**Methodology (manifesto analysis)**

To establish party placements along the SI – FM; GAL - TAN and ‘issue’ dimensions, the starting point has been the model developed by Pellikaan *et al* (2003; see also Odmalm, 2012; De Lange, 2007). Their measurement tool builds on Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995) ideas of the two-dimensional space and seek to capture degrees of conflict on key variables. The SI - FM dimension is thus defined as ‘opposition//…//between statements favouring the ‘political redistribution’ of economic resources//…//and statements favouring the ‘market allocation’ of resources’ (1995:1). Following De Lange (2007), the central indicators have been used: (1) Privatisation, (2) Public Sector, (3) Welfare and Social Security System, (4) Labour Market, (5) Taxation, (6) Budget Deficit and (7) Trade and Enterprise policies.

A hand-coded content analysis (Patton, 2002; Mayring, 2000) was then carried out using key words to identify the quasi-sentences associated with each individual category (e.g. ‘private’; ‘public’ or ‘pensions’). Should the statements ‘predominantly indicate that a party was in favour of state intervention [it] receive[d] a score of (-1) on that specific issue’ (2007: 420), exemplified by the following quotes:

‘Alternatives and diversity - against commercialisation and privatisation.’ (V, 1991) [‘Privatisation’];

‘We will immediately introduce an emergency programme of investment in the infrastructure and in public works in order to get companies and people back to work.’ (Lib Dems, 1992) [‘Public Sector’];

‘[A]dditional health insurance should never replace the basic provision of health care.’ (CD&V, 2007) [‘Welfare and Social Security System’].

Conversely, when the statements suggested to be in favour of more market influence, a score of (+1) was given –

‘The state is the biggest owner of businesses in Sweden. FP and the Alliance aim to privatise a couple of these enterprises.’ (FP, 2006) [‘Privatisation’];

‘Open VLD wants the government to act mainly as the regulator of public services’ (Open VLD, 2007) [‘Public Sector’];

‘[B]e allowed the opportunity to build up supplementary pensions in addition to the statutory one.’ (MR, 2003) [‘Welfare and Social Security System’].

Should the statements be unclear or ambiguous, on the other hand, a score of 0 was allocated as per the following excerpts -

‘Modern government has a strategic role not to replace the market but to ensure that the market works properly. Other competitors in Europe and elsewhere recognise that industrial policy must be at the heart of economic policy. It is the government's responsibility to create the conditions for enterprise to thrive.’ (Labour, 1992) [‘Privatisation’];

‘[E]nhance public transportation but also make the administration and public service provision more efficient.’(CDH, 1995) [‘Public Sector’];

‘Financing the health care sector should be done by everyone through taxation but the execution//…//should be characterised by diversity’ (M, 2010) [‘Welfare and Social Security System’].

But for some of the indicators the ‘more state-more market’ – dichotomy did not always work. A few adjustments have therefore been made. On indicators 4 and 7, a score of (-1) was given should the manifesto indicate a preference for more regulation, and (+1) should it prefer less (e.g. ‘The market economy must be regulated//…//we want to introduce a 6-hour working day//…//’ (V, 1994) (-1); ‘New Labour believes in a flexible labour market that serves employers and employees alike. But flexibility alone is not enough. We need 'flexibility plus'’ (Labour, 1997) (+1)).

On indicator 5, if the statement favoured raising taxes, a score of (-1) was given whereas lowering taxes was scored (+1) (e.g. ’[T]he decision to abolish tax on wealth should be revoked’ (SAP, 1994) (-1); ‘We will be a tax-cutting government.’ (Conservatives, 2001) (+1)). And on indicator 6, a statement that advocated for more public spending was given a score of (-1) whereas if it suggested less, it was scored (+1) (e.g. ‘[I]t is neither realistic nor wise to assume that the hole in our budget can be fully closed during a government's four year term. If we cut so much at once, the probability of a 'double dip' recession is great.’ (SP, 2010) (-1); ‘Reduce the budget deficit that has grown during the past administration’ (VVD, 2010) (+1)).

