

CODEBOOK

GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES

Project principal:
Petra Schleiter
St Hilda's College
and Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford.

Research officer:
Emma Sell
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford.

This data collection project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, Grant Reference No. RES-000-22-0365)

If you wish to use this dataset please cite:
Schleiter, Petra (2004), Dataset: Governments in European Semi-Presidential Regimes, available from
<http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academic-faculty/petra-schleiter.html>

Oxford, 2004

Introduction:

This codebook describes the contents of the Governments in European Semi-Presidential Regimes dataset. The dataset comprises information on the governments formed in fifteen East and West European countries, which have or had semi-presidential regimes for some time between 1945 and Dec 2003. Since the dataset is designed to enable the study of governments in democratic semi-presidential regimes, a threshold for inclusion in the dataset is applied. Countries are included during time periods in which they reach the mid-scale value of .5 or better on *either* the Freedom House or the Polity scales (both normalised to a 0-1 range, where 0 denotes complete lack of democracy and 1 fully fledged democratic procedures). The countries included in the dataset are Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine. For the West European countries information is collected from the time the first government is formed post World War II, or from the time the first government is formed after the adoption of a semi-presidential regime through constitutional change (as in the case of France and Portugal). For the East European countries information is collected from the formation of the first government after the adoption of a democratic semi-presidential regime through constitutional change. The dataset includes information on governments up to Dec 2003, or up to the point at which constitutional changes end the semi-presidential regime.

The data consists of a Stata file "Schleiter_Semi-Presidential Cabinets.dta". The data records government attributes, as well as parliamentary attributes, presidential attributes, and constitutional attributes that describe the environments within which governments work. Cases in these files are defined as individual governments.

The collection of this dataset was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, Grant Reference No. RES-000-22-0365). Project principal: Dr

Petra Schleiter, St Hilda's College and Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. Research officer: Emma Sell, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.

Variables, coding rules and sources

1 Government Attributes

caseno	Government id
country	Country name
countryn	Country id
pm	Name of PM <i>Sources: Müller and Strøm 2000</i> Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
actingPM	Name of acting PM <i>Sources: Müller and Strøm 2000</i> Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
govpart	Parties/ alliances in government <i>Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson 2000</i> <u>Indridasson (2000)</u> (Iceland), "Keesing's Contemporary Archives" 1991 - 2003 Ionescu 1997Ionescu (Moldova), "Constitutional Watch - a Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional Politics in Eastern Europe and the Ex-Ussr" 2001EECR (Moldova), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
govtnumb	Number of government Note: Continuous numbering of all democratic governments since the end of WWII, or since the adoption of a semi-presidential constitution.
formdate	Government formation date Note: date on which government approved by parliament/ acting cabinet appointed by president . <i>Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)</i>
termdate	Government termination date Note: date of formal resignation or date of the election which constitutionally terminates government, whichever is earlier.

Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)

- elprox** **Proximity of cabinet formation to election**
Coding : Within 6 months after parliamentary election = 1, More than six months after presidential or parliamentary elections = 2, Within 6 months after presidential elections = 3
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
- regime** **Character of regime**
Coding: President-parliamentary = 1, premier-presidential = 0
Source: definition of regime classification criteria Shugart and Carey (1992: 23-24), "Constitutions" Constitutions
- technic** **Character of government**
Coding: Technical = 1, Non-technical = 0
Note: Technical governments are defined as governments in which over 50% of the ministers have no party affiliation.
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data).
- govtype** **Government type**
Coding: Technical = 0, Unified = 1, Cohabitation = 2
Note: Technical governments are defined as governments in which over 50% of the ministers have no party affiliation.
Unified government is defined as a situation in which the president is a member of /affiliated with a party in government
Cohabitation is defined as a situation in which the president is not a member of /affiliated with any party in government
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data).
- termin** **Preceding government ended by discretionary parliamentary termination**
Coding: Discretionary parliamentary termination = 1, Otherwise = 0.
Note: Discretionary parliamentary terminations are defined as terminations caused by early parliamentary elections, voluntary enlargement of coalition, government defeat by opposition in parliament, termination of acting government by formation of a new government, conflict between coalition parties, intra-party conflict in coalition party or parties.

Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data).

Cause of termination code/s

Note: Text column coding one or several causes of termination.

