Motivating knowledge agents: Can incentive pay overcome social distance? 2010-2015

Berg, Erlend and Ghatak, Maitreesh and R Manjula, R and Rajasekhar, D and Roy, Sanchari (2020). Motivating knowledge agents: Can incentive pay overcome social distance? 2010-2015. [Data Collection]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Service. 10.5255/UKDA-SN-854126

Data description (abstract)

In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. The resulting article studies the interaction of incentive pay with intrinsic motivation and social distance. It analyses theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have not only pro-social objectives but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another.

Data creators:
Creator Name Affiliation ORCID (as URL)
Berg Erlend University of Bristol
Ghatak Maitreesh London School of Economics
R Manjula R Institute for Social and Economic Change
Rajasekhar D Institute for Social and Economic Change
Roy Sanchari Kings College London
Sponsors: Economic and Social Research Council
Grant reference: ES/H021248/1
Topic classification: Health
Economics
Education
Keywords: public services, information, incentives, knowledge transfer, Social stratification, Information transfer
Project title: Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)
Grant holders: Nicholas Crafts, Andrew Oswald, Sharun Mukand, Sascha O Becker, Sayantan Ghosal, Kimberley Scharf, Stephen Broadberry, Anandi Mani, John Whalley
Project dates:
FromTo
4 January 20103 January 2015
Date published: 15 Apr 2020 16:06
Last modified: 15 Apr 2020 16:07

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