the jurisdiction that adapts them.

Learning lies at the voluntary end of the spectrum and occurs when policy agents actively seek knowledge and ideas from elsewhere (Jones and Newburn 2007). Competition normally occurs when countries willingly adopt similar international standards and regulations to better attract international capital (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007). Coercive policy transfer results from overt or covert impositions and incentives at the hands of more powerful states, international governing bodies and by bilateral/

multilateral aid organizations onto jurisdictions, agencies or countries who lack the financial or hegemonic power to resist or refuse (Blaustein 2016; Ellison and Pino 2012). Lastly, mimicry is defined by attempts to copy or emulate a foreign policy for political and symbolic reasons, rather than for practical goals of adaptability, feasibility or functional efficiency (Marsh and Sharman 2009). It is important to note that policy transfer is not a simple process and may be driven by not just one, but by a mix of these underlying factors.

The Problems of North-South Policy Transfer

At least until recently, general theories of crime control have been overwhelmingly developed by criminologists based in the Global North, with criminological scholarship dominated by Anglophone nations, namely the United States and the United Kingdom (Bowling 2011a). Despite the limited socio-cultural and geographic context of much Northern criminological theories, they were often (implicitly or explicitly) purported to be universally generalizable and transnationally transferable across social, political and geographic lines (Bowling 2011a).

In instances when Northern social and criminological theories were transferred to the Global South and investigated, there was typically very little confidence that doing so would offer any revelatory insights (Connell 2007). The problem was not a lack of critical or crucial findings from the South, but rather, a "deficit of recognition and circulation" (Connell 2015: 52). It was typical for any divergent observations to be treated as inconvenient but nonetheless unimportant outliers that could readily be dismissed and ignored. This biased viewpoint can be explained by what Connell describes as "metropolitan thinking", wherein she posits that much of the social sciences had often made the implicit, unstated assumption that all nations had to mimic societies of the North in order to successfully modernize. This therefore meant that counter-intuitive findings made anywhere but the supposedly normative conditions of Northern nations caused them to be viewed as empirically irrelevant in mainstream discourses (Connell 2007).

Given the limited reach and fragmented presence of criminology in the Global South, many Southern criminal justice institutions chose to import policies from the Global North. This implicit preference for the replication of Northern derived policy prescriptions at virtually all levels of the criminal justice pipeline is itself evident of the high level of legitimacy and deference placed upon Northern criminological policy and practice

(Carrington et al. 2019). The high degree of affinity for paradigms and assumptions associated with Northern criminology served to further cement their normative appeal so that they were often seen as the only viable measures to address emerging problems of rampantly increasing rates of both violent and non-violent offences across many developing locales (Natarajan 2016).

However, many scholars began to question the Northern dominance of criminological discourse, recognizing numerous instances of Anglophone theories of crime control failing to resonate with the specific empirical realities of the periphery. It was Cohen (1988) who was among the first to warn against the practice of exporting theories and models of crime control developed in rich Northern countries to poorer nations in the South. In particular, he noted that criminological institutions, both domestically in the country of adoption and internationally in the countries that encouraged policy transfer, can be paradoxically counter-productive to crime control as even the most well-intentioned and benevolent interventions can be disastrous when implemented (Cohen 1988). Agozino (2004) showed that the inflated deference given to Northern policy measures meant that they continued to be preferred and proliferated throughout the Third World often with very little concern for the unique circumstances of the local criminogenic environment. This led to many models and theories of Northern criminology to frequently be incongruent with and misrepresentative of Southern criminological realities, often failing to live up to expectations of being the optimal, legitimate and normative prescriptions for which they were perceived to be (Cain 2000).

Uncritically exporting Northern theory to Third World countries therefore led to poor policy outcomes given stark differences in the nature and operations of crime and justice systems. As originally expressed by Cohen (1988), without the use of a comparative or transnational approach that can critically incorporate the often different, local and unique facets of crime in the Third World, Northern-derived policy prescriptions will often turn out to be unhelpful when implemented there and even produce harmful outcomes in the long term (Cain 2000). Many scholars have pointed out similar failures of Northern criminological theories to reconcile with diverging empirical observations in diverse socio-geographical settings, either producing benign or insignificant changes or more commonly leading to malignant and paradoxical outcomes that result in an exacerbation of the problem they were originally intended to address (Bowling 2011a; Nelken 2009; Sheptycki 2005).

In response to these alarming concerns, Shearing and Marks (2011: 139) have advocated for the removal of unbridled faith in Euro-American norms and the idea that "West knows best" when it comes to crime control. Several scholars have proposed the establishment of a criminology of harm production which seeks to understand the potential drawbacks and damaging effects that can be brought about by the global export of crime control theories and techniques (Bowling 2011a; Loader and Sparks 2011).

It is important to note that a criminology of harm production does not set out to outrightly reject the advances of Northern criminological theory and practice or diminish the benefits and desirable consequences produced by North-South policy transfers to criminal justice systems of the developing world. Some prominent positive impacts include the diffusion of international human rights conventions (Linde 2016), the spread of legal protections against torture (Daems 2017) and the increasing adoption of evidence-based policing strategies (Sherman 2013).

As a result, some scholars argue that North-South policy mobilities should not be seen as inherently problematic, pointing out that it is often the case that policies do not fail on their own merits (Hudson, Hunter and Peckham 2019). Even good policies can drift into full or partial failure during the implementation phase, arguably the most important component of the policy transfer process. Blaustein (2016) found that in Latin America and the Caribbean, evidence-based crime measures imported from the North and adapted to regional police jurisdictions, though potentially beneficial, often failed due to their practical aspects of implementation, such as a lack of qualified personnel and training, lack of institutional resources, poor data availability and corruption.

Context and Conditions of Crime and Crime Control

Trinidad and Tobago is a multi-ethnic developing country situated in the southern Caribbean with an estimated population size of 1.3 million people (Central Statistical Office 2012). Both the country and the Caribbean region to which it belongs have experienced an increase in criminal violence since the 1990s. The situation is made worse by the tendency of regional law enforcement and justice systems to be limited in their capacity to provide for the effective protection of citizens (World Bank 2011). This trend is made evident by the fact that murder rates in the Caribbean region are some of the highest in the world while clearance and conviction rates have remained stagnant (Jaitman and Ajzenman 2016; Maguire et al.

2010). In countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, the high rates of violence and gang activity present a significant challenge to an already under-resourced and inadequately trained police service (UNDP 2012).

The study was carried out in southern Trinidad, in the city of San Fernando. Despite not being the capital, San Fernando is the larger of Trinidad and Tobago's two cities, in terms of both area and municipal population. The southern city occupies roughly 20 square kilometres and is inhabited by a total residential population of approximately 50,208 (Central Statistical Office 2012). The study specifically includes crime recorded at the Marabella, Mon Repos and downtown San Fernando police stations which collectively serve the city.

Recent incidents of intense violence in San Fernando have drawn attention to the city's emerging rampant crime problem. A significant and growing portion of this violence is attributed to the influence of gangs, illegal narcotics and firearms, with most reported crimes occurring within San Fernando and the other metropolitan area of Port of Spain (OSAC 2016). The southern division of the TTPS¹ saw an overall trend of increasing violent activity, with a 38.2% increase in homicides and an 18.5% increase in incidents of assault from 2013 to 2015 (TTPS n.d.). In recent years, divisional homicide rates have continued to trend upwards, increasing by 24% from 2016 to 2017 alone (OSAC 2017, 2018). Annual figures have remained high for the small division, which now consistently records close to seventy homicides per year.

The TTPS has attempted a number of reforms in the recent past, adopting different technological innovations and processes borrowed from foreign police doctrine as a means of grappling with rising crime rates. Unfortunately, many of these solutions have demonstrated a poor track record of successful integration into local policing operations so that positive outcomes in the management, reduction and control of crime as a result of these interventions have been the exception rather than the norm. A study completed by Maguire and King (2013), which explored the transfer of criminal investigation practices used in the developed nations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia to the TTPS, found that both purely technocratic interventions based on popular scientific technologies (automated ballistic imaging and DNA profiling) and the more complex process of organizational modernization and reform of the homicide bureau all ultimately failed when implemented.

¹The TTPS divides its operations into nine regional divisions throughout Trinidad and Tobago. The southern division of the TTPS includes the Marabella, Mon Repos and downtown San Fernando stations which collectively cover the city.

The reasons behind these institutional failures were numerous. Their potential beneficial impacts on crime and criminal investigations were held back by the substantial backlog of unprocessed evidence, inadequate or poorly trained personnel, improper evidence handling at crime scenes and storage facilities leading to evidence contamination and a fragmented command structure over case assignments. These and other factors prevented valuable evidence and other outcomes generated from these innovations to be usefully deployed.

Ultimately, their unsuccessful implementation was pinned on the lack of critical and consistent investment of organizational support structures, processes and systems. As noted by Jones and Newburn (2019), policies cannot simply be copied to another jurisdiction and be expected to naturally work when first attempted. Instead, they need to be fully integrated into the operations of the adoptive institution via systemic reform of its entire cultural and organizational makeup. They also require steering by suitable supervisory, accountability and auditing procedures to ensure that targets are constantly being met and allowing for constructive reconfiguring and adaptation of the practical details of their implementation to optimize efficiency and assimilation (Jones and Newburn 2007).

Unfortunately, the TTPS along with other organizational arms of the country's criminal justice system, such as the national crime laboratory (the Forensic Science Centre), was repeatedly demonstrated to lack the organizational commitment necessary for the enactment of wide-ranging institutional reforms that would have facilitated maximization of the potential benefits to be gained from the Northern criminological practices they adopted. These instituted practices therefore amounted to little more than empty gestures whose symbolic appeal gave these organizations legitimacy in the short term, but ultimately produced little in terms of tangible improvements in criminal investigations and crime control (Maguire and King 2013). It is likely that the implementation of Compstat by the TTPS may also be critically undermined by these same systemic problems.

Methodology

Spatial representations of crime hot spots were generated from crime data recorded by the Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) branch of the TTPS using a Geographic Information System (GIS). It should be acknowledged that in order to analyse the problems associated with the importation and implementation of the Northern-derived policy of Compstat, the study

must coincidentally make use of data from CAPA, which is also an organizational component derived from Northern policing practice whose implementation and integration into the operations of the TTPS were undertaken based on recommendations by American crime advisors (Mastrofski and Lum 2008; Trinidad and Tobago Police Manpower Audit Committee 2017).

Particularly, the use of CAPA data may be seen as problematic in the context of the study, which aims to understand the potential problems of importing and implementing the Northern-derived policy of Compstat in a Southern context. Given that CAPA is a manifestation of that same dynamic of transnational knowledge sharing and is itself a crucial component in facilitating Compstat operations, CAPA data may be seen as inappropriate for use in the ensuing analysis. However, its inclusion was deemed necessary as there were no other sources of divisional crime data available to researchers. As the arm of the TTPS that deals with data processing, CAPA wields principal control and authority over the supply of organizational crime data, such that access and permission to said data had to be sought from them.

The study area included all three San Fernando sub-divisions: downtown, Mon Repos and Marabella, which collectively cover the entire city's area and allowed for a comprehensive data set. The study accessed twelve and a half years' worth of CAPA data for various types of crime events which occurred in San Fernando from the period January 2005 to July 2016. Spatio-temporal maps were created for the crimes of homicides, assaults, sexual offences and breaking offences for every triennial (three-year) period (i.e. 2005–07; 2008–10; 2011–13; and 2014–16). Crime hot spots generated from recorded crime data only for the most recent triennial period of 2014–16 were compared with the perceived hot spots of San Fernando law enforcement officers. Police perceptions of crime locations were obtained via a survey of officers conducted during August 2016. The survey involved repeated visits to each of the three stations where interviews were conducted with all officers on duty. This yielded a total sample size of 101 officers, representing a response rate of roughly 62% of the actual strength (assigned personnel) for all three stations. It is important to note that actual (assigned) personnel counts vary heavily and would have included officers who were absent from duty, on leave or on assignment at other posts during the study and therefore unavailable for interview.

As part of the survey, officers were asked to take part in a cognitive mapping exercise to establish their perceived locations of hot spots.

The cognitive or mental maps that were produced for this study therefore represented a geographic representation of where officers thought certain crimes were concentrated in San Fernando. Cognitive maps have previously been used to gain a qualitative understanding of the occurrence of crime and related criminological phenomena in different locales and at different scales. For example, cognitive mapping approaches have been used to examine perceptions of crime (Brantingham, Brantingham and Molumby 1977), perceptions of danger (Rengert and Pelfrey 1997) and perceptions of gang areas (Kennedy, Braga and Piehl 1998). It has also been used to examine police officers' perceptions of crime locations (Ratcliffe and McCullagh 2001), similar to what has been done in this study.

Asking officers to perform this cognitive mapping exercise was suitable given that law enforcement officers are known to exhibit a high degree of spatial awareness due to the geographical nature of police work. Research has shown that spatial cognition is greatly influenced by someone's level of personal knowledge and experience within a particular space (Hibdon 2011; Kitchen and Blades 2002), and as noted by Klinger et al. (2016), policing is a highly territorially based activity, with operations typically demarcated by divisions or districts, which are sub-divided further into beats that officers routinely patrol. Given the inherent spatial organization of police work, officers are essentially "required" to become acutely aware of the spaces they patrol. Officers often gain vast territorial knowledge and experience of their beats, enabling them to readily gauge the locations of greatest threat or unsafety within districts and communities (Klinger 2004; Sobol, Wu and Sun 2013), such as areas with high levels of crime or hot spots (Weisburd, Groff and Yang 2012).

To facilitate the mapping exercise, each willing respondent was given four identical copies of paper maps, that is, one for each of the four broad categories of crime types examined. The maps included spatial cues in the form of street names and landmarks. A north arrow and scale were used to help clarify orientation. Respondents were asked to identify the hot spots under question by drawing dots or points on the map, as many or as few times as they wished (including nil responses if they thought there were no hot spots).

Additional questions included as part of the survey probed further details related to the spatial and temporal distributions of these crimes and the capacity and challenges officers associated with Compstat. A validation exercise was also carried out using a short online questionnaire to more accurately interpret the results from the hot spot analysis and

cognitive mapping. A total of six officers participated, involving an even mix of senior commanders and charge room officers who demonstrated intimate knowledge of crime patterns. The validation exercise allowed for in-depth explanations of the discrepancies between statistically derived patterns of crime and officers' innate cognitive knowledge of them, thereby garnering critical insights from those directly involved in the Compstat process.

Four crime types were chosen for examination: homicides, assaults, sexual offences and breaking offences. These were selected on the basis that they were all high volume, thereby allowing for a sufficiently large number of incidents for spatial correlation. The data set comprised 4039 events occurring within the period of January 2005–July 2016. The incidents were manually geocoded, using a basemap containing addresses and lot numbers that corresponded to the individual record, given that the recording of GPS coordinates for individual crimes was not widely practiced by the TTPS during the period for which the data were curated. The graphical representation of crime data was done in a GIS using a kernel density estimation process. This resulted in the creation of a continuous surface showing graded crime intensity that accurately reflected the spatial pattern of crime.

Temporal patterns were analysed at hourly, weekly, monthly and annual intervals. To determine the hourly timing of events, the mid-point or split-time method was used whereby the mid-point of the start and end times of events were found (Helms 2009). This approach was used due to unavailability of supplemental data on the precise timing of events that would have permitted more complex analysis. Despite its computational simplicity, this method of interpolating the hourly timing of crime events is known for producing accurate predictions of offence times (Ashby and Bowers 2013). It has been shown to be suitable for the analysis of long-term trends and is also advantageous given that each event would correspond to a single definite time (Ratcliffe and McCullagh 1998).

Results and Discussion

Although attempted in the past, the TTPS began to fully integrate Compstat and hot spot policing into national operations around 2012 (Mastrofski and Lum 2008; Sherman 2013). At its core, the TTPS's implementation of Compstat functions similarly to the NYPD model that has been adopted by police departments throughout the world. Compstat functions as a multi-step process that aims to gather intelligence, rapidly deploy resources and personnel and engage in effective tactics based on this intelligence and

continuously review and assess past targets to ensure goals are being met and performance improves (Walsh and Vito 2004). Police executives (i.e. Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, etc.) hold weekly Compstat meetings with the country's nine divisional commanders who gather to review crime statistics for the previous week and month (including raw crime counts, maps of hotspot locations and graphs detailing changing trends in criminal activity), identify emerging crime problems based on these statistics, discuss strategic approaches for managing crime and examine progress made in the previous week.

Based on what was discussed, police executives, in consultation with divisional commanders, set goals and objectives that aim to be achieved by the next weekly meeting or in the longer term (bi-weekly, monthly, quarterly or annually). Each of the nine divisional commanders then chairs another round of weekly Compstat meetings for each of their respective divisions where data are disseminated, and appropriate strategies are further deliberated and discussed with all Station and Unit supervisors in the division. These local supervisors are finally expected to hold briefings at the local Station or Unit, where junior officers of varying ranks are made aware of managerial directives, are exposed to crime statistics and are able to contribute to decision-making and crime management for local patrols and other operations.

CAPA is responsible for the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of crime data in Compstat meetings convened by the TTPS. This means that CAPA takes primary responsibility for crime analysis and the formulation of crime management policies and strategies. Crime analysts at CAPA monitor crime in their assigned police divisions and provide briefings of their findings and recommended strategies at weekly Compstat meetings whether at the station, divisional or national level. Longer-term monitoring, such as quarterly or annual reviews of crime trends, may also be done by CAPA's statistical officers. GIS officers analyse and visualize the spatial distribution of crime events and other activities that may influence criminal activity. This information is presented at Compstat meetings and helps to ratify strategic responses and special operations, such as targeted or increased patrols. It may also be used to implement preventative measures such as town halls in notably high-risk communities or press briefings during periods of high offending (such as during the Christmas holidays or festivals such as Carnival) (Seepersad 2016).

Although the adoption of Compstat as a major policy initiative has proven to be a useful and effective tool for improving crime control

and management in numerous police jurisdictions throughout the world, it is apparent that the TTPS nevertheless faces several constraints which limit their capability to optimize Compstat's success. A comprehensive analysis of the Compstat process in the San Fernando sub-divisions of the TTPS reveals that there are several systemic issues that prevent the full scope of policing practices from being optimized for more effective operations.

Resource constraints

Allocation of funding to the TTPS remains a major point of contention between senior commanders and Government leaders (Bruzual 2016). Although the annual national budgetary allocation to the TTPS has progressively increased from 2.6% to 5.0% from 2011 to 2017 (Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago 2017), representing a total monetary value of US\$ 381 million, the TTPS is said to still be critically underfunded (Rambally 2016). Financial constraints faced by the TTPS are readily reflected in the poor and deteriorating conditions at the sub-divisions surveyed. It was clear that officers' facilities were in a state of disrepair or poorly maintained, and access to basic resources was either limited or unreliable.

Despite being in a major metropolitan centre, all three stations in San Fernando were observed to have been plagued by major structural issues that adversely impacted daily operations of both police and civilian personnel. A consistent issue was the irregular supply of water, electricity and other essential services. At one points in the administration of surveys, the downtown station's water supply had been cut off, such that civilian personnel were permitted to leave in accordance with occupational health and safety guidelines. This resulted in the activities of the Compstat district office, housed in the downtown station, being forced to stop as data analysts left for the day. Such disruptions are frequent, often precluding any possibility for the timely output of crime statistics essential to the Compstat process.

Apart from essential service provision, officers also complained that mission-critical tools, technology and resources were also systemically unavailable, having a direct impact on numerous components of Compstat operations. Despite the country's fairly high police to population ratio (493 police per 100,000 inhabitants), the number of assigned personnel and resources such as vehicles that were available on any given shift in the three San Fernando sub-divisions were often insufficient to carry out the full slate of targeted patrols recommended by Compstat meetings. Officers also complained of being unable to receive adequate

training in Compstat or the equipment necessary to facilitate its related processes of GPS recording and hot spot policing. Such dismal operational realities circumvented officers' overall levels of productivity and prevented optimal performance of their everyday duties as they were forced to adjust to these debilitating circumstances. It may have even affected their morale in the long term as these same problems persist and continue to afflict them. As a result, the timely and effective functioning of processes essential to Compstat that involve officers' input (such as meetings, patrols, etc.) was directly and indirectly hampered.

The profound impact these resource constraints can have on Compstat operations can be reflected by the results of the survey conducted among officers. When asked about factors that prevented them from performing Compstat optimally, the most prevalent responses given by officers were a lack of mission-critical resources and poor work conditions, reported by 78% and 66% of officers, respectively. In both instances, these factors caused major challenges in the performance of their duties and added additional stresses that were not at all conducive to efficient operations. These findings seem to corroborate those from a recent study investigating stress and job performance among police officers in Trinidad which found that officers island-wide exhibited higher than normal stress levels on the job. The situation may have also been exacerbated by many officers having to work long (12, 24 and 48 hour) shifts that often extends into overtime. This led to many experiencing burnout which in turn impacted police performance in individual and collaborative tasks (Baek, Han and Seepersad 2021).

It is important to note that this problem of resource allocation was likely more prominent in the southern division of the TTPS and emblematic of a more prominent issue of polarized development. The northern divisions host the capital city of Port-of-Spain so that they tend to be prioritized and consequently favoured in terms of resource allocation compared with those in the south of the country. This was a common notion articulated by many officers who are often transferred among the various divisions during their career. One officer stated, "Port of Spain and other divisions in the north don't experience these issues. They have everything they need to get the work done. I can't say the same for here".

Ultimately, the issue of basic resource and service provision has been detrimental to the performance of law enforcement officers in San Fernando, limiting their capacity to optimally adhere to their duties. It directly hinders the organization's ability to carry out mission-critical activities and indirectly contributes to a diminished sense of morale. If issues of basic resource and service provisioning are left unaddressed, it will remain

a significant barrier to the effective implementation of Compstat and its overall goal of meaningful organizational transformation.

Faulty information pipeline

The collection, processing and dissemination of crime records were hampered by a number of prominent flaws, negatively impacting the quality and reliability of the digitized outputs used by officers to plan patrols and develop crime control methods. Foremost, GPS devices were not widely used by the TTPS. At the time the surveys were conducted, CAPA had approximately forty GPS handsets distributed to a fraction of the seventy-seven stations nationwide (Seepersad 2016), when each station should have had access to at least one. The stations in which officers were surveyed reported only having a few on hand, with insufficient personnel trained to use it. Given that access to smartphones with GPS capabilities was not quite as ubiquitous as it is today, the recording of coordinates for crimes was seldom practiced and was reserved primarily for homicides².

Reported crimes were still being recorded using hand-written forms that were manually digitized by CAPA personnel, who reported that 50% of forms contained errors, were missing data or were illegible (Seepersad 2016). This statistic raises major concerns over the accuracy of crime data produced by CAPA. Other studies have openly acknowledged that the statistics produced by the TTPS do not accurately portray the true extent of the country's crime problem (see Pino 2016; Watson et al. 2019). This seriously compromises the quality and reliability of any operational plan and targeted effort that may result from the Compstat process.