Coding:

Technical terminations coding:

1 = Regular presidential or parliamentary elections which require government termination

2 = Other constitutional reason

3 = Death/ Illness of PM

3.5 = Government not terminated by Dec 31 2003

3.51 = Termination of caretaker government by elections that were arranged before the caretaker government took office.

Discretionary termination coding:

4 = Early parliamentary elections

5 = Voluntary enlargement of coalition

6 = Cabinet defeated by opposition in parliament

6.5 = Acting government terminated by formation of new government

7 = Conflict between coalition parties

7.5 = Cabinet dismissed by president

8 = Intra-party conflict in coalition party or parties

8.5 = Assembly dissolution by president

Critical event termination coding:

9 = Discretionary resignation after parliamentary/presidential or other election which does not constitutionally require cabinet termination

10 = Popular opinion shocks

11 = International or national security event

12 = Economic event

13 = Personal event

14 = President/PM conflict

15 = Insurrection/ Riots

history

Character of previous government

Coding: Technical = 1, Otherwise = 0

Note: history = **technic** lagged by 1.

Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data).

majstat

Majority status of government

Coding: Technical = 0, Minority = 1, Majority = 2

Note: technical = **technic**, Minority and Majority defined by percentage of assembly seats controlled by governing party/coalition, based on the previous election results. Minority (0-50%), Majority (50.1-100%)

Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck 1997-2004 Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), "Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe" Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001)(EEU)

- duration** **Duration of government in days**
Note: Number of days from government taking office (**formdate**) to government termination (**termdate**).
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data).
- maxdays** **Maximum potential duration of government in days**
Note: The potential duration of government in days from time of taking office (**formdate**) to next constitutionally scheduled election date, defined by constitutional inter-election period (CIEP).
Coding: nextelecta/p - formdate
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data), International Constitutional Law.
- daysdiff** **Difference between actual government duration in days and potential maximum duration of government in days.**
Note: Difference in days between actual government duration (**duration**) and potential duration according to CIEP (**maxdays**).
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data), Constitutions.
- defgovt** **Definition of new government**
Note: Reason for identifying new cabinet according to Müller & Strøm (2000) criteria.
Coding:
1 = A change in the party composition of the government/ or in non-partisan governments a change of 50% or more of cabinet members with voting rights
2 = A change of the head of government
3 = Government formation following an election.
These reasons for counting a new government are not mutually exclusive and several of them may apply at the same time. The

different combinations of reasons for counting a new government are coded as follows:

Aggregation rule: 1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3, 4 = 1+2, 5 = 1+3, 6 = 2+3, 7 = 1+2+3

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

Technical Technical cause of government termination

Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).

Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred for technical reason (cause of termination code/s 1 – 3.51), otherwise = 0

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

discretionary Discretionary cause of government termination

Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).

Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred for discretionary reason (cause of termination code/s 4-8.5), otherwise = 0

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

event Government termination triggered by critical events:

Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).

Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred following a critical event (cause of termination code/s 9-15), otherwise = 0

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

cause Cause of termination

Note: Text column describing reason for cabinet termination

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data)

gvtseats Government strength in parliamentary seats

Note: Number of seats held by governing party/parties based on results of last parliamentary election.

Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU and Croatia) Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), "France - Assemblée Nationale" French Assembly, "Portugal - Assembleia Da República" Portuguese Parliament

singlmaj Single party majority in government

Coding: Single party majority = 1, otherwise = 0

Notes: Single party majority coded if a single party forms the government and controls at least 50.1% of the assembly seats.

Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU)
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU)

- prctseat** **Government strength in parliament as a percentage of total seats**
Coding: govtsseats/totseats x 100.
Note: measured by results of last parliamentary election
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament
- assuppre** **Assembly support for government pre-parliamentary election**
Note: Amount of support in the assembly for the government by percentage of seat shares before an election, based on the previous election results.
Coding: Minority = 0 (0-50%), Majority = 1 (50.1-66.65%), Super-majority (66.66-100%) = 2
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament
- assuppos** **Assembly support for government post-election**
Note: Amount of support in the assembly for the government by percentage of seat shares after an election. For regimes in which the constitution does not require the resignation of the government following parliamentary elections, this variable may differ from **assuppre**.
Coding: Minority = 0 (0-50%), Majority = 1 (50.1-66.65%), Super-majority (66.66-100%) = 2
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament

2 Parliamentary attributes

- totseats** **Total parliamentary seats**
Note: Number of parliamentary seats filled at the time of the last parliamentary election
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament

- prctmaj** **Percentage of majority based governments during constitutional era**
Note: A constitutional era is delimited by constitutional changes (coded in **datechange**) that alter the relationship between president and parliament, thus creating a new regime
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament
- parldate** **Date of parliamentary election**
Note: Date on which parliamentary election took place – if several rounds, latest date used.
Source: parliamentary election data – Caramani 1999 Caramani (1999), Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), Election Results Archive, Carr Psephos, Croatia: 2003 Electionworld <http://www.electionworld.org/croatia.htm>, 2000 and 1992 Election Results Archive <http://binghamton.edu/era/elections/>
 Birch 2003
- enp** **Effective number of parliamentary parties**
Coding: Laakso-Taagepera Index
Note: Data for WEU post-2000 unavailable; 2000 data used.
Sources: WEU: Müller and Strøm (2000 ed.), Iceland: Indridasson (2000), EEU: Birch (2003: 109-110).
- enp2** **Effective number of parliamentary parties**
Coding: Laakso-Taagepera Index, based on authors' own calculations using parliamentary election outcomes (see sources for parldate, prctmaj)
- volat** **Electoral volatility**
Note: Birch –
 Volatility = the amount of change observed within the set of parties that contest two consecutive elections (data available to 2002). To obtain the 'true' volatility score it is necessary to divide by the sum of the fractional shares of the total vote at each election of the parties which are included in the calculations.
Calculation of indices in Birch (2003) are based on the most comparable figures, thus figures are based on SMD and PR for some cases – comments in cells highlight these cases.

Warwick – Half sum of proportional changes in parliamentary strengths of parties from one election to the next (data available to 1987, data unavailable for France).

Sources: Birch 2003 Birch (2003) (EEU), Warwick (1995) (WEU)

volatbp Pedersen volatility score

Note: The Pedersen volatility score - the amount of change observed within the set of parties that contest two consecutive elections (data available to 2002) using 2 as a denominator.

This measure is more directly comparable with Warwick's data.

Sources: Birch 2003 Birch (2003) (EEU), Lane & Ersson (1999) (WEU). Lane and Ersson 1999

3 Presidential Attributes

presdate Date of presidential election

Note: Date on which presidential election took place – if more than one date or run-off then latest date/ run off date used

Source: Psephos, Rulers, "[Election Results Archive](#)" [Election Results Archive](#) (WEU, Croatia, Slovenia), "[Lijphart Elections Archive](#)" [Lijphart Elections Archive](#) (Finland), "Statistics Finland" Statistics Finland, "Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer Rückblick" Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU)

presinaug Date of presidential inauguration

Note: Date on which president begins tenure

Source: Ortiz de Zárate (2000), "National Politics Web Guide" [National Politics Web Guide](#) (France, Ireland), "Rulers" [Rulers](#) (France), "Presidency of the Portuguese Republic" Presidency of the Portuguese Republic (Portugal)

electpres Nature of presidential election

Note: Popular election = 0, Election by parliament = 1

Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (WEU post-1999, EEU and FSU data).

president Name of president

Note: Name of president and party affiliation/association

Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU data).

- prespart** **Party membership of president**
Coding: Party affiliation = 1, otherwise = 0. Sources: see **president**.
- unified** **Unified or divided government**
Coding: Unified = 1, Divided = 0
Note: Based on party affiliation of president and coalition/party make-up of government at time of cabinet formation. Unified government is coded when the president is a member of/associated with a party in government.
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
- presctrl** **Degree of presidential control over government**
Coding: Technical = 0, Single party majority = 1, single party minority = 2, coalition majority = 3, coalition minority = 4, cohabitation = 5. Coding rules for technical, majority and minority as for **majstat**.
Note: Based on party affiliation of president and coalition/party make-up of government at time of cabinet formation
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
- presupre** **Presidential support for government pre-presidential election**
Note: Amount of presidential support for the government based on party affiliation at last election.
Coding: Does not support government = 0, Supports government = 1, Supports government and government has a super-majority in parliament = 2
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
- presupos** **Presidential support for government post-presidential election**
Note: Amount of presidential support for the government based on party affiliation.
Coding: Does not support government = 0, Supports government = 1, Supports government and government has a super-majority in parliament = 2
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
- presdis** **Presidential involvement in cabinet dismissal**
Coding: President not involved = 0, Assembly dissolution by president = 1, Cabinet dismissal by president = 2, Cabinet resignation requested by president = 3

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives.

