

Claiming Urban Space: Street Vending in Ahmedabad

Working Paper 2:
Law, Rights and Regulation in the Informal Economy
ESRC-DFID Research Project

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Contributors

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Summary

Working Paper 2 forms part of the research project, *Making Space for the Poor: Law, Rights, Regulation and Street-Trade in the 21st Century*, awarded to Cardiff University d by the UK's Economic & Social Research Council and Department for International Development (UK-Aid) (ESRC/DFID Awards RES-167-25-0591). Working Paper 1 on *Law, Rights and Regulations for Street Vending in Globalising Ahmedabad* analyses the legal context of street vending in the city.

This working paper reports the findings of fieldwork in Ahmedabad in 2011-2012. We are extremely grateful to the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) for their support during the research.

The research used mixed methods including: document and internet review; key informant interviews, and semi-structured interviews with street vendors in vulnerable localities in six main markets, and four other pilot locations.

Ahmedabad

Ahmedabad is the seventh largest metropolis in India with a population estimated at 6.35 million in the 2011 census, and one of the fastest growing urban economies in India. Nevertheless urban poverty remains acute and around 26% of the urban population live in slums. In 2000, it was estimated that in Ahmedabad 77% of employment was informal, and there were around 80,000 street vendors.

Vending Areas

The six main market areas where interviews were carried out were extremely varied:

- Bhadra: one of the oldest markets in the walled city, with around 3,500 vendors selling shoes, clothes, household goods etc; affected by the Bhadra Plaza Development Project;
- Delhi Darwaja: outside the walled quarter with about 150 traders selling mainly second hand clothes and household utensils;
- Kankaria Lake: recently subject to upgrading under the Kankaria Lakefront Redevelopment project, displacing slums. Traders had to move outside the gated waterfront;
- Jamalpur Market: a vegetable market of about 675 vendors at the eastern end of Sardar Bridge/Jamalpur flyover, next to the AMPC wholesale market, selling mainly vegetables;
- Parasnagar Market: a local district market with about 130 vendors relocated for the BRTS (Bus Rapid Transport System);
- Khodiyarnagar: a linear suburban market with about 300 vendors selling vegetables and 'Amerika' (second hand imported clothes), also moved back for the BRTS .

Smaller, pilot surveys were undertaken in four additional areas: Nehrunagar, Vastrapur Market, Geeta Mandir Bus Stand market and Vejalpur market.

The Vendors

The 200 vendors interviewed —130 men and 70 women—were selling a wide variety of goods, including new clothes, second hand clothes (at Delhi Darwaja only), shoes and fashion items, household goods, vegetables, prepared food and toys. Some sold specialist items at festival times - eg: kites. Almost half the sample used a *lari,* which has huge advantages of flexibility for vendors but is quite large so does not allow for very efficient use of trading space.

Vendors were mostly from Ahmedabad; the majority were over 35 and were married. Several were the second generation in the business. This belies the common view that street vending is an entry-level urban job for young people and new migrants. Vendors in different markets had specific characteristics, eg: most vendors were Hindu except in Bhadra where Muslims predominated, and specific groups of Backward Castes were found in Delhi Darwaja and Khodiyarnagar.

The Value Chain

Vendors incomes support a complex network within the urban value chain. Customers are mostly households or other small businesses, but vendors also act as outlets for larger concerns eg: shops and wholesalers. Most depend on passing trade, which means they cannot easily move to other locations. Markets are very specialist in their offer, forming different nodes in the supply chain.

The overall value of street vending to the urban economy is significant, although difficult to calculate because of uncertainties in income data and numbers of street vendors. However, the research estimated that the 3,500 vendors in 1,400 businesses operating in Bhadra at the time of the survey produced an annual turnover of around Rs. 95 crore or US$19million (Jajoo 2011). The overall value of street vending to the urban economy is likely to be much larger.

The Challenges

The associational characteristics of vendors were specific to different markets, and where SEWA membership was high—Jamalpur and Khodiyarnagar—SEWA was able to provide a degree of security. In Bhadra and probably IIM the *agewan* (informal landlord) took payment and negotiated with the police, but were unable to protect vendors from eviction during the Bhadra Plaza Development Project. Evictions took place in January 2012 just after our survey so are not reported here. Elsewhere associations were localised and not very effective in negotiations with the municipality.

Relations between vendors and the state were generally conflictual, and all the vending areas were regularly patrolled by the *dabaan* (AMC guards) or police, whose role was to keep order, settle disputes, and avoid obstruction of traffic. Rent-seeking is common and the officials also regularly extract *hafta* (inducements), seize goods, demand free snacks or evict vendors; *hafta* payments were much higher during festivals.

An extremely high proportion of vendors surveyed had suffered harassment, confiscation of goods, fines or evictions, affecting 86% of the 200 vendors in the survey. Almost half had suffered evictions, some with violence causing injury. The Bhadra Plaza Development Project is a major threat to one of the most profitable and long-established vending areas in the city.

In Jamalpur, SEWA has tracked the conflicts over the last thirty years, but is now negotiating with AMC (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation) to manage space under the flyover for street vendors, demonstrating good practice in local space management.

The laws and regulations governing street vending are covered in Working Paper 1 of this series, but in summary there are several main areas of legislation which restrict the right to vend in public space, including policing, highways and planning acts. Vendors in the survey were only aware of the *Indian Penal Code*, 1860, as a reason for eviction, although many other regulations affect them.

The research found specific vulnerabilities amongst certain groups: women were more vulnerable to confiscation of goods and to eviction, and vendors with a BPL (below poverty line) ration card, and those with temporary facilities trading from the ground or a wall, also suffered high levels of eviction. As one vendor said: *"We are tired! Continuous demands and hopes but nothing good has happened."*

Recommendations

- Local government policy should recognise the importance of street vending as a livelihood option for the urban poor;
- Further research led by vendors and their representatives should strengthen understanding of their contribution to the urban economy;
- Policy should identify all 'natural markets' within Ahmedabad, based on research already done by SEWA, and protect vending in these;
- In identified 'natural markets' a decentralised vending committee should manage space, and collect vending fees;
- Elsewhere in Ahmedabad, vending should be permitted provided that it does not compromise public safety;
- Urban infrastructure and 'beautification' schemes should protect vendors livelihoods, accommodating vendors *in situ* wherever technically feasible;
- Where this is not possible, alternative viable trading sites should be sought. Summary evictions should *never* take place;
- An inexpensive alternative to the *lari* should be sought to allow for more efficient use of trading space.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Project

This working paper forms part of the research project, *Making Space for the Poor: Law, Rights, Regulation and Street-Trade in the 21st Century*, awarded to Cardiff University under the joint programme funded by the UK's Economic & Social Research Council and Department for International Development (UK-Aid) (ESRC/DFID Awards RES-167-25-0591).

The research is based on an international comparative study of different cities, and draws on a rights-based perspective, to explore the impact of law, regulation and policy on the informal economy with a focus on street traders. The research hypothesis is that the urban informal economy operates in a fragmented and plural regulatory environment, with conflicts between formal and informal regulatory systems that exacerbate risks, vulnerabilities and exclusions of the working poor, and are hugely damaging to the security and stability of their livelihoods, particularly at times of economic crisis. Understanding and addressing the risks and conflicts is crucial to developing an enabling, pro-poor regulatory environment.

The working paper reports the findings of fieldwork in Ahmedabad, including the results of extended semi-structured interviews with 200 street vendors[1], key informant interviews, and a follow-up survey of hawkers undertaken in January 2011, on-going background research and interviews, and supplementary interviews in January 2012.

The focus was to explore the characteristics of street vending in Ahmedabad, and vulnerabilities of street vendors as evidenced in harassment, coercion, bribery and eviction, and the associational and response methods adopted to address these problems. Another working paper on *Law, Rights and Regulations for Street Vending in Globalising Ahmedabad* (Mahadevia *et al* 2012) analyses in depth the legal context of street vending in the city.

We are extremely grateful to the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) which played an active advisory role throughout the research, making available past studies, contributing to the research design and conceptualisation, and advising on the political economy of vending in Ahmedabad and SEWA's use of court procedures. Survey locations were selected in consultation with SEWA staff.

1.2 Ahmedabad

Ahmedabad is the seventh largest metropolis in India, and the largest of the State of Gujarat, with an estimated population of 6.35 million in 2011 and an urban area of over 450 sq km. Gujarat is the second most industrialised, fourth richest and third most urbanised state of India. Central Ahmedabad, administered by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), had a population of 5.5m in 2010. Greater Ahmedabad includes the new state capital of Gandhinagar, and the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) areas. Ahmedabad is an industrial heartland specializing in chemicals, textiles, drugs and pharmaceuticals, with major investment in urban projects such as the Sabarmati Riverfront, the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS), and the Gujarat International Finance Tech City (GIFT).

Nevertheless, urban poverty in Ahmedabad remains acute. In 1998 it was estimated that about 60% of households fell below the poverty line (AMC and AUDA 2003: 71). Since 1991 the number of slums has decreased to 710 identified slums, but the population of slum dwellers has nearly doubled, estimated in 2001 to be around 906,000 people, about 26% of the AMC population. An additional 1m people live in *chawls,* tenement housing originally built for mill workers is often sub-standard (AMC and AUDA 2003: 73).

In 2000 it was estimated that 77% of employment was in the informal economy generating 47% of the total city income, with an estimated 80,000 street vendors in Ahmedabad, representing around 7% of the informal workforce, with street vending representing about 17% of all informal enterprises (Rani and Unni 2000 in Chen 2003).

Central Ahmedabad is a walled city with a dense urban core, and narrow street network, located to the east of the River Sabramati. Several of the old gates *(darwaja)* remain, although the walls no

[1] In India the term 'street vendors' describes street traders, and is adopted in this report. It includes street and market vendors, those vending from fixed structures in the street and hawkers or mobile vendors.

longer exist. The historic city has narrow streets and fine architecture including Hindu and Jain temples, Mogul palaces and mosques, 1930s colonial architecture, and the residential *poles* – or gated communities, although many of the older areas are in poor repair. Outside the walled city, the area administered by Ahmedabad Municipal Council (AMC) was developed from about the 1930s to 1990s with modern multi-story neighbourhoods, and low income housing in the former *chawls* (tenement mill-workers' housing) and informal settlements.

The outer ring of the city is administered by Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA); on the west of the city newer development includes shopping malls and new middle and upper-income residential societies (cooperatives), with some squatter areas occupied by construction workers and migrants; the eastern area includes the airport, medium to high-rise housing, and low-income settlements. The River Sabramati is dammed at the southern limits of the urban area to retain water in the river channel. A major improvement scheme started in 2008 onwards, which consists of concrete flood protection bunds and redevelopment of the reclaimed riverbed lands for recreational and commercial purposes, which has resulted in the relocation of slum households formerly living on the river banks.

1.3 Methods

The concept of 'natural markets' was developed by SEWA as places where good accessibility and a significant pedestrian flow create a commercial opportunity, and in 2003 they supported a survey of 165 'natural markets' in Ahmedabad (Dalwadi 2003). Street vending in Ahmedabad is widespread, and it was impossible to sample all 165 locations for this research, so the survey locations represented different types of markets, with a focus on areas of dispute (eg: peripheral or marginal sites) and on vulnerable groups of vendors.