The efficacy and relevance of crime plans are also severely reduced by the length of time it takes to process the data. Data processing times are heavily extended by CAPA's need to digitize crime reports from officers and manually input location data via the use of addresses. They must also fulfill these functions despite equipment and personnel issues that affect data entry, GIS analysis and IT-related tasks. According to Seepersad (2016), CAPA's GIS Department was only supported by two staff members trained to use the mapping software ArcGIS using

²It is important to note that since 2016, the TTPS has added more methods to enable the geocoding of crime locations, including the outfitting of police patrol and emergency response vehicles with built-in GPS units, and has greatly added to the number of handheld GPS devices available to each Station. Additionally, calls to service made using mobile phones and a TTPS branded crime app allow for the automatic recording of the locations of past or in progress crime events.

two computers that lack the processing power required to efficiently complete their assigned tasks. He also noted that CAPA was able to facilitate data entry at only twenty-eight of the country's seventy-seven police stations, so that many stations must manually send out their forms every two days. Additionally, the results of the survey indicated that officers often submitted crime report forms late, with 40% reporting they were unable to submit reports on time at some point within the last year.

This means that by the time a crime map is produced, it may already be outdated by months. This lengthy delay between the collection of crime data and the production of their analytical output in the form of visualizations and statistics is a major deterrent to the effectiveness of targeted operations, such as the planning of patrols. Officers often complained that by the time they received the information in weekly Compstat briefings, it was either outdated or not a true reflection of the patterns they observed "on the street". Additionally, many officers said that the information received was outright wrong. These issues may account for the dissatisfaction many officers expressed towards Compstat's implementation (Figure 1). Over 30% of officers surveyed felt that the Compstat process was not very effective.

Given that one of Compstat's primary aims is knowledge dissemination of crime patterns to officers, quantitatively assessing their awareness of crime hot spot locations and peak periods of criminal activity may be a useful exercise in assessing the success of the model's implementation by the TTPS. To this end, officers' perceptions of crime patterns were directly compared with statistical crime data. Considering problems accessing data and complaints of inaccuracy of the information disseminated at Compstat meetings, it is not surprising that the results of such




Figure 1. Common Challenges Officers Reported with Compstat.



Figure 2. Statistically Derived Hot Spots of Homicide (Left) and Breaking Offences (Right), Each Overlaid by Police Perceptions of Hot Spot Locations (Dots).

Table 1. Number of Crime Events, Police Estimates of Hot Spot Locations and their Accuracy.

Crime Type	Number of Crime Events (2014–2016)	Police Estimates of Hotspot Areas	Correct Estimates	Correct Estimates (%)
Homicides	46	71	66	93.0%
Assaults	136	43	36	83.7%
Breaking Offences	373	28	19	67.9%
Sexual Offences	110	15	7	46.7%

comparative analyses showed that officers’ perceptions were not always consistent with what the statistical data portrayed, with the accuracy of officers’ perceptions varying a great deal depending on crime type (Figure 2, Table 1). It was found that officers generally displayed greater accuracy when pointing out the locations of hot spots of violent offences. Specifically, homicide and assault saw the greatest accuracy in law enforcement estimates of hot spot location. However, the same degree of spatial awareness of hot spot locations officers demonstrated for violent offences was not shared for non-violent crime types. While breaking offences saw a moderate rate of accurate responses, sexual offences saw the most erroneous responses given by officers.

Similarly, officers were generally accurate in their knowledge of temporal concentrations (periods of heightened activity) for violent offences, at various timescales. For the violent offence of assault, the majority of officers were right in the expressed belief that assaults were more frequent at night. More than half of all officers surveyed, specifically 54.2%, thought that this was the case. This trend was deemed to be accurate when compared with the statistical data. It showed that a majority (61.3%) of offences occurred between the period of 1800 and 0600 hours (6 PM to 6 AM), with 2300 hours being the modal interval. Not only were officers fairly well aware of the temporal concentration of violent crime over a 24-hour period but exhibited a similar degree of accuracy in identifying temporal concentrations over longer timescales. For example, when examining annual crime rates, assault data showed a clear spike in incidents from 2013 to 2015. Officers' perceptions were generally in line with this prominent statistical trend, with most (61.4%) stating they felt a notable increase had occurred within the last three years.

Despite officers' notable degree of success in identifying the spatial and temporal concentrations of the offences of homicide and assault, their perceptions of other crime types were demonstrated to generally be more erroneous and less congruent with the recorded crime data. For example, plotting out breaking offences³ along annual intervals showed a halving in the rate of occurrences from 2012 to 2015. However, less than half of all officers surveyed (42.1%) perceived that a decrease had occurred during this interval. The 24-hour time profile of sexual offences⁴ divided by hourly intervals showed a prominent spike in events during the day, from 0900 to 1600 hours. However, only around one-quarter of all officers surveyed (26.8%) were able to correctly assert that sexual offences were concentrated during the daytime.

The greater level of accuracy of officers' estimates for the spatial and temporal concentrations of homicide and assault in comparison to breaking and sexual offences may be partly explained by higher levels of delayed or under-reporting for these crime types (UNDP 2012). How-

³Breaking offences refer to the acts of burglary and break-in, which involve illegally entering an occupied dwelling during the night and day, respectively. Burglaries occur exclusively during the day, and break-ins occur exclusively during the night.

⁴Sexual offences include a broad range of criminal acts. For this study, four were analysed: rape, sexual assault, serious indecency and incest. Rape occurs when a person has sexual intercourse with another, without the consent of the complainant; sexual assault refers to penetrative sexual acts (other than intercourse); serious indecency is an act other than sexual intercourse involving the use of the genital organ; incest occurs when a blood relative engages in the act of sexual intercourse with another blood relative.

ever, the disparity among crime types may also be indicative of a disproportionate organizational focus on violent offences which tend to garner a high level of media attention. This may be described as the "if it bleeds, it leads syndrome" whereby notably violent crimes tend to attract media circulation, consequently leading to them garnering a comparatively higher level of prioritization (Eterno and Silverman 2012). Therefore, sexual and breaking offences, which tend to receive less media attention and public focus, would have also been less likely to receive a proportionate degree of attention during Compstat meetings. This may have ultimately been detrimental to the dissemination process for these crime types, explaining why officers' perceptions had a greater tendency to be incongruent with the statistically derived data.

Top-down control of data and decision-making

There is also the problem of limited data access among officers. The only means of disseminating crime data to them occurred via weekly Compstat meetings. A common complaint emerging from discussions with officers was that these meetings were too lengthy, with the information lectured to them in sessions that typically lasted 4–5 hours or sometimes longer. These meetings often took place outside of working hours, with little follow-up access to the data discussed and strategies planned during these sessions. Outside of Compstat meetings, there is no option for officers to look up statistics or observe changing crime patterns in order to better plan patrols or help develop targeted policing strategies or approaches. Control and access to this information remained in the hands and minds of high-ranking police officers.

The choice of restricting data access based on rank was readily defended by senior officers who justified the top-down structure as being better able to protect crime data from reaching into the hands of organized gangs assisted by corrupt police officers. However, there is still the issue that rank-and-file officers, the personnel probably holding the greatest ability to directly respond to crime patterns and benefit from having this information, not only lack the ability to access the data but also lack the ability to contribute in any meaningful way to discussions surrounding both short- and long-term plans for crime control and management. With supervision and planning still largely done in the traditional top-down manner, commanders lead the charge without much in the way of participatory input from officers "on the street". Officers often made the complaint that when it comes to crime plans raised in Compstat: "The top knows, but the bottom doesn't." It was not surprising that a huge

majority (88%) of the officers surveyed felt that data accessibility should be improved.

Lack of accountability

Instances of crime statistic manipulation have been recorded in a number of police jurisdictions in the United States (New York, Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, New Orleans, Philadelphia) and throughout the world (Australia, France, the United Kingdom), many of which adopted a management style similar to NYPD's Compstat model or had copied it entirely (Eterno and Silverman 2010a, 2012; Rashbaum 2010). Attempts at manipulating or spinning data in order to spread the idea that a situation is more favourable than is really the case are often referred to as "juking the stats" (Wallace 2014). For this reason, when crime data are being compared from one geographic locality or period of time to another, homicide data are often used to gauge a more representative reflection of crime levels, for the simple fact that homicides cannot be changed or coded down.

For Trinidad and Tobago in general and San Fernando in particular, it is significant to note that although the TTPS reports success of its Compstat policing efforts via the reduction of serious crimes (see La Vende 2013; Loop News 2017, 2018; Trinidad and Tobago Police Manpower Audit Committee 2017), such reporting may not be reflective of the full story of Compstat's impact on crime levels and possibly shrouds some of its shortcomings. From the period 2014 to 2015, there was a 6.7% reported decrease in the rate of serious criminal activity, although this same time period saw a concurrent increase in homicides (TTPS n.d.). Periodically, year after year, this same trend persists as the TTPS reports a decrease in serious crimes, while homicides continue to trend upwards annually (with the exception of 2020).

Examining these accounts and media briefings reveals that the organization often reports on decreases in serious crime across selectively curated time periods, such as the same month (e.g. January) or quarter (e.g. January to March) compared from one year to the other (La Vende 2013; Loop News 2017, 2018). However, the very same TTPS crime statistics show violent crime levels trending upwards or at least remaining stable along annual timescales, generally from 2014 to 2019. For example, while the TTPS reported that the 2018 crime statistics demonstrated a 2.5% decrease in overall serious criminal activity compared with 2017, the rate of homicides increased across this same period (OSAC 2019). Apart from crime statistics, a few officers also verbally reported that

the data that were being used and reported on were inaccurate, with few accountability or auditing measures in place at the time.

Such issues have been highlighted in a government-sanctioned manpower audit of the TTPS which noted, "The inability for certain data to be verified is a frightening reality. This must be fixed with great urgency" (Trinidad and Tobago Police Manpower Audit Committee 2017). These factors highlight serious issues affecting the validity, integrity and accuracy of crime data, thereby compromising both the reliability and strategic usefulness of plans and other decisions made in Compstat. Given the sensitive nature of this topic, and the fact that surveys took place openly at police stations where officers were in the presence of fellow colleagues and commanders, this issue could not be probed openly. Although not covered directly in this paper, these factors point to the need for a more in-depth study into the organization's data authentication and crime reporting practices.

Conclusion and Recommendations

When Compstat was first implemented by the NYPD, it was lauded as a potentially potent antidote to the perceived underperformance of police personnel and concomitant increases in crime rates. By attempting to implement Compstat as a central tenet of its organizational philosophy, the TTPS hopes to replicate this past success by achieving repeated instances of targeted gains in crime reduction via the deployment of concentrated efforts at hot spots using accurate and timely crime data and operational plans. However, the results of its adoption locally did not necessarily parallel the success demonstrated by the NYPD. Instead, the TTPS's adoption of Compstat as a crime fighting strategy may have been compromised by structural and functional weaknesses operating at an organizational or institutional level.

Specifically, the paper has outlined several flaws regarding the organizational structure and institutional capacity of the TTPS to fulfil a number of mission-critical conditions conducive to the productive and efficient functioning of Compstat-related operations, when the failure of any one component can potentially cripple its overall effectiveness. Many of the study's findings suggest that the implementation of Compstat in San Fernando represents a poorly optimized and precariously integrated geospatial solution that is serviceable at best. It is apparent that a significant ingredient for its successful implementation hinges on tweaking the nuances of the approach in order to suit the "limitations" which

characterize the unique operational environment. Particularly, the application of Compstat in the context of the TTPS necessitates both adaptation of the method and a strengthening of the capacity of the police service in order to effectively support the implementation. Therefore, despite its current defunct state, this does not preclude the possibility of major reform and transformation. A central focus should involve addressing its systemic shortfalls and enhancing inherent synergies among the administrative, operational and technical components of the TTPS.

In this regard, inherent structural and resource constraints faced by the TTPS need to be addressed before Compstat can be fully integrated and its full potential realized. Immediate efforts should centre on improving resources in order to facilitate more efficient data collection and dissemination. Consideration should therefore be given to the gamut of GIS technologies which could potentially facilitate the digitization of crime data through the use of mobile data collection tools. These tools tend to be more user-friendly and accessible than traditional handheld GPS devices and may be better for real-time data collection and management as data trends can be easily transferred to a central server. The integration of these technologies may also be beneficial as they require less intensive training and are deployed on mobile devices, such as cell phones or tablets, which are essentially ubiquitous in today's world. Additionally, GIS dashboards provide an excellent platform for visualization of spatial and statistical insights. Ultimately, the successful integration of these technologies and approaches should be necessarily underpinned by a consistent auditing and evaluation process involving critical assessments by independent third-party organizations and the academic research community.

Despite its shortcomings, the transition to an evidence-based policing paradigm by the TTPS should certainly be regarded as a laudable effort at transformational change, representing a stark departure from the more reactive nature of its past operations. However, such technocentric interventions should really be viewed as only part of a solution which inevitably demands a multifaceted approach, and their adoption should not be seen as the magical quick fix that they are often perceived to be. If replication of Northern policies ignores the local and unique contexts of policing, they will ultimately fail to reproduce desired outcomes. The problem may not lie with the policy itself, but rather the lack of effort taken to fully adapt it to the political, social and cultural aspects of the local setting and integrate it at all operational levels of the institutional structure. Policies cannot implement themselves. They require intense and consistent leadership,

organizational commitment as well as a great deal of creativity and flexibility to be optimized specifically for local operations.

Ultimately, the study suggests that Compstat's success in the TTPS may have been hampered by a poor communicative and organizational culture within the police service, leading to numerous systemic weaknesses which potentially compromised its implementation. Accordingly, greater focus should be placed on adaptation rather than wholesale adoption and mimicry of approaches and philosophies originating in more developed countries. Although situated within the context of Trinidad and Tobago, the challenges outlined and suggested recommendations are potentially relevant to other law enforcement settings in the developing world. Wherever the jurisdiction, policing and crime control in a Global South context require the need for nuanced approaches in the face of rising rates of crime, inadequate resource access, the tendency for corrupt public institutions, among other debilitating factors.

References

- Agozino, B. "Imperialism, Crime and Criminology: Towards the Decolonisation of Criminology." *Crime, Law and Social Change* **41**, no. 4 (2004): 343–358.
- Ashby, M., and K. Bowers. "A Comparison of Methods for Temporal Analysis of Aoristic Crime." *Crime Science* **2**, no. 1 (2013): 1–16.
- Baek, H., S. Han, and R. Seepersad. "The Impact of Social Support and Occupational Stress on Burnout in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service." *Police Quarterly* (2021).
- Bennett, C. "What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?" *British Journal of Political Science* **21**, no. 2 (1991): 215–233.
- Bissessar, A. M. "Policy Transfer and Implementation Failure: A Review of the Policy of Domestic Violence in Trinidad and Tobago." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology* **5**, no. 1–2 (2000): 57–80.
- Blaustein, J. "Exporting Criminological Innovation Abroad: Discursive Representation, Evidence-Based Crime Prevention and the Post-Neoliberal Development Agenda in Latin America." *Theoretical Criminology* **20**, no. 2 (2016): 165–184.
- Bowling, B. "Transnational Criminology and the Globalization of Harm Production." In *What is Criminology?* edited by M. Bosworth and C. Hoyle, 361–379. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011a.
- Bowling, B. *Policing the Caribbean: Transnational security cooperation in practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011b.
- Bratton, W., and P. Knobler. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House, 1998.

- Bratton, W., and S. Malinowski. "Police Performance Management in Practice: Taking COMPSTAT to the Next Level." *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 2, no. 3: 259–65, 2008.
- Brantingham, P., and P. Brantingham. "Environment, Routine and Situation: Toward a Pattern Theory of Crime." *Advances in Criminological Theory* 5, no. 2 (1993a): 259–294.
- Brantingham, P., and P. Brantingham. "Nodes, Paths and Edges: Considerations on the Complexity of Crime and the Physical Environment." *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 13, no. 1 (1993b): 3–28.
- Brantingham, P., and P. Brantingham. "A Theoretical Model of Crime Hot Spot Generation." *Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention* 8, no. 1 (1999): 7–26.
- Brantingham, P., P. Brantingham, and T. Molumby. "Perceptions of Crime in a Dreadful Enclosure." *Ohio Journal of Science* 77, no. 6 (1977): 256–261.
- Bruzual, A. Protective services hopeful for budget \$\$ to boost security. *Trinidad and Tobago Express*, September 16, 2016. https://trinidadexpress.com/news/local/protective-services-hopeful-for-budget-to-boost-security/article_b06b715f-e90e-5fb0-ae6c-d5c57b3f9be6.html.
- Cain, M. "Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Sociology of Crime." *British Journal of Criminology* 40, no. 2 (2000): 239–260.
- Carrington, K., B. Dixon, D. Fonseca, D. R. Goyes, J. Liu, and D. Zysman. "Criminologies of the Global South: Critical Reflections." *Critical Criminology* 27, no. 1 (2019): 163–189.
- Carrington, K., R. Hogg, and M. Sozzo. "Southern Criminology." *The British Journal of Criminology* 56, no. 1 (2016): 1–20.
- Central Statistical Office. *2011 Population and Housing Census: Demographic Report*. Port of Spain: Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development, 2012.
- Clark, J. "Policy Diffusion and Program Scope: Research Directions." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 15, no. 4 (1985): 61–70.
- Cohen, S. "Western Crime Models in the Third World: Benign or Malignant." In *Against Criminology*, edited by S. Cohen, 171–202. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988.
- Connell, R. *Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- Connell, R. "Meeting at the Edge of Fear: Theory on a World Scale." *Feminist Theory* 16, no. 1 (2015): 49–66.
- Daems, T. "Slaves and Statues: Torture Prevention in Contemporary Europe." *British Journal of Criminology* 57, no. 3 (2017): 627–643.
- Dobbin, F., B. Simmons, and G. Garrett. "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (2007): 449–472.
- Dolowitz, D., and D. Marsh. "Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature." *Political Studies* 44, no. 2 (1996): 343–357.
- Dolowitz, D., and D. Marsh. "Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making." *Governance* 13, no. 1 (2000): 5–23.

- Dommel, P. "Neighborhood Rehabilitation and Policy Transfer." *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 8, no. 3 (1990): 241–250.
- Ellison, G., and N. Pino. *Globalization, Police Reform and Development: Doing it the Western Way?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Eterno, J., and E. Silverman. "The NYPD's Compstat: Compare Statistics or Compose Statistics?" *International Journal of Police Science & Management* 12, no. 3 (2010a): 426–449.
- Eterno, J., and E. Silverman. "Understanding Police Management: A Typology of the Underside of Compstat." *Professional Issues in Criminal Justice* 5, no. 2 (2010b): 11–28.
- Eterno, J., and E. Silverman. *The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation*. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2012.
- Eterno, J., E. Silverman, and M. Berlin. "Police Leadership of Tomorrow: Comprehensive Compstat Performance Management Moving from Stagnation to Innovation." *Police Practice and Research* 22, no. 1 (2020): 886–902.
- Helms, D. "Temporal analysis." In *Tactical Crime Analysis*, edited by Derek Paulsen, Sean Bair and Dan Helms, 91–104. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2009.
- Henry, V. *The COMPSTAT Paradigm: Management Accountability in Policing, Business, and the Public Sector*. New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, 2002.
- Hibdon, J. *What's Hot and What's Not: The Effects of Individual Factors on the Identification of Hot and Cool Crime Spots*. PhD Dissertation. George Mason University, 2011.
- Hudson, B., D. Hunter, and S. Peckham. "Policy Failure and the Policy-Implementation Gap: Can Policy Support Programs Help?" *Policy Design and Practice* 2, no. 1: 1–14, (2019).
- Jaitman, L., and N. Ajzenman. *Crime Concentration and Hot Spot Dynamics in Latin America*. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2016.
- Jones, T., and T. Newburn. "Policy Convergence and Crime Control in the USA and the UK." *Criminal Justice* 2, no. 2: 173–203, (2002).
- Jones, T., and T. Newburn. *Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice: Exploring US Influence Over British Crime Control Policy*. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2007.
- Jones, T., and T. Newburn. "Understanding Transnational Policy Flows in Security and Justice." *Journal of Law and Society* 46 (2019): S12–S30.
- Kennedy, D., A. Braga, and A. Piehl. "The (un)known universe: Mapping gangs and gang violence in Boston." In *Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention*, edited by D. Weisburd and T. McEwen, 219–264. Monsey: Criminal Justice Press, 1998.
- Kitchen, R., and M. Blades. *The Cognition of Geographic Space*. London: L.B. Taurus, 2002.
- Klinger, D. "Environment and Organization: Reviving a Perspective on the Police." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593, no. 1 (2004): 119–136.
- Klinger, D., R. Rosenfeld, D. Isom, and M. Deckard. "Race, Crime, and the Micro-Ecology of Deadly Force." *Criminology & Public Policy* 15, no. 1 (2016): 193–222.

- La Vende, J. Murders hit 405, but TTPS boasts of lowest serious crimes in 29 years. *Trinidad and Tobago Guardian*, December 31, 2013. <https://www.guardian.co.tt/article-6.2.413103.c271ba2424>.
- Linde, R. *The Globalization of Childhood: The International Diffusion of Norms and Law against the Child Death Penalty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Loader, I., and R. Sparks. "Criminology's Public Roles: A Drama in Six Acts." In *What is Criminology?* edited by M. Bosworth and C. Hoyle, 17–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Loop News. TTPS: Serious crimes down 29 percent for 2017. *Loop News Trinidad and Tobago*, March 30, 2017. <https://tt.loopnews.com/content/ttps-serious-crimes-down-29-percent-2017>.
- Loop News. TTPS: Crime rate down, except for murder. *Loop News Trinidad and Tobago*, April 11, 2018. <https://tt.loopnews.com/content/ttps-crime-rate-down-except-murder>.
- Maguire, E., and W. King. "Transferring Criminal Investigation Methods from Developed to Developing Nations." *Policing and Society* **23**, no. 3 (2013): 346–361.
- Maguire, E., W. King, D. Johnson, and C. Katz. "Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean." *Policing & Society* **20**, no. 4 (2010): 373–400.
- Marsh, D., and J. Sharman. "Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer." *Policy Studies* **30**, (3) (2009): 269–288.
- Mastrofski, S., and C. Lum. "Meeting the Challenges of Police Governance in Trinidad and Tobago." *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* **2**, no. 4 (2008): 481–496.
- Natarajan, M. "Crime in Developing Countries: The Contribution of Crime Science." *Crime Science* **5**, no. 8 (2016).
- Nelken, D. "Comparative Criminal Justice: Beyond Ethnocentrism and Relativism." *European Journal of Criminology* **6**, (4) (2009): 291–311.
- OSAC. *Trinidad and Tobago 2016 Crime & Safety Report*. Port of Spain: Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2016.
- OSAC. *Trinidad and Tobago 2017 Crime & Safety Report*. Port of Spain: Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2017.
- OSAC. *Trinidad and Tobago 2018 Crime & Safety Report*. Port of Spain: Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2018.
- OSAC. *Trinidad and Tobago 2019 Crime & Safety Report*. Port of Spain: Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2019.
- Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago. *A summary of the police service's expenditure, departments and projects*. Port of Spain: Financial Scrutiny Unit, Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, 2017.
- Peck, J. "Geographies of Policy: From Transfer-Diffusion to Mobility-Mutation." *Progress in Human Geography* **35**, no. 6: 773–797, 2011.
- Pino, N. "Trinidad and Tobago: Crime, Police Corruption, and Police Reforms." In *Police Corruption and Police Reforms in Developing Societies*, edited by K. R. Hope Sr., 230–251. Boca Raton: Routledge, 2016.