Operationalising the GAL - TAN dimension proved somewhat more complicated. These challenges stem from how it ‘encompasses several political questions’ (De Lange, 2007: 420), and how it suffers from a lack of consensus regarding what the key indicators should be (see for example Franklin, 1992; Inglehart, 1990). De Lange, however, points to how Kitschelt’s three elements (citizenship/ethnocultural relations; individual freedoms and collective decision-making) are central to this dimension of conflict and has thus suggested the following scheme -

1. Citizenship/Ethnocultural relations
	1. *Immigration* (support for an inclusive and universalistic society (-1); support for an exclusive and particularistic society (+1));
	2. *Integration of Cultural Minorities* (support for an inclusive and universalistic society (-1); support for an exclusive and particularistic society (+1))
2. Individual Freedoms
	1. *Diversity of Lifestyles* (support for individual freedom (-1); support for a moral government (+1));
	2. *Ethical Legislation* (support for individual freedom (-1); support for a moral government (+1));
3. Collective Decision-Making
	1. *Direct Representation* (support for more direct representation and more participation in the decision-making process (-1); support for appointed representation and hierarchical decision-making procedures (+1));
	2. *Participation in Decision-Making* (support for more direct representation and more participation in the decision-making process (-1); support for appointed representation and hierarchical decision-making procedures (+1))

Nevertheless some challenges are still present, especially regarding the wording of some of these indicators. ‘Immigration’ and ‘Integration of Cultural Minorities’, for example, are used to measure ‘Citizenship/Ethnocultural Relations’ yet they appear to be more relevant for stances on ‘Integration’ *only*,and do not necessarily capture ‘Immigration’ as such. There is also some inherent ambiguity with the term ‘Integration’ since it may *also* capture positions on ‘Nationalism’ and/or ‘National Identity’. To dichotomise ‘Diversity of Lifestyles’ as ‘support for individual freedom/moral government’ may equally run the risk of not capturing the full range of *diversities* that exist or the impact that parties perceive them to have on society.

And, crucially perhaps, neither indicator captures the key GAL - TAN concern of ‘Environmental Protection’ versus ‘Economic Growth’. Therefore, the second scale has also been modified so it clearly covers ‘Integration’, ‘The Environment’ and ‘National Identity’ in addition to the existing categories of ‘Individual Freedoms’ (‘Diversity of Lifestyles’/‘Ethical Legislation’), and ‘Modes of Collective Decision-Making’ (‘Direct Representation’/‘Participation in the Decision-Making’).

These subsequent adjustments have thus meant a slightly different scoring system to that proposed by De Lange:

1. Diversity of Lifestyles: Positive (-1) or Negative (+1)

‘Equality between men and women, equal rights and opportunities for all//…//tolerance and the right to be different.” (MR, 2003) (-1);

‘Those who come to the Netherlands//…//are in a society where the Judeo-Christian, and a humanist tradition and culture colour society. This means that a Western culture and the Western values are leading for Dutch society.’ (CDA, 2010) (+1);

2) Supports: Individual Freedom (-1) or a Moral Government (+1)

‘Everyone has the right to a private sphere//…//[i]t should be a cornerstone in a free and democratic society.’ (MP, 2010) (-1);

‘Labour will appoint an anti-drugs supremo to co-ordinate our battle against drugs across all government departments. The 'drug czar' will be a symbol of our commitment to tackle the modern menace of drugs in our communities.’ (Labour, 1997) (+1);

3) Supports: Direct (-1) or Appointed Representation (+1)

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‘[M]ore referendums increase citizens' possibilities to influence and strengthens democracy//…//more power to local authorities.’ (MP, 2002) (-1);

‘Mayors and commissioners remain appointed by the Crown.’ (CDA, 2002) (+1);

4) Supports: Individual Participation (-1) or Hierarchical Modes of Decision-Making (+1)

‘[M]ore participatory democracy, where citizens are actively involved in public debate’ (GA, 2010) (-1);

‘PS, however, considers community issues, which constitute a danger to the unity of our country, to be likely to bias the participatory process.’ (PS, 2007) (+1);

5) National Identity: Less (-1) or More Important to Preserve (+1)