In order to understand patterns of trading, the operation of existing legislation, and informal processes of organisation, the research, carried out in January 2011 and supplemented in January 2012, adopted a mixed-methods approach, including five main strategies:

i. *Previous studies:* The review of previous academic and other studies and the legal and regulatory review undertaken in the parallel working paper on *Law, Rights and Regulations for Street Vending in Globalising Ahmedabad* (Mahadevia et al 2012)
ii. *Key informants:* Key informant interviews were held at national level with officials from the National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MoHUPA), and at local level with street vendor leaders, local NGOs, officials from Ahmedabad City Council, the JNNURM[2] team of the Gujarat State Government, and a High Court judge.
iii. *Semi-structured interviews in six vending areas:* Six street-vending locations were selected for detailed study representing different vending contexts (eg: central area, district market etc)—Bhadra, Delhi Darwaja, Kankaria Lake, Jamalpur Market, Parasnagar Market, and Khodiyarnagar. 183 semi-structured interviews were carried out with vendors covering: personal data; employment and migration information; the business; value chains; associational characteristics; state-vendor relations; legal context and shocks and stresses.
iv. *Pilot semi-structured interviews in four additional vending areas:* The research team were surprised that there was relatively limited link between migration and street vending and carried out a further 17 interviews in four additional areas: outside the Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Nehrunagar, Vastrapur, and outside CEPT University.
v. *Guided interviews in six areas (including four of the initial areas and two new ones).* To cross check associational characteristics, guided interviews were carried out in six locations: Bhardra/Manek Chowk, IIM, Khodiyarnagar, Geeta Mandir Bus Stand and Vejalpur Market.

[2] JNNURM, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

2. Vending Areas

2.1 Locations of Research

This section describes the locations where interviews were undertaken outlined in Section 1.3 (Figure 2.1). The descriptions below are drawn from survey findings, supplemented by information from the survey of 'natural markets'. The survey locations are shown in Appendix 1.

Figure 2.1: Location of Markets Studied



Source: Centre for Urban Equiy Survey team

2.2 City Centre Sites

One of the selected vending areas was within the historic city. **Bhadra** is one of the largest market areas stretching from the Lal Darwaja, the main AMTS terminus on one side and from Bhadra Fort, eastwards to a second gate, Teen Darwaja, and thence further east to link with the cloth markets, and the central jewellery and vegetable markets of Manek Chowk. In Bhadra and Manek Chowk there are thought to be around 5,000 vendors, 3,500 between Bhadra Fort and Teen Darwaja, and a further 2,000 eastwards to Makek Chowk. The market lies near several important historic and government buildings, including Bhadra Kali temple, Raja no Hajiro, Rani no Hajiro, and the Jumma Masjid.

Bhadra is one of the oldest markets in the walled city, with a predominance of Muslim traders. The main commodities sold are new clothes, household goods, shoes and sandals, and fashion accessories. In addition to the vegetable vendors in Manek Chowk, there is also a night market that operates from 8.00pm-2.00am, with at that time 27 licensed vendors selling cooked food and four unlicensed vendors. For the survey, most interviews were undertaken between Bhadra Fort and Teen Darwaja (Figure 2.2), and a few interviews with vegetable vendors in Manek Chowk.

Figure 2.2 Bhadra Market

The area from Bhadra Fort east to Teen Darwaja is part of the Bhadra Plaza Development Project, a pedestrianisation and improvement scheme for the Bhadra Fort area (Figure 2.3). The project is undertaken under the JNNURM programme through a partnership with Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the first such partnership in the country. The budget is Rs. 115/-crore (US$ 23m), or which Rs.74.39 crore (US$ 15m) had been committed by the JNNURM committee by July 2011. Drawing of the scheme of the scheme below are those uploaded onto the open internet site Skyscraper City 2012. Work started in January 2012.

Figure 2.3: Bhadra Fort Redevelopment Project Source: Skyscraper City 2012[3].



[3] Skyscraper City (2012) (open blog) Bhadra Fort redevelopment project, http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1414918, accessed February 2012

Delhi Darwaja is located beside the Delhi Darwaja gate on the eastern fringes of the historic city near several city bus stops, and is around 50 years old (Figure 2.4). The market accommodates around 150 traders, and is known for the sale of second hand clothes and household utensils, and many of the traders are women selling from temporary facilities or sheets on the ground. The clothes sold are sourced from the city and wider region and are not imported (Dalwadi 2003). There is a complex local distribution mechanism. In the morning, hawkers sell household utensils in the residential areas of the city in exchange for old clothes and then after 3 pm sell them in this market.

Figure 2.4 Delhi Darwaja Market

2.3 Other Areas

Kankaria Lake is an artificial lake with 34 sides, built in 1451 AD, with a summer palace on an promontory in the lake. In 2009, the Kankaria Lakefront Redevelopment project created a gated lakefront precinct with a paved walkway round the waterfront, cafés, seating areas, playgrounds, a small train along the shore, and 6 kilometres of access roads. The lake is popular at weekends but an entry fee is charged. The beautification project displaced several slum settlements and vending locations. Although some vendors have relocated outside the gates, their numbers have reduced, and the clientele has changed - vendors before the development low and middle income groups were frequent visitors, but now only high and middle income groups visit the area (survey findings).

Jamalpur Market is a vegetable market accommodating about 675 vendors, at the eastern end of Sardar Bridge at the junction of Bhagtacharya Road and Jamalpur Road, which are connected by a new flyover. The informal market lies outside the Sardar Patel Agricultural Produce Market Committee (the APMC market) the vegetable and grain wholesale market for the district. Vendors at Jamalpur buy from the main market (Figure 2.5). The Calico Mill flower market is nearby. Traders in Jamalpur have to pay a service charge of 10% on the purchase of goods from APMC market, which formerly used to be paid by farmers selling to the market.

Figure 2.5 Jamalpur Market

Jamalpur has been the subject of a number of confrontations between traders and the AMC because of concerns over encroachment onto the road, and vendors have formed a market vending committee to help resolve issues with the police and municipality officials and the confiscation of goods. The conflict and construction of the flyover have reduced trade. Many of the traders are

SEWA members, and SEWA is supporting the market committee in negotiating with AMC to move vendors to space under the flyover and to manage the new location.

Parasnagar Market has about 130 vendors, and is near the Ahmedabad Electricity Company Limited zonal office in Narapura Village, beside the Parasnagar ATMS bus stand, and adjacent to the new BRTS route; before it opened vendors used to sit along the main road but have now moved to a side street surrounded by residential colonies. The market caters for the surrounding low and middle-income area, selling vegetables, food, small household items and fashion goods. It opens after 3.00pm, but during the day many vendors hawk in nearby areas. Many vendors buy goods from Jamalpur or Kalupur wholesale markets, and there is a strong SEWA membership in the market.

Khodiyarnagar is a linear suburban market with about 250-300 vendors in the east of the city, on the eastern side of Narol Naroda Road north of the junction with Nikol Road. The market is the main vegetable market for the district of Khodiyarnagar and operates from 8-11am and 4-9pm. The market is about 20 years old, and used to be located within the residential area, but the location became untenable when AMTS buses started to use the route, and the vendors sought permission to move to the main road. There are 200+ stalls selling vegetables, 24 stalls selling 'Amerika' (imported second-hand clothes), and about 10 food vendors selling snacks. Three owners control about 25 *laris,* used by their employees or renters.

In 2010 vendors were moved into the cycle/service lane to accommodate the BRTS, which leads to disputes between shopkeepers and vendors. The vendors have formed a market committee, supported by SEWA, to solve disputes, arrange the market in rows to avoid traffic congestion, and deal with municipal officers and the police during evictions. Newcomers tend to locate in the carriageway which causes objections from the police.

Figure 2.5 Khodiyarnagar Market

In addition to the main survey, small pilot surveys were undertaken in four additional locations. Of these, two markets serve the student population. Vendors operate from the footpath outside the **IIM campus** (Indian Institute of Management), where about 10-15 vendors sell cooked food and snacks; the stalls are open from about 7.00am to 9.00pm. The market has been in existence for about 25 years, and vendors sell tea, *pauva*, buns, sandwiches, *idli-dosa,* and other prepared food. At **CEPT University** and Atira Park about 40 vendors sell T-shirts and new clothing along the wall.

The other two locations surveyed were **Nehrunagar** on the BRT route from Nehrunagar Circle to Shivranjni Crossroads, a new evening market selling new clothes, and **Vastrapur Market** near Vastrapur Lake, an important landmark. The lake is surrounded by a mixed residential area of shops and residential societies, and attracts visitors to whom vendors sell toys and cooked food etc.

The guided interviews took place in four areas already surveyed, Bhadra (including the Manek Chowk night market), Delhi Darwaja, Khodiyarnagar, and IIM, then covered two further markets. **Geeta Mandir Bus Stand** is the main ST bus terminus east of the river, near the Geeta Mandir temple, where vendors are affected by a proposed extension to the BRTS. The market is about 40 years old and serves bus passengers. Stalls operate for about 19 hours a day, so many people work in shifts. **Vejalpur Market** is an evening vegetable and fruit market open from around 4.00-9.00pm with around 150 vendors, serving the nearby residential area. The market has been open for about 20 years, but has expanded rapidly as new housing has been built.

3. The Vendors

3.1 The Sample

The aim was to survey around 20-30 vendors in each of six main survey markets, Bhadra, Delhi Darwaja, Kankaria Lake, Jamalpur, Parasnagar and Khodiyarnagar, with more interviews in Bhadra reflecting its larger size. The survey did not include a base count of vendors because boundaries are not defined and vendor numbers fluctuate, but respondents were selected on the basis of gender, goods sold and the type of trading facility, representing observed variations in each market. The survey thus presents an in-depth analysis of different sectors. Key data is presented in the following section with additional tables (numbered "A") in the appendix. In the report, the term ‘vendors’ refers to those trading from a location, and ‘hawkers’ to those carrying goods and moving around, but the distinction is not clear-cut.

After the first fieldwork period, two supplementary questions were explored. First, was whether street vending was an entry job for new migrants to the city, a common assumption not evident from the initial results, through pilot surveys in four newer vending area. Second, was the associational character and economic integration of vending areas, through guided interviews with well-established traders in four main areas, Bhadra/Manek Chowk, Delhi Darwaja, Jamalpur and IIM, and two other areas, Geeta Mandeer Bus Stand and Vejalpur.

3.2 Vendors and their Goods

The distribution of interviews is given in Table 3.1. Men and women were vending in all markets, but, as reflected in the survey, in Bhadra vendors were mostly men, and in Jamalpur they were mostly women. In total the survey included 200 interviews with 130 men and 70 women.