- Rambally, R. Crime ... a major budget concern. *Trinidad and Tobago Guardian*, September 25, 2016. <https://www.guardian.co.tt/article-6.2.358306.8a72515431>.
- Rashbaum, W. Retired officers raise questions on crime data. *The New York Times*, February 6, 2010. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/nyregion/07crime.html>.
- Ratcliffe, J., and M. McCullagh. "Aoristic Crime Analysis." *International Journal of Geographical Information Science* **12**, no. 7 (1998): 751-764.
- Ratcliffe, J., and M. McCullagh. "Chasing Ghosts? Police Perception of High Crime Areas." *British Journal of Criminology* **41**, no. 2 (2001): 330-341.
- Rengert, G., and W. Pelfrey. "Cognitive Mapping of the City Center: Comparative Perceptions of Dangerous Places." In *Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention*, edited by D. Weisburd and T. McEwen, 193-217. Monsey: Criminal Justice Press, 1997.
- Robertson, A. "Criminal Justice Policy Transfer to POST-SOVIET STATES: Two Case Studies of Police Reform in Russia and Ukraine." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* **11**, no. 1 (2005): 1-28.
- Rose, R. "What is Lesson-Drawing?" *Journal of Public Policy* **11**, no. 1 (1991): 3-30.
- Safir, H. "Goal-Oriented Community Policing: The NYPD Approach." *Police Chief* **64**, (1997): 31-39.
- Seepersad, R. *Crime and Violence in Trinidad and Tobago*. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2016.
- Shearing, C., and M. Marks. "Criminology's Disney World: The Ethnographer's Ride of South African Criminal Justice." In *What is Criminology?* edited by M. Bosworth and C. Hoyle, 125-142. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Sheptycki, J. "Relativism, Transnationalisation and Comparative Criminology." In *Transnational and Comparative Criminology*, edited by J. Sheptycki and A. Wardak, 79-98. London: Glasshouse, 2005.
- Sherman, L. W. "The rise of evidence-based policing: Targeting, testing, and tracking." *Crime and Justice*, **42**, no. 1 (2013): 377-451.
- Silverman, E. *NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999.
- Sobol, J., Y. Wu, and I. Sun. "Neighborhood Context and Police Vigor: A Multilevel Analysis." *Crime & Delinquency* **59**, no. 3: 344-368, (2013).
- Steinberg, J. "Crime Prevention Goes Abroad: Policy Transfer and Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Theoretical Criminology* **15**, no. 4 (2011): 349-364.
- Trinidad and Tobago Police Manpower Audit Committee. *Final Report of the Police Manpower Audit Committee – Now is the Time, No Sacred Cows*. Port of Spain: Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2017.
- TTPS, *Total Crime by Division Report*, n.d. <http://tpps.gov.tt/Statistics/Crime-Division-Totals>
- UNDP. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and Shift to Better Citizen Security*. New York: UNDP, 2012.
- Walker, J. "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States." *American Political Science Review* **63**, no. 3: 880-899, (1969).

- Wallace, J. "Juking the stats? Authoritarian information problems in China. *British Journal of Political Science* **46**, no. 1 (2014): 11-29.
- Walsh, W. "Compstat: An Analysis of An Emerging Police Managerial Paradigm." *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* **24**, no. 3 (2001): 347-362.
- Walsh, W., and G. Vito. "The Meaning of Compstat: Analysis and Response." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* **20**, no. 1 (2004): 51-69.
- Watson, D., L. M. Johnson, N. Pino, and P. Morgan. "Police Perceptions of Residents in a High-Crime Area in Trinidad and Tobago: Community Framing and Crime Wars." *Criminology and Criminal Justice* **21**, no. 1 (2019): 3-20.
- Weisburd, D., E. Groff, and S.-M. Yang. *The Criminology of Place: Street Segments and Our Understanding of the Crime Problem*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Willis, J., D. Weisburd, and S. Mastrofski. *Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities*. Washington DC: Police Foundation, 2003.
- World Bank. *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington DC: World Bank, 2011.

Interrupting Gang Violence in Urban Trinidad through Conflict Mediation

Ericka B. Adams¹, Patrice K. Morris²,
and Edward R. Maguire³

¹(Corresponding Author) Department of Justice Studies, San José State University, One Washington Square, San José, CA 95192
/Email: ericka.adams@sjsu.edu

²Georgia Gwinnett College, Criminal Justice and Criminology,
W-1148 1000 University Center Lane, Lawrenceville,
GA 30043 /Email: pmorris1@ggc.edu

³Director of Public Safety Innovation Lab, Arizona State
University
/Email: edmaguire@asu.edu

Abstract

Gang violence is an ongoing threat to community safety and citizen security in many communities in Trinidad and Tobago. Known for high violent crime rates in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago has been battling gangs and escalating rates of gang-related violence for more than two decades. To tackle the ongoing issue of gang violence, the Trinidadian government adopted a community-based intervention strategy known as Project REASON (Resolve Enmity, Articulate Solutions, Organize Neighborhoods). Adapted from Cure Violence, an initiative developed in Chicago, Project REASON assigned trained community members to engage in mediation efforts with offenders, victims and other stakeholders. The current study is an exploratory analysis of the specific approaches used by Project REASON staff in their efforts to prevent gang-related violence in high crime communities in Trinidad.

Keywords: gang violence; community-based violence intervention; Trinidad and Tobago; Cure Violence.

Introduction

Trinidad and Tobago is a two-island state in the southeastern Caribbean that has experienced a dramatic increase in homicides over the past

twenty years. In 2019, the murder rate in the nation was 41.5 per 100,000, which places it among the most violent nations in the world.¹ Previous research has shown that approximately 60 per cent of homicides in the nation are gang-related (Maguire et al. 2010). Unfortunately, the criminal justice system has been largely unsuccessful at addressing gang-related violence, including homicides (Katz and Maguire 2015; Maguire et al. 2010). In reflecting on gangs in the Caribbean, Harriott (2015) urged researchers to widen their perspective from looking primarily at *distal* (or "root") causes to learning more about the *proximate* causes of gang-related phenomena, including gang violence. While it may take a generation or more to influence distal causes (such as poverty and unemployment), proximate causes (such as gang rivalries) lend themselves more easily to achieving short-term results (Harriott 2015; Katz and Maguire 2015). One approach to addressing proximate causes is mediation efforts that seek to prevent imminent acts of violence. In this paper, we examine the activities carried out by *violence interveners* (VIs) in Trinidad and Tobago who were employed for just this purpose. These are people with deep connections to the communities they serve who intervene directly with offenders, victims and their associates and loved ones, to prevent violence.

Trinidad and Tobago is a "small island developing state" of about 1.3 million people located approximately 7 miles from the northeastern coast of Venezuela.² Although it is one of the wealthiest nations in the Caribbean due to its reserves of oil and natural gas, many of its residents are impoverished (Kedir and Sookram 2013; Moonansingh, Wallace, and Dialsingh 2019). As of 2012, there were 102 criminal gangs in Trinidad and Tobago (Seepersad 2015). Violence, specifically murder, is concentrated in a handful of hot spots, including the urban communities of Port of Spain, which is the capital of Trinidad and Tobago (Felix-John and Williams 2013; Hill 2013; Katz and Maguire 2015; Maguire et al. 2008; Seepersad 2015). Previous research has shown that 28.6 per cent of gang members in the country report having been shot, 66.7 per cent have been threatened with a gun and 52.4 per cent have been injured with a weapon (Katz, Maguire, and Choate 2011). Consistent with findings

¹In 2015, the most recent year for which the World Health Organization has released international homicide data, Trinidad and Tobago ranked eighth in the world with a homicide rate of 32.8 per 100,000 people.

²Trinidad and Tobago is one of 38 nations in the world designated by the United Nations as Small Island Developing States. For more information, see: <https://www.un.org/ohrrls/content/about-small-island-developing-states>

from other nations, research in Trinidad and Tobago suggests that there is a strong connection between gang involvement and violent victimization. Gang leaders attain power through violent struggles to control illicit markets³ and secure lucrative public work contracts from the government (Adams, Morris, and Maguire 2018; Griffin and Persad 2013; Maguire et al. 2008; Seepersad 2015). Rivalries for these contracts have resulted in shootouts within communities and the deaths of gang leaders, gang members, people perceived as threatening by gangs and people who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Not surprisingly, a survey of residents in Trinidad and Tobago's capital city, Port of Spain, found that over 50 per cent of residents felt unsafe in that area and that their community had pressing issues with gun violence (QURE Limited 2015).

The sharp increase in gang-related and gun-related violence led local officials to search abroad for viable policy options. One such option was a community-based violence reduction initiative known as Cure Violence (CV), which was developed in Chicago and was later implemented in many other settings (Butts et al. 2015; Ransford and Slutkin 2017). In Trinidad, the local adaptation of CV was named Project REASON (Resolve Enmity, Articulate Solutions, Organize Neighborhoods), and it was implemented in sixteen urban communities in the Port of Spain metropolitan area.⁴ A quasi-experimental impact evaluation found that Project REASON was associated with "a significant and substantial drop in violence" in the communities where it was implemented (Maguire, Oakley, and Corsaro 2018: 36). The present study draws on qualitative analysis of data from interviews with a variety of Project REASON stakeholders to understand the roles played by VIs⁵ in the communities where they were assigned, including the specific mechanisms they used to reduce violence.

³Our interviews in this and previous projects reveal that gangs in Trinidad and Tobago participate in a variety of illicit markets, including drugs and guns. Some of them also engage in other revenue-generating offenses including kidnapping for ransom and murder for hire.

⁴The sixteen communities include Beetham Estate, Belmont, Eastern Port of Spain, Eastern Quarry, Gonzales, Laventille, Marie Road, Mon Repos, Morvant, Never Dirty, Picton, Port of Spain Proper, Romain Lands, Sea Lots, St. Barbs and Upper Belmont.

⁵The Cure Violence model distinguishes between two different types of workers: "violence interrupters" and "outreach workers". Violence interrupters are responsible for mediating "impending or ongoing street conflicts before a shooting occurs", whereas outreach workers "serve as case managers to help youth access needed social services and work on longer-term lifestyle objectives, such as leaving a gang" (Whitehill et al. 2014, p. 85). A process evaluation of Project REASON found that although outreach workers were hired, they did not engage in the types of focused interventions that characterized their intended role (Maguire, Oakley, and Corsaro 2018). In the present study, we use the generic term "violence intervener" to refer to employees who were engaged in mediation efforts whether their formal title was outreach worker or violence interrupter.

Review of Relevant Literature

Gang violence in Trinidad's capital

Gang violence continues to circumscribe the lives of non-gang-affiliated persons who reside in gang-infiltrated communities in Trinidad and Tobago. Gang rivalries affect the ability of residents to engage safely in routine activities such as walking to school or work, purchasing groceries, seeking medical attention or taking a taxi (Felix-John and Williams 2013). Young men feel trapped in their neighbourhoods because crossing invisible borderlines and entering another gang's turf can be deadly (Adams, Morris, and Maguire 2018). To avoid being hit by stray bullets, some residents prevent their children from playing in common areas (e.g. community streets and playgrounds), avoid using rooms in their homes that face the street and sleep on the floor (Adams, Morris, and Maguire 2018). Residents in gang-infiltrated communities also report difficulty in finding employment due to the reputation of the area where they live (Adams, Morris, and Maguire 2018; Felix-John and Williams 2013). Some residents have resorted to changing the address listed on their resumes to increase the probability of securing employment. These are just a few of the strategies used by residents to cope with gang violence since the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), and the criminal justice system more broadly, lacks the capacity to control gangs and violence effectively (Katz and Maguire 2015).

Strategies to intervene in gang violence

The criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago has experienced significant difficulties in addressing gang violence generally and gang-related homicides more specifically. These difficulties are perhaps most evident in the nation's low homicide clearance rate, which creates an environment of impunity in which offenders are unlikely to be arrested and convicted for committing acts of violence (Clancy, Brookman, and Maguire 2019; Maguire et al. 2010). Previous research has shown that these issues arose, in part, due to infrastructure issues within the criminal justice system. For instance, homicide investigators often lacked the training and experience necessary to conduct these investigations in a thorough and competent manner (Katz and Maguire 2015; Maguire et al. 2010). Similarly, the nation's crime laboratory lacked the capacity to collect, preserve, transport and process physical evidence from crime scenes in a manner that would help move criminal cases forward (King

and Wells 2015). At the same time, some of the reasons for the low homicide clearance rate were external to the criminal justice system. Perhaps one of the most important reasons was the environment of fear created by criminal street gangs. Fear of retaliation from gangs led most eyewitnesses to refuse to cooperate with the police (Clancy, Brookman, and Maguire 2019; Katz and Maguire 2015; Maguire et al. 2010). As a result, arrests in gang homicides are rare, and prosecutions seldom result in convictions (Clancy, Brookman, and Maguire 2019; Katz and Maguire 2015).

Traditional law enforcement strategies that rely primarily on suppression (rather than prevention or intervention) have produced limited success in the fight against gangs, crime and violence in Trinidad and Tobago (Seepersad 2015). Since most of the gang violence is concentrated in certain people and places, researchers suggest that targeted strategies with a strong focus on the right people and places would be more likely to reduce violence than more commonly used generic strategies (Maguire et al. 2008; Katz and Maguire 2015). These findings are consistent with the criminological literature more broadly, which suggests that suppression efforts alone are insufficient to control gangs and gang violence (Klein and Maxson 2006). Research shows that communities must couple their suppression efforts with prevention strategies that keep young people out of gangs and intervention strategies that focus on altering the behaviour of people who are already in gangs (Klein and Maxson 2006; Spergel and Grossman 1997). In Trinidad and Tobago, the government created the Citizen Security Program (CSP) to provide a variety of services to high-risk youth in the nation's most distressed communities. The CSP chose to adopt CV as part of its suite of prevention and intervention efforts.

CV is a community-based public health initiative designed to address the prevalence of gun violence mainly in struggling impoverished communities. CV has been implemented in several cities in the United States and elsewhere, primarily in locations that struggle with firearm violence and high rates of violent crime. The central goal of the CV model is to prevent violence in communities. The objective is to intervene and interrupt potentially violent conflicts before they escalate and result in death or serious injury. To reduce violence effectively, the CV model relies on trained, paid employees recruited from the community. Critical to the success of CV initiatives are two types of program staff: violence interrupters and outreach workers. Violence interrupters are usually individuals who have a history of criminal involvement and or gang affiliation, many of whom have been previously incarcerated. Violence interrupters, who are mainly men, serve as the eyes and ears of their community.

They not only attempt to interrupt violence but also build relationships with the youth who pose a danger to the community. They work with outreach workers who are mainly responsible for connecting the high-risk youth to employment opportunities and resources such as skills training and educational programmes.

The local adaptation of CV became known as Project REASON. It was launched in 2016 across sixteen distressed urban communities in and around the Port of Spain metropolitan area. Project REASON is predicated on the notion that certain acts of violence can be prevented when properly trained community members engage in mediation efforts with offenders, victims and other stakeholders (Maguire, Oakley, and Corsaro 2018). Project REASON adopted the CV strategy for "interrupting" imminent acts of violence. Consistent with the CV approach, Project REASON hired twelve people to engage in violence intervention efforts who had deep connections to their communities and who knew many of the people in criminal street gangs. Many members of the staff had been gang members themselves and had spent time in prison for a variety of criminal offenses. VIs were trained, from 8 to 18 June in 2015, on the guiding principles of the CV model and the methods and strategies for violence intervention (Maguire et al. 2018). Topics covered in the training included, but were not limited to: identifying situations that are likely to result in violence, responding to shooting victims and peacefully mediating conflicts. In this paper, we explore in detail the specific approaches used by Project REASON staff to prevent gang-related violence in high crime communities in Trinidad. Our analysis also helps illuminate some of the challenging interpersonal and social dynamics of high crime neighbourhoods rife with gang problems.

Methodology

The qualitative data analysed in this paper were collected as part of an evaluation of Project REASON. The evaluation contained three components: an impact evaluation to determine whether the initiative reduced violence, a process evaluation that documented the implementation of Project REASON and a cost-effectiveness analysis. The current paper draws on data collected as part of the process evaluation. The research team gathered detailed field notes during their interviews with project stakeholders and during their observations in the communities where Project REASON was implemented. These field notes serve as the qualitative data that we analyse in this paper. The guiding research questions

for the paper are: (1) what strategies do Project REASON staff use to intervene in gang violence, and (2) what situational dynamics enable Project REASON staff to intervene successfully in a potentially violent situation?

Research strategy

The authors of this paper were members of a nine-person research team. Eight of the nine researchers resided in the United States at the time of this study. However, most of the researchers had extensive experience conducting research in the Caribbean. Four researchers were from the Caribbean, including two from Trinidad and Tobago and two from Jamaica. Three of the five researchers from the United States have conducted research in Trinidad and Tobago for more than a decade and have long-standing relationships with the communities under investigation. Individual members of the research team were insiders or outsiders at different points of the study with respect to their nationality, culture, place of residence, experience with the communities under investigation, race, class, gender and level of education (Merriam et al. 2001; Zinn 1979). The research team was aware of our insider/outsider status throughout the investigation and the impact it had on our perceptions of the experiences of our research participants. The research team met daily during data collection to compare notes, identify common themes and clarify potential misinterpretations. We spoke to community residents about our initial findings to ensure that our interpretations were consistent with their lived experience.

Data collection for the larger evaluation occurred from 2015 to 2018 using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews were the primary data collection techniques employed for the research reported here. The research team triangulated the data across multiple sources and methods with the hope of cross-validating our observations and inferences (Bailey 2007; O'Connell Davidson and Layder 1994). Data collection occurred in the sixteen Project REASON communities, all of which had high rates of gang activity and violence.

Semi-structured and focus group interviews were conducted with Project REASON staff. The Project REASON staff introduced the research team to residents and police officers assigned to the target communities; semi-structured interviews were conducted with this population. A total of thirty-seven semi-structured interviews and two focus groups were conducted. Eighteen of the thirty-seven semi-structured interviews conducted were with VIs and four interviews were with Project REASON's

supervisors and office managers. Of the fifteen remaining interviews, our respondent sample was diverse and included young males who had current or former gang affiliations, influential and respected local community residents, community residents impacted by gang violence, police officers assigned to the target communities and government officials. Interviews were conducted in locations where respondents spent time including their homes, neighbourhood shops, street corners, yards and local community organizations. Both focus group interviews were conducted with VIs at Project REASON's office. In 2015, ten of the twelve VIs participated in the focus group while in 2018, all twelve VIs were present for this interview. Interviewers took extensive notes during each interview and spent time recreating the interview and filling in their notes after each interview to ensure that all pertinent information was recorded. Semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours. Respondents did not receive monetary compensation for participation in this study. All participants were over the age of 18 and provided informed consent. All names and identifying information were removed from transcripts and notes. This study was approved by the institutional review board at [universities redacted for external review].

Analytical strategy

Members of the research team took detailed field notes during the data collection period and prepared the interview transcripts. Documenting field notes enabled us to organize our thoughts pertaining to interviewees' responses, identify areas where additional information was needed and keep track of how we laid claim to what we discovered (Lofland et al. 2006; Richardson and St. Pierre 2000). Initial coding of interview transcripts and field notes began during data collection (Lofland et al. 2006). Focused coding was completed by one researcher via NVivo (Version 11.4.3). Nodes were developed and grouped into themes. Reference counts were used to select the most important nodes for data analysis. Focused coding continued as the authors started writing this paper and comparing our findings to the existing literature.

Results

This section explores the factors that enable respondents to intervene in neighbourhood problems, including gang-related violence within their communities. In articulating the strategies Project REASON's VIs use

to mediate neighbourhood problems, one intervener said: "Everybody can be approached, is just when and where." For this VI, "[k]nowing who to talk to, how to talk to them, when to talk, and when not to talk" is key to successful intervention. This section explores the notion that "everybody can be approached" and unpacks how VIs' positionality, and their attempts to assist fellow residents with non-crime-related problems, situated them to intervene in gang-related homicides. The results are divided into four sections that explore (1) the characteristics of VIs, (2) VIs' intervention in neighbourhood problems, (3) VIs' intervention in community violence and (4) the role of the police.

Characteristics of violence interveners

VIs in this study were all Afro-Trinidadian men ($n = 9$) and women ($n = 3$) of various ages (20s–60s) who had strong ties in the high crime neighbourhoods where they worked. These interviewees were not only respected and well-known, but they also had experience with outreach work in their communities. Most had dedicated years (5–20 years, depending on the violence intervener) to addressing neighbourhood problems. Having lived in their communities for decades, VIs had personal experience with the struggles many residents experience. For example, most of the VIs had prior involvement in gangs, the criminal justice system or loved ones with criminal involvement. They were recruited to be VIs based on their community ties and involvement in outreach work. The next three subsections detail the characteristics that enable VIs to intervene successfully in neighbourhood problems and gang-related violence.

Street crime adjacent

At the time of this investigation, VIs self-reported no involvement in the street economy, but many shared experiences about their former involvement or contact with the criminal justice system. We refer to this positionality as *street crime adjacent*. In speaking about their former involvement in street crime, some VIs explained:

I started at the age of 12 years: robbing, shooting was my life of crime. I got shot by the police 7 times in my life. ... I was the leader of a gang.

From age 13 I was in gang, started smoking weed then stealing. I got locked up at age 22 for a month. Bank seized my car, I start making money through drugs. We planned to kill a man. He found out and send a man to try to kill me. Then I got shot.

I was incarcerated for robbery, shooting, murders. I spent 20 years in prison. It was really rough but I learn. ... I know the youth in my area very well.

Everybody knows my past life. They see I turn around my life and they give me that respect.

Here we see that some VIs were intimately involved in street crime. They reported being involved with gangs, engaging in crimes and being arrested and incarcerated for various offenses. Other VIs self-reported vicarious involvement in the street economy. For example, one male interviewee explained that his cousin "was an underworld boss who drafted in countless number of men into his underworld activities since 2000. He was killed in 2003." VIs' firsthand involvement and vicarious experiences with street crime and the criminal justice system situated them to connect with young people currently involved in street crime and empathize with youths' struggles.

Community trusted insiders

In conjunction with having prior involvement in the street economy, VIs live in the areas where they engage in intervention activities, and they face (or previously faced) many of the same social and economic struggles as other residents in these communities. Having intimate knowledge of these struggles is an important factor that distinguishes VIs from other well-intentioned citizens who attempt to intervene in gang violence. Interviewees said:

A lot guys who are running programs geared towards working with gang members cannot talk to these guys on the street. They cannot reach them.

Within these communities, you have people with degrees, people who are supposed to help community members with social services, but they cannot walk and talk with the people like we could. They might have state programs to do what we are doing but they are not hiring people who could reach community members. So although people talk behind closed doors, nothing is getting done.

Here, respondents articulate their belief that community outsiders with genuine intentions to help residents in the communities under investigation, or those that hold qualifications (e.g. degrees, jobs in non-profit or governmental organizations) that validate their capacity to intervene, may be unable to connect with gang members. This connection may provide a sense of trust and understanding that makes it easier for VIs to intervene in neighbourhood problems relative to other well-intentioned outsiders. In contrast, respondents believe that VIs' ability to identify with the struggles faced by gang members enables them to establish a connection more easily, thereby setting the stage for intervention. One resident explained:

Young men in the community don't want to talk with advocates, they don't. They say that they don't know what they are going through. VIs [are] people from the area who have rapport to deal with the heads of gangs.