4 Constitutional Attributes

Sources for all constitutional variables:

Croatia -

"The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia" The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia

Moldova -

"Constitution of the Republic of Moldova" Constitution of the Republic of Moldova

"The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova" Constitution Finder

Ukraine -

"President of Ukraine" President of Ukraine

Iceland -

Icelandic Constitution

Portugal -

"Constitution Finder" , "Constitución De La República Portuguesa" Constitution Finder

Finland -

Constitution Act of Finland Parliament Act 1984 Constitution Act of Finland Parliament Act

Iceland -

Constitutional rules are coded in context of standing orders of parliament, which give authoritative interpretation of unclear constitutional passages - Kristjansson 2003 Kristjansson in Strøm *et al* (2003)

All other countries - "International Constitutional Law" International Constitutional Law

constdate **Date of Constitutional change**

legpow **Legislative power of president**

Note: Legislative powers of president according to the Constitution using Schleiter coding

Aggregation rule - Positive legislative powers (Decree, legislative initiative, referenda) multiplied by policy responsibility. Then add sum of negative powers (package veto and judicial review).

Coding:

Decrees (Legislative)

4 Reserved powers, no recission

3 Reserved powers in limited policy areas/ until legislation is adopted

- 2 President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
- 1 Authority to enact decrees limited to states or emergency/martial law, or by countersignature of government/minister
- 0 No decree powers, or only as delegated by assembly

Legislative Initiative

- 4 Unrestricted right of legislative initiative
- 1 President can exercise legislative initiative only with governmental/ministerial countersignature
- 0 No power of legislative initiative

Proposal of Referenda

- 4 Unrestricted
- 1.5 President can call a referendum only at proposal or with the approval of govt
- 1 President can call a referendum only at the proposal or with the approval of parliament
- 0 No power to initiate a referendum

Package Veto/Override

- 4 No override
- 3 Override by extraordinary majority
- 2 Override by absolute majority of whole membership
- 1 Override by simple majority of quorum (default code when no specific provisions on override)
- 0 No veto

Judicial Review (prior to promulgation)

- 4 President alone refers
- 2 President, cabinet or majority of assembly refer
- 1 President, cabinet or minority of assembly refer
- 0 President may not refer or no prior judicial review

Policy Responsibility

- 4 Foreign & Domestic (e.g. president presides in Council of Ministers and/or has explicit domestic policy responsibilities)
- 2 Foreign, Security, Emergency
- 1.5 Security/ Emergency only
- 1 Presidential responsibility can be exercised only upon govt initiative/ with govt countersignature
- 0 None

polresp

Policy responsibility of president

Note: Policy responsibility of the president according to the Constitution using Schleiter coding. See **legpow**

cabpow

Presidential cabinet related powers

Note: Cabinet related powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding

Aggregation rule: Cabinet termination (average of technical cabinet termination, cabinet dismissal and censure) plus cabinet formation plus assembly dissolution powers

Coding:

Cabinet Termination (average technical cabinet termination, cabinet dismissal and censure)

Technical Cabinet Termination

4 After presidential elections

2 After presidential and parliamentary elections

0 After parliamentary elections

Cabinet Dismissal by president

4 President dismisses cabinet at will

1.5 President may initiate dismissal of ministers, but needs approval of the PM

1 President may initiate dismissal of cabinet, but requires approval of the assembly/ advisory body

0 Cabinet/ministers may only be dismissed by assembly/ at initiative of PM

Censure - No Confidence Vote

4 No censure

3 Censure of cabinet by assembly gives president discretionary/mandatory power to dissolve the assembly

2 Censure requires government resignation, which may be rejected by president (possibly on advice of PM)

1 Constructive vote of no confidence

0 Unrestricted censure (through single or repeated no confidence votes)

Cabinet Formation

4 President appoints PM and/or cabinet without need for assembly approval

3 President appoints PM and/or cabinet after consultation or with consent of assembly (e.g. no formal investiture vote required), and president has first move in all rounds of appointment process