Table 3.1 Vendors Interviewed - Male/Female by Market

Market	Males	Females	Total
Bhadra	33	5	38
Delhi Darwaja	13	17	30
Kankaria Lake	21	10	31
Jamalpur	4	15	19
Parasnagar	26	8	34
Khodiyarnagar	18	13	31
IIM	3	0	3
Nehrunagar	4	1	5
Vastrapur	4	0	4
CEPT Univ.	4	1	5
Total	**130**	**70**	**200**

The survey sampled vendors by the main products sold in each vending area: in Bhadra mainly clothes, shoes and household goods; in Delhi Darwaja second hand clothes; in Kankaria snacks and cooked food, and Jamalpur vegetables. Parasnagar and Khodiyarnagar are district markets selling mixed goods, while three of the four pilot markets sold snacks and cooked food, and the fourth fashion items and clothing (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Vendors by Market and Products Sold

Market	New clothes	%	Second hand clothes	%	Shoes bags belts	%	Fashion	%	Household	%	Fresh food	%	Cooked food, drink	%	Toys	%	Total
Bhadra	13	*34*			2	*5*	3	*8*	10	*26*	6	*16*	2	*5*	2	*5*	38
Delhi Darwaja	1	*3*	23	*77*							1	*3*	5	*17*			30
Kankaria Lake									2	*6*	1	*3*	20	*65*	8	*26*	31
Jamalpur									0		19	*100*					19
Parasnagar	1	*3*							3	*9*	18	*53*	11	*32*	1	*3*	34
Khodiyarnagar	5	*16*			3	*10*	5	*16*	1	*3*	12	*39*	5	*16*			31
IIM													3	*100*			3
Nehrunagar	2	*40*					3	*60*									5
Vastrapur													4	*100*			4
CEPT Univ.													5	*100*			5
Total	**22**	***11***	**23**	***12***	**5**	***3***	**11**	***6***	**16**	***8***	**57**	***29***	**55**	***28***	**11**	***6***	**200**

3.3 Location and Type of Vending Facility

The majority of vendors interviewed were trading in the open without cover (74% of the sample) reflecting the lack of facilities in the locations surveyed, although at Jamalpur a few traders were located under the flyover (Table A1.1). All the markets had static and mobile vendors - just over half the vendors in the survey were mobile (51%) (Table A1.2). Most of the mobile vendors used a *lari*, a trolley on four bicycle wheels, usually 1.8m x 1.1m in size (Figure 3.1). Often one person will own and rent out several *laris*. These are flexible and easy to move with the display, but they quite large for the amount displayed, and are thus a constraint to achieving a compact trading layout.


Figure 3.1 The ubiquitous lari

Also common was to display goods on the ground, on a wall or on a small box. In Bhadra, Dehli Darwaja and Jamalpur a high proportion of interviewees were trading from the ground (11, 13 and 18 vendors respectively), whereas in the district markets of Parasnagar and Khodiyarnagar most traders used *laris* (Table A1.3).

3.4 Vendors' Characteristics

Almost half the traders interviewed were in the 35-54-year age group (49%), the main age of family responsibilities, with a significant group of older traders of 55 or over (16%) (Table 3.3). This age distribution suggests that vending is a main occupation for those surveyed, confirmed responses to other interview questions. In general, women in the survey were older than men with 80% aged 35 or over compared to only 55% of male traders (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Vendors by Gender & Age

	< 18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid respo -nses
Male	2	*2*	15	*12*	41	*32*	56	*43*	16	*12*	130
Female	0	*0*	4	*6*	10	*14*	41	*59*	15	*21*	70
Total	**2**	***1***	**19**	***10***	**51**	***26***	**97**	***49***	**31**	***16***	**200**

In Delhi Darwaja nearly a quarter of the vendors interviewed were 55 or above (23%), suggesting that older women can find work selling second hand clothes (Table A1.4). In Bhadra the proportion of workers of 55 or above was also high (21%), but this is probably because the area is well-established and difficult for newcomers to enter.

The low proportion of younger vendors in the survey suggests that vending is not an entry profession for new migrants to the city, although there were more young men aged 18-24 in the survey than young women (Table 3.3). This differs from surveys the team have done in other countries. The pilot surveys in four additional markets did not show a significantly younger age profile, indicating that newer markets are not an entry point for migrants either. Key informant interviews suggest that new rural-urban migrants are more likely to work in construction than street vending and move into vending if they can as working conditions are seen as easier.

Many of the vendors' businesses were very well established. Although 20% were set up between 2006 and 2010, and a further 37% in the previous decade, 43% started in 1995 or before, with 12 started in 1975 or before, ie: more than 36 years before the survey. One person had been vending for 70 years.

Many people had taken over the business from parents or family members:

> *Since generations I have been trading here. I buy old clothes from the feriwalas* (people who collect old clothes from households in exchange for household goods) *and wash these clothes, iron them and sell them on my bicycle.* (Male, Delhi Darwwaja, selling old shirts and trousers, selling for 50 years)

> *I started assisting my mother since age of 12, continued even after marriage. I used to reside in Chamanpura (old city) before being married, then I shifted to Saraspur with my husband.* (Female, Bhadra, selling onions, potato, garlic, chilli and ginger, selling for 43 years)
>
> *I had no past job, my family was trading here, before they were inside now they shifted outside. Now we might stop this trade because now there are many issues with trading space and police and outside is not good business* (Female, Kankaria selling snacks and water packets, selling for 30 years)

There was some evidence of a move into street vending after the decline of Ahmedabad's textile industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, or as a result of failure to get a government job:

> *I used to work as a rolling man in a textile industry (Arvind Mills) for 11 years (1982-1993) but I had to resign due to closure of the mills 15 years ago* (Male, Khodiyarnagar, selling vegetables, brinjal, cauliflower, vending for 15 years)
>
> *When I migrated to Abad, I worked as a waiter for 10 years in 3-4 hotels/restaurants. Then I worked in a factory (textile bleaching) for 5 years, and left due to very less salary for my family needs. Then I used to sell peanuts by hawking for 2 years but, due to very less profit, started in this business* (Male, Kankaria, selling coconut water, vending for 15 years).
>
> *I tried many interviews in government jobs but did not get any as most of them had Reservation Quota In 1986, the quota issue flared up and there were riots in Ahmedabad. I did jobs here and there but that was for Rs.50/- a day. Selling vegetables is better, you are independent and you earn more* (Male, Delhi Darwaja, selling vegetables, 15 years).

3.5 Education and Religion

The vendors interviewed were asked both about years of schooling and level of literacy, ie: whether they could read and write; just read; sign their name; or were not able to read. Some 60 respondents had no schooling; 73 had some primary education (between 1 - 7 years), and 60 had secondary education. There were also 7 college graduates in the survey, including one person with a postgraduate degree.

Vendors in the different markets showed distinct differences in literacy. Overall 127 vendors could either read and write, or read (64%), but 73 vendors were either illiterate or could only write a signature (37%) (Table A1.5). In both Bhadra and Khodiyarnagar literacy was relatively high with 74% of sample read and write or reading, although 26% in both markets were illiterate. In Jamalpur literacy was low with 15 of the 19 traders interviewed (79%) either illiterate or able only to sign their name; illiteracy rates in Delhi Darwaja were also high at 53% (Table A1.5).

There are also striking differences in the religious characteristics of vendors in the different markets. Nearly two thirds of the vendors interviewed in Bhadra were Muslim, which is typical of the market as a whole, whereas elsewhere vendors were predominantly Hindu, with only two vendors of other religions in Nehrunagar and CEPT University (Table A1.6).

3.6 Origins and Caste

In the six main markets, the survey found a traditional sector dominated by specific groups, many of whom were second generation vendors, belying the commonly held view that it is easy to enter street vending. In Delhi Darwaja 14 of the 30 traders interviewed came from the Dataniya community (a Scheduled Caste), and Khodiyarnagar 9 of the 31 traders interviewed came from the Patni community[4]. Overall 69% of the survey were originally from Ahmedabad (Table A1.7). Of the 28 vendors interviewed born outside Gujarat, most came from Rajasthan, with a few from Uttar Pradesh, two from Pakistan, and others from Bihar and Karnataka.

Of the 200 interviewees, about a third were from Scheduled Castes (34%), and a third from Other Backward Casts (31%), with a slightly higher rate in the six main vending areas (Table A1.8). In Delhi Darwaja 67% of interviewees were from Scheduled Castes. Overall the rate in Bhadra was lower, as only 53% of the interviewees were from Scheduled Castes or Other Backward Castes, compared to 65% in the survey as a whole.

[4] The Dataniya and Patni are sub-castes of the Vagri, a scheduled caste (tribal communities) from Gujarat and Rajasthan.

3.7 Vendors' Family Status

The majority of vendors were married (84% of 199 responses) suggesting strong family support amongst vendors (Table 3.4). A higher proportion of men were single compared to women (18% compared to 3%), reflecting the younger age of male vendors.

Table 3.4: Vendors by Gender and Marital Status

	Single	%	Married	%	Widow-ed	%	Divorced	%	Valid res-ponses
Male	23	*18*	104	*81*	2	*2*			129
Female	2	*3*	63	*90*	3	*4*	2	*3*	70
Total	**25**	***13***	**167**	***84***	**5**	***3***	**2**	***1***	**199**

A relatively high dependency ratio (non-working to working household members) was also found. Across the whole survey the average household size was 6.4 people, with an average of 3.3 non-working members to 2.1 working members per household, a dependency ratio of 1:1.6 (Table 3.5). The figures suggest relatively high participation of women in the labour market, suggesting that the poverty impacts of disruptions to vendors' work are significant for dependent family members. There were some differences across the markets, with a higher dependency ratio in Bhadra, perhaps reflecting the predominantly Muslim character of vendors in Bhadra (Table A1.9).

Table 3.5: Vendors by Market and Dependents

Market	Av. of people in household	Av. of workers in household	Depend-ents	Valid responses
Total	**6.4**	**2.1**	**3.3**	**200**

A high proportion of vendor's households (172 out of 199 responses) include children, and around 88% of the children of school age were going to school, although the proportion was lower amongst vendors at Kankaria Lake where the most vulnerable households were found (Table A1.10)

3.8 Legal Identity

Being without a legal identity is a crucial problem for many of the urban poor, so the research explored several aspects of this—whether vendors have a ration card, a voting card or social security (Table 3.6). Ration cards are available to households who request one, and give access to government shops selling subsidised food and fuel, especially kerosene which cannot be purchased elsewhere.

Table 3.6: Vendors by Market and Identity Cards

	Vendors by Market and Ration Card (APL and BPL)					Vendors by Market and Voting Card			Vendors by Market and Social Security		
Market	Ration card APL	%	Ration card BPL	%	Valid res-ponse	Yes	%	Valid res-ponse	Yes	%	Valid res-ponse
Bhadra	13	*87*	2	*13*	15	18	*47*	38	27	*75*	36
Delhi Darwaja	18	*90*	2	*10*	20	25	*83*	30	27	*90*	30
Kankaria Lake	12	*63*	7	*37*	19	21	*68*	31	29	*94*	31
Jamalpur	14	*88*	2	*13*	16	17	*90*	19	16	*89*	18
Parasnagar	16	*76*	5	*24*	21	28	*82*	34	26	*84*	31
Kodiyarnagar	14	*88*	2	*13*	16	19	*61*	31	26	*84*	31
IIM	2	*67*	1	*33*	3	3	*100*	3	2	*67*	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	1	*20*	5	5	*100*	5	5	*100*	5
Vastrapur	2	*67*	1	*33*	3	3	*75*	4	4	*100*	4
CEPT Univ.	3	*100*			3	3	*60*	5	1	*20*	5
Total	**98**	***81***	**23**	***19***	**121**	**142**	***71***	**200**	**163**	***84***	**194**

There are two types of ration card: APL (Above Poverty Line) which provides access to government shops, and BPL (Below Poverty Line). A BPL card enables the holder to gain access to subsidised basic foods, but consequently are sought-after and can often only be obtained by making an unofficial payment (KI interview). In the survey, vendors in Kankaria Lake stood out as having the highest proportion of BPL ration cards in the survey (Table 3.6).