In conjunction with sharing gang members' experiences, this respondent believes that VIs have the rapport to connect with gang members. Similarly, a VI explained that they spoke the same language as the gang members in their area which enabled them to reason with the gang leader. The VI said:

How I approach situations, I could challenge some of these guys. For example, I understand the Islamic standpoint so I could use that to talk to some of these guys. I have a gate at the back of my yard and the gang leader in the area told me not to lock the gate on two separate occasions. When I found him by himself, I used Islamic teachings to ask him: "Can I tell you how to tie your camel?" He said no and so I asked him then how could he tell me how to tie my camel. Since I am Muslim, I used insider knowledge to reason with him.

VIs' insider status in the communities under investigation provides a foundation of shared experiences with community members; it is upon this foundation that they could approach gang members and intervene in violence. However, VIs' insider status in the communities where they work means that they are aware of, and need to abide by, informal community rules that outsiders may find difficult to navigate.

Cannot work as informants

As a rule, VIs understand that they cannot serve as informants to law enforcement. They believe that if they provide information to the police, the police may share their name with offenders who are associated with this information. This would then trigger retaliation against the VI by the offender or his associates. As such, VIs (and residents of these neighbourhoods more broadly) perceive that they would be killed if they reported information about planned or completed crimes to the police (see Maguire et al. 2010). In speaking about community members' willingness to report the victimization they experience to the police, one VI noted:

Many innocent people have been shot because of the war. However, these innocent victims will not help the police because they fear for their lives. If the victims retaliate against the gang members (and report their victimization to the police), they may end up dying.

This quote exemplifies community members' inability to demand justice for their victimization through the legal system. Working with law enforcement to prosecute offenders would trigger additional

victimization for residents, thus many victims remain silent about the harm they experienced.

Studies conducted in other parts of Trinidad support the belief that reporting crimes to the police puts residents in danger of retaliation from offenders (Adams 2012; Maguire et al. 2010; Townsend 2009). Being very knowledgeable about the dynamics within their communities, VIs understand that reporting crimes to the police places them at risk of victimization. As such, VIs abided by community rules and uniformly avoided informing the police about crimes they learned about. VIs explained:

Our ears on the ground (people who inform us what is going on in the community) are more intense than the police. People trust us. If they suspect we are bringing information to the police we could be killed and so we do not report to the police. It boils down to trust.

We also have to be careful of how we disclose information. ... For example, if we were seen as giving the police information, all of us would lose credibility. Even if we know who did a shooting we have to keep that confidential.

Here we see that if VIs report their knowledge of completed or planned crimes to the police, they will face two threats: first, risk of victimization and second, loss of credibility. With interviewees viewing their informants as more "intense" or dangerous than the police, reporting offenses to law enforcement is very unlikely. However, when VIs do not report their knowledge of planned or completed crime to the police, they effectively enable criminal offenders to go unpunished. In contemplating the dilemma of reporting offenses to the police or abiding by informal community rules (i.e. against serving as informants), one VI noted:

My commitment is not to law enforcement, my commitment [is] to the families. When someone is shot, and they go to the hospital that is an expense on the state. When someone is arrested that is also an expense on the state. So yes, I might not be calling the police, but I am saving the state money and preventing a killing. If the person never got shot in the first place, we have one less Black person going to jail, one less Black person going to the hospital or to cemetery.

Here, the VI justifies not sharing information about potential offenses with the police stating that even though they are not working with law enforcement officials, they are creating change and impacting society in a positive way.

Intervening in neighbourhood problems

VIs have dedicated years to helping fellow community members with a variety of social and economic issues, many of which are not directly related to crime and violence. Where possible, they help community

members access social services and provide comfort during difficult times (e.g. the death of a loved one). VIs are well known in their community and, through community dialogue, become aware of the difficulties neighbourhood residents encounter. Upon learning of residents' hardships, VIs offer various forms of support. As explained by two VIs:

There was an incident where a young lady was being abused. She had three children for one man and one child for another guy and they had a matter in family court. From speaking to her over the phone, she mentioned she had court and I went with her so I could take care of the baby while she was attending court.

One [young man] stayed with me for two weeks because his mother got kicked out. He was 15 years. ... He stayed with me and he mother got back on her feet and he's back with her.

Here we see VIs serving as a support system for community members experiencing non-crime-related problems. These actions build trust and strengthen the bond between community residents.

A second area where VIs provide support to community members is after the death of a loved one. The homicide of a loved one is a deeply traumatic event associated with severe physical and mental health outcomes (Hinkson, Huggins, and Modeste-James 2020). Recognizing this, VIs aim to provide chief mourners with emotional support. One VI noted, "Last month, I brought a shooting victim's mother ... to see her son who was dead. That was one of the hardest things I've ever done." Here, the VI supports the mother of the deceased through an emotionally challenging experience – seeing the body of her deceased son. VIs also visit the homes of those mourning the death of a loved one to express their condolences to the family and provide small tokens of support (e.g. candles for the wake). They explained:

We pay a lot of attention to the victims of violence, the people who have lost family members. The violence shatters a home and when a person loses a family member, we usually refer them to victims support.

With the killing in the community, we try to help out in any way we could. We might offer them candles for the wake. We try to provide support systems to the families in the community.

There was a lady in Palmville⁶ whose husband was killed and about a year after her husband was killed, they killed her son. ... [We] were able to organize counseling. Through the help she got from counseling, she was able to go back to work and earn an income to help out her daughter with her grandchild.

Believing that "violence shatters the home", VIs are part of the community fabric that envelops those in mourning in a blanket of care. In

⁶Pseudonyms were assigned to each community to protect the identity of the research site and respondents.

supporting community members through the bereavement process, VIs show their commitment to community members' well-being. Further, VIs provide community members with information about publicly available support services that could help them navigate their bereavement. These support services (e.g. counseling) provide bereaved family members with the tools to process the death of their loved one and work through their grief.

The emotional support that VIs provide to grieving community members sometimes involves providing outlets for residents to express their grief. In relaying an incident where a young man was killed due to mistaken identity, one VI explained:

One of the [interventions] we did for the young people was that we brought cardboard and had the young man's picture on the cardboard. We put these in all the buildings and the young people write how they felt about the young man and how they felt about the war and the killing.

Here, VIs provide community members with an outlet to express their pain and frustration after the accidental killing of a young man. VIs provide various types of support to community members depending on each community member's specific needs. In general, VIs appear to have invested heavily in being present to care for members of their community who are enduring difficult experiences. In supporting community members with non-crime-related needs, VIs do the important work of forging relationships that may be helpful for intervening in future violent situations. At the same time, as we explore in more detail in the discussion section, these efforts may detract from the intense degree of focus on violence that is essential for effective violence interruption.

Intervening in community violence

In the previous sections, we discussed why VIs are well positioned to intervene in violent situations in the communities under investigation. Here, we explore the two intervention strategies that are implemented most often by VIs. These include talking potential offenders out of engaging in crime and engaging with potential victims and their loved ones to ensure that they take the necessary precautions to prevent imminent victimization.

Talking them down

VIs often focus their efforts on gang members or others who are planning to kill someone. Upon learning of a planned homicide, VIs go to potential

offenders to dissuade them from carrying out the offense. These conversations occur soon after VIs learn of the plan to commit a crime, often at various hours of the day or night, and they last many hours and sometimes several days. Speaking about this strategy, VIs said:

There was a case with Brent (pseudonym) in Humming Bird Road. He was into music, working, and a very respectable young man in his community. A person who was not so upstanding was spotted in front of Brent's building. Someone made the call to have that person killed. By the time the gunman came, the person he was supposed to shoot was gone and Brent was standing in front of the building. The gunman accidentally killed Brent. ... We had to sit on [stay with] the older brother for 4 days straight because he was very disturbed. We cooked food for him and made sure no one went to do any reprisals.

A taxi man was seen driving his car with a Muslim gang member in the front seat. They [gang 1] were about to kill the taxi-driver because they felt he was in solidarity with [gang 2]. [The VI] was trying desperately to save the taxi man's life. Of course, the taxi driver didn't even know his life was on the line. [The VI] begged the gang boss in his area to just give him a few minutes to see who the taxi man really was. In the end, when he talked to the taxi man, he wasn't even aware that his passenger was a member of any gang. He was simply offering his usual taxi service, and the gang member happens to be the one that stopped him, the taxi man explained that he was just trying to get his coins; he had no idea who the guy was. [The VI] was able to relay this back to the gang leader and the taxi operator was spared.

VIs have their "ears to the ground" in the communities under investigation. They are trusted insiders who leverage their status to talk potential criminal offenders out of killing someone. When successful, their efforts save lives. However, talking community members out of perpetrating a planned criminal offense is not always successful.

In some situations, VIs were unable to talk community members out of engaging in violence. This is evidenced through the conversations below:

A gang member called [the VI] to tell him that he was instructed to kill someone. The gang member was struggling with this instruction. ... As [the VIs] was talking to the gang member, [they] could see the tears rolling down his cheeks. He [gang member] quickly wiped them away, so that [the VI] and his colleague would not see it. They stayed with the gang member for hours, trying to dissuade him from carrying out this grisly act. However, as the hours waned, the gang member weepingly admitted that he just had to do it, he said "it was either that guy's life, or his. Because if he did not carry out the instructions that he was given, he would face consequences from the gang leader who ordered the hit." [The VI] admits he listened with bated breath to hear of the murder. Soon enough news came that the hit was carried out.

Five weeks ago a guy got shot during the day. [VIs] went to talk to the gang the victim was from. The gang members were very upset and actually noted "VI, vouch

for yourself. We killing someone today." Seeing that the gang members were very upset and were not listening to reason, we left. An important part of this [work] is knowing when to walk away.

Here we see two examples in which the VIs' efforts to intervene in two planned homicides were unsuccessful. In the first example, the gang member felt he had no choice but to carry out this murder – he believed it was either his life or the life of the victim. In the second situation, gang members were too upset about the death of one of their comrades to listen to reason; they were intent on retaliating.

Keeping them safe

In some cases, rather than engaging directly with would-be offenders, VIs engaged with potential victims or their loved ones and encouraged them to take precautionary measures, such as leaving the area. For example, in one incident, a VI explained:

Sometimes they tell you there is nothing you can do to stop them and then you just have to respect that and let them be. But if I cannot talk a guy out of killing someone, I might be able to talk the potential victim out of the area. We talk to their family and try to get them to help out with the situation.

It is well known in criminology that a crime requires an offender and a victim/target (with the exception of so-called "victimless crimes") (Cohen and Felson 1979). If the VI is unable to influence the would-be offender, then it may be a viable alternative to influence the intended victim. Below is another example in which a VI was able to encourage a potential victim's family to take precautionary measures to save their loved one's life:

There was an incident where a guy who is rocking with the Muslims went up in an area and told the guys that they is soft. These guys wanted to get him. So I called his sisters, who lived foreign, and they put him on a plane and they carry him out. Right now he is in Canada.

Because Trinidad and Tobago are small islands, it can be difficult for people to hide, therefore the intended victim's relatives moved him to a different country in an effort to save his life.

In some instances, VIs may seek to influence both the offender and the victim. For instance, VIs intervened with both the offender and victim in a case in which a baby was shot:

There was a situation where a man was going to shoot someone. I tried to stop him but by that time he had already bus the shots. He accidentally shot a child. So we worked with the child's mother and now the gunman is paying her compensation. The child did not die. The child was 1 year and 7 months old. The compensation

helped us settle this situation without retaliation. The police were called in but the person who shot the child did not get arrested. It is a set amount that the shooter will be paying to the mother.... If she said she wanted the shooter to be locked up instead of taking the money, she and the child would probably be dead right now. The state would not have moved them out of the community fast enough before the young man came to kill them.

This case illustrates how VIs operate outside the purview of the state, especially the formal criminal justice system. Here the VIs engineered an informal solution that excluded the state and its agents from any involvement. This example reinforces the idea that in communities without effective institutions, including criminal justice systems, informal social control can begin to take the place of formal social control. It is not reasonable to expect that a handful of VIs alone can control violence. Their role is to mediate in those situations where it is most likely to be effective in forestalling impending acts of violence. However, the VIs recognize that police still have a crucial role, as noted in the next section.

The role of the police

When a homicide occurs, police officers respond to the scene of the crime to investigate the incident. Heavy police presence sometimes deters the family and friends of the deceased from engaging in immediate acts of retaliation. In one of the situations described above, when VIs left gang members when they were told "vouch for yourself", the VIs returned to the group later that evening and realized that police officers' presence in the community had deterred the gang's planned attempt at retaliation. VIs said:

We went back [to the home of the deceased gang member] in the evening to talk with the gang and we stayed there until 3:30 the next morning ... Luckily, police were present in the community otherwise the gang members may have been more inclined to seek retaliation.

This was not a singular occurrence. Rather, other VIs provided examples where the presence of the police deterred other planned offenses. They explained:

We had another incident on Peeco Street where a Buccooville man was shot in his foot twice. Some of us went and took the guy to hospital. Then when I was in the hospital I got a call that some guys from Buccooville came up to retaliate and I had to go back down the road. I tried to talk to them but they didn't want to hear me. The police arrived and so nothing happened.

Then there was another incident on Ibis Street when some guys came down from Hibiscus Hill shooting at a youth man. The men from Ibis Street wanted to

go back for a reprisal, but we end up working with the youth man and calmed him down. We let them know that there were police on the other side to avoid that reprisal. There were no reprisals in that incident.

Noticing that the presence of police officers deterred community members from engaging in criminal offenses, VIs began relaying information about the presence of officers in adjacent communities to talk community members out of retaliation. Immediately following violent victimization or the death of the loved one, community members are not always ready to renounce their plans for retribution. In these instances, the presence of police officers investigating the initial offense may provide a cooling off period during which time VIs could talk potential offenders out of planned retaliation. Our focus on community-based violence initiatives is not meant to suggest that police do not have a role. The two efforts can co-exist in parallel with one another.

Discussion

Although much of the public discourse about preventing and reducing violent crime focuses on the formal criminal justice process (police, courts and corrections), community-based alternatives for controlling violence have also shown great promise (Abt 2019; Corvo 1997). In this paper, we examined the violence prevention efforts used by community-based VIs to reduce shootings and homicides in Trinidad and Tobago. These VIs were part of an effort known as Project REASON, a local adaptation of CV implemented in and around Port of Spain, the capital city of Trinidad and Tobago. A quasi-experimental impact evaluation showed that Project REASON resulted in "significant and substantial reductions in violence" over two years (Maguire et al. 2018, xiv). The current paper explored the work of these VIs, including the specific tactics they used to "interrupt" violence as part of Project REASON. These tactics are consistent in many ways with the CV model from which they were derived. In other instances, they deviated from the model in ways that raise interesting questions about implementing a US-based model in a developing nation with a weak social safety net.

Much of the debate around reducing crime and violence revolves around the "root causes" of crime such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, racial and ethnic tension and other dynamics that tend to change slowly. However, outbreaks of violence often erupt rapidly, particularly when cycles of retaliation are involved. In such instances, one shooting can lead to many *tit-for-tat* retaliation shootings. Retaliatory shootings

tend to be more predictable than other types of shootings, and their predictability provides a potential lever that can be used to interrupt the cycle. Mediation efforts, when carried out by people with the appropriate credibility and street knowledge, can help prevent imminent acts of violence. This is the foundation of the CV approach and was the basis for Project REASON in Trinidad.

Community-based intervention efforts may be especially suitable policy options in developing nations. In many developing nations, public trust and confidence in the formal criminal justice system – including the police – are low. Deficits in the perceived legitimacy of the police are often the result of the police being unresponsive to the needs of the populace. In some instances, legitimacy deficits may stem from overt forms of lawlessness such as corruption, brutality and criminal behaviour by the police (Goldsmith 2005; Haugen and Boutros 2014). In either case, when the population does not view the police as a legitimate institution, the police are likely to face significant difficulties in controlling violence. For example, witnesses who do not trust the police are less likely to provide police with information or to testify during criminal proceedings (Clancy, Brookman, and Maguire 2019). These legitimacy deficits are endemic in the developing world, where impoverished populations do not view police as an institution that they can trust or turn to for help or protection (Haugen and Boutros, 2014). In such circumstances, the most obvious policy solution is to reform the police, but decades of research have shown that police reform of this nature is both challenging and time-consuming (Ellison 2007; Goldsmith 2005; Prado Trebilcock and Hartford 2012). Another alternative in communities struggling with high rates of violence is to rely on community-based strategies to help control violence. CV, a public health approach to violence prevention, is one such strategy (Butts et al. 2015; Ransford and Slutkin 2017).

While research evidence on the effectiveness of CV and related strategies is mixed (Butts et al. 2015), quantitative findings from the evaluation of Project REASON in Trinidad and Tobago showed that it was clearly effective in reducing violence (Maguire et al. 2018). Our findings here suggest that VIs were deeply enmeshed in their communities, were aware of ongoing and emerging conflicts that may become violent and often became aware of imminent acts of violence, particularly in cases of retaliatory violence. This deep connection to the communities under study places VIs in a good position to influence would-be offenders and victims to forestall imminent acts of violence. Our findings in Trinidad and Tobago are consistent with findings from the United States, where researchers found that

"proactive efforts to learn about gang conflicts, retaliation, and minor incidents that could potentially lead to future violence are needed for this type of intervention to succeed" (Whitehill et al. 2014, 93).

However, VIs in Project REASON often found themselves engaging in activities that fell outside of the CV framework, including providing desperate residents with groceries, diapers for their babies or small cash handouts. Although VIs were not compensated for these expenditures, they viewed themselves as having little choice while navigating impoverished communities with no real social safety net. This adaptation is one that deserves further exploration as CV is adopted in other developing nations. On the one hand, it helps to cement personal relationships with residents in these communities. The trust that accrues from those relationships may prove invaluable for helping VIs in their efforts to prevent violence. On the other hand, engaging in these types of social welfare functions may distract VIs from having the high degree of focus on violence that is the hallmark of CV. Future research in other developing nations would be useful for clarifying the benefits and drawbacks of having VIs engage in these types of social welfare activities, particularly in disadvantaged communities.

The findings presented here are useful for understanding the potential role of community members in addressing problems, including violent crime, in their communities. Formal social control institutions such as the police are essential for safeguarding communities. However, these institutions are often underfunded, understaffed or otherwise dysfunctional, particularly in developing nations where they lack trust and perceived legitimacy (Haugen and Boutros 2014). In such settings, community-based initiatives may be able to contribute to the social safety net, offering prevention and intervention initiatives and helping to stimulate informal social control. Many such initiatives exist in the developing world, often administered by well-intentioned people seeking to better their communities. However, most of these initiatives have either not been rigorously evaluated or conflict with existing research evidence on what works. There is a strong need, particularly in the developing world, to build a rigorous body of empirical research on what works to reduce violence, fear and related outcomes. Project REASON is one of the few initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean for which there is now solid research evidence supporting its effectiveness. It should be tested and evaluated in a variety of other settings with an eye towards building up this body of knowledge.

While this study has many strengths, it is not without limitations. It examines one community-based violence reduction initiative in one

nation. It is based on a handful of interviews and observations carried out by researchers who visited the study site from another nation. Deeper ethnographic research involving more intensive observations and interviews would likely generate richer data and stronger inferences. Such research is not without risks in the settings where this research was carried out. During our fieldwork, gunfire erupted near the research team on two different occasions. Assuming such risks can be managed, rigorous ethnographic research in these communities could provide powerful lessons for how to reduce violence and reform the institutions that can play a role in achieving this important goal.

Conclusion

The research reported here is useful for thinking about the role of community-based violence intervention efforts in distressed communities facing serious gang violence issues. Project REASON is a community-based initiative that significantly reduced violence in Trinidad and Tobago. Project REASON staff embedded themselves in communities with high rates of violence, particularly gang violence. They paid close attention to the dynamics driving violence in these communities and took action to prevent imminent acts of violence. Their mediation efforts focused primarily on the would-be offenders who were expected to carry out imminent acts of violence as well as the intended victims. In some cases, their mediation efforts involved the loved ones of would-be offenders and victims. Using these methods, Project REASON was able to achieve dramatic reductions in violence in communities where gang violence was endemic.

Further research is needed to examine the role of such initiatives in developing nations, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean where homicide rates are among the highest in the world. Further research is also needed to improve our understanding of how interventions like these can be best adapted in developing nation settings facing a variety of socio-economic challenges. As the research on community violence reduction initiatives grows, it will result in a body of research evidence that can provide a solid foundation for policymakers seeking to improve health, safety and quality of life outcomes in disadvantaged violent communities.

References

- Abt, T. *Bleeding Out: The Devastating Consequences of Urban Violence - and a Bold New Plan for Peace in the Streets*. New York: Basic Books, 2019.

- Adams, E. B. "We are Like Prey': How People Negotiate a Violent Community in Trinidad and Tobago." *Race and Justice* 2, no. 4 (2012): 274–303.
- Adams, E. B., P. Morris, and E. R. Maguire. "The Impact of Gangs on Community Life in Trinidad." *Race and Justice*, Online First (2018). doi.org/10.1177/2153368718820577
- Bailey, C. A. *A Guide to Qualitative Field Research* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2007.
- Butts, J. A., C. G. Roman, L. Bostwick, and J. R. Porter. "Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence." *Annual Review of Public Health* 36 (2015): 39–53.
- Clancy, A., F. Brookman, and E. R. Maguire. "Gang-related Homicide and Police Corruption in Trinidad and Tobago: A Rapid Evidence Assessment," 2019. <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/gang-related-homicide-and-police-corruption-in-trinidad-and-tobago.pdf>
- Cohen, L., and M. Felson. "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach." *American Sociological Review* 44 (1979): 588–607.
- Corvo, K. N. "Community-based Youth Violence Prevention: A Framework for Planners and Funders." *Youth and Society* 28, no. 3 (1997): 291–316.
- Ellison, G. "A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World? Police Reform, Political Transition, and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland." *Police Quarterly* 10 (2007): 243–269.
- Felix-John, K.-A., and D. Williams. "The Impact of Mediation on Truce with Rival Gangs of East Port of Spain." In *Gangs in the Caribbean* edited by R. Seepersad and A. M. Bissessar, 261–285. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.
- Goldsmith, A. "Police Reform and the Problem of Trust." *Theoretical Criminology* 9, no. 4 (2005): 443–470.
- Griffin, C., and R. Persad. "Dons" so-called "Community Leaders" and the Emergence of "un-civil" Society in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean*, edited by R. Seepersad and A. M. Bissessar, 80–113. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.
- Harriott, A. "Moving Forward: Responding to Gangs and Organized Crime in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by A. Harriott and C. M. Katz, 175–211. Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press, 2015.
- Haugen, G., and V. Boutros. *The Locust Effect: Why the End of Poverty Requires the End of Violence*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Hill, S. "The Rise of Gang Violence in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean*, edited by R. Seepersad and A. M. Bissessar, 36–79. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.
- Hinkson, G., C. Huggins, and A. Modeste-James. "Mothers' Physical and Mental Health Status after the Homicide of their Adult Children in the Small Island State of Trinidad and Tobago." *Traumatology* 26, no. 4 (2020): 336–343. <https://doi.org/10.1037/trm0000264>

- Katz, C. M. and E. R. Maguire. "Diagnosing Gang Violence in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by A. Harriott and C. M. Katz, 175–211. Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press, 2015.
- Katz, C. M., E. R. Maguire, and D. Choate. "A Cross-National Comparison of Gangs in the United States and Trinidad and Tobago." *International Criminal Justice Review* **21**, no. 3 (2011): 243–262.
- Kedir, A. M., and S. Sookram. *Poverty and Household Welfare in Trinidad and Tobago: Evidence from the Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) 2005*, 1–17. The University of the West Indies: St. Augustine, 2013. <https://sta.uwi.edu/salises/pubs/workingpapers/PovertyHouseholdWelfareTNT.pdf>
- King, W. R., and W. Wells. "Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging Information In Criminal Investigations: Lessons from the Use of IBIS in a Developing Nation." *Forensic Science Policy & Management: An International Journal* **6**, no. 1–2 (2015): 47–57.
- Klein, M., and C. L. Maxson. *Street Gang Patterns and Policies*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Lofland, J., D. A. Snow, L. Anderson, and L. Lofland. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis* (4th ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning, 2006.
- Maguire, E. R., W. R. King, D. Johnson, and C. M. Katz. "Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean." *Police and Society* **20**, no. 4 (2010): 373–400.
- Maguire, E. R., M. T. Oakley, and N. Corsaro. *Evaluating Cure Violence in Trinidad and Tobago*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2018.
- Maguire, E. R., J. A. Willis, J. A. Snipes, and M. Gantley. "Spatial Concentrations of Violence in Trinidad and Tobago." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety* **13**, no. 1&2 (2008): 44–83.
- Merriam, S. B., J. Johnson-Bailey, M.-Y. Lee, Y. Kee, G. Ntseane, and M. Muhamad. "Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and across Cultures." *International Journal of Lifelong Education* **20**, no. 5 (2001): 405–416. doi: 10.1080/02601370120490.
- Moonansingh, C., W. C. Wallace, and I. Dialsingh. "From Unidimensional to Multidimensional Measurement of Poverty in Trinidad and Tobago: The Latent Class Analysis of Poverty Measurement as an Alternative to the Financial Deprivation Model." *Poverty & Public Policy*, **11**, no. 1&2 (2019): 57–72.
- O'Connell Davidson, J., and D. Layder. *Methods, Sex and Madness*. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Prado, M., M. Trebilcock, and P. Hartford. "Police Reform in Violent Democracies in Latin America." *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* **4** (2012): 252–285.
- QURE Limited. *Final Report: National Crime and Victimization Survey, 2015*. Tacarigua, Trinidad, W.I.: Qure Limited, 2015.