2 President nominates PM, who needs confirmation/investiture by the assembly; PM proposes/appoints other cabinet ministers (president has first move in all rounds of appointment process)

1 President nominates PM, who needs confirmation/investiture by the assembly; PM proposes/appoints other cabinet ministers (president only has first move in first round of appointment process)
0 Parliament proposes PM, president appoints

Assembly Dissolution

4 Unrestricted
3 Restricted by frequency or point within term
2 Requires/ may prompt early presidential elections
1.5 In response to no confidence vote/ failure to adopt budget/ legislative deadlock
1 In response to failed government formation, or only at proposal of government/PM
0 No provision, or dissolution only when assembly fails to convene

- formpow** **Cabinet formation powers of president**
Note: Cabinet formation powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding. See **cabpow**
- dismiss** **Cabinet dismissal powers of president**
Note: Cabinet dismissal powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding. See **cabpow**
- dissolut** **Assembly dissolution power of president**
Note: Assembly dissolution powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding. See **cabpow**
- totpow** **Total presidential powers**
Note: Total presidential powers according to constitution using Schleiter coding
Aggregation rule: **legpow** plus **cabpow**
- scleg** **Shugart and Carey presidential legislative powers**
Note: Legislative presidential powers according to Constitution using Shugart and Carey (1992) coding
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally given by Shugart and Carey (1992).
Aggregation rule: Additive

Coding:

Package Veto/Override

4 Veto with no override
3 Veto with override requiring greater than 2/3 (of quorum)
2 Veto with override requiring 2/3

- 1 Veto with override requiring absolute majority of assembly or extraordinary majority less than 2/3
- 0 No veto; or veto requires only simple majority to override

Partial Veto/ Override

- 4 No override
- 3 Override by extraordinary majority
- 2 Override by absolute majority of whole membership
- 1 Override by simple majority of quorum
- 0 No partial veto

Decree

- 4 Reserved powers, no recission
- 2 President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
- 1 Authority to enact decrees limited (interpreted to include legislative decree powers during states of emergency and decrees that require parliamentary approval)
- 0 No decree powers; or only as delegated by assembly
- Exclusive introduction of legislation (reserved policy areas)
- 4 No amendments by assembly
- 2 Restricted amendment by assembly
- 1 Unrestricted amendment by assembly
- 0 No exclusive powers

Budgetary Powers

- 4 President prepares budget; no amendment permitted
- 3 Assembly may reduce but not increase amount of budgetary items
- 2 President sets upper limit on total spending within which assembly may amend
- 1 Assembly may increase expenditures only if it designates new revenues
- 0 Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare or amend budget

Proposal of referenda

- 4 Unrestricted
- 2 Restricted
- 0 No presidential authority to propose referenda

sccab

Shugart and Carey presidential cabinet powers

Note: Presidential cabinet powers according to constitution using Shugart and Carey 1992 coding (changes to coding in italics) Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally given by Shugart and Carey (1992).

Aggregation rule: Additive

Coding:

Cabinet formation

- 4 President names cabinet without need for confirmation or investiture
- 3 President names cabinet ministers subject to confirmation or investiture by assembly
- 1 President names premier, subject to investiture who then names other ministers
- 0 President cannot name ministers except on recommendation of assembly

Cabinet dismissal

- 4 President dismisses cabinet or ministers at will
- 2 Restricted powers of dismissal
- 1 President may dismiss only upon acceptance by assembly of alternative minister or cabinet
- 0 Cabinet or ministers may be censured and removed by assembly (includes removal by president on approval of assembly).

Censure

- 4 Assembly may not censure and remove cabinet or ministers
- 2 Assembly may censure but president may respond by dissolving assembly
- 1 "Constructive" vote of no confidence (assembly majority must present alternative cabinet)
- 0 Unrestricted censure

Dissolution of Assembly

- 4 Unrestricted
- 3 Restricted by frequency of point within term
- 2 Requires new presidential election
- 1 Restricted: only as response to censures (or as a result of legislative factors, or as a response to failure to form government)

sctotal

Shugart and Carey total presidential powers

Note: Total presidential powers according to constitution using Shugart and Carey (1992) coding

Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally given by Shugart and Carey (1992).