Voting cards are eligible to anyone with a recognised address, with an average of 71% across the survey. Surprisingly in the stable vending population of Bhadra relatively few interviewees had a voting card, which appears to be an anomaly in the data (Table 3.6). Overall 84% of interviewees had taken up free social and health insurance through the national Life Insurance Company.

In 2009 the Indian government launched a 3-year initiative to provide a UID (Unique Identification Number) to every Indian citizen, as a commitment of the Congress party's 2007 election manifesto. The UID includes biometric data, with the aim of extending services to poorer people and will mean that all adults have to carry an identity card (UIDAI 2011). Take-up is voluntary, but progress on registration has been faster than sceptics initially predicted. Vendors' groups should explore the extent to which the UID provides an opportunity to collect data about vulnerable street vendors.

4. The Businesses

Large vending economies are linked in complex value chains[5] to city economies and to national and international supply chains. Vending areas tend to be very specific and tailored to particular supply chains or customer bases, a characteristic reflected in the survey sites in Ahmedabad.

4.1 Goods and Suppliers

The vendors in the supply chain can be conceptualised as having different sources of backward linkages and forward linkages as illustrated below. All are evident in Ahmedabad.

Figure 4.1 Street Vendors in the Value Chain



Street vending provides an important outlet for lower cost goods, and street vendors often buy goods from formal sources, for example wholesalers, or act as selling agents for formal businesses (Table A2.1).

Backward linkages: New goods such as the shoes and clothes sold in Bhadra and CEPT University, are often bought from formal businesses, sometimes on credit. In Bhadra several vendors are outworkers for ready-made garment shops and factories in different parts of the city, selling new clothes on commission. The second hand clothes sold in Delhi Dharwaja are sourced through complex local systems from Ahmedabad, and elsewhere in Gujarat and Rajasthan, reportedly as far afield as Ajmer, Jodhpur, and Jaipur (Dalwadi 2003), while some of the second hand clothes sold in Khodiyarnagar (Amerikas) are imported.

Jamalpur is an important link in the distribution of vegetables which are purchased mainly from the APMC market. In Khodiyarnagar vegetable vendors generally buy from Kalupur, Jamalpur, Juhapura and Naroda and Manek Chowk, as third or fourth tier purchases from the APMC market. Many of the snack-sellers make their own goods, but vendors in IIM who sell snacks get regular deliveries of milk, bread, and flour to their place of work. Almost all the vendors in the survey (93%) sold the same goods throughout the year, although some added seasonal items like kites or seasonal fruit.

Forward linkages: Vendors' incomes support a complex network. Customers are mostly other small businesses or low to middle income households, and vendors rely almost exclusively on passing trade; in a multiple choice question 171 vendors (86%) said passing pedestrians were their most important clients, and 102 (51%) mentioned local households (Table A2.2). Other sources of custom were much less important, and when vendors are relocated they often lose their client base.

In addition, an active local economy supports street vending, including porters, *chaiwalas* (tea boys) and other service providers, a link rarely understood by policy makers (Table A2.3). Finally vendor's payments provide both licit and illicit income. In Ahmedabad relatively few vendors pay fees to local government bodies, but renting space and equipment - particularly *laris* - is common. Instead there is extensive illicit payment to the police as the following quote illustrates (also see Sections 5.1 to 5.3 below).

[5] A value chain describes the links between producer and end user of goods *and* the social relations that support that chain

> *I set up 5 to 6 stalls during the kite-flying time to sell kites and threads, but at that time all the policemen (from high to low ranks) from Ghatlodia Police Station came and took goods worth of Rs. 5000/- from each stall, as well as cash bribes. This is very unfair because we built our stall on somebody's land and we pay Rs. 1000/- per stall; policemen taken too much bribes and all our profit is eaten by them.* (Male, Parasnagar, selling seasonal items - fruit, kites and kite threads)

> *The police comes on occasions like diwali, rakhshabandhan etc and takes bribe from each vendor. Every morning the police visit at around 7 and takes vegetables from us.* (Female, Jamalpur, selling vegetables)

4.2 The Trading Space

Nearly 80% of vendors have an informal arrangement to secure space, which often involves weekly or monthly payments and it is extremely difficult for new vendors to get space in most of the markets surveyed, particularly Bhadra, Delhi Darwaja, and Jamalpur (Table A2.4).

New vendors can only come to the area when a place is vacated, eg: by a death, and costs are high. One vendor reported paying Rs.50,000/- to the middlemen as a deposit, returnable when he leaves. He also paid a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/- to the middlemen, which is increased to Rs.3,500 during festivals. He shares storage with four other vendors which costs him Rs.750/- a month. These payments are in addition to 'protection money' payments.

Access to basic services is poor, with only 99 vendors (50%) saying that they had access to water at their place of work (Table A2.5), and only 103 vendors (52%) having access to a toilet (Table A2.6), although some people have access to water and toilets in nearby buildings.

4.3 Employment and Migration

The majority of vendors worked independently (128 of 200 - 64%), although some people particularly in Bhadra employed others to work for them (26% in Bhadra (Table A2.7). Nearly a quarter of the sample were working for other family members, often unpaid (23%). Most of the businesses were very small, with only 1 or 2 workers, and none of those interviewed reported having more than 5 people involved in the business.

For most vendors interviewed, vending was their main job, with 80% working 7 days a week, and 97% working for 12 months a year at the trade (Table A2.8). Of the 122 who replied to the question, for 103 (84%) vending was their main form of employment. The days are often very long:

> *I go to Jamalpur at 4 am and come back around 9 am. If vegetables are left from yesterday then I goes for hawking in residential societies (areas), and during the evenings I come to Parasnagar to vend* (Male, Parasnagar, selling vegetables)

Three quarters of those interviewed (75%) started vending within the last five years (Table 2.9):

> *I started assisting my mother since the age of 12, and continued even after marriage. I used to live in Chamanpura (old city) before I was married, and then shifted to Saraspur with my husband* (Female aged 55 or over, near Manek Chowk, selling vegetables)

> *Its a family business, not much change happens in the business. I feel that it might go on years and years.* (Female aged 55 or over, Delhi Darwaja, selling second hand clothes and buying cutlery and kitchen equipment which is then exchanged for the second hand clothes)

Some people had evidently had a more varied employment history, as these two vendors illustrate:

> *I was a diamond worker earlier for 5 years and then I was working as blacksmith for one year, but I was not gaining enough money, so my uncle helped me to join his business, and I now handle my uncle's business. Although I have not had any kind of eviction yet because I just started 1 year ago, during festival times we have to take care because there are lots of traffic problems and the policy come to evict vendorse* (Male, Khodiyarnagar, selling shoes and sandals)

> *I did labour work for about1.5 years, first as a security guard, then as a gas cylinder lifter and then an autorickshaw driver when the market was shut. (*Male, Bhadra selling sandals for kids, ladies shoes (*chapals and modi))*

4.4 Costs and Vending Income

The research tried to establish the costs of trading, including space rental, transport costs, and storage (Table A2.10). Payments for storage range from about Rs.10/- to Rs.60/- per day, and transport costs, mostly to autorickshaws, from about Rs.20/- to Rs.100/- a day. Payments for bribes were not well reported in the survey, but the guided interviews suggest that in Bhadra at least, vendors are paying about Rs.300/- a month for rental and 'protection' money.

Establishing income data from surveys is notoriously unreliable, either because people are reluctant to disclose information, or because they do not accurately record their earnings. However, information on *costs, income* and *profit* was provided by 139 respondents which allows for cross-checking; this suggests that profit(net earnings) for street vendors varys between Rs.90/- a day in Kankaria Lake to Rs.360/- a day in Bhadra (Table A2.11). When corroborated by key informant information, the data seems reasonable with the exception of Delhi Darwaja where earnings are probably lower than reported. This appears generally consistent with a study eleven years earlier in 2000 that found net earnings averaged Rs.28,142/- a year (Rani and Unni 2000 in Chen 2003).

The overall value of street vending to the urban economy is significant, although difficult to calculate because of uncertainties in income data and numbers of street vendors. However, the the survey suggests that the amount of income retained in the local economy from approximately 3,500 street vendors in Bhadra amounts to Rs. 95 crore or US$19m (Figure 4.2). The overall value of street vending to the urban economy is likely to be much larger.

Figure 4.2: Potential Contribution of Vendors to the Local Economy

Item	Number	Rs.
Approx No: Street Vendors in Bhadra (1)	3,500	
Average workers per business (survey findings)	2.5	
Est. number of businesses in Bhadra	**1,400**	
Average business turnover per day (Rs.) (2)		**1,880**
Average days per week worked (3)	6.97	
Weeks per year worked (3)	51.65	
Average working days per year	**360**	
Annual Average Turnover		Rs.94.75 crore
Annual Average Turnover (US$) (4)		US$ 19 million

(1)Jajoo, K. (2012) Measuring the street traders contribution to the urban economy (examining Ahmedabad) [Thesis], CEPT University Library, Ahmedabad
(2) See Table A2.11
(3) Data analysis
(4) Assuming an exchange rate of US1 = Rs.50 (this varies over time)

Traders were very specific about the causes of change to their business (Table A2.12). In Bhadra, Delhi Darwaja, Parasnagar, and Khodiyarnagar, wider economic factors were seen as the main problem, specifically inflation, identified by 17 of the 45 people who answered the question. In Kankaria Lake and Jamalpur the main problem was 'beautification' - city improvement works.

The questionnaire asked about the sending and receipt of remittances, but this is did not seem to be a significant part of vendors' networks, possibly because they are relatively established and those interviewed were not linked to migration routes.

5. Challenges

5.1 Associations

The associational characteristics of vendors were specific to the different markets. In two markets, Jamalpur and Khodiyarnagar, SEWA membership was strong and provided security. In Jamalpur, 10 of the 19 interviewees were members of SEWA or SEWA Bank, and 3 vendors were members APMC market association (the nearby wholesale market) (Table 5.1). In Khodiyarnagar, 8 of the 31 interviewees were SEWA members. In the areas were SEWA is active, it has a crucial role in solving disputes (Table A3.1). Many vendors said they did not have enough time or money to join associations, or that no-one had ever asked them to join.

Table 5.1: Market by Associational Character

Market	Belong to associations	%	Total
Bhadra	17	*45*	38
Delhi Darwaja	9	*30*	30
Kankaria Lake	4	*13*	31
Jamalpur	13	*68*	19
Parasnagar	3	*9*	34
Khodiyarnagar	10	*32*	31
IIM			3
Nehrunagar			5
Vastrapur			4
CEPT Univ.			5
Total	**57**	***29***	**200**

Nevertheless, the scheduled interviews suggest that some interesting associational processes exist particularly in the older established city centre vending areas. Findings are outlined below

Bhadra: In the mainly Muslim vending areas around Bhadra Fort, many of the vending businesses have been in existence for 40-50 years. Access is often controlled by an *agewan* (informal landlord), who oversees perhaps a hundred vendors. Vendors reported paying Rs. 100/- a week in 'protection' to the *agewan* who gives a bribe to the police at the end of the month. A portion is retained, and if the police confiscate goods the vendor is reimbursed, and in an emergency may get a no-interest loan. The *agewan* also retains a small percentage of the money collected. It was suggested that when a new Deputy Commissioner of Police is appointed there are more evictions and bribes tend to increase. Some higher payments were reported, eg: *lari* operators may pay Rs.1000/- a month in 'protection'.