- Ransford, C., and G. Slutkin. "Seeing and Treating Violence as a Health Issue." In *The Handbook of Homicide*, edited by F. Brookman, E. R. Maguire, and M. Maguire, 599–625. Wiley-Blackwell, 2017.
- Richardson, L., and E. A. St. Pierre. "Writing: A Method of Inquiry." In *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 923–948. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000.
- Seepersad, R. "Gangs in Trinidad and Tobago." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by A. Harriott and C. M. Katz, 95–116. Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press, 2015.
- Spergel, I. A., and S. F. Grossman. "The Little Village Project: A Community Approach to the Gang Problem." *Social Work* 42 (1997): 456–170.
- Townsend, D. *No other life: Gangs, guns, and governance in Trinidad and Tobago*. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2009.
- United States Department of State. *Trinidad and Tobago 2020 Crime & Safety Report*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Overseas Advisory Security Council, 2020. <https://www.osac.gov/Country/TrinidadTobago/Content/Detail/Report/e71edbe1-3d87-4d1f-989d-18900d4002c6>
- Whitehill, J. M., D. W. Webster, S. Frattaroli, and E. M. Parker. "Interrupting Violence: How the Cease Fire Program Prevents Imminent Gun Violence through Conflict Mediation." *Journal of Urban Health* 91, no. 1 (2014): 84–95.
- Zinn, M. B. "Field Research in Minority Communities: Ethical, Methodological, and Political Observations by an Insider." *Social Problems* 27, no. 2 (1979): 209–219.

Policy Note: Enhancing the Capacity for Data-Driven Decision-Making on Citizen Security across the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Case Study of CariSECURE

Charles M. Katz, PhD¹, John Walcott, MSc²,
Kayla Freemon, M.S.³, and Paolo delMistro, MPA, MBA⁴

¹(Corresponding Author) The School of Criminology and Criminal Justice and the Centre for Violence Prevention and Community Safety, Arizona State University /Email: ckatz@asu.edu
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7251-3110>

²CariSECURE, United Nations Development Program, Bridgetown, Barbados /Email: john.walcott@undp.org

³Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety & School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State University /Email: kfreemon@asu.edu ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5960-494X>

⁴Manager, Project Rule of Law/Justice, United Nations Development Program, Port-au-Prince, Haiti /Email: paolo.delmistro@undp.org

Abstract

This policy essay provides new evidence and lessons learned from the launch and implementation of CariSECURE. CariSECURE seeks to enhance the capacity of Eastern and Southern Caribbean policymakers by increasing the reliability, validity and access to official police data in the region. Through this essay, we document the region's capacity for data-driven citizen security decision-making prior to the programme. We then chronicle the historical progression of the project by drawing from multiple sources of data. Our review and analyses suggest that while CariSECURE has and still faces challenges, participating police services and a regional crime observatory are beginning to possess the capacity to readily

generate data on crime incidents, which is a key first step in developing the capacity for data-driven decision-making.

Keywords: CariSECURE; police; official; crime; evidence-based; policy.

Introduction

Over the last several decades, Caribbean nations have experienced economic and social crises. These crises have escalated regional problems associated with youth violence and crime. For example, rates of homicide have more than doubled over the past several years in many Eastern and Southern Caribbean nations (Sutton and Ruprah 2017). The rapid increase in violence led to several regional and national assessments of the problem, including a 2012 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Caribbean Human Development Report (CHDR) entitled "Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security". It reported that increasing cases of violent crimes, particularly among youth, coincide with negative economic and social indicators in the Caribbean. The CHDR recommended the development of capacity for evidence-based policy and highlighted the importance of shifting policy from state security to citizens' security. In practical terms, it emphasized social crime prevention, institutional transformation, human rights, rule of law, youth empowerment and gender equality. The main finding was that robust policies and programmes could not be developed in the absence of timely and reliable data (Harriott 2012).

In response to a series of national citizen security dialogues in 2015 and 2016, and in preparation of CariSECURE, UNDP brought together over 600 Caribbean citizens, drawn from government ministries, youth and women's organizations, faith-based organizations, academia and other stakeholder groups in Barbados, OECS Member States, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Suriname to better understand specific national contexts. These generated several recommendations for possible solutions for citizen security policy and programming. Recommendations included the need for more targeted and sustained interventions on citizen security; the need for legislative review on matters of age (as it pertains to juvenile offenders), domestic violence and child abuse; the need for organizations to work together to build a multi-sectoral approach; core sets of citizen security indicators to be monitored at the national level; and above all, the need for quality data to both ascertain the dimensions of the problem and to inform the development of solutions (UNDP 2016:15).

In July 2016, USAID awarded US\$14 million to UNDP Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean to implement a programme entitled "Strengthening Evidenced Based Decision Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean – CariSECURE". CariSECURE was to target Eastern and Southern Caribbean nations – Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago – with the ultimate goal of each nation using evidence-based decision-making to develop and approve policies and programmes supported with national budgetary allocations, which target youth risk factors and ultimately reduce crime and violence (UNDP 2018).

The purpose of this policy essay is to share new information and lessons learned from the implementation of CariSECURE. By design, CariSECURE sought to enhance the capacity of Caribbean policymakers and researchers by increasing the reliability, validity and access of official and administrative data in the region. The first part of the essay details the state of official police data prior to CariSECURE, underscoring the need for improved capability. The essay's second section discusses CariSECURE policy development, revisions and implementation, focusing on data capacity to strengthen citizen security. A brief review of police crime incident data from two nations is provided to demonstrate implementation and its state of readiness. We conclude the essay with a discussion of the near- and long-term policy implications of CariSECURE and recommendations for its future. In doing so, we rely on data collected from official and unofficial documents, official incident data, survey data and reports generated by the first author, which rely on interviews conducted over the project period. The multiple sources of data are used to focus on a single point and to help explain, clarify and corroborate issues of question (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Merriam 1988).

Capacity for Data-Driven Citizen Security Decision-Making Prior to CariSECURE

In 2018, an assessment examining the current state of citizen security data management and information sharing within Eastern and Southern Caribbean nations was completed by the first author. Except for Grenada, three- to five-day site visits were made to each CariSECURE nation and the Regional Security System (RSS). During the site visits, interviews were conducted with 139 key stakeholders, including 61 with police officials, 25 with prosecutors and court officials, 18 with prison

officials, 7 with staff from ministry statistical offices, 3 with probation or youth service officials, 18 with ministry officials and 7 with other stakeholders such as IT consultants, RSS staff and CariSECURE personnel.

Assessment findings suggested that criminal justice agencies in general and the police specifically produced little data for the development and implementation of evidence-based policy and programming. The region's data collection and case management systems were based on century-old protocols that failed to evolve and keep pace with contemporary standards in policing (Katz 2018).¹

Interviews with the key stakeholders indicated a substantial amount of commonality in the crime incident data collection and management protocols utilized by police services across nations. Each nation relied on: (1) station diaries (logbooks) that contained narrative data on police activities, events and happenings within each station district; (2) crime logbooks² and occurrence logbooks that contained narrative data on serious (crime logbook) and petty (occurrence logbook) crimes and included (when available) qualitative information on the crime committed, suspect's and victim's names (and other biographical information), circumstances, witnesses and other pertinent information; and (3) special topic logbooks that contained narrative information on specialized problems (e.g. traffic, domestic violence, lost/stolen property) reported to the police within each station district.

Information contained in logbooks was hand-written, typically in pen. Each incident was assigned an incident identification number based on the date (e.g. 15-20182706), and a sequential number based on the order the event was recorded by the station (e.g. 01-20180210, 02-20180210; 03-20180210). The station district where the incident was reported and recorded is not included in the incident identification number. As such, the assessments determined that incident identification numbers were not a unique identifier at the national level.

The system maintained its integrity because requests for police service are directed to station districts for a response. Residents typically report incidents by calling or walking into the station district that services their community. If a resident calls a centralized emergency number (e.g. 999, 911) for service, the receiving operator transfers the call to the responsible station district or uses a radio to contact a station district constable who

¹This section of the essay was excerpted from a complexity of change assessment conducted by the first author. Charles M. Katz, *Complexity of Change Assessment*, Arizona State University: Phoenix, Arizona, 2018.

²For the purpose of this manuscript, logbook and registry are the same.

responds to the incident. Constables and investigators were sometimes contacted in the field to report an incident. Regardless of the means of initiation, the station district was responsible for recording and managing the data related to the event.

Variation in the above was found in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and Guyana. St. Kitts and Nevis police relied on a centralized incident report number generated by a control room. In St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia, the police recorded information on a standardized incident report form, crime report form, charge sheet and custody report form. In St. Kitts and Nevis, reports were duplicated and forwarded to the intelligence unit, where the data were entered, analysed and reported in Excel. Police in St. Kitts expressed universal dissatisfaction with the system, with the most frequent complaints related to substantial missing data, delays in data recording and entry and lack of search capacity. In St. Lucia, data were entered into a Crime Management System, which was developed in 2009 with the assistance of the Taiwanese government. The system was installed on computers in each of the nation's station districts. While the police initially expressed satisfaction with the Crime Management System, they noted that it was not maintained and has not kept pace with current technology. They provided numerous examples of problems with the system related to its lack of capacity for inputting important data elements (e.g. geographic location), limited report generation capacity and lack of capacity to update the software because its code was written in Mandarin.

Site visits also revealed that Guyana had a crime information system. Logbook data were abstracted from crime logbooks by data clerks and input into an Integrated Crime Information System (ICIS). The ICIS was housed at the Ministry of Public Security and was developed through funding obtained from the Inter-American Development Bank. Interviews indicated that the system was never fully developed, and implementation was never fully realized. Problems with the system worsened after most of those who implemented the system left the ministry. At the time of the site visit, the system was used mainly to store a limited amount of information that is exported for analysis in Excel. In summary, while each of the three nations technically had an electronic information management system, police executives and managers in each nation agreed that their system was inadequate at best to inoperable at worst.

Regardless of the police service, police leaders voiced concern about the quality of the data collected. They noted that the information was often collected non-systematically, inconsistently and sloppily and was difficult for supervisors to assess. As noted above, crime reports, except

for St Kitts and St Lucia, were collected by journaling the account of the incident in a logbook, without the use of an instrument that guided the constable through the collection of specific data elements, which heavily rely on standardized response options.

Recording practices resulted in important information being omitted and substantial variation in how information is recorded. In every police service, leaders noted that these problems were amplified because it was difficult to read many constable's records, which further detracted from the quality of the report's usability. For all of the above reasons, supervisors noted that they had a more difficult time conducting quality control audits of constable reports, and the routinization of audits was largely perfunctory rather than substantive. In those nations that utilized electronic data management systems, the above problems were amplified. Often data entry clerks were required to abstract the above qualitative data with the above-noted problems and enter the data in a data management system, which resulted in missing data. Audits of supervisory review of the data entered into the electronic data system found that most supervisors rarely reviewed and verified the entered data.

Interviews with police officials found that data collection and entry were inefficient in most of the region's police services. Except for St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia, information was first recorded by the constable through notes in an unorganized fashion, typically through an interview with the complainant(s), the victim(s) and witness(es). After the information was extracted and hand-written notes were recorded, the constable converted the notes to a narrative report in the crime logbook. After formally recording the event in the crime logbook, if analysis was needed, the information was again abstracted and manually entered into a spreadsheet or other electronic format. The lack of clarity and precision in hand-written records required data clerks to contact the constable to request information to clarify gaps in understanding. Furthermore, stakeholders stated that if additional information came to the attention of the police, the same information often needed to be updated in multiple files located in different physical locations (e.g. station diary, crime logbook, CID files).

Interviews revealed that police service data management practices resulted in cumbersome and limited report generation capacity. In St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis, their data information systems contained limited data, and report generation capacity was minimal. In the other nations, it was because of the slow pace of data exchange, and retrieving information from paper was inefficient. As an example, police leaders reported that current methods of managing data required the same

information to be abstracted numerous times. When information was requested, data were abstracted for that specific request. If a police leader, for instance, requested a report on robbery by day of the week, the information must be abstracted from each station district's crime log-book, where personnel must abstract the information. If police leadership requires a report on assaults with a cutlass, the same processes as the above must be observed again. Likewise, data management practices in all of the nations did not easily permit multiple units, station districts or personnel to access information. Those who sought the information were required to physically abstract the information from the physical location where the information was collected and stored. This necessarily restricted its usability for investigative purposes in general and limited its use in situations that require rapid intelligence more specifically.

Data collection and management practices also led to inadequate capacity for information dissemination expected of contemporary police services. Poor data collection and management practices led police services in each nation to have limited capacity for all three types of contemporary crime analysis: administrative, strategic and tactical. Administrative crime analysis involves long-range projects, including providing financial, geographic and law enforcement information to police management, political leaders and neighbourhood/citizen groups. Its purpose is financial, organizational and political and to track and report on performance indicators that allow for greater accountability and transparency. Strategic crime analysis involves identifying unusual crime activity over certain levels or at different seasonal times, identifying unusual community conditions, providing police service more efficiently by matching demands for service with service delivery, reducing or eliminating recurring problems and assisting in community policing or problem-oriented policing. Tactical analysis often links offender and modus operandi information from several offenses in an attempt to provide investigative leads, help solve crimes and clear cases after apprehension and arrests (Santos, 2017). Without this analytical capacity, data-driven decision-making is not possible.

Station districts across each nation except for St. Lucia had uneven access to computers and the Internet. Police leaders noted that even if a station district had a computer, access to it was limited. Likewise, while some station districts had access to the Internet, others did not. Computer literacy also varied substantially. Police leaders within each nation reported that younger officers, typically those who had served ten or fewer years in the police service, were computer literate. These officers were comfortable turning on a computer, logging onto an intra-network system, using email and the

Internet and using traditional Microsoft products such as Word and Excel. Leaders in each nation stated that the older officers, including the most senior ranking officers, were often the least computer literate.

Site visits were made to station houses within each CariSECURE nation. Data security was found to be an issue in most of the police services. First, interviews with station district offices indicated there was no system for backing up logbooks, other than in St. Lucia, where some incident-related data were entered into an electronic crime management system. If logbooks are destroyed through an act of god (e.g. natural disaster), accidentally (e.g. fire) or purposefully (e.g. stolen), there was little recourse or backup. Second, we observed that there was no way to control access to records in many nations. Logbooks were often kept in the open near the entrance of station districts where officers could access them and the information contained within them. There was no means of auditing who had reviewed the records and for what purpose. This presented challenges for maintaining the confidentiality of records and ensuring their review was for police purposes only. Third, and perhaps most important, there was little capacity to regulate when, why and who changed logbook records. A review of logbooks showed that information is added, changed or deleted through erasing, the use of "white-out" and a pen with little means of auditing or determining the appropriateness of an addition, change or deletion of a record.

Constables and other personnel noted that one of the significant impediments to successfully achieving the goals and objectives of CariSECURE was police officers' prior experience with the failure of similar efforts in the past, which had fueled cynicism. While different experiences were shared, they all contained common themes. One central theme was that their police service announced numerous changes in the past but rarely followed through with them. They stated that it was difficult to understand which changes police leaders were serious about and which were "lip service". Consequently, officers often did not embrace a change until they were confident that it would be implemented and knew that leadership is personally invested in the change. Another central theme was that international development agencies often fund programmes and activities, but their governments rarely sustained them following the programme's conclusion. This gave the officers the sense that their efforts related to international development programmes were often a waste of time and would be discontinued in the near future. The third theme focused on the belief that data collection and management changes had been attempted in the past but had failed. In some of the nations, police officers and managers noted that they continue to rely

on logbooks, station diaries and similar manual methods because prior attempts at automation had failed and resulted in the loss of vital information. In each example, stakeholders frequently complained that the nation did not have the funds to sustain anything but the most basic and traditionally used practices.

Strengthening Evidence-Based Decision-Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean through Policy Planning and Implementation

The above findings on the challenges in obtaining timely and reliable data to inform policy decisions on citizen security across many English-speaking Caribbean nations resulted in the widespread understanding of the need for enhanced data infrastructure. The CariSECURE project sought to build each nation's and the region's capacity to develop and implement citizen security policy and make data-driven decisions related to crime reduction. This section presents CariSECURE's strategy, policies initially developed and policy revisions that occurred following challenges in implementation and describes the state of policy implementation to improve data and analytical capacity for policymaking in CariSECURE nations through mid-2021.

Strategy and policy development

In 2016, USAID awarded US\$14 million to UNDP Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean to implement CariSECURE. During the startup phase, CariSECURE project personnel created a theory of change to improve the decision-making process in Caribbean citizen security institutions by providing quantitative and qualitative tools for analysis and decision-making and supporting their incorporation into national citizen security actions. The rationale of the theory of change was based on the premise that by transforming quantitative data into qualitative information, decisions taken by policymakers in nation-state institutions are informed, tested and result in better policies and programmes. The project's intervention logic was based on a public health approach to violence prevention, comprising four essential steps: (1) identifying the problem, (2) identifying risk and protective factors, (3) developing and testing prevention strategies and (4) ensuring widespread adoption of these strategies (UNDP 2018a).

Based on the theory of change, CariSECURE sought to achieve three outputs. First, it sought to establish standardized and disaggregated crime data sources. Indicators of successful implementation included, for

example, the number of countries with a government-approved Caribbean Citizen Security Toolkit comprised a comprehensive list of Citizen Security Indicators to be collected by each nation; the number of countries with a correspondence table for the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS); and the number of countries that implemented a computer data management system that allows for the collection and housing of official data for police and prison services. Second, the CariSECURE programme sought to inform policy-making and programming by increasing each nation's, and the region's, capacity to analyse crime and violence data. Indicators of successful implementation included the creation and implementation of crime observatories with the capacity to analyse security data and the number of countries capable of producing analysis using the Citizen Security Indicators. Third, the CariSECURE programme sought to improve youth crime and violence decision-making based on available data at the national and regional levels. Indicators of successful implementation, for example, included the number of countries with model national citizen security policies with youth as a priority population (No author, n.d.).

During the startup phase, CariSECURE also implemented three assessments that were conducted to identify the complexity of each nation's environment prior to programme implementation. The first assessment examined the legal environment regulating official data within and between each nation's police, courts and corrections systems. The second assessment examined the capacity of each of these agencies and national statistical offices to collect and manage official and survey data (see Katz 2018). The third assessment conducted an inventory of all crime prevention policies and programmes in each nation to determine how CariSECURE might leverage any existing resources (UNDP, n.d.b.)

Policy revision and enactment

Following the startup phase, there were indications that the environment regionally had evolved. In 2018, the CariSECURE project faced a significant budget cut. The initial funding level at the start of the project was US\$14 million; however, in 2018, this was reduced to US\$9.5 million. Furthermore, the assessment of the region's capacity to collect, manage and analyse official data indicated that this capacity largely rested on the police, courts and corrections. The Ministry of Youth Affairs, which had been planned to be a major focus of the project, was found to have limited capacity to identify risk factors among youth in each nation (UNDP 2018c: 4). Consequently, CariSECURE made several significant revisions

in consultation with USAID to its approach to building each nation's capacity to enact data-driven policy.

First, CariSECURE pivoted and placed increased attention towards enhancing the capacity of information systems administered by the police, courts and corrections within each nation, prior to establishing and conducting youth prevention activities, which had been an original goal of the project (UNDP 2018c: 4). Many of the project's activities were going to be administered by civil society organizations (CSOs) but instead were omitted from the project. These activities included hosting and facilitating youth forums, training CSOs to analyse and report official data and hosting workshops for the media on the responsible reporting of crime data produced by national institutions such as the police (UNDP 2018c: 7). Instead, in 2018, the CariSECURE project reoriented its efforts towards the improvement of "overall crime information management systems while simultaneously prioritizing critical data disaggregates, such as age and gender, for improving monitoring of key trends among youth" (UNDP 2018c: 4).

In practical terms, this meant increasing each nation's institutional and technical capacities for providing disaggregated and standardized crime reports and sharing administrative and survey crime data across agencies. It was determined that this would be done by developing and implementing a Police Records Management Information Systems (PRMIS) and providing software and computer equipment such as servers, printers, personal computers and monitors to law enforcement agencies in each nation. The goal of the PRMIS was to transform each nation's police service from paper-based reporting to electronic records-based systems. The system was intended to facilitate the standardization of data collection for real-time analysis and provide each nation with the capacity for data-driven decision-making to reduce crime and violence. In addition, the PRMIS system would enhance the region's and each nation's citizen security agencies to collect data on multiple issues (i.e. gangs, crimes against tourists, evidence impounding, prison admissions and release) and share the official data with other agencies (e.g. courts, corrections, observatories). It was anticipated that this approach would have the long-term impact of fostering a culture of evidence-informed citizen security policy-making, targeting more general crime prevention efforts and targeting youth in need of prevention services (UNDP 2019b).

Second, CariSECURE re-focused its security indicator framework. Initially, the programme called for a policy that required a unified and systematic method of collecting, measuring and analysing citizen security data in general and specifically youth crime and violence. In 2018,

CariSECURE changed course and implemented a Caribbean Composite Citizen Security Indicator Framework (CCSIF). The framework was implemented to allow participating citizen security agencies to "track key indicators at the primary, secondary, policy, and national levels. Countries were also able to customize the framework for monitoring youth more broadly across the different levels" (UNDP 2018c: 5).