‘We want to protect the rights and opportunities for our national minorities to develop their own culture and language.’ (V, 2002) (-1);

‘Revive Britain's sense of community.’ (Lib Dems, 1997); (+1)

6) Supports: an Inclusive and Universalistic (-1) or Exclusive and Particularistic (+1) Society

‘It is SP’s view that everything possible should be done to help these people to integrate into our society.’ (SP, 1994) (-1);

‘English language tests for everyone who wants to stay permanently.’ (Labour, 2005) (+1);

7) More important: Environmental Protection (-1) or Economic Growth (+1)

‘Increasing taxes on environmentally damaging activities is not only desirable but also necessary.’ (CP, 1994) (-1);

‘Expand airport and transport options//…//everyone is concerned about the economy, it is important to innovate and grow.’ (VVD, 2006) (+1).

Two additional 7-point scales were then set up to measure positions on the EU and immigration ‘issues’. As elaborated on above, only a minority of parties can be said to ‘fit’ neatly into either a soft or hard ‘Eurosceptic’ category (Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001). They should instead fall somewhere along a continuum ranging from Eurosceptic to -pragmatic to Euroenthusiastic (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). And the manifestos should also likely to vary regarding the ‘enthusiasm’ that is expressed for the different *aspects* of the European project (Hooghe *et al*, 2002). With these points in mind, the EU scale was designed so as to capture levels of confrontation on the following key areas –

(1) Membership; (2) Function of the EU; (3); Integration; (4) The Euro; (5) Common Foreign Policy; (6) Enlargement and, finally, (7) Constitution/Treaties.

The scoring system has been comparatively straight forward and based around statements that portray an overall *Negative* (-1) –

‘The current drive for a political; monetary; economic and military union is only in the interests of business.” (SP, 1994) [Membership];

‘The EMU is an undemocratic construction//…//it is not run by the elected but by independent central bankers that follow dogmatic treaty texts.’ (V, 1998) [Euro];

- or *Positive* view (+1)

‘Europe is essential for our prosperity and for our security.’ (CD&V, 2010) [Membership];

‘Labour is pledged to do all it can to enable the first group of applicant countries to join in time to take part in the next European Parliamentary elections in 2004’ (Labour, 2001) [Enlargement].

A similar situation is likely to apply to the immigration ‘issue’ as well. That is, it should be rare to find instances where the aggregate sum amounts to either an exclusively ‘liberal’ or an exclusively ‘restrictive’ position. It is rather expected to fall somewhere between these two poles. It is equally expected that these positions will vary depending on what *type* of migrants that the parties are more liberal or more restrictive towards. To then capture the full range of newcomers, seven categories have been identified. These cover the ‘typical’ (e.g. ‘Asylum Seeker/Refugees’) to the ‘atypical’ migrant (‘Retirement’).

1. Asylum Seekers/Refugees; (2) Labour; (3) Family Reunification; (4) Unaccompanied Minors; (5) Students: (6) Retirement and (7) Immigration (in general)[[1]](#footnote-1).

Apart from ‘Immigration (in general)’ and ‘Student Migration’, the same scoring system has been used throughout: (-1) if the statement indicated a more liberal approach, and (+1) if it suggests a more restrictive one. E.g. FP’s statement in 2010 - ‘Sweden should be open to labour migrants’ - was given a score of -1, whereas SP’s line in 2002 - ‘No short-sighted imports of foreign labour’ - was allocated a score of (+1). The two exceptions were scored depending on whether they were considered to have a positive (-1) or a negative (+1) impact on the receiving society[[2]](#footnote-2).

And again, should statements be unclear or ambiguous (on either scale), a score of (0) is given, exemplified by CDA’s 2010 view on ‘Labour Migration’ –

‘Admission of migrant workers should be based upon the needs of the Dutch labour market’ –

and by GL’s 2006 statement on ‘Enlargement’ –

‘The European Union took on the promise that Turkey and the countries of the Western Balkans could join if they meet the entry requirements.’