An agewan who has been working in the area for a long time has usually developed good relations with the police. Some *agewan* also use a registration form for their members as a bargaining point in discussions with AMC. One organisation identified was *Swayam Sewi Sramgeevi Sangathan*, but in general there are few vendors' associations in the area. Vendors have sought the help of SEWA to negotiate with AMC during the proposed 'beautification'.

Manek Chowk (at the eastern end of the Bhadra complex)**:** There used to be 16 cinemas in the area, so the night market in Manek Chowk became established as an evening venue. Most of the cinemas have closed but the night market remains popular and operates from around 8.00pm to 2.00am. Vendors have formed the *Manek Chowk Ratri Bazaar Khani Peeni Association*. No new licences have been issued since 1978, but existing vendors are allowed to renew their licenses for 1, 2 or 5 years. An AMC waste-collection vehicle calls round at 11.00pm, and stall holders clear their rubbish into this.

Delhi Dharwaja: Delhi Darwaja one of the 30 interviewees reported being affiliated with a local shop, and six were in local savings groups including three saving with SEWA Bank. However many respondents said that they were not educated, had no time or money to take part in associations, or were living far from their home town. Seven of the vendors reported paying bribes to the local police or municipality often at festival times, and one said that:

> *Mostly the Dabaan come to clear the roadside because of traffic jams. There are haftas (inducements), but on festivals I have to give 'something*" (Male selling second hand men's clothing)

Khodiyarnagar: Newcomers are allowed to vend but not in locations used by long-established traders. Many vendors are SEWA members, but there are no landlords controlling the market.

IIM: There is an internal system of self-management so that vendors keep their stalls about 2 metres apart. The vendors have little problem from the local police unless there is an obstruction to traffic, and several vendors keep a whistle which they stop customers in cars parking badly and disrupting traffic. However, AMC officers evict vendors about once a month confiscating their goods. Vendors can retrieve their goods after 15 days but have to pay a minimum fine of Rs. 500/-, with a surcharge of Rs.10/- a day over 15 days if the goods are not claimed. Three vendors have combined to buy an AMC dustbin costing Rs.600/-.

Geeta Mandir Bus Stand: At one stage there was an organisation (details not given) that fought a Supreme Court case to establish a legal vending place, but the case was lost. Although the stalls have no legal status, newcomers have to pay money to the previous vendor to occupy space. There are clearances every two months. Vendors reported that they were paying around Rs. 30-40/- a day in protection money.

Vejalpur Market: There is no local market association but the vendors pay around Rs.50/- to the local police about every two months. Vendors also pay to AMC and are given receipts, but did not appear to know why. The *dabaan* (AMC guards) comes about every four months to evict vendors.

In markets where SEWA is active the orgnanisation plays and important leadership and conciliatory role, as this vegetable vendor from Khodiyarnagar illustrates:

> *Mostly there are disputes between vegetable vendors and Patharawalas (roadside sitters). Vegetable vendors sell in shifts - in morning and in evening. They go home in the afternoon and come back in evening just to find that Patarawalas have taken their places. SEWA is a good at helping to resolve the conflicts, but I would like a permanant place to sit as I have been evicted twice before over the BRTS* (Female, Khodiyarnagar, selling vegetables).

5.2 Relations with the State

Relations between vendors and state agencies were generally conflictual. All the vending areas were fairly regularly patrolled and visited by municipality officials, *dabaan,* or the police; various reasons for the visits were given, including:

- general order and patrolling
- settling disputes between traders
- to reduce traffic congestion and ensure that vendors were not blocking highways
- eviction / *hafta* (inducements) / seizing goods / getting free snacks
- during visits of higher officials, ministers or the Chief Minister

Visits for *hafta* were much more frequent during festivals, which was a considerable burden for vendors.

> *For the future only thing I want is that the government makes this place a permanent bazaar'. In 2000 the police took 14-15 people to the police station for questioning and after some intervention by municipality offices, they released them. There was also was a law suit which recently finished in this year some time* (Male, Bhadra, selling T-shirts, trousers, pants for men and women)

Although few vendors in the survey (8%) said that councillors were useful in solving problems, there are exceptions. The research team visited a local corporator (councillor) in Gomptipur who had negotiated space for a local vending area alongside the road for about 300 vendors, and used his locally allocated development funds for small-scale infrastructure improvements in his ward.

5.3 Rent-Seeking

There is considerable difficulty in getting information on bribes and informal payments from workers in the informal economy, because systems are complex, payments are irregular, and people find it difficult to report with accuracy, or because they may be unwilling to reveal information. In Ahmedabad, the term commonly used for payment is *hafta,* a politer word than a 'bribe' referring to a negotiated payment. The research team therefore tried several methods to understand the informal payments which vendors make and the amounts paid.

In addition to a direct payment how much *hafta* traders paid, and to whom, they were also asked how they resolved problems - a quarter said that they used bribes (Table A3.1). Information was triangulated through the scheduled interviews. Payments appear to be made in a variety of ways, through rent to the owner of space, payments to an *agewan*, direct payments or giving goods to the police or AMC officials. In Bhadra it was suggested that these payments typically amounted to around Rs. 2,500/- a month, although payments are higher for larger centrally-located businesses.

5.4 Evictions and Other Problems

An extremely high proportion of the vendors surveyed (86%) had suffered shocks and stresses, with particular problems in the main markets of Bhadra, Jamalpur, and Delhi Darwaja; some 16 of the 17 vendors interviewed in the four outlying areas had also suffered problems (Table 5.2).

Although the survey sites were selected as points of conflict in order to explore how disputes were resolved, they nevertheless covered a wide range of vending locations and different types of market. The extent and degree of harassment is acute, and if replicated throughout the city, represents a significant level of insecurity for vendors that causes hardship and personal distress to both vendors, their families and other businesses which depend on them.

Table 5.2: Suffered Shocks and Stresses by Market

Market	Yes	%	Total
Bhadra	37	97	38
Delhi Darwaja	27	90	30
Kankaria Lake	25	81	31
Jamalpur	18	94	19
Parasnagar	25	74	34
Kodiyarnagar	24	77	31
IIM	3	100	3
Nehrunagar	5	100	5
Vastrapur	3	75	4
CEPT Univ.	5	100	5
Total	**172**	**86**	**200**

Low-level harassment, confiscation of goods, and fines are common, but the most significant result is that half the vendors had suffered eviction at some time in the past (Tables 5.3 and Table A3.2). Many vendors reported visits by the *dabaan* every one or two months, resulting in street clearances and confiscation of goods. A standard fine for reclaiming confiscated goods was be around Rs.500/- paid after 15 days.

Table 5.3: Market by Type of Shocks and Stresses (summary table)

Market	Harass-ment	%	Confis-cation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Total
Total	**41**	**21**	**45**	**23**	**24**	**12**	**100**	**50**	**200**

Conflicts were commonly reported with the police or Municipality officials (91% of the sample) - respondents did not always make a very clear distinction between the Municipal enforcement officers and the Police (Table A3.3). In Bhadra, evictions have become the norm, which take place when vendors' stalls encroach too far onto the road or restrict access to Bhadra Fort, or when the Chief Minister or a dignitary is visiting the area. The most frequent conflicts with the police were report in Jamalpur and Kankaria Lake (Table A3.3).

Bhadra: 'Beautification' plans for Bhardra Fort are now a major threat to a long-established vending community (see Figure 2.3, and Section 2.2). The Bhadra Fort Redevelopment Project was approved in June 2011under a JNNURM[6] scheme to create an historic pedestrian route from Teen

[6] Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

Darwaja to a new pedestrian bridge over the River Sabramati. Vendors were first evicted in December 2011, but made representations to AMC, and given a temporary reprieve, but evictions were carried out in January 2012. They were not given an alternative space before the eviction, but after January SEWA met hte Police Commissioner and there is some accommodation with vendors shifting to avoid the renovation work.

Jamalpur: Conflict has been a factor in Jamalpur for many years (Figure 5.1). SEWA has worked with vendors to establish and support an organising committee, and is now negotiating with AMC to take over space underneath the flyover to create a new market (Figure 5.2). In Khodiyarnagar, vendors reported being evicted about every two months, and just before the 2012 interview, four vendors lost their laris, and had to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- to reclaim these.

Figure 5.1: Summary of Key Events in Jamalpur



Source: Reproduced with permission from SEWA, Presentation November 2011

Figure 5.2: Design Proposals for Jamalpur



Source: Reproduced with permission from SEWA, Presentation November 2011

5.5 Laws and Regulations

Legal Audit

Working Paper 1 of this series covers the legal context of vending in Ahmedabad. The rights of street vendors are framed by both the Constitution of India, federal and state legislation, by local policy as summarised below.

Legislation: Three areas of national and state legislation are important relating to: human rights; the duties of municipal government; and the protection of public rights of way

- *Constitution of India* establishes rights to life and personal liberty (court cases decisions on whether 'right to life' subsumes a 'right to a livelihood');
- *Indian Penal Code, 1860* prohibits any act that creates a danger within a public right of way (s.283);
- *Motor Vehicle Act, 1988* seeks to ensure the free flow of traffic;
- *Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, that allows a police officer to arrest anyone about to commit any cognizable offence without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant;*
- *Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949* still applies to Gujarat as it was enacted while Gujarat was still part of the old Province of Bombay, and sets out the duties, powers and responsibilities of municipalities. These include: improving streets and maintaining them free from obstruction (Ss. 209, 226, 229, 231 and 234); issuing licenses for selling in public places, markets and slaughterhouses (Ss. 384, 328, 377, 378, 379, and 383) and the avoidance of public nuisance
- *Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976* deals with the designation of land for development.

Thus street vendors can be charged on a number of counts, most frequently for causing an obstruction or not having a license, although no new licenses have been issued for many years.

Public Interest Litigation: PIL was introduced in the 1980s and allows both the courts and any other private party to request review of matters of 'public interest'. PIL has become an important mechanism by which communities define their rights in relation to the state, and its use by street vendors' representatives provides some interesting legal precedents. In 1985, the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation determined that while the Constitution grants a 'right to life' and thus a 'right to livelihood' this should not compromise the rights of the public to a right of passage. Thus the 'right to a livelihood' was not absolute and could occur if there were reasonable grounds for removal and a just and fair process was undertaken under the law.

National Policy: A *National Policy on Urban Street Vendors,* (NPUSV) was first published in 2004 and updated in 2009, as a result of lobbying by the National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI), with efforts to frame Model Legislation for the Street Vendors in 2011. The policy is under the remit of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, but has to be implemented individually by State governments. The policy recognises street vending as a legitimate element of the urban retail distribution system, and recommends that vending is managed by a Town Vending Committee (TVC) representing the urban local body (municipality), the policy and vendors. A Model legislation if framed will have to be adopted by the state governments as their own legislation.

PIL in Ahmedabad: In 2006 SEWA brought a PIL case against the State of Gujarat requiring the implementation of the NPUSV in Ahmedabad. The case was followed by a complex series of court orders, effectively resulting in policy making becoming the purview of the courts. The orders required AMC to draw up a street vending scheme. Despite submissions by SEWA that the scheme drawn up was inadequate as a result of inadequate consultation during its preparation and its design, it is now being implemented.

Ahmedabad Street Vendors' Scheme: As a result of the PILs discussed above, in 2010 AMC approved the Ahmedabad Street Vendor's Scheme. This determined the functions and composition of the Ahmedabad TVC, and classified major streets in the city by the level of street vending permitted - 'red' (prohibited), 'amber' (restricted by time and products), and 'green' (permitted). There are two crucial problems with this approach: first, that it ignores the 'natural markets' identified by SEWA, ie: markets established in places where there is a significant flow of customers; and second that it will lead to extensive evictions.