Third, given the reduction in financial resources, the number of beneficiary countries was reduced from ten to eight. While Trinidad and Tobago had initially expressed interest in the project, by the halfway point it had made little progress (UNDP 2018c: 5). As a consequence, Trinidad and Tobago was removed as a participating agency. In 2017, Dominica was hit by Hurricane Maria. The damage was extensive, and all of the nation's personnel and financial resources were re-directed towards humanitarian and reconstruction efforts; and Dominica had to discontinue its participation in CariSECURE (UNDP n.d.: 3). The reduction in financial resources also resulted in the number of crime observatories being reduced from three to one. Original project plans called for St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and Guyana to each establish a crime observatory; however, with reduced resources, CariSECURE revised its plans and instead established one crime observatory. The new plan called for the observatory to be housed with the Regional Security System (RSS), with the support of the OECS Commission and CARICOM IMPACS, given its pre-existing organizational capacity to serve the region. These changes allowed the project to continue despite the reduction in financial resources and at the same time expanded the utility of an observatory to a greater number of nations (UNDP 2018b).

Policy implementation

By 2019, a number of policies and activities were implemented that were intended to build the foundation for improved decision-making on youth crime and violence. In particular, these policies and strategies were intended to lead to standardized and disaggregated crime data reporting. This approach was considered necessary since valid, accurate and accessible data on citizen security are required to bolster authorities' decision-making capacity and facilitate comparison across nations. These efforts are described next.

Increasing capacity for data standardization and collection

As noted above, early in the implementation phase, CariSECURE led efforts to standardize data collection and reporting by providing technical

assistance to project nations to draft correspondence tables that systematically categorized offenses into crime categories. The United Nation's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice framework for ICCS guided the categories and processes. The ICCS creates common terminology around crime and allows nations to compare crime statistics more accurately across nations, data sources (e.g. official data, survey data) and stages of the criminal justice system (e.g. arrest, charging, sentencing) (Bisogno, 2021). Each nation mapped its national laws and extracted and matched offenses within correspondence tables. For quality assurance, the UNDP reviewed each nation's correspondence tables for accuracy and provided each nation with recommendations if appropriate (UNDP 2019a).

CariSECURE created and implemented a Police Incident Form (PIF) to collect information on all incidents reported by persons to each nation's police service. The form was expected to replace each nation's method of collecting official crime reports through a station diary. The foundation of the CariSECURE PIF was based on a modified Canadian official police crime report. The form was first revised by the CariSECURE team to incorporate Caribbean language, culture, law and administrative principles and was then shared with participating police services. Each nation's police service provided feedback for incorporation into the PIF. The PIF was developed to: (1) allow for data to be collected through a paper form or electronically; (2) collect detailed information on the victim, offender and event; and (3) be able to introduce the information contained on the PIF to the courts. The coding structure of the form also provided a standardized method for collecting information and evidence across station districts within nations and between nations (UNDP 2019b).

In 2019 and 2020, CariSECURE completed network assessments in each nation to better understand where and how existing data were physically stored and networked. The assessments showed many technical and management infrastructure vulnerabilities at site storage locations for police, prisons and prosecutor offices in each nation that would result in data security risks. Some of the risks identified included: (1) poor cabling infrastructure, (2) poor physical security and physical access control to server and IT equipment, (3) poor disaster recovery strategies and (4) limited staff coverage to support users.

After identifying some of these vulnerabilities, CariSECURE conducted another assessment to identify a data centre within the region that possessed adequate technical, management and staffing standards. Based on the assessments, CARICOM IMPACS data centre was found to meet

many CariSECURE requirements, and it was determined that in addition to each nation storing their data on local servers, the CARICOM IMPACS data centre would serve as the backup server and provide the technical support to sustain PRMIS. This strategy addressed concerns about data loss due to security breaches and natural disasters such as hurricanes, which require backup servers located in safe areas. It also addressed some stakeholder concerns that some participating nations might not be able to sustain technological requirements, such as PRMIS updates, which will be required over time (UNDP 2019b: 2).

Simultaneously, CariSECURE provided computer hardware equipment and software to participating law enforcement agencies and piloted the PRMIS. The PRMIS application was first tested in a few stations in each nation to collect information through PIF on crime incidents (UNDP 2019b: 3). Prior to testing PRMIS, CariSECURE staff trained police personnel and system administrators who worked in the pilot stations in each country. About thirty staff within each nation's police service participated in the sessions. Participants learned to create login accounts for users and administrators, and the training provided them with exercises that allowed personnel to use the digitized PIF (UNDP 2019a).

Creating capacity to analyse data to inform policy

While systems such as those previously described provide an important step towards informed policymaking abilities, it was also vital that stakeholders be able to analyse and draw evidence-backed conclusions from data. This required building police capacity to engage in evidence-based analysis of crime data to inform citizen security strategies, programmes and policies. Efforts towards this goal are discussed next.

Following an assessment and recommendations by Dr. Charles M. Katz, the RSS and UNDP agreed on the establishment of the Regional Crime Observatory (RCO) (UNDP 2019b). The purpose of the observatory was to build the data infrastructure required to conduct national and regional system-wide analysis; to expand knowledge and inform public policy; serve as a major link for criminal justice agencies in the RSS to exchange data and conduct research and analysis; conduct research and engage in analytical work that is relevant to criminal justice policy and data-driven strategic and tactical crime control activities; and provide technical assistance to RSS nation-states. The RCO is staffed by three full-time personnel: an operations manager, crime analyst and data

management specialist. These three individuals are responsible for collecting data, building data sets, conducting analyses and writing detailed reports. CariSECURE equipped the observatory with the hardware and software necessary to analyse crime data (Katz 2018).

The CariSECURE team also created a training manual on crime analysis for citizen security. The original document was developed by the USAID-funded UNDP InfoSegura project in 2016 for the Dominican Republic and Central American countries and was translated and modified for use in the English-speaking Caribbean. The manual sought to introduce policymakers and practitioners to crime analysis, provide support on data collection methodologies and educate decision-makers and policymakers about different types of analysis that can be used to support evidence-based policies. The document also provided new crime analysts guidance on the necessary skills to manage, analyse and communicate evidence-based citizen security policies. The manual was integrated into the core curriculum of the crime analysis training, discussed next (UNDP 2019a).

Arizona State University's (ASU) Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety (CVPCS) was contracted to develop and implement a crime analysis training programme for delivery to police officers and staff in related agencies in the Caribbean to serve as their agency's crime analysts. The goal was to enhance each nation's organizational capacity to use applied crime analysis to generate, analyse and report data to inform police operations and decision-making as well as policy development. The training programme exposed staff to crime analysis concepts, methods and skills to formulate and address problems of interest to their organization and nation. The programme's focus was on training staff to use data to perform administrative, strategic and tactical crime analysis. Emphasis was placed on participants learning to scan their respective environments for problems, issues and trends and to use data analysis to gain a deeper understanding of these elements for use by police leaders and policymakers to respond to crime and violence. Additional focus was placed on using applied research methods to evaluate agency/organizational performance, the impact of agency practices and policies on justice and security outcomes and assessing the completeness of their agency's data (Katz 2019). The training was delivered to nineteen police officers, seven statisticians (many of whom were employed by their nation's central statistical office) and five civilians employed as research officers for the RSS and CARICOM IMPACS. All of the participants received a total of 320 hours of training (Katz 2019).

Table 1. Katz, Charles M. Complexity of Change Assessment. Report Submitted to the United Nations Development Programme. Bridgetown: Barbados, 2018.

	A&B	Barbados	Guyana	Grenada	SKN	SLU	Suriname	SVG	UNDP	RSS	Total
Police	8	8	7	0	4	9	21	4	0	0	61
Courts	3	9	1	0	2	3	1	6	0	0	25
Prisons	1	5	7	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	18
Statistics	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	7
Probation	0	1		0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
Ministry Officials	1	0	5	0	6	0	2	4	0	0	18
Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	4	3	7
Total	13	24	21	0	18	12	25	22	4	3	139

Table 2. Perceptions of Police Crime Analysis Readiness by Pre-and Post-Test.

	Support		Data Availability		Resources	
	Time 1	Time 2	Time 1	Time 2	Time 1	Time 2
Overall Average	15.6	17.8	12.9	14.0	12.5	20.1

As part of the crime analysis training programming, participants completed a Crime Analysis Readiness Assessment, which was created and recommended for use by the International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA) at the start (November 2019) and the conclusion of the programme (July 2020).³ We provide the regional averages in Table 2 at Time 1 (the start of the training programme) and Time 2 (the conclusion of the training programme) to demonstrate the initial crime analysis capacity of each nation, as well as the improved capability for crime analysis in the region after the training.

The assessment targeted three aspects key for crime analysis. The first was perceived "support" for crime analysis. These items primarily focused on the perceived organizational and administrative support received by the analysts from executives and managers within their organization. The second was related to "data" available for use by crime analysts and their perceptions of the accuracy, completeness, storage capacity and history of their agency's data. The third was "resources" available to facilitate crime analysis, such as the availability of staff, computers and software. Pre-test surveys were received from all the participating nations; however, post-test surveys were not received from two nations.⁴

As shown in Table 2, across the region, support for crime analysis, data availability and resources available for crime analysis all improved over the eight-month training period. The most significant improvement was observed for the perceived resources available for crime analysis, which increased by about 61%. Perceptions of data availability increased by

³See the assessment guide at https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/CrimeAnalysisReadinessAssessment%28CARA%29Tool_MethodologyInstrumentandSampleResults.pdf.

⁴Time 1 surveys were completed individually by participants ($n = 22$) while only one Time 2 surveys was completed by each nation ($n = 8$).

Table 3. Katz, Charles M. Anonymized data from two CarisECURE participating agencies. Phoenix, Arizona: United States, 2021.

Incident Reported Number of Reports	Nation 1	Nation 2
	April 1-30, 2021 439 <i>n</i> (%)	January 1-31, 2021 914 <i>n</i> (%)
Offense Classes		
Homicide	3 (0.7%)	0
Assault	80 (18.2%)	222 (24.3%)
Robbery	7 (1.6%)	n/a
Sexual Violence	18 (4.1%)	7 (0.8%)
Weapons	8 (1.8%)	21 (2.3%)
Property	151 (34.4%)	263 (28.8%)
Automotive Theft	2 (0.5%)	0
Drug-Related	98 (22.3%)	6 (0.66%)
Public Order	55 (12.5%)	12 (1.3%)
Other	17 (3.9%)	272 (29.8%)
Missing	0	111 (12.1%)

about 8.5%, and perceptions of support for crime analysis increased by about 14%.

Following the completion of the crime analysis training programme, Arizona State University’s CVPCS developed and facilitated a train-the-trainer module to sustain crime analysis capacity and increase training opportunities in the region. The training module enabled master trainers, who simultaneously serve as analysts for the RSS regional crime observatory and CARICOM IMPACS, to teach future personnel crime analysis and provide technical assistance to previously trained crime analysts. During this module, training materials, tools and guidelines were developed, and master trainers were provided instruction on leading discussions, listening effectively, making accurate observations, teaching online and in-person and directing trainees to supplementary resources.

Next, we examined the current state of data readiness and analyst capacity to retrieve data by requesting police services to provide us with one month of PIF data from PRMIS. At the time of the data request in July 2021, two nations had completed nationwide implementation of the PIF and entered their data into PRMIS. The remaining nations had not substantively increased their use of the PIF, and the subsequent deployment

of PRMIS in these nations was delayed due to supply chain delays. It was reported that each of the nations would fully deploy the PIF and PRMIS by February 2022. Data were made immediately available through electronic transfer to the authors after our written request to the two nations. This suggested that the data were readily available and exportable for analysis. The data were provided in Excel and were transferred to STATA 17.0 for analysis.

We first explored the types of incidents reported in each nation for their sample of data to assess face validity. Nation 2 reported roughly two times the number of incidents as Nation 1. Specifically, in Nation 1, 439 incidents were reported to the police, and in Nation 2, 914 incidents were reported to the police. This finding suggests potential problems with the validity of the data in the first few months of implementation as we would expect more reported crime in Nation 1 given its population is roughly 1.5 times that of Nation 2 and, in the past, generally reported less violence and crime than Nation 2. Nation 2 reported roughly three times the number of assaults and weapons offenses and about 74% more property crimes. Of particular interest was the finding that Nation 2, when compared with Nation 1, had a substantial number of "other" incidents reported to the police ($n = 272$; 29.8%). These incidents included offenses related to criminal deception, arson, furious driving and other criminal acts not clearly classified. In addition, in Nation 2, 12.1% of incidents reported to the police were not ascribed to an offense type.

As shown in Table 4, we also examined the day of the week and time of day incidents reportedly occurred and were reported to the police. With respect to the day the incident was reported to the police, the data appeared to be fairly well distributed, and there was no missing data in either nation. In Nation 1, a modest amount of data was missing for the day the incident occurred (6.4%), and in Nation 2, the majority of data (64.6%) on when the incident occurred were missing. Similar trends were found for the time the incident occurred and was reported to the police. In both nations, less than 10% of data were missing for the time of day the incident was reported to the police. However, in Nation 1, about 12% of their data were missing for the time the incident occurred, and in Nation 2, about 77% of their data were missing for the time the incident occurred.

Next, in Tables 5 and 6, we review the time between crime incidents and when they were reported to the police. Findings from Nation 1 are presented in Table 5. While around 7% of data were missing due to missing incident dates, these data still provide important insight into understanding when citizens engage with the police and the type of offenses and days and

Table 4. Day of Week and Time of Day by Nation.

	Nation 1		Nation 2	
	Incident Occurred <i>n</i> (%)	Incident Reported <i>n</i> (%)	Incident Occurred <i>n</i> (%)	Incident Reported <i>n</i> (%)
Day of the Week				
Monday	48 (10.9%)	49 (11.2%)	37 (4.1%)	126 (13.8%)
Tuesday	42 (9.6%)	60 (13.7%)	30 (3.3%)	116 (12.7%)
Wednesday	61 (13.9%)	63 (14.4%)	33 (3.6%)	112 (12.3%)
Thursday	75 (17.1%)	81 (18.5%)	34 (3.7%)	113 (12.4%)
Friday	60 (13.7%)	88 (20.1%)	64 (7.0%)	149 (16.8%)
Saturday	59 (13.4%)	57 (13.0%)	87 (9.5%)	163 (17.8%)
Sunday	66 (15.0%)	41 (9.3%)	39 (4.3%)	135 (14.8%)
Missing	28 (6.4%)	0	590 (64.6%)	0
Time Reported				
Morning (6am–11am)	96 (21.9%)	131 (29.8%)	23 (2.5%)	213 (23.3%)
Afternoon (11am–6pm)	158 (36.0%)	143 (32.6%)	55 (6.0%)	273 (29.9%)
Evening (6pm–11pm)	90 (20.5%)	91 (20.7%)	56 (6.1%)	157 (17.2%)
Night (11pm–6am)	42 (9.6%)	42 (9.6%)	75 (8.2%)	235 (25.7%)
Missing	53 (12.1%)	32 (7.35)	705 (77.1%)	36 (3.9%)

times when reporting is delayed. While delayed reporting for some crimes frequently occurs due to the nature of the offense (e.g. burglary), police are limited in properly investigating the incident when reporting is delayed. As shown, most crime incidents (58%) in Nation 1 were reported on the day the incident occurred. Approximately 13% were reported the following day, and 22% were reported two days or more after the offense occurred. Time data are most likely to be missing for automotive theft cases (50%), followed by homicide (33%) and “other” offenses (29%).

Examining reporting time by offense class, most offenses across types were reported the day the crime occurred (for weapons crimes, 100% were reported the same day). Exceptions included sexual violence, where only 41% were reported the same day, and property offenses, where 43% were reported the same day. Similarly, over 50% of offenses were reported on the same day as the incident for every day of the week.

Table 5. Time between Crime Incident and Report, Nation 1.

	<i>n</i>	Reported on the Same Day (%)	Reported Next Day (%)	Reported after Next Day (%)	Missing (%)
Total	420	58.3	13.3	21.7	6.7
Offense Classes					
Homicide	3	66.7	0	0	33.3
Assault	76	73.7	15.8	5.3	5.3
Robbery	7	85.7	0	14.3	0
Sexual Violence	17	41.2	23.5	29.4	5.6
Weapons	8	100.0	0	0	0
Property	144	43.1	24.3	27.8	4.9
Automotive Theft	2	0	50.0	0	50.0
Drug-Related	94	69.2	4.3	25.5	1.1
Public Order	52	55.8	0	28.9	15.4
Other	17	58.8	0	11.8	29.4
Missing	0				
Day of the Week Reported					
Monday	47	57.5	21.3	10.6	10.6
Tuesday	59	50.9	15.3	27.1	6.8
Wednesday	60	63.3	13.3	18.3	5.0
Thursday	77	54.6	14.3	28.6	2.6
Friday	83	51.8	9.6	26.5	12.1
Saturday	54	74.1	3.7	16.7	5.6
Sunday	40	62.5	20.0	15.0	2.5
Time Reported					
Morning (6am-11am)	125	40.0	23.2	30.4	6.4
Afternoon (11am-6pm)	136	58.1	10.3	25.0	6.6
Evening (6pm-11pm)	88	81.8	8.0	3.4	6.8
Night (11pm-6am)	39	74.4	5.1	12.8	7.7
Missing	32	46.9	12.5	34.4	6.3

Notes: Cases where the crime incident was reported but had not occurred yet were dropped for this table (*n* = 19).

Table 6. Time between Crime Incident and Report, Nation 2.

	<i>n</i>	Reported on the same day (%)	Reported next day (%)	Reported after next day (%)	Missing (%)
Total	906	20.9	5.1	8.9	65.1
Offense Classes					
Homicide	0				
Assault	220	24.6	4.1	5.0	66.4
Robbery	0				
Sexual Violence	7	42.9	14.3	14.3	28.6
Weapons	21	38.1	0	9.5	52.4
Property	261	18.4	10.3	9.2	62.1
Automotive Theft	0				
Drug-Related	6	16.7	0	16.7	66.7
Public Order	12	8.3	0	8.3	83.3
Other	268	22.4	2.2	14.9	60.5
Missing	111	12.6	2.7	0.9	83.8
Day of the Week Reported					
Monday	126	19.8	5.6	6.4	68.3
Tuesday	116	13.8	2.3	3.5	80.2
Wednesday	109	10.1	1.8	22.9	65.1
Thursday	111	18.9	7.2	8.1	65.8
Friday	147	26.5	4.1	6.8	62.6
Saturday	162	32.7	6.8	4.9	55.6
Sunday	135	17.8	6.7	12.6	63.0
Time Reported					
Morning (6am-11am)	211	10.9	6.6	10.0	72.5
Afternoon (11am-6pm)	271	20.3	5.2	11.4	63.1
Evening (6pm-11pm)	154	31.2	2.6	3.9	62.3
Night (11pm-6am)	234	20.5	5.6	9.4	64.5
Missing	36	41.7	2.8	2.8	52.8

Notes: Cases where the crime incident was reported but has not occurred yet were dropped for this table (*n* = 8).

Data were most commonly missing for incidents reported on Monday (11%) and Friday (12%). Finally, evening and night crime reports were the most common type of incident that occurred the same day (82% and 74%, respectively). Missing data were fairly evenly distributed across times reported (6–7%).

Findings from Nation 2 are presented in Table 6. Missing data, again due to missing crime incident data, were more common in Nation 2, compared with Nation 1. Approximately 65% of the time, data on the date and time the crime was reported to the police were missing for Nation 2. While this missingness limits our understanding of crime reporting practices, the data still provide for some insights. Based on the available data, nearly 21% of crime incidents in Nation 2 are reported on the day they occurred, 5% are reported the next day, and 9% are reported two or more days later. When exploring offense types and the time between crime incident and report, sexual violence (43%), weapons (38%), assault (25%) and "other" crimes (22%) are more commonly reported on the same day, while public order (8%), drug-related (17%) and property offenses (18%) have a lower percentage reported the same day. Missing data are most common for public order crime (83%) and least common for sexual violence (29%). Crimes for which the offense type is missing ($n = 111$) also had a high percentage of missing time data (84%).

Looking at the day of the week the crime was reported, citizens most often reported incidents the same day on Fridays and Saturdays (27% and 33%, respectively). On Tuesdays and Wednesdays meanwhile, it was less common to have a crime incident reported the day it occurred (14% and 10%, respectively). However, missing data were prevalent on Tuesdays: 81% of the data were missing. Missing data were least common on Saturdays (56%). Finally, the time crime incidents were reported in Nation 2 revealed that crimes reported in the evening most frequently occurred the same day (31%). This is followed by crime reported at night (20.5%), in the afternoon (20.3%), then in the morning (11%). Crimes for which the time reported information was missing were most reported the same day (42%). Missing data were most common for crimes reported in the mornings (73%).

Creating capacity to understand the "dark figure of crime" to inform policy

While administrative data, such as the police data discussed above, can provide needed insights into crime and crime trends to inform policy, these data are limited as citizens do not report every crime to the police

for a variety of reasons (e.g. not important to them, embarrassment, lack of trust in the police). Because of this, academics and others have sought to identify this "dark figure of crime" through interviewing and surveying individuals about victimization experiences. Crime Victimization Surveys (CVSs) provide information on crime and victimization through a standard questionnaire, the results of which are internationally comparable. The CVS aims to identify the prevalence and incidence of victimization within a country, and understand fear of crime and its impact on the public and the effect of crime on the public's perceptions of the criminal justice system (UNDP 2019b).

CariSECURE hosted a series of training workshops on CVSs. The training workshops were intended to increase understanding of the value of information from CVS for policymaker decision-making and enhance the capacity of each nation to implement a CVS. The sessions provided information on the role and importance of CVSs to provide context to official crime statistics. Participants from each of the participating nations attended the sessions. Many of those in attendance were employed by their nation's central statistical office, the same office that conducts its nation's population census. As part of these workshops, a technical group developed a victimization survey instrument. Participants reviewed a core instrument previously developed through the UNDP Victimization Lab's Latin America and the Caribbean Crime Victimization Survey Initiative (LACSI) and adapted it to local context and pilot tested it. A final version of the victimization survey, and the manual developed for the pilot test, was produced in 2019 (UNODC 2019; UNDP 2019a: 25).

Following its development and pilot testing, about seventy data collection specialists were trained in Barbados and St. Lucia. As part of the training, the data collection specialists were introduced to standardized and internationally recognized methodologies, concepts, definitions and techniques that improve participants' understanding and ability to collect quality crime data. The victimization survey was recently carried out in St. Lucia to formulate and evaluate evidence-based citizen security policies and programmes (UNODC 2019). The St. Lucia Crime Victimization Survey (SLCVS) results were intended to support "The Government of Saint Lucia developed Medium Term Development Strategy 2020-2023", which, in part, aims to reduce crime and improve the capacity of the judicial system by 2023. Specifically, it seeks to reduce the serious crime rate by 45%, recidivism by 30% and improve the public's perception of crime and safety by 30%.