Aggregation rule: Additive cabinet powers and legislative powers

nexteleca

Next assembly election date according to constitution

Note: Date of next constitutionally scheduled election, which triggers government change. Where the constitution is silent regarding the termination of governments following either type of

election, the coding reflects political practice rather than constitutional norms

Coding rule: parldate + ciepa

Source: parliamentary election data – Caramani 1999Caramani (1999), [Nordsieck \(2004\)](#) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), Election Results Archive, Carr Psephos, ConstitutionsBirch 2003

nextelecpc **Next presidential election date according to constitution**

Note: Date of next constitutionally scheduled election, which triggers government change. Where the constitution is silent regarding the termination of governments following either type of election, the coding reflects political practice rather than constitutional norms

Coding rule: presdate + ciepp

Source: Psephos, Rulers, "[Election Results Archive](#)" [Election Results Archive](#) (WEU, Croatia, Slovenia), "Lijphart Elections Archive" [Lijphart Elections Archive](#) (Finland), "Statistics Finland" Statistics Finland, "Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer Rückblick" Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), Constitutions

ciepa **Constitutional inter-election (parliamentary) period**

Note: Number of days, according to the Constitution, to next parliamentary election that would trigger government change

Source: Constitutions

ciepp **Constitutional inter-election period of president**

Note: Number of days, according to the Constitution, to next presidential election that would trigger government change

Source: Constitutions

References:

- Birch, Sarah. *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003.
- Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer Rückblick* [cited. Available from <http://www.bmi.gv.at/walen/bpwahl-historisches.asp>].
- Caramani, © Daniele. "Elections in Western Europe since 1815." London: Macmillan, 1999.
- Carr, Adam. *Psephos - Adam Carr's Election Archive* [cited. Available from <http://psephos.adam-carr.net>].
- Constitución De La República Portuguesa* [cited. Available from <http://confinder.richmond.edu/PortugalSp.htm>].
- The Parliament of Finland
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Justice. *Constitution Act of Finland Parliament Act. Constitution Finder* [cited. Available from <http://confinder.richmond.edu/>].
- The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia* [cited. Available from http://www.usud.hr/htdocs/en/the_constitution.htm].
- Constitution of the Republic of Moldova* [cited. Available from <http://confinder.richmond.edu/moldova3.htm>].
- "Constitutional Watch - a Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional Politics in Eastern Europe and the Ex-Ussr." *East European Constitutional Review* 7-10 (2001).
- Constitutions* [cited. Available from www.oefre.ch/law/icl/].
- Election Results Archive* [cited. Available from <http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/elections>].
- France - Assemblée Nationale* [cited. Available from <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/>].
- Indridasson, Indridi H. *A Theory of Coalitions and Clientelism* 2000 [cited. Available from <http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~inin/Clientelism.pdf>].
- International Constitutional Law* [cited. Available from <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html>].
- Ionescu, Dan. "Moldova - in Search of Stability." In *Transitions Online - Country files*, 1997.
- "Keesing's Contemporary Archives." London: Keesing's Limited, 1991 - 2003.
- Kristjansson, Svanur. "Iceland: A Parliamentary Democracy with a Semi-Presidential Constitution." In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, edited by Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman. Oxford: OUP, 2003.
- Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson. *Politics and Society in Western Europe*. 4th ed. London: Sage Publications, 1999.
- Lijphart Elections Archive* [cited. Available from <http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/westeurope/>].
- Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm, eds. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- National Politics Web Guide* [cited. Available from <http://lego70.tripod.com/>].

Nordsieck, © Wolfram. *Parties and Elections in Europe 1997-2004* [cited.
Available from www.parties-and-elections.de.
Ortiz de Zárate, Roberto. © Copyright Zpc, Roberto Ortiz De Zárate, 1996-2004
[cited.
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe
[cited. Available from <http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections>.
Portugal - Assembleia Da República [cited. Available from
<http://www.parlamento.pt/deputados/resultadoseleitorais/>.
"Presidency of the Portuguese Republic."
President of Ukraine [cited. Available from
<http://www.president.gov.ua/eng/president/constitution/>.
Rulers [cited. Available from <http://www.rulers.org>.
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies -
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. USA: Cambridge University
Press, 1992.
Warwick, Paul V. *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
———. "Survival Data Set Codebook." 1995.