There is an urgent need to address the conflicting legal environment under which street vending operates. The crucial problem is that there is no recognition of the concept of a 'natural market', where footfall creates a significant commercial opportunity, and no redress if vendors are relocated to an place where there is no commercial potential.

Vendors' Rights

The survey suggests that very few vendors interviewed had established rights to trade, although some have *de facto* rights by virtue of having been trading in one place for a long time. Most vendors had no idea what laws and regulations affected them. Of the 132 people who replied to the question about which main laws or regulations affected their work, 87% (117 of 132) said that they did not know, while 10% had a vague notion, ie: something to do with traffic.

Only two traders were aware of any specific part of the legal framework that affected them and they both quoted Section 283 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which seeks to avoid obstruction to public rights of way. The relevant sections is as follows

> **Section 283. Danger or obstruction in public way or line of navigation**.-- *Whoever, by doing any act, or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge, causes danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any public way or public line of navigation, shall be punished, with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.*

Several also referred to the role of the courts, which seem to have been a forum for contest in Ahmedabad quite early on, as this story illustrates.

> *The 1980s in Makek Chowk 327 vendors were evicted, harassed and goods confiscate. They filed a case in the Supreme Court, with a judgement issues in 1984, that permitted to vend and temporary license. I have paid Rs. 200/- for the license as well (to SEWA). After the case I was not harassed by the municipal officers or police except in 2004. The municipality and police often make visits in the market and remove other vendors obstructing the roads, traffic movement etc.* (Male, Manek Chowk, selling spiced vegetables)

5.6 Vulnerabilities

Vendors commonly report four main forms of stresses in their trading environment: low-level harassment, confiscation of goods, fines and eviction. The latter may be short-term removal from the trading site or a longer-term eviction.

The extent to which different groups were vulnerable to different types of stresses was examined by considering gender, age, the facility from which vendors operated, the type of ration card that people held, and their caste and religion. Some interesting dynamics emerge.

Female vendors appear to be more vulnerable to confiscation and to suffer much higher rates of eviction than men (67% of female vendors reported having been affected by eviction compared to 40% of men) but men report a slightly higher rate of fines (Table 5.4). Those with the least permanent facilities, ie: trading on the ground or carrying their goods, also report significantly higher levels of eviction (60%) compared to those with a more established vending set-up (ie: trading from a table, bed, *lari* or bicycle).

Table 5.4: Vulnerability of Vendors by Gender and Age

	TOTAL REPSONSES	Harassment	%	Confiscations	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%
Gender * Shocks & Stresses											
Male	**130**	27	*20*	25	*19*	19	*14*	53	*40*	18	*13*
Female	**70**	14	*20*	20	*28*	5	*7*	47	*67*	2	*2*
Total	**200**	**41**	***20***	**45**	***22***	**24**	***12***	**100**	***50***	**20**	***10***
Type of display * Shocks & Stresses											
Temporary (1)	**64**	14	*21*	16	*25*	7	*10*	39	*60*	6	*9*
Equipment (2)	**132**	25	*18*	29	*22*	17	*12*	59	*44*	14	*10*
Total	**196**	**39**	***19***	**45**	***23***	**24**	***12***	**98**	***50***	**20**	***10***

(1) Vendors with temporary facilities ie: selling from the ground or carrying goods were classed vulnerable
(2) Vendors with equipment had a slightly higher degree of investment eg: a table, *lari* or bicycle.

Vendors with BPL ration cards (Below Poverty Line) were mainly found in Parasnagar and Kankaria Lake. Although numbers of respondents are small, they appear to have suffered more shocks than vendors with an APL ration card (Above Poverty Line) (Figure 6.7). Whether or not vendors possessed a voting card was not associated with vulnerability (Figure 6.7).

Muslim vendors were less subject to fines and harassment than Hindus, probably because the *agewan* system in Bhadra gave them some form of protection, but they reported higher levels of eviction and confiscation, probably because most were trading in the city centre areas (Table A3.4). Vendors from Scheduled Castes had suffered more evictions than others in the survey (Table A3.5). Relocations to new sites promised as part of an upgrading project often do not transpire, as the quote below illustrates.

> *When the Kankaria plan was developed Modi announced that everyone would get their own space after completion, but after the first month of operation, we were evicted from the premises and after that we had to find places for ourselves...at the same time I was also evicted from my home, which was in a slum demolished to make way for the development. The government promised to rehouse the residents, but for the last four years nothing has happened.* (Male, Kankaria Lake, selling Pakodi (snack))

The survey team found at least one family sleeping on the street after the Kankaria evictions. The stories of vendors demonstrate an entrenched history of harassment and eviction over a long period of time.

> *During the early years when there were just 27 vendors in Jamalpur and we had to face lot of evictions. But after I joined SEWA it has reduced. We want a place to vend and not licenses. How will the government give us licenses when they do not permit us to vend at all. I saw the police taking bribes from each of the carts with vegetables coming from the APMC market. They were collecting around Rs.20-30/- from each vehicle. There was a police van standing outside gate with 3-4 police and each of the police took turns to stand at the gate to collect money* (Female, Jamalpur, selling chilli and garlic)

> *We are tired! Continuous demands and hopes but nothing good has happened. When the market used to be on main road, the business was good, but since we moved to an inside location business has decreased. In 1972 a leading politician said we could trade here. We did for 25 years, even before Parasnagar housing was constructed. But 6 years ago, the residential apartments had shops on ground floor. The shopkeepers started complaining about the vendors and insisted that they should be removed. Their laris were taken to police station. They used to get arrested for a day. The sufferings increased so they came together (a group of 15-20) and united and shifted to near place near Parasnagar* (Male, Parasnagar, Vegetable seller and seasonal items)

Often the police are named as culprits, but vendors do not always distinguish between the police and city officials.

> *The police and corporation people used to come with a laathi charge* (beating with a stick) *and sneaking away goods if I can't pay hafta. Once a man objected to the laathi charge, but it was taken to Ela Ben in SEWA, she fought against the police* (Female, Manek Chowk, selling garlic, chilli and vegetables)

Certain events trigger a crackdown, for example the visits of high level politicians, as this vendor from Delhi Darwaja reported. During festivals both rents and bribes escalate, and the experience of a vendor Parasnagar was widespread.

> *Whenever any politician goes by we are not allowed to sit here and the police visit to evict us, even if there is no traffic problems. Once the police go back we come back* (Male, Delhi Darwaja, selling second hand clothes)

> *I created 5 to 6 stalls during the kite season to sell kites and threads. At that time all the police men from the Ghatlodia police station (from high to low rank) came and took goods worth Rs.5000/- from each stall as well as cash bribes. This is very unfair because we made our stall on somebody's land and we pay Rs.1000/- per stall. When the policemen take too much bribes then all our profit is eaten by them* (Male, Parasnagar, Vegetable seller and kites near the Utarayan festival)

Evictions are still on-going in all the markets interviewed.

> *Around 25 days ago, the municipality vehicle has seized the goods and cart. We have to pay Rs.600/- and get a receipt from the Usmanpura Office, and we get a 1-year window to retrieve things, but it can take 3 months to get the goods back. I lost many goods and after 3 months the goods will be of no use and the cart will be broken* (Female, Parasnagar, selling green vegetables and spices)

> *The police and Daaban come 2-3 times in a week and try to evict us. At that time we run away with goods and come back after they are gone* (Male, Delhi Darwaja, selling second hand clothes).

> *Only in name are we democratic. Earlier before the development there were around 500 vendors. Now a there is a 75% reduction in vendors - all are dispersed. Only those who are working from generations are here. We are sitting on the internal road, but still have a lot of Daaban, only because the police considers us a money-makers for them. Bribes have increased after development as it has become a centre of attraction. If the police take away our goods, we have to give Rs.300/- as a bribe to get them back* (Male, Kankaria Lake, selling pan)

The stress of evictions is very evident, and the effect of combined evictions from housing and livelihoods can be devastating as this vendor explains.

> *When they confiscate our goods in order to release then we have to pay Rs.90/- per item and most of the times half of the things are broken, so this way they mentally torture us* (Female, IIM, selling Punjabi and Chinese food and paratha)

> *I stayed at Macchi Pir slum. I had gone to my village as my in-laws expired. Was given notice that this land is municipal land. When I came back my house was destroyed by a bulldozer. I lost all my documents except my voting card. Now I have no place to stay, so I stay on road. My family has been vending here since generations. It was good there. They took photos and told us we would be given space to sit. After it was built we were allowed to sit next to the boundary. Then a few months ago during Christmas they built a small gate and we were pushed out. Earlier we were 100 in this row. Now only 30 remain, the rest have gone to do labourers work* (Male, Kankaria Lake, selling popcorn)

6. Summary and Conclusions

The results of this survey demonstrate legal, physical and political marginalisation of street vending in Ahmedabad, and its complex segmented character. Many of the 200 street vendors— 130 men and 70 women—in this survey were working in insecure environments, under constant threat of eviction, and paying considerable sums for their space. Yet they are given neither voice nor space in urban management and upgrading plans.

6.1 Vendors and their Goods

Vendors in the six main markets surveyed showed very different characteristics. In Bhadra the vendors were predominantly Mulsim, reflecting the rich cultural heritage of Ahmedabad's historic core. In Delhi Darwaja, just outside the city centre, significant numbers were from the Dataniya community and in Khodiyarnagar several people from the Patni community were found; people from Schedules and Other Backward Castes are often marginalised in urban development processes.

Some 65% of vendors were over 35 years old, and 84% were married, particularly women, suggesting that most vendors have family responsibilities and dependents. For 80% of those interviewed, vending was their main job, and 69% were from Ahmedabad. This evidence belies the common view that street vending is an entry-level urban job for young people and new migrants.

Access to state benefits and a legal identity was by no means assured. All 200 vendors answered the question that asked if they had a voting card—only available to those with an address—71% did, but 29% did not. Only 121 vendors answered questions about ration cards[7]; of these 81% had an APL ration card, but only 23% had a BPL ration card. This confirms earlier studies that the poorest and most vulnerable find it difficult to get a BPL card.

6.2 Businesses in the Urban Economy

Street vending is intricately enmeshed in the urban economy, with different areas dominated by ethnic, religious or caste groups. It is a long-established profession, with businesses sometimes handed down through generations, where 'gatekeepers' and trading traditions make access, particularly to the more profitable locations, difficult and expensive.

Many of the markets exhibit complex links to other economic sectors in Ahmedabad. In Bhadra and the CEPT market, vendors sell new clothes on commission from shops and factories elsewhere. In Jamalpur, vegetable vendors act as middle-men buying wholesale from the adjoining APMC market and selling in bulk to small businesses. In Delhi Darwaja there is a complex part-cash economy where second hand clothes are collected from households in exchange for household utensils, and later sold in the market. Khodiyarnagar and Parasnagar act as local centres, and the Kankaria Lake area sells snacks and souvenirs to visitors.