The Regional Crime Observatory

Under the CariSECURE framework, the RCO was officially launched on 31 August 2021, linking crime analysis through RSS member states and providing an avenue to support data capacity and cross-national comparison. Crime statistics are gathered from seven nations, including Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Information on offenses is collected monthly directly from police forces. Interviews with members of the RCO and a review of documents indicated that the RCO have successfully adopted the UNODC International Standard Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) to standardize and compare crime across the region despite differing crime codes (Harris 2021). Partnering with CARICOM IMPACS, the RCO plans to deliver its first regional crime analysis course through the RSS Training Institute. The first cohort is expected in 2022. Additionally, the RCO is currently in the process of establishing an advisory board to direct operations.

The RCO is responsible for producing a comparative monthly and annual RSS Situation Report – the first report of this kind in the region. They also produce annual country crime indicators based on the ICCS definitions. To demonstrate this capacity, we reviewed the December 2020 Monthly Situation Report. The report documents crime occurring in member nations for December in 2020. The production highlights the RCO's capability to collect, synthesize, aggregate and publicize crime data. Regionally, reported crimes rose by almost 4% from November to December 2020, for a total of 3,895 crime incidents. Most crime events were acts causing harm or intending to cause harm to the person or acts against property (Regional Crime Observatory 2021). Changes in the number of crime incidents are reported and described overall and by nation. Primarily descriptive, this capacity enables policymakers at regional and national levels to gain comparative insights to inform administrative and strategic decision-making.

Increasing evidence on youth crime and violence to improve decision-making

The ultimate goal of CariSECURE is to increase data infrastructure to support policymakers and decision-making, particularly related to youth crime and violence. While the programme aimed to establish this capacity by mid-2021, the required data infrastructure will not be fully implanted until early 2022. Given this, we could not yet measure policy impacts

resulting from CariSECURE. Despite this, it is possible to foresee how future researchers and evaluators will measure the impact of increased data capacity on policy changes and decision-making in the region. For example, improved data capabilities should improve police services' ability to engage in evidence-based practices such as hot spots policing or larger strategic responses to crime (see Katz and Huff 2020). As another example, in the future, National Security Ministers should be able to request administrative information on citizen security to inform budgetary decisions such as personnel and financial allocations devoted to crime and violence. This should directly increase efficiency in suppression, intervention and prevention efforts and provide strong backing for future citizen security initiatives that address empirically identified problems.

Conclusions and Implications for the Future

This policy essay provided new evidence and lessons learned from the launch and implementation of CariSECURE. CariSECURE is intended to enhance the capacity of Eastern and Southern Caribbean policymakers by increasing the reliability, validity and access of official and administrative data in the region. We documented the historical progression of the project and drew from multiple sources of data to describe progress towards this goal. While CariSECURE has and still faces challenges, we are optimistic about the future of the project and the Caribbean region's capacity to use data to advance citizen security.

These developments are particularly promising given the state of data and decision-making capacity before CariSECURE. The status of data collection, management and security posed significant obstacles to timely and reliable data, although variation existed between nations. Our review showed that some nations lacked the necessary resources (e.g. computer, software and Internet access) to collect data or crime analysis. These barriers limited – and sometimes entirely restricted – police service's ability to generate reports or disseminate information quickly to inform policy and programme development or respond to pressing crime threats. Building a data infrastructure and providing training for the use of that data, thus, were importantly identified and implemented as a necessary step in developing the capacity for data-driven decision-making.

The essay demonstrated that international development programmes, even relatively modestly funded programmes such as CariSECURE, can seed potentially sustainable practices with a strong likelihood of effecting policy and programming related to civilian policing and broader crime control measures. While it is too early to assess the impact of

CariSECURE, early evidence suggests that the initial foundations of the programme have been established and are beginning to produce data that can be applied to policy and practice. For example, our data showed that substantial progress had been made in implementing electronic official police data collection. We found that by mid-2021, two of the eight participating CariSECURE nations could produce at least one month of nationwide crime data, and discussions with the six other nations indicated that they will implement the PIF PRMIS by February 2022. Furthermore, by December 2021, the RSS's RCO produced a country crime indicators report based on the ICCS definitions, demonstrating Eastern Caribbean nations' capacity to share their crime data and demonstrating the RCO's capacity to manage, analyse and report on regional crime trends. Analysis of survey data also showed analyst's perceived police data were becoming more available, that resources available to facilitate crime analysis had increased and that the data available for their use was starting to improve in terms of its accuracy, completeness and availability. Additionally, analysts indicated that they perceived greater support for crime analysis by police executives and managers.

To be sure, participating nations have a long way to go to institutionalize core policies and practices associated with their electronic crime reporting systems. There is a clear need for the review, documentation and reporting of data quality through a data quality tracking system, which each nation should implement independently. At a minimum, data should be audited annually. All of the participating police services stated that they would maintain their station diaries and logbooks until PRMIS was institutionalized, which they anticipated could take some time. This duplication of data collection permits the station diaries and logbooks to serve as a means of assessing the representativeness of the PRMIS data. At a minimum, quality assurance indicators might include: "logbook to PRMIS" data entry ratio, time from crime reported to a police officer to the time data was input into PRMIS, missingness of data by data element and errors in data entry. The audit results should be used to identify common problems and address them as needed.

It is also clear that if the founding goals of CariSECURE are to be realized, crime analysts will have to be incorporated as a vital and necessary component of policing. Crime analysts serve as a "force multiplier" by providing decision-makers with information about the precise people, places and crimes associated with a disproportionate amount of problems and

allowing decision-makers the opportunity to direct their finite resources more efficiently and effectively. In fact, the success of the CariSECURE programme will later be evaluated based on the impact that crime analysts, and others, have when they use PRMIS data to provide national and international policymakers the opportunity to understand the contributing factors that influence and cause crime and violence, which is necessary for the effective creation and deployment of large-scale strategic responses that address both the proximate and root causes of problems.⁵

In the near term, however, we should expect crime analysts to more regularly use PRMIS data to bound police leader decision-making by directing leaders through the results of data analysis to focus police resources on identified problems (Sherman, 2013). In other words, findings produced by crime analysts will substantiate or debunk anecdotes, police culture, hunches and popular misconceptions about local crime problems and provide police leaders with the evidence they need to make rational decisions. In the same way, following the identification of problems, we should expect to see increased use of evidence-based practices and policies in response to those problems; as well as increased use of PRMIS data to serve as internal performance measures to track whether responses have been implemented and to understand the impact of the responses (Sherman, 2013).

Furthermore, soon, policymakers and police leaders are going to have to determine if and when it is in their nation's interest to release data and the results of data analysis. Some police agencies in nations outside of the Caribbean, such as those in the United States, have a long history of not releasing official crime data. More recently, however, police agencies have begun to publicly release their data through their own agency's portals or through larger enterprises such as the Police Data Initiative. The Police Data Initiative promotes the open exchange of police collected data through an online "data warehouse" that anyone can use to better understand crime, law enforcement agencies and police practices and seeks to promote better policing through science. More than 130 US

⁵The increasing costs for healthcare, education, energy and transportation means that Governments will have to prioritize interventions which can reduce costs, improve the efficiency of public services and which can support the achievement of multiple SDGs simultaneously. This issue is critical, particularly in the context of the costs of incarceration and the opportunity for diversion and reducing custodial costs, where the costs to maintain and provide support to individuals in prison have been steadily increasing. In many territories, the percentage of those in prison on remand/pre-trial detention is over 30%, with some countries such as Trinidad and Tobago (60%), Barbados (56%) and St. Lucia (55%) far exceeding this (UNDP 2020).

police agencies provide their data on police incident reports, calls for service, stops, citations and arrests, as well as data on the use of force, complaints against the police and workforce demographics (<https://www.policedatainitiative.org/>).

UNDP assessments have shown that there has been a general reluctance to share data on the part of Caribbean governments and state institutions. This may be due to several factors. There is a lack of knowledge regarding the use, purpose and management of data and a fear that personal, identifiable information will be shared. This concern can be addressed through education and training and making clear the type of information that is typically required to conduct crime analysis. While it is important to have as much disaggregated information as possible (e.g. sex, age, location), some details are not necessarily required for analysis purposes (e.g. names, dates of birth). Making a clear distinction about the types of information needed for crime analysis, research and evaluation should alleviate most of the tensions on the willingness to share information.

It is also important to note that civil society, which in many other regions is a major driver of demand for evidence-based policymaking and transparency in the collection and analysis of data, is relatively weak and disorganized in the CARICOM region. While some local and organized civil society organizations exist – particularly youth, women's, faith-based and, in some countries, LGBTQ organizations – they are generally weak and often narrowly focused. There is also reluctance on the part of governments to engage with civil society groups, particularly on sensitive issues such as crime and violence data, citing their lack of formal mandate and political agendas. This is a long-term problem requiring an incremental approach to mutual confidence and capacity building for both government and civil society, leading to a fundamental cultural change.

Regardless, some CariSECURE participating police services are just beginning to possess the capacity to readily generate data on crime incidents. The data will be the first of its kind to allow policymakers and researchers to better understand the causes and correlates of crime in the region, which is still relatively unknown. A modest path forward might include the development of police service policies that allow for strong police–university partnerships, such as that found between the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) and the University of the West Indies-St. Augustine Campus, and the Jamaican Constabulary Force and the University of West Indies-Mona campus, which often collaborate through the provision of police data to researchers who, in exchange, provide research and evaluation services (Jamaica Observer, n.d.).

While the development and implementation of the CariSECURE project have made substantial strides since its inception, not enough time has elapsed to assess the programme's ultimate goal – the effect of improved data on policymaking in the participating nations. It is vital that continued monitoring and evaluation of implementation occur to bolster evidence for this future outcome. Indeed, if the process is not well documented, it will be difficult to draw conclusions from the project later. Further, if the success of CariSECURE is evident in future effectiveness evaluations, strong continual monitoring and evaluation will be useful to inform efforts to export the programme to other regions similarly desiring to build citizen security through improved data capacity.

The issues raised above are just a few of those that will need to be addressed soon by CariSECURE participating agencies. Participating nations are in the promising position of being able to revolutionize policy decision-making by making it possible to bound decisions based on readily available data rather than suppositions about problems of concern. The number of nations that fully implement CariSECURE will usher in a new era in policymaking made possible, where evidence-based practices are prioritized, and the reduction of violence is more possible than before.

Acknowledgements

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of Arizona State University or the United Nations Development Programme.

References

- Bisogno, E. "Reflections on ICCS Implementation." *Presented at the Council of Europe Conference*, 2021. <https://rm.coe.int/presentation-enrico-bisogno-on-iccs/1680a1e42e>.
- Harriott, A. *"Caribbean Human Development Report 2012."* Barbados: United Nations Development Program, 2012.
- Harris, S. *Personal Communication*, November 10, 2021.
- Jamaica Observer. (n.d.). UWI, police to explore solutions to gang-related crime in Jamaica. <https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/UWI-police-to-explore-solutions-to-gang-related-crime-in-Jamaica&template=MobileArticle>.
- Katz, C. M. *Complexity of Change Assessment*. Report submitted to the United Nations Development Program. Bridgetown: Barbados, 2018.
- Katz, C. M. *Development of a Regional Crime Observatory at RSS Headquarters: Report Submitted to the RSS and UNDP*. Phoenix, Arizona: Charles M. Katz, May 2018.

- Katz, C. M. and J. Huff. "Implement Collaborative Strategic Crime Control Strategies." In *Transforming the Police: Thirteen Key Reforms*, edited by C. M. Katz and E. Maguire, 31–46. Waveland Press: Long Grove, IL, 2020.
- Katz, C. M. *Crime Analysis Curriculum Development and Training*, submitted to CariSECURE. Phoenix, Arizona: Arizona State University, February 22, 2019.
- Lincoln, Y. S. and E. G. Guba. *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Sage, 1985.
- Merriam, S. B. *Case Study Research in Education: A Qualitative Approach*. Jossey-Bass, 1988.
- No author, n.d., Internal CariSECURE notes.
- Regional Crime Observatory. "Monthly Situation Report Period 1-31 December 2020." Christ Church, Barbados, 2021.
- UNDP. *Proposal to USAID, "Strengthening Evidenced Based Decision Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean – CARISECURE: Executive Summary"*. Barbados: UNDP, 2016.
- UNDP. CariSECURE Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan October 1, 2018-September 2020. Barbados: UNDP, December 14, 2018a.
- UNDP. *Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan*, October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE, n.d.a.
- UNDP. *Annual Report Year, 3 October 1, 2018-September 30, 2019*. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE. October 31, 2019a.
- UNDP. *Annual Report October 1 2017 to September 30, 2018*. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE. October 31, 2018b.
- UNDP. *Annual Implementation Work Plan Year 3 October 1, 2018-September 30, 2019*. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE. n.d.b.
- UNDP. *Annual Implementation Work Plan Year 4 October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020*. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE, September 2019b.
- UNDP, LAC: *Sustentative Revision. Draft CariSECURE Internal Memorandum*. Christ Church, Barbados: UNDP, January 2019c.
- UNDP, LAC: *Sustentative Revision. CariSECURE Internal Memorandum*. Christ Church, Barbados: UNDP, November 29, 2018c.
- UNDP, *Modification to CariSECURE Project Approach*. Christ Church, Barbados: UNDP, n.d.c.
- UNDP. *Quarterly Report Year 3 Third Quarter April 1-June 31, 2019*. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE. July 31, 2019e.
- UNDP. *Towards a Modern Administration of Justice: A Needs Assessment of the Judicial System in Nine (9) Caribbean Countries*. Christ Church, Barbados: CariSECURE, April 2020.
- UNODC, *Combined first and second Bi-annual Reports. Mexico City, Mexico: Statistical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice, September 20, 2019f*.
- Santos, R. B. *Crime analysis with crime mapping*. Sage Publications, Inc, 2017.
- Sutton, H. and I. Ruprah. *Restoring paradise in the Caribbean: Combatting violence with numbers*, 2017.
- Sherman, L. W. "The rise of evidence-based policing: Targeting, testing, and tracking." *Crime and Justice*, **42**, no. 1 (2013): 377–451.

Book Review

Review of the Book: *Recidivism in the Caribbean: Improving the Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners*. Dacia Leslie

Regan Reid

Recidivism in the Caribbean: Improving the Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners is a compelling and thought-provoking book that gives the readers an inside look at the complexities of imprisonment, recidivism, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-prisoners into the receiving Jamaican society. This book, written by Dr. Dacia L. Leslie, analyses the narratives of formerly incarcerated men and women to explain what influenced them to offend and how they may be more effectively reintegrated.

Leslie, a Research Fellow at the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES), UWI Mona, is preeminent in research about recidivism, crime prevention, criminal justice reform, offender reintegration and evidence-based policymaking and is keen to increase public awareness on criminal justice issues. She masterfully demonstrates that the intersectionality between community, individual, relational and structural factors is problematic, so much so that it prevents ex-prisoners from reintegrating successfully. Against this backdrop, recidivism is more likely. At the same time, Leslie champions the idea of combatting recidivism by developing structures that oversee the reintegration and resettlement process, generating institutional and community support and strengthening case management and information protocols.

There are many lessons to be discovered throughout this book, and the authenticity shared in the ex-inmates' accounts might allow us to become more welcoming of their insights. Advocates, policymakers, practitioners, service providers, academics and university students in criminology, public policy and sociology will find it incredibly relevant, while lay readers will also find it worthwhile reading. Leslie's willingness to be candid and authentic makes her more relatable and affords the reader a riveting experience.

Caribbean Journal of Criminology 3, 1 (2021): 124–128

Leslie helpfully sets the context to support a compelling argument that "ex-prisoners are confronted by a myriad of structural, community, relational and individual barriers that predispose them to recidivate" (Leslie 2019, 331). This observation allows Leslie to expose the influence of Jamaica's colonial past that endures throughout the culture, in traditional law enforcement practices and correctional policy. The impression is that the criminal justice system in Jamaica today, notwithstanding its aims at modernity, remains inherently punitive, fragmented and backward. Although the prison system has secured compliance among offenders, it is unlikely that offenders will sustain this behaviour in their communities due to the system's failure to safeguard their welfare upon release.

It is not by coincidence that Leslie launched her book around the same time violent crimes escalated, mirroring a similar growth in the Jamaican prison population far beyond what the national budget could afford. According to Leslie in her foreword, "expenditure on correctional services accounted for 11.3 percent of the 2017/2018 national budget" (viii). Arguing that a decrease in the recidivism rate in Jamaica is necessary, Leslie illustrated the need for ex-offenders to experience positive behavioural change to encourage crime desistance and support reintegration.

The agentic perspective is at the centre of Leslie's methodical argument, which holds that ex-offenders must acquire a sense of personal agency irrespective of their circumstance. Having agency is critical to the rehabilitation and reintegration process. However, on its own, it may not be adequate for effective reintegration. From a holistic perspective, additional preconditions assist with empowering ex-prisoners to lead positive lives by accommodating changes that foster desistance and a crime-free lifestyle. The academic literature maintains that ex-offenders also require access to social capital, aftercare services and sustained support from civil society, including NGOs, to circumvent the correctional system's revolving door (Leslie 2019).

The "Improving the Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners" of the book's title refers to both indigenous prisoners and Jamaican citizens who have been removed from prison facilities in foreign jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and the United States. To a great extent, these ex-prisoners share the same marginalized experiences when they return to their communities. Leslie does an admirable job of identifying the challenges that individuals from both groups encounter, though she laments that finding new approaches to reintegrating ex-prisoners into Jamaican society is a "pressing but complex social, economic and moral challenge" (ix), making her book accessible to the layman.

Using a largely qualitative approach, Leslie obtained in-depth information from a sample of incarcerated adults in Jamaica's prisons, after-care service providers and ex-offenders who had returned to their community post-release. She offers some direct quotes from inmates and basic statistics that present a comprehensive picture of incarceration experiences and correctional services. Overall, the book is rich in data and is methodologically sound as points are carefully referenced.

The book is organized thematically and covers a broad spectrum of topics that offer contemporary insights into recidivism and reintegration in the Jamaican context. Leslie's integrated theoretical framework and her practical knowledge indicate that she took an analytical and descriptive approach to explore the research problem. The book is divided into four separate sections, each of which has its unique focus and themes but works well with the other sections to achieve a greater purpose. You will find that this book is conversational as it includes excerpts from the respondents' narratives in both English and Jamaican creole. Clear signposting will guide you through the connections between each topic, keeping you thoroughly engaged. The author relies on clear and descriptive tables and statistics to show comparisons across the data in her analyses. Organizing the book like this allows the reader to navigate the discussion easily without ever wanting to put the book down.

What factors prevent successful reintegration in Jamaica? Dacia Leslie's answer includes marginalization; scarcity of prison research in Jamaica; and the absence of a more protective legislative environment that preserves ex-prisoners' basic rights. Acknowledging the lack of Jamaican research regarding corrections, Leslie supplemented her analysis with research from international jurisdictions. For example, Leslie draws on best practices from Turkey and the United States that prioritize assisting formerly incarcerated men and women in leading better lives by applying career advancement models that address behavioural, educational and skill gaps. Leslie maintained that "the cycle of release and reimprisonment is difficult to break due to their marginalized status" (304). Thus, she presents a helpful contrast between ex-offenders who "relapse" and those who have managed to redeem themselves having acquired the personal agency and rejecting society's application of negative labels and stigmas such as "old criminal" (305) or "deportee" to them.

Alternatively, Leslie paints a different picture of those who assume a "protagonist identity" (141) where the offender feels so inspired by their lived experiences that they strongly dissuaded others from taking on deviant values and pursuing a criminal lifestyle. Many of the narratives that

Leslie included bore a redemptive tinge, except for Renegade, who would have desisted from committing a crime if, in his view, he was not marginalized. As Leslie noted, experiences of stigmatization can strengthen criminal subcultures where offenders use deviance to feel accepted and admired in their communities. Unlike some offenders, who distinctively accommodated identity changes that would foster desistance, others like Renegade would put a new focus on how negative attitudes towards ex-prisoners could amplify their risk for deviant behaviours.

Throughout the book, Leslie makes balanced arguments. Hence, it is difficult to detect bias. However, there are key areas where the book can be improved. For instance, Leslie could have dedicated a specific section of the book to discuss the juvenile justice system and included youth in conflict with the law in her sample to present their experiences more clearly. Leslie demonstrated that the effective reintegration of child detainees requires a partnership that fosters complementarity between the government and civil society. Without the narratives from child detainees, it is difficult to understand the nature of juvenile detention in Jamaica and correspondingly challenging to develop meaningful interventions and desistance-supportive policies.

Perhaps, the most notable feat *Recidivism in the Caribbean: Improving the Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners* accomplishes is suggesting new approaches to reintegrate ex-prisoners into the Jamaican society effectively. As Leslie noted, many of the practices of the correctional system are to achieve a desistance-supportive ethos. The book is likely to contribute to the development of progressive correctional policy and increased public knowledge about imprisonment and the challenges to social reintegration.

From a policy perspective, effective reintegration in the Jamaican context is mainly dependent on a needs assessment to determine in which services the inmate should be encouraged to partake, increasing access to these services, evaluating the service results or outcomes and augmenting those that produce meaningful results.

One avenue of future research would be examining desistance among juvenile offenders to help guide the necessary interventions. Additionally, future research must look at the circumstances of recently returned migrants to Jamaica and their experience of social reintegration. Finally, future research can seek to analyse correctional interventions from a gendered perspective.

Despite the limitations mentioned above, this book is timely and culturally relevant. Leslie insightfully introduces to the readers what

may very well turn out to be a blueprint for the future of corrections in Jamaica and the Caribbean. *Recidivism in the Caribbean: Improving the Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners* is a compelling book that should inspire readers to think critically about the problematic nexus between crime, recidivism and offender reintegration in their society.

References

Leslie, D. *Recidivism in the Caribbean: Improving the Reintegration of Jamaican Ex-prisoners*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Editorial – Farewell from Former Editor

Anthony D. Harriott

The *Caribbean Journal of Criminology* (CJC) is in its fifth year and second volume. There is however a direct line of continuity that threads it to the *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology* (CJCSP) (1996–2007) and the *Caribbean Journal of Public Safety* (CJPS) (2008–2010). Since the first publication in 1996, there have been, by my count, twenty-two volumes cumulatively published as CJSP, CJPS and CJC. The journal has encouraged much research which otherwise may not have been done. Much has been accomplished.

In his farewell editorial note, Ramesh Deosaran, who must be credited for founding the CJCSP and CJPS, specified some of the accomplishments of the journal as follows: deliberately including papers written by graduate students and promoting innovative policy work by them and making a shift to “more applied skill-development criminology” (Deosaran 2010). The latter was evident in the number of publications by practitioners who at the time of writing their papers held important positions in the criminal justice systems of the countries of the region. These contributions have given us a better understanding of the administrative problems such as caseload of the courts and the capacities of the criminal justice systems to solve these problems (a condition of which is the ability to self-critically assess the attempted solutions and to take corrective action). He however suggested that perhaps the greatest achievement of the journal was to have survived for as long as it did or as he put it “escaping death” and “instead flourishing.” Financial support from The University was a matter of life or death for the journal.

It is now time for me to write my farewell note. In this short note, I will present a summary of the main accomplishments and the challenges facing the journal as well how some of these may be resolved.

The accomplishments Understated

If the later volumes of the CJCSP were concerned with some of the big administrative challenges that the criminal justice institutions are faced with, the earlier volumes were dedicated to understanding the root or distal causes of the different types of crimes in the region, and importantly, better understanding the variations in the determinants of these crimes across the countries of the region. I believe that this has been the most important contribution of the journal.