This measurement technique thus differs from that of the CMP and CHES (Bakker *et al*, 2012; Hooghe *et al*, 2010; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Budge *et al*, 2001; Ray, 1999; Laver and Hunt, 1992). While the CMP data directly reflect the stated party positions and have generated a rich time-series set (Budge and Pennings, 2007), they also contain significant methodological ‘noise’ since the economic and social policy positions are conflated into one, unified left-right dimension which may exaggerate positions as well as the moves that parties make between elections (Benoit and Laver, 2007). The CHES data has tried to avoid the ‘mathematically constrained nature of the saliency-based CMP left-right measure’ (ibid: 103) by asking country experts to classify parties on four substantive dimensions – economic, social, loci of decision-making and environmental policy – plus a ‘direct measure of party positions on a general left-right scale’ (ibid: 91). Although this method allows for more measurement flexibility, the survey is also limited by its current lack of comparative *time* points. Furthermore, the key finding suggests that ‘the substantive meaning of left-right is not constant’ (ibid: 103) and, as such, appears to be highly dependent on context. This raises further questions as to what type of (comparative) conclusions that can actually be drawn if the tools are not able to ‘travel’ between cases.

In contrast, the measurement technique used within is less constrained by context and also offers a more nuanced view on the key ‘issue’ variables. Although the CMP covers e.g. ‘Membership’ and ‘Enlargement’, it does not include any specific indicators on the ‘Euro’, or a ‘Common Foreign Policy’. And the indicators used for immigration - ‘Underprivileged Minority Groups’ and ‘Multiculturalism: Positive/Negative’ - do again not capture such positions as much as they do integration. The CHES data, conversely, provide more detail (especially on the EU) but are also mainly concerned with ‘leadership’ rather than ‘party’ positions. And while the 2010 survey includes a general indicator on ‘Immigration’, it has previously been understood as ‘Asylum’ *only* and will as such miss to pick up any of the other categories of newcomers.

The calculations made for this book have however been compared with the CMP and CHES results for general directional fit, and the average party positions tend to fall in the same ideological sphere as the two comparative benchmarks. And none of the calculation fall into the ‘CMP says ‘right’, CHES says ‘left’- category’. The estimations do, however, allocate some parties with a higher score. One reason for this discrepancy is because the SI – FM dimension (i.e. ‘old’ Left-Right) is defined in strictly economic terms whereas for the CMP, e.g., it is ‘a general scale dealing with social-economic policy positions’ (Benoit and Laver, 2007: 100). And since party positions are understood to be the sum of the proportion of right-wing categories minus the left-wing ones, they will naturally end up being closer to the mid-way point. To further ensure coding consistency, a series of inter-reliability checks were carried out. The relevant manifesto statements were initially scored by the author, or the research assistant, and then passed on to the other to score ‘blind’. Some differences were identified through this process, e.g. one coder would allocate a score of (+1) whereas the other would give it a (0). These instances tended to arise when the concerned quasi-sentences were particularly lengthy, thus prompting a discussion, and occasional re-coding, of the score given.

Quantifying manifestos in this way provides a positional range where the closer to (-7) the aggregate score is, the more SI/GAL/EU: Negative/Liberal the party’s stance will be. In contrast, the closer to (+7) the score is, the more FM/TAN/EU: Positive/Restrictive will the position be. To then establish which parties that should be more and less likely to experience any conflicting ideological ‘pull’, the average SI-FM and GAL-TAN position has been taken for the 22 elections that have been studied. The respective party locations are plotted in a two-dimensional scatter diagram, and grouped together depending on positional configuration.

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1. This category includes any mentions not covered by the other categories. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. E.g. [Immigration (in general)] ‘People from abroad make a positive contribution to British society. (Labour, 2001) (-1); ‘Do you know that 100,000 asylum-seekers have entered our country in the past seven years and that most of them have stayed illegally? (MR, 1995) (+1); [Student Migration] ‘America and China know how to lure the best students and scientists. These people must come and stay here!’ (VVD, 2006); (-1); ‘We want to encourage students to come to our universities and colleges, but our student visa system has become the biggest weakness in our border controls.’ (Conservatives, 2010) (+1). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)