Estimates of income and profits are notoriously unreliable, but results checked through various questions suggest that, at the extremes, average *business turnover* and *profit* is lowest in Kankaria Lake (Rs.380/- and Rs. Rs.90/- a day respectively), and highest in Bhadra (Rs.1880/- and Rs.360/- a day respectively) (Table A2.11), indicating that street vending's economic contribution is significant. At the time of the survey there were around 3,500 vendors working in 1,400 businesses in Bhadra; their combined average turnover could thus be around US$ 19m[8] a year (Jajoo 2011).

6.3 Challenges

With the exception of markets where SEWA has a strong presence, vendors do not have strong associations, although in some markets—notably Bhadra and probably IIM—a local *agewan* (informal landlord) collects 'protection' money and negotiates with the police. This does not always prevent problems, and the *agewan* have not been effective in saving vendors from eviction during the Bhadra Plaza Development Project. Street vendors are particularly vulnerable during 'beautification' and urban infrastructure projects such as the improvements to Bhadra market and the introduction of the BRTS (Bus Rapid Transport System), which are actively pursued in Ahmedabad as part of its modernisation agenda.

[7] APL = Above Poverty Line; BPL = Below Poverty Line
[8] At an exchange rate of US$1 = Rs.50/-

Relations with the state are almost always conflictual. All the areas visited were regularly patrolled by the *dabaan* (AMC guards) or police, whose visits meant resulted in demands for free snacks or goods, *hafta* (inducements), confiscations and fines, or eviction. Payment of *hafta* is widespread, mostly to the *dabaan* or police, although the reported amounts varied from around Rs.400/- to Rs.2,500/- a month. A standard fine for reclaiming goods is Rs.500/-.

The extent and degree of harassment is acute, with more than half of vendors suffering eviction at some time in the past, sometimes with violence and injuries. The evictions vary from temporary displacements, which take place before the Chief Minister or VIP pass, to permanent clearances. The rent-seeking and evictions represent a significant and on-going level of insecurity that causes hardship and personal distress to all; vendors, their families and other dependent businesses.

The stress of evictions is acute with people feeling victimised and excluded from democratic processes. Some specific vulnerabilities are evident. Female vendors seem more liable to confiscation and eviction than men, although male vendors report more frequent fines. Those with temporary vending facilities are particularly vulnerable. Vendors from Scheduled Castes and those with a BPL ration card were more liable to evictions than others in the survey.

The regulatory environment for street vendors is covered in Working Paper 1 (Mahadevia *et al* 2012), and demonstrates the complexity of legislation affecting street vendors. Street vendors can be evicted under a number of Acts, including the *Indian Penal Code,* 1860; the *Motor Vehicle Act,* 1988; the *Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,* 1949, and the *Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act,* 1976. SEWA has sought to use Public Interest Litigation to compel AMC to implement the *National Policy on Urban Street Vendors,* with mixed outcomes as the resulting policy is likely to be punitive.

There is some good practice in joint management, but the examples are rare. In Jamalpur, conflict has been ongoing since 1985, but SEWA is working with AMC officials to organise vendors, redesign and manage the vending space. This represents imaginative use of urban space that should be replicated elsewhere in the city, but examples are rare.

6.3 Recommendations

The marginalisation of street vendors appears to significantly harm the livelihoods of some of the most vulnerable urban workers and run counter to good practice in poverty reduction. The following recommendations are made:

i. Local government policy should recognise the importance of street vending as a livelihood option for the urban poor, especially the vulnerable poor, eg: women (particularly older women), and Scheduled Castes and Tribes;
ii. Further research, led by vendors' representatives, should strengthen understanding the economic contribution of street vending and its place within Ahmedabad value chains;
iii. Policy should identify all 'natural markets' throughout the city, based on and updated from the initial identification in the 2003 by Dalwadi (2003), and protect vending in these. This should be the prime role of the TVC established to implement the *National Policy on Urban Street Vendors* in Ahmedabad.
iv. In identified 'natural markets' decentralised management committees should be set up, led by vendors based on the pilots by SEWA in Jamalpur, Khodiyarnagar and elsewhere, to manage the market and collect vending fees;
v. Elsewhere in Ahmedabad, street vending should be permitted provided that it does not cause problems for public safety;
vi. Urban infrastructure and 'beautification' schemes should protect street vendors' livelihoods, and where vending spaces are affected, should redesign public space to accommodate vendors *in situ;*
vii. Where this is not possible, alternative viable trading sites should be sought. Summary evictions should *never* take place;
viii. Inexpensive alternatives to the *lari* should be explored to create smaller mobile vending platforms that allow for efficient use of space. This could be a project for engineering or architectural students.

APPENDIX A - Tables

A1. The Vendors

Table A1.1: Vendors Interviewed - Covered or Open Location by Market

Market	Covered	%	Tent, umbrella	%	Open	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	1	3	6	16	31	82	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	3	10	3	10	24	80	30	30
Kankaria Lake	5	16	6	19	20	65	31	31
Jamalpur			8	42	11	58	19	19
Parasnagar	2	6	1	3	31	91	34	34
Kkodiyarnagar	2	6	7	23	22	71	31	31
IIM					3	100	3	3
Nehrunagar					5	100	5	5
Vastrapur	3	75	1	25			4	4
CEPT Univ.	2	40	3	60			5	5
Total	**18**	**9**	**35**	**18**	**147**	**74**	**200**	**200**

Table A1.2: Vendors Interviewed - Fixed/Mobile by Market

Market	Fixed	%	Mobile	%	Valid res-ponse	Total vendors
Bhadra	19	51	18	49	37	38
Delhi Darwaja	12	40	18	60	30	30
Kankaria Lake	12	40	18	60	30	31
Jamalpur	10	56	8	44	18	19
Parasnagar	16	48	17	52	33	34
Khodiyarnagar	14	45	17	55	31	31
IIM	1	33	2	67	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	80	1	20	5	5
Vastrapur	2	50	2	50	4	4
CEPT Univ.			5	100	5	5
Total	**90**	**46**	**106**	**54**	**196**	**200**

Table A1.3: Vendors by Market & Type of Display (Multiple Choice Question)

	Ground, wall	Box	Table	Kiosk	Bicycle	Carrying goods	Lari	Other	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	11	5	5	2	2	3	16		44	38
Delhi Darwaja	13			1	1		13		28	30
Kankaria Lake	7		4	3	6	3	8		31	31
Jamalpur	18						2		20	19
Parasnagar						1	31	1	33	34
Khodiyarnagar	4		2		1		22	1	30	31
IIM	2				1				3	3
Nehrunagar	3					1	3		7	5
Vastrapur							4		4	4
CEPT Univ.							4	1	5	5
TOTAL	**58**	**5**	**11**	**6**	**11**	**8**	**103**	**3**	**205**	**200**

Note: some vendors had more than one type of display

Age

Table A1.4: Vendors by Market & Age

Market	< 18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra			3	*8*	11	*29*	16	*42*	8	*21*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja			1	*3*	3	*10*	19	*63*	7	*23*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	1	*3*	3	*10*	9	*29*	15	*48*	3	*10*	31	31
Jamalpur			1	*5*	1	*5*	14	*74*	3	*16*	19	19
Parasnagar			3	*9*	12	*35*	16	*47*	3	*9*	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	1	*3*	5	*16*	11	*35*	9	*29*	5	*16*	31	31
IIM			1	*33*			2	*67*			3	3
Nehrunagar					3	*60*	2	*40*			5	5
Vastrapur			1	*25*	1	*25*	1	*25*	1	*25*	4	4
CEPT Univ.			1	*20*			3	*60*	1	*20*	5	5
Total	**2**	***1***	**19**	***10***	**51**	***26***	**97**	***49***	**31**	***16***		**200**

Education and Religion

Table A1.5: Vendors by Market and Literacy

Market	Illiter-ate	%	Signa-ture	%	Read	%	Read& Write	%	Total vendors
Bhadra	10	*26*			5	*13*	23	*61*	38
Delhi Darwaja	13	*43*	3	*10*	1	*3*	13	*43*	30
Kankaria Lake	6	*19*	5	*16*	3	*10*	17	*55*	31
Jamalpur	12	*63*	3	*16*	1	*5*	3	*16*	19
Parasnagar	8	*24*	2	*6*	4	*12*	20	*59*	34
Khodiyarnagar	6	*19*	2	*7*	1	*3*	22	*71*	31
IIM							3	*100*	3
Nehrunagar			1	*20*			4	*80*	5
Vastrapur	1	*25*					3	*75*	4
CEPT Univ.			1	*20*	1	*20*	3	*60*	5
Total	**56**	***28***	**17**	***9***	**16**	***8***	**111**	***56***	**200**

Table A1.6: Vendors by Market and Religion

Market	Hindu	%	Muslim	%	Christian	%	Other	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	15	*39*	23	*61*					38	38
Delhi Darwaja	30	*100*							30	30
Kankaria Lake	29	*94*	2	*6*					31	31
Jamalpur	18	*95*	1	*5*					19	19
Parasnagar	34	*100*							34	34
Khodiyarnagar	31	*100*							31	31
IIM	3	*100*							3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*					1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur	4	*100*							4	4
CEPT Univ.	4	*80*			1	*20*			5	5
Total	**172**	***86***	**26**	***13***	**1**	***1***	**1**	***1***		**200**

Origins and Caste

Table A1.7: Vendors by Market and Place of Origin

Market	Ahmed abad	%	Other - Gujarat	%	Other state/ country	%	Valid respon se	Total vendor s
Bhadra	29	81	6	17	1	3	36	38
Delhi Darwaja	22	73	2	7	6	20	30	30
Kankaria Lake	21	68	7	23	3	10	31	31
Jamalpur	16	84	2	11	1	5	19	19
Parasnagar	21	62	9	26	4	12	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	18	60	2	7	10	33	30	31
IIM	0	0	2	67	1	33	3	3
Nehrunagar	3	60	0	0	2	40	5	5
Vastrapur	3	75	1	25	0	0	4	4
CEPT Univ.	2	40	3	60	0	0	5	5
Total	**135**	**69**	**34**	**17**	**28**	**14**	**197**	**200**

Table A1.8: Vendors by Market and Caste

Market	Schedule d caste	%	Schedule d tribe	%	Other Backward Caste	%	Other	%	Valid res-ponse	Total vendors
Bhadra	6	16	1	3	13	34	18	47	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	20	67			5	17	5	16	30	30
Kankaria Lake	4	13	1	3	14	47	11	36	30	31
Jamalpur	10	56	1	6	1	6	6	33	18	19
Parasnagar	9	27			14	42	10	30	33	34
Khodiyarnagar	13	42			10	32	8	25	31	31
IIM	1	33					2	66	3	3
Nehrunagar					2	50	2	50	4	5
Vastrapur							4	100	4	4
CEPT Univ.					1	20	4	80	5	5
Total	**63**	**32**	**3**	**2**	**60**	**31**	**70**	**35**	**196**	**200**

Family Status

Table A1.9: Vendors by Market and Dependency

Market	Average people in household	Average workers in household	Dependency ratio	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	6.9	1.8	3.7	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	5.7	2.2	2.6	30	30
Kankaria Lake	5.5	2.1	2.6	31	31
Jamalpur	9.1	2.3	3.9	19	19
Parasnagar	5.8	2.1	2.7	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	5.9	1.9	3.1	31	31
IIM	7.0	2.3	3.0	3	3
Nehrunagar	4.4	2.6	1.7	5	5
Vastrapur	7.3	3.5	2.1	4	4
CEPT Univ.	6.0	2.6	2.3	5	5
Total	**6.4**	**2.1**	**3.3**	**200**	**200**