During the early stages of its career, the CJCSP benefited from the high-quality contributions of quite a few established scholars. I would like to name them, but readers will understand the difficulties which attend such an exercise. The range of contributions was truly (English-Speaking) Caribbean in scope, that is, beyond the usual suspects of Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. It was much easier to get reliable official statistics on these countries. Those countries that made access to basic crime data difficult deprived themselves of vital (for free) primary research on the subject. Consequently, they may have suffered the most by paying for expensive but ineffective canned crime prevention projects. This is the outcome of the continuing failure to appreciate the importance of basic research to problem-solving and a kind of conditioned reflex action of protecting poor crime control performance by limiting access to data to researchers whose personal networks extend into the state security establishments. This has been a sad barrier to criminological research in much of the Caribbean where data shielding is also strongly related to the avoidance of accountability. Nevertheless, there were several country-specific studies and a few cross-national studies of the structural drivers of selected serious crimes, but there were not explicitly comparative studies of crimes or criminal justice problems.

The discussions on the crime and criminal justice problems have not been exclusively criminological. Economists, social psychologists, statisticians, historians and literary scholars have made useful contributions to both the understandings of crime and the criminal justice systems. Professionals who operate inside the criminal justice systems, including magistrates, have also provided a practitioner's perspective on some of the problems. We are all the richer for this wide range of contributions.

If researchers were interested in a wide range of issues or breadth of coverage, they were also in search of a coherent picture of the processes in the region and a depth of understanding that required theoretical engagement. As a first rough approximation, this search may be taken as the

Caribbean Criminology project. The CJCSP served to further illuminate and push along the discussion of the issue of Caribbean Criminology and what that might and might not entail. The concept was first presented by Pryce (1976) whose concern was with the applicability of the existing criminological theories. His essay may be read as a call for theory-testing and innovation – a call that has not been systematically taken up. This idea of Caribbean Criminology was intensely debated at the first Caribbean Conferences on Crime which was held in Barbados circa 1995. This conference was followed by others – the last of which was held in Trinidad and Tobago in 2007. They were hosted by the respective criminology centres on the three campuses of the UWI and had the full support of the respective campus principals. Hundreds of papers were presented at these conferences, some of which were published in the CJCSP. Several persons have made useful contributions to this important discussion on a Caribbean Criminology, but these are bracketed by the contributions of Pryce (1976) and Birkbeck (1999).

This quest for a Caribbean Criminology should be understood in its historical context and the ferment of ideas across the disciplines within the UWI system. At the time when the UWI was formed in 1948 (when teaching began) just prior to Independence, much of the published scholarship on the Caribbean had been written from British colonial perspectives. People and place were misinterpreted and too often disparaged. The rising Caribbean nationalist intelligentsia was faced with the challenge of better understanding the place and generating developmentally useful self-knowledge. Successful self-government had to rest on self-knowledge. The generation of this knowledge and finding solutions to the big developmental challenges was not just the charge in the social sciences and humanities; it was extended to the Life Sciences.

There was a subsequent flourishing of, for example, the Plantation Economy School, and other work on Caribbean economies and societies. In the humanities, an impressive body of work was developed and appropriately named Caribbean History. Caribbean literature is similarly impressive and loaded with insights about our societies and peoples. No less impressive has been the outputs from the study of the creole languages. Much later, there was even a discussion of what might constitute Caribbean Philosophy (McKenzie 2009). And, in the Life Sciences, for example, The TMRU and the Sickle Cell Unit (at the UWI) were formed in an effort to respond to neglected fields of health research that were important to us as a people – such as Sickle Cell Anemia. Interestingly, much of this work was done by persons from outside the region who came to UWI and stayed

and worked here. There were also the specific problems of tropical agriculture including how to engineer climate suitable cattle, and so on.

The generation of these fields of Caribbean self-knowledge and the related innovations helped to shift public policy priorities in an effort to solve the problems that mattered to our people. And, it stood in opposition to unexamined inapplicable imported canned "solutions." We may simply regard the above intellectual projects as unfinished business, locate Caribbean Criminology in this context and let the matter rest at this first approximation. I, however, cannot claim that degree of innocence.

Interestingly, the generation of this body of self-knowledge permitted a better appreciation of the histories of the disciplines and of the relationships between the ideas and the contexts in which they emerged, and what was insightful and useful and what was not. One is only able to critically examine the established theories for their applicability and theory informed imported policies and programmes – if there is prior knowledge of the related Caribbean problems and possibilities. Without this self-knowledge, we risk squandering the scarce resources of our people. At the time of writing this note, the Jamaican state authorities were grappling with the reasons for the low yield on the significant investments in crime prevention which were made over the last 15 years and the persistent unresponsiveness of the criminal justice institutions to the efforts at make them more effective. That "said," as was the case in the other disciplines, much of the published and useful unpublished work on crime was done in a spirit of collaboration with partners from universities elsewhere in the world who may be differently racialized. These partnerships have been very fruitful and beneficial for the CJC.

Thus far, I have but hinted at the more fundamental issues. These hints have been loaded onto the idea of self-knowledge. I have avoided the issue of how this self-knowledge is to be generated. And, what is its relationship to the larger body of knowledge that is generated by the discipline of criminology. I do not believe that among those who participated in the discussions, there were any among us who thought of Caribbean Criminology as the development of a totally new body of knowledge that would be detached from "mainstream" criminology and would develop its conceptual and methodological tools "from scratch." The most developed, interesting and provocative arguments along these lines (for theoretically relevant distinctiveness) were made in economics by the members of the Planation School, in particular by Lloyd Best (Best, Lloyd 2003). However, of all the Caribbean projects of this sort, it is perhaps only Caribbean Literature that was thought of in those terms – as a new and separate

contribution (but in fact was not that separate and distinct in style and method).

My point is that the Caribbean Criminology project may be viewed as a part of the larger effort to build a Caribbean intellectual tradition. In the broadest sense, there are two central common features of this effort across the disciplines. The first is the highlighting of the importance of grasping the theoretical and policy-relevant details of the target of our research projects. The specifics of the place and time must be understood. The second general and closely related feature is more problematic. It is a call for a kind of Caribbean-centredness in our engagement with the disciplines – especially on matters of theory. Put perhaps somewhat crudely, it may be taken as a call for privileging the observer; the Caribbean observer. This is the time-place problem that I think is perhaps most pronounced in the work of Lloyd Best. It is evident in his article *Thought and Freedom where he makes the case for Caribbean distinctiveness and centeredness* (Best 1967) and in his *Reflections on the Reflections* (Best 2003) where he reemphasizes the importance of grasping this distinctiveness. In the latter work, he sums key Caribbean peculiarities as follows:

In the Caribbean we are all introduced and transplanted populations. We started big. We born big as they say in the Caribbean. We started with all production as export production. There were no households; there was no production for domestic consumption. There were no families. There were slaves and there were indentured workers. We brought them as individuals. We had to construct a society out of that (Best 2003:427).

There is much of value here. He rightly draws attention to the peculiarities and importance of understanding the place. We have agency and with it responsibility for self, but we still in many ways carry the marks of our history. For example, family instability is one such mark that has consequences for attachment formation and school achievement – both of which in turn shape important life course choices. An understanding of our history may thus direct, perhaps better direct our theoretical-empirical inquiries. There is, however, a risk in overemphasizing the peculiarities and the distinctiveness to the point of distorting our perspective on global phenomena such as crime.

In this regard, the notion of Caribbean-centredness, like the other time-place centrism, tends to collide with the Copernican Principle. Standing in our specially privileged place, we risk believing that the metaphoric sun revolves around our metaphoric earth. Such a centrism can only be rescued by reducing everything to perceptions. Were it to take this path, the Caribbean Criminology project would be set in tension with the sciences.

I believe that while we are still concerned with mapping our distinctiveness, we are now less concerned with distinctiveness-separateness. In this regard, Berbick's article (1999) was particularly useful and clarifying. Simply put, the project of knowing thy self should not be anchored in an assumption of a Caribbean distinctiveness that discounts the theoretical accomplishments of criminology. Indeed, from very early, Pryce (1976) was fairly clear on these matters. In that essay, he wrote that a Caribbean Criminology could not be "theoretically unique" but would examine "the realities of crime from a critical standpoint in the context of the region's history of capitalist repression and exploitation and in terms of the cultural heritage of black working class styles of protests and modes of oppression..." He lands squarely as an advocate of conflict theories (which were popular if not dominant in some departments of the UWI at the time when he wrote his essay).

There is much to be gained from this approach. For example, historicization permits an understanding of how criminalization was motivated and done and importantly helps to explain some of the important differences between the legal and social definitions of crime, and the conflicts between citizen and citizen, and citizens and state that are generated. For example, in Jamaica, it is widely known that fruit trees are practically regarded as belonging to the commons, as nature's or as "God-the-Giver-of-all-Things" gifts to all. Their fruit becomes privately held *only when it is picked and in the possession of the picker* or some picker approved other. Thus, there is no socially defined crime as theft of fruit *from trees* (if you examine the Jamaica National Victimization Survey, you will see that some of the crimes listed are not socially defined as such). Tests of the difference in definitions arise from time to time when people are punished by the state system for these legally but not socially defined crimes. On these occasions, there are usually expressions of outrage against these punishments as oppressive of the poor. Many mango farms have been done and undone by these colliding definitions of theft.

Historicization of the crime-related problems permit an appreciation of the colonial legacies which remain with us as laws, policing methods and penal policies as well as their underpinning but now hidden assumptions about the "nature" of our people.¹ For example, the idea that we are inherently unruly and defiant and given to non-compliance with law. This

¹For example, the supposedly non-compliant "nature of Jamaicans" may be interpreted in a variety of way – as inherent inherited character; as rational behavior or, as alienation from law and law enforcement that does not serve us. The responses of the state and especially how disciplinary violence is used turns on some of these assumptions.

idea then leads to the view that a good measure of state violence is necessary in order to maintain law and order. These understandings are not just a matter of the generation of self-knowledge for its own sake. It should inform law, policing and penal policy reform agendas. I believe that this has been the spirit of the journal and what we have come to loosely call the Caribbean Criminology project. In sum, my reading of the discussion on Caribbean Criminology is that it has largely been taken as a matter of perspective and interpretation and perhaps, of policy agenda-setting. This understanding may very well exert a pressure that pushes the project away from the sciences (broadly understood as method) and in a speculative direction. However, this need not be so.

The Challenges

Along with the achievements, the CJCSP also had its challenges. These challenges included maintaining a consistently high standard with regard to the quality of content, ensuring coverage goes beyond Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica, securing funding and guaranteeing the reliability of the publication. These were all life-threatening problems. It was left to the CJS to try to solve them.

In order to improve or even maintain quality standards, the journal must rely on the outputs of a small set of researchers who do dedicated research in this field of study and who are vested in constantly developing their expertise in this field. The pool of writers is very small. Moreover, colleagues are incentivized by their universities to publish in more established high-impact international journals. There has been a long and old debate about the value that we in the Caribbean (and at UWI) place on the development of our own journals.

Experience suggests that there are several ways of trying to solve this problem of limited researchers. These include encouraging co-authorships between early-stage scholars and their more accomplished colleagues, and the hosting of special well-planned seminars and publishing the outputs. CJC Vol. 1 Issue 4 is an example of the latter. Another is to seek to widen the geographic scope of the journal to perhaps bring in the Spanish- and French-speaking Caribbean (I am well aware of the difficulties in so doing including translation issues and editorial re-writes) and extending beyond this to the wider global South.

Widening the scope of the CJC is consistent with increasing self-knowledge. The self is best understood comparatively – by the discovery of similarities and differences and the sources and meanings of these

similarities and differences. There is no better way to understand our policy-relevant specificities and to develop the ability to interrogate the portability of prevention programmes.

This broadening of the geographic scope of articles that may be published in the CJC should have the effect of widening its circulation. Comparative work both widens {the "sex appeal") and deepens (the understanding of self and other). As the outgoing editor, I know that while the editor may try to facilitate such articles by putting authors with similar interests in touch with each other, it is individuals who must make it happen. A wider circulation of the journal is a condition which must be met if it is to become financially independent and to "avoid death." The UWI Press was kind enough to take responsibility for its circulation. In so doing, they have also ably reinforced the effort to upgrade the quality of the journal.

Unfortunately, none of the major challenges that the CJC is faced with have been solved. As is the case with so many other things Caribbean, the journal must continue to fight for its survival. New leadership may wish to give new policy directions. That is how we make progress.

I wish to thank Charmaine McKenzie, our former managing editor, whose help was invaluable. Dr. Danielle Brown ably assisted with the administrative process. Tarik Weeks later took over as Managing Editor and continues to give service in this post. I must also thank Professor Stephan Gift, former PVC Graduate Studies and Research for the financial support that allowed the journal to survive. The UWI Press has helped us to formalize our processes and make them more reliable. We owe a debt of gratitude to the editorial board and most of all to our contributors who are the life-blood of the journal.

Best wishes

References

- Best, L. "Thought and freedom." *New World Quarterly* 3, no. 4 (1967).
- Best, L. "Reflections on the reflections." In *Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom: Essays in Honour of Lloyd Best*, edited by S. Ryan, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: St. Augustine. Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the West Indies, 2003.
- Birkbeck, C. "By your theories you shall be known: Some reflections on Caribbean criminology." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology* 4, no. 1/2 (1999): 1-31.
- Deosaran, R. "Editorial- A Happy 15th Anniversary and Editor's Farewell." *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety* 15, no. 1&2 (2010): i-vi.

Lacky, T. P. Genetic Improvement in Dairy Cattle in the Tropics. PhD dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 1951.

McKenzie, E., *Philosophy in the West Indian Novel*. Kingston: The Press, University of the West Indies, 2009.

Pryce, K. "Toward a Caribbean Criminology." In *Crime, Delinquency and Justice – A Caribbean Readers*, edited by R. Deosaran. Kingston: IRP, 1976.

Notes on Contributors

Aleem Mahabir (aleem.mahabir@mymona.uwi.edu) is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography and Geology at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica. His research interests lie at the intersection of Urban Social Geography, Crime and Psychology. His current work focuses on the link among hope(lessness), exclusion and under-development among marginalized populations in Caribbean cities. He has also been involved in a number of projects organized under supranational entities and NGOs including the FAO, the Nature Conservancy, the Hungry Cities Partnership and the Clinton Foundation.

Charles M. Katz (ckatz@asu.edu) is the Watts Endowed Family Chair of the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice & Director of the Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety, at Arizona State University. His work focuses on police transformation and strategic responses to crime. He currently serves as a research partner to the Phoenix Police Department to evaluate their BJA-sponsored initiatives related to body-worn cameras and Crime Gun Intelligence. He serves as the principal investigator of the Arizona Violent Death Reporting System (Az-VDRS) and the Arizona Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System (Az-SUDORS) sponsored by the CDC. He regularly collaborates with USAID and UNDP to develop comprehensive strategic plans to reform international police agencies. He recently completed several research projects for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and USAID in El Salvador and Honduras on issues involving gangs and delinquency prevention. ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7251-3110>

Clare Anderson (ca26@leicester.ac.uk) is a Professor of History at the University of Leicester. Her research centres on the history of incarceration and penal colonies, their intersections with other modes of confinement and coerced labour and their ongoing impacts in post-colonial societies. Clare's most recent publication is *Convicts: A Global History* (Cambridge University Press, 2021). She is editor of the *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*.

Dylan Kerrigan (dylan.kerrigan@leicester.ac.uk) is a Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Leicester. A Caribbeanist, his interdisciplinary research explores coloniality and the punishment of capital in the Caribbean across various (in)justice systems under capitalism including prisons, court systems, transnational organized crime and securitization. His most recent book *Imagining Society: The Case for Sociology* was published by Bristol University Press in February 2020.

Edward R. Maguire (edmaguire@asu.edu) is a Professor of criminology and criminal justice at Arizona State University, where he also serves as director of the Public Safety Innovation Lab. Dr. Maguire specializes in the study of policing and violence. He has been doing criminal justice research in the Caribbean since 2004.

Ericka B. Adams (ericka.adams@sjsu.edu) is an associate Professor and the graduate coordinator in the Department of Justice Studies at San José State University. Born and raised in Northern Trinidad, Dr. Adams has developed her expertise in two areas: (1) the impact of violence on communities in Trinidad and Tobago and (2) how criminal justice practices impact people's lived experiences in the United States and internationally (e.g. in areas such as policing and the collateral consequences of a criminal record).

John Walcott (john.walcott@undp.org) is the Team Leader of CariSECURE having served in the Multi-Country Office of UNDP Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean since 2018 and has served over the last three years in notable development programmes on Prevention and Early Warning Systems to Strengthen Disaster Preparedness, Advocacy on Disaster Risk Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation Strategies and Strengthening Evidence-Based Decision-Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean. John has 22 years of experience in Programme and Project Management Delivery, a key attribute that has nurtured him to lead the CariSECURE Team and Project. John has an MSc in Project Management and Evaluation and is a Managing Successful Programmes (MSP) practitioner and Certified Scrum Master (CSM), expertly skilled in a proven best-practice approach to delivering transformational change by means of applied programme management methods. John understands the role data collection has and its importance to Management Information Systems in the transformation of Data to Information and, the use of Data Analytics in the implementation of data-driven decision-making, strategy and policy for Citizen Security. John is a strong advocate of the UNDP brand, its growth and targeted achievements within Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean region and is a servant leader to advance the cause,

relevance and use of Management Information Systems for Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions in the Caribbean.

Kayla Freemon (kfreemon@asu.edu) is a Criminology and Criminal Justice doctoral student at Arizona State University. Her research interests include policy and programme evaluation, crime prevention, and crime and justice in the Caribbean. Kayla previously worked as an International Affairs Specialist at the U.S. Department of Justice and served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Guyana. ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5960-494X>

Kellie Moss (km345@leicester.ac.uk) is a Research Associate at the University of Leicester, working on the history of mental health and substance abuse in the colonial prisons of British Guiana. She was awarded a PhD in 2018 for her thesis on the global mobilities and integration of coerced labourers in nineteenth-century Western Australia, including indentured servants, apprenticed juvenile emigrants, convict labourers and Indigenous peoples. Kellie is co-author of "Guyana's Prisons: Colonial Histories of Post-Colonial Challenges" (2020), in a special issue of *The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice*.

Kristy Warren (kwarren@lincoln.ac.uk) is Lecturer in Black History at the University of Lincoln. She researches the socio-political history of British colonialism in the Caribbean and the lingering legacies of this past in the region and the United Kingdom. She is also an Honorary Fellow at the University of Leicester, where she focuses on mental illness and substance use in Guyanese prisons since independence in 1966.

Patrice K. Morris (pmorris1@ggc.edu) completed her undergraduate study at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus, Jamaica, and earned a PhD in Criminal Justice from Rutgers University. She is currently Chair of Studies and Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Georgia Gwinnett College. She has received national recognition and awards for her research and teaching. Her research interests are on homicide in the Caribbean, institutional and community-based corrections and prison reform. Her articles are published in the *British Journal of Criminology*, *Race and Justice* and *International Criminal Justice Review*.

Paolo delMistro (paolo.delmistro@undp.org) began his career with the Montreal Police Department (SPVM) and the Service de police de la Ville de Quebec (SPVQ) as a drug investigator and an officer. He was seconded to the Community Policing module of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) and then to the ministry of Public Security as part of the Deputy ministry team developing the White Paper on Community Policing in Quebec. From 2005, he provided

support to international development agencies as a police expert (Guinea, Iraq, Timor Leste, Albania, Yemen, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Georgia) before joining the United Nations in 2010 as a full-time Senior Manager of Security Sector Reform Programmes (Tunisia, Palestine, Central African Republic, the Caribbean). With more than six years of experience in the Caribbean region, he has a solid knowledge and understanding of the issues faced by police and justice organizations. He is an engineer by training and has a Master's in Business Administration (MBA) (specializing in private security management) and a Master's in Public Administration (specializing in public security management).

Queenela Cameron (queenela.cameron@uog.edu.gy) is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Guyana with specialisms in International Law, Human Rights and International Relations. She has a general and specific interest in human rights research and promotion, especially those relating women, girls, prisoners and migrants.

Regan Reid (rreid8@pvamu.edu) is a Juvenile Justice doctoral student at Prairie View A&M University and a research assistant with the Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention Center. She earned a BSc in Political Science and Criminology and an MSc in International Public and Development Management from the University of the West Indies, Mona (UWI). She was also as an instructor of Government at UWI. Her research interests include Jamaican child-rearing, youth behavioural health, mental health, bullying, global security, human rights, family violence and economic development. She is a global peace ambassador with the Global Peace Chain and the Graduate Student Representative for the Caribbean Studies Association.

Robert Kinlocke (robert.kinlocke02@uwimona.edu.jm) is a lecturer in the Department of Geography and Geology at the University of the West Indies, Mona where he teaches courses in Urban Planning and Geographic Information Systems. Dr. Kinlocke's research interests revolve around urban sustainability, housing, food security and climate change.

Tammy Ayres (tca2@leicester.ac.uk) is an Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of Leicester working in the area of drugs, particularly drug policy, treatment and theory. She has experience of undertaking research with vulnerable populations, particularly problematic drug users, prisoners, people with mental ill-health and trauma in the community and in prisons in the United Kingdom and in Guyana. This research has helped to shape policymaking and professional practice at both a local and a national level.

Submission Guidelines

Submissions: Articles, especially unsolicited submissions, should be submitted in both hard copy and electronically and must contain original unpublished work, not being considered elsewhere. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page which can be readily detached. The author's business address, email address and a brief biographical paragraph outlining the author's current academic rank and affiliation should also be on this fly sheet, together with the title of the article. The title of the article without the author's name should be repeated on another page. Titles of articles should not be more than eight words. Articles should be word-processed, flush left, unjustified, using double spacing (including notes and quotations), with generous margins on all four sides. Authors should retain a true copy. The first line of each paragraph should be indented except after titles and sub-heads. Unclear copy will not be reviewed. Include no more than five key words, placed at the end of the abstract. Pages should be numbered consecutively. Length of articles should be 7,000–10,000 words including notes, and Notes and Comments should be in the 1,500–2,000-word range or less. Acknowledgements and references to grants and so on should appear as a footnote to the author's name on the cover page and should not be included in the main list of notes. Overall, articles should be no more than 25 pages.

Format and style: Articles not submitted in CJC's format and style will not be considered. The Chicago Manual of Style is the reference book for CJC's house style. Chicago-Style Citation Quick Guide is available at http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.

Book reviews should not exceed 1,500 words. Book review headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, also pagination and price, if available.

An abstract of no more than 100 words describing the aims, methods, findings and conclusions of the study must accompany the article. Articles without abstracts will be returned.

Notes should be used only to provide additional comments and discussion and should be numbered consecutively throughout the article. They should not be used to convey bibliographic information. Endnotes are preferred to footnotes. Note numbers must be inserted manually in the text; they must not be autoformatted.

Tables and illustrative figures are not to be included in the text. They should be numbered consecutively with Arabic numbers and should have titles as well as numbers. Tables are to be doubled spaced, with each table on a separate sheet. Figures, including maps, must also be on separate sheets and must be of professional standard and in camera-ready form. Tables, appendices and graphs will be reproduced in black and white and should be designed accordingly. Their position in the text should be indicated.

Further information on CJC's format and style is available <https://www.uwipress.com/journals/caribbean-journal-of-criminology/>