Table A1.10: Vendors by Market and Numbers of Children per Household

Market	Hhds with own children	Hhda with no children	Av no children (total hhds)	Av no children of school age	% of School age children in school	No. households supporting other children	% children in school	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	31	6	2.9	2.2	*89*	14	*37*	37	38
Delhi Darwaja	25	5	2.9	1.4	*88*	3	*10*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	27	4	2.2	1.4	*77*	2	*7*	31	31
Jamalpur	18	1	4.1	2.5	*83*	2	*11*	19	19
Parasnagar	30	4	2.5	1.1	*90*	5	*15*	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	28	3	2.7	2.0	*93*	2	*7*	31	31
IIM	2	1	1.0	0.7	*100*			3	3
Nehrunagar	4	1	0.8	0.6	*100*			5	5
Vastrapur	3	1	2.5	1.8	*100*	1	*25*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	4	1	2.8	2.8	*93*	1	*20*	5	5
Total	**172**	**27**	**2.7**	**1.7**	***88***	**30**	***15***	**199**	**200**

A2. The Businesses

Suppliers

Table A2.1: Vendors by Market and Suppliers (Multiple Choice Question)

Market	Supermarket	% of vendors	Small shops	% of vendors	Other vendors	% of vendors	Self	% of vendors	Local wholesaler	% of vendors	Other	% of vendors	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	1	*3*	1	*3*	5	*13*	1	*3*	27	*71*	6	*16*	41	38
Delhi Darwaja			1	*3*	13	*43*	3	*10*	2	*7*	9	*30*	28	30
Kankaria Lake			2	*7*	1	*3*	7	*23*	18	*58*	1	*3*	29	31
Jamalpur									19	*100*			19	19
Parasnagar	5	*15*				*3*	7	*21*	23	*68*			35	34
Khodiyarnagar	2	*6*	1	*3*	1	*3*	4	*13*	24	*77*	1	*3*	33	31
IIM									2	*67*	1	*33*	3	3
Nehrunagar									4	*80*	1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur							2	*50*	2	*50*			4	4
CEPT Univ.							5	*100*					5	5
Total	**8**	***4***	**7**	***4***	**21**	***11***	**29**	***15***	**121**	***61***	**15**	***8***		**200**

Table A2.2: Market by Main Clients (Multiple Choice Question)

Market	Busi-nesses	Passers-by	Other vendors	House-holds	Other	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra		36		18		54	38
Delhi Darwaja	7	17	14	8	2	48	30
Kankaria Lake		25	3	4	6	38	31
Jamalpur	1	16	8	12	1	38	19
Parasnagar		34	1	28		63	34
Khodiyarnagar		29		25		54	31
IIM		3		3		6	3
Nehrunagar		5		1		6	5
Vastrapur		4		1		5	4
CEPT Univ.		2		2	1	5	5
Total	**8**	**171**	**26**	**102**	**10**		**200**

Table A2.3: Market by Use of Business Services (Multiple Choice Question)

Market	Porters	%	Guard	%	Repairs	%	Food & drink suppliers	%	Other services	%	Valid responses	Total vendors
Bhadra	8	*21*	7	*18*	2	*5*			3	*8*	20	38
Delhi Darwaja			1	*3*			1	*3*	9	*30*	11	30
Kankaria Lake					2	*7*	3	*10*	6	*19*	11	31
Jamalpur			1	*5*			3	*16*	4	*21*	8	19
Parasnagar									5	*15*	5	34
Kodiyarnagar									3	*10*	3	31
Other markets												17
Total	**8**	***4***	**9**	***5***	**4**	***2***	**7**	***4***	**30**	***15***		**200**

The Trading Space

Table A2.6: Market - by How Vendors Secure Trading Space

Market	Informal arrangement	%	Arrive early	%	Pay someone	%	Do nothing	%	Mobile trader	%	Other	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	22	*57*	3	*8*			8	*21*			5	*13*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	24	*80*	3	*10*			3	*10*					30	30
Kankaria Lake	22	*71*					7	*23*	2	*7*			31	31
Jamalpur	19	*100*											19	19
Parasnagar	30	*88*	1	*3*			1	*3*			2	*6*	34	34
Kodiyarnagar	27	*87*	2	*7*			2	*7*					31	31
IIM	2	*66*					1	*33*					3	3
Nehrunagar	2	*40*			2	*40*			1	*20*			5	5
Vastrapur	4	*100*											4	4
CEPT Univ.	5	*100*											5	5
Total	**157**	***79***	**9**	***5***	**2**	***1***	**22**	***11***	**3**	***2***	**7**	***4***		**200**

Table A2.4: Vendors by Market and Access to Water

	Access to water		Water Source							
Market	**Yes**	**%**	**Near-by**	**%**	**Buy**	**%**	**Home**	**%**	**Other**	**%**
Bhadra	24	*63*	11	*46*	5	*21*	6	*25*	2	*8*
Delhi Darwaja	10	*33*	4	*40*	5	*50*	1	*10*		
Kankaria Lake	18	*58*	6	*33*	8	*44*			4	*22*
Jamalpur	18	*95*	12	*67*	4	*22*	1	*6*	1	*6*
Parasnagar	11	*32*	4	*36*	2	*18*	1	*9*	4	*36*
Khodiyarnagar	11	*35*	5	*45*	2	*18*			4	*36*
IIM	3	*100*	3	*100*						
Nehrunagar										
Vastrapur	2	*50*	1	*50*	1	*50*				
CEPT Univ.	2	*40*	1	*50*					1	*50*
Total	**99**	***50***	**47**	***47***	**27**	***27***	**9**	***9***	**16**	***16***

Table A2.5: Vendors by Market and Access to Toilets

	Access to toilet		Location of Toilet					
Market	**Yes**	%	**Building nearby**	%	**Pay**	%	**Home**	%
Bhadra	34	90	9	27	23	68	2	5.9
Delhi Darwaja	19	63	1	5	17	90	1	5.3
Kankaria Lake	19	61	4	21	14	74	1	5.3
Jamalpur	18	95	8	44	10	56		
Parasnagar	3	9	1	33	2	67		
Kodiyarnagar	2	7	2	100				
IIM	3	100	3	100				
Nehrunagar								
Vastrapur	2	50	2	100				
CEPT Univ.	3	60	1	33	2	67		
Total	**103**	**52**	**31**	**30**	**68**	**66**	**4**	**3.9**

Employment and Migration

Table A2.7: Vendors by Market and Employment Status

Market	**Employer**	**%**	**Inde-pendent**	**%**	**Paid employee**	**%**	**Unpaid or family worker**	**%**	**Valid responses**	**Total vendors**
Bhadra	10	26	21	55	2	5	5	13	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	3	10	19	63	1	3	7	12	30	30
Kankaria Lake	1	3	24	77			6	19	31	31
Jamalpur			9	47			10	53	19	19
Parasnagar	4	12	23	68			7	21	34	34
Kodiyarnagar			25	81			6	19	31	31
IIM			2	67			1	33	3	3
Nehrunagar	3	60	1	20			1	20	5	5
Vastrapur			4	100					4	4
CEPT Univ.					2	40	3	60	5	5
Total	**21**	**11**	**128**	**64**	**5**	**3**	**46**	**23**	**200**	**200**

Table A2.8: Vendors by Working Days and Months

Market	**>6 days/ week**	**6 days/ week**	**7 days/ week**	**Valid responses**	**>11 months/ year**	**11 months/ year**	**12 months/ year**	**Valid responses**	**Other jobs Yes**	**Other jobs No**	**Valid response**	**Total vendors**
Total	1	37	161	200	3	3	194	200	19	103	122	38

Table 2.9: Vendors by Market and Year Started

Market	<=1	2-3	4-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-30	31+	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	1	7	10	11	6	2	1		38	38
Delhi Darwaja	1	5	12	4	1	5	1	1	30	30
Kankaria Lake	2	17	10	2					31	31
Jamalpur		4	6	7	1	1			19	19
Parasnagar		17	13	3	1	0			34	34
Kodiyarnagar	1	18	9	1	1	1			31	31
IIM		1	2						3	3
Nehrunagar	1	4							5	5
Vastrapur		3	1						4	4
CEPT Univ.		3	1	1					5	5
Total	**6**	**79**	**64**	**29**	**10**	**9**	**2**	**1**		**200**

Costs and Vending Income

Table A2.10: Market by Trading Costs

	Pay for storage		Pay for transport		Pay for bribes		
Market	**Yes**	**% of sample**	**Yes**	**% of sample**	**Yes**	**% of sample**	**Total**
Bhadra	23	*61*	25	*66*	19	*50*	38
Delhi Darwaja	6	*20*	23	*77*	7	*23*	30
Kankaria Lake	7	*23*	13	*42*	10	*32*	31
Jamalpur	14	*74*	15	*79*	4	*21*	19
Parasnagar	4	*12*	23	*68*	10	*29*	34
Kodiyarnagar	2	*7*	15	*48*	2	*7*	31
IIM	1	*33*	1	*33*	1	*33*	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	5	*100*	3	*60*	5
Vastrapur	1	*25*	1	*25*	1	*25*	4
CEPT Univ.	1	*20*	3	*60*	4	*80*	5
Total	**63**	***32***	**124**	***62***	**61**	***31***	**200**

Table A2.11: Market by Average Reported Costs (Purchases), Income and Profit

Market	Costs/ day Rs.	Income/ day Rs.	Reported profit/ day Rs.	Valid resp-onses*	Total
Bhadra	1,481	1,878	362	25	38
Delhi Darwaja	870	1,073	230	20	30
Kankaria Lake	306	379	90	19	31
Jamalpur	1,532	1,616	222	8	19
Parasnagar	1,256	1,379	229	27	34
Kodiyarnagar	1,119	1,303	132	25	31
IIM	2,210	3,250	442	2	3
Nehrunagar	929	5,250	1000	4	5
Vastrapur	663	1,088	438	4	4
CEPT Univ.	2,600	3,520	920	5	5
Total	**1,143**	**1,453**	**263**	**139**	**200**

Notes:
1. Results drawn from interviews where all three relevant questions were completed
2. Data from other sources (ie: student theses) suggest that profit for traders in Delhi Darwaja is probably lower - around Rs.100-150 a day
3. Small samples suggest that data from IIM and CEPT University sites should be discounted.

Table A2.12: Market by Changes in Business

Market	Up	%	Down	%	None	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	7	*18*	9	*24*	22	*58*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	1	*3*	8	*27*	21	*70*	30	30
Kankaria Lake			7	*23*	24	*77*	31	31
Jamalpur	1	*5*	9	*47*	9	*47*	19	19
Parasnagar	1	*3*	7	*21*	26	*77*	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	3	*10*	4	*13*	24	*77*	31	31
IIM					3	*100*	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*			1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur					4	*100*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	2	*40*	1	*20*	2	*40*	5	5
Total	**19**	***10***	**45**	***23***	**136**	***68***		**200**

A3. Challenges and Responses

Associations

Table A3.1: Market by Problem Resolution

Market	Bribe	%	No bribe	%	Asso-ciation	%	Market manager	%	Other means	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	7	*18*	15	*40*	1	*3*	3	*8*	9	*24*	35	38
Delhi Darwaja	4	*13*	1	*3*			3	*10*	13	*43*	21	30
Kankaria Lake	10	*32*	1	*3*					7	*23*	18	31
Jamalpur	7	*37*			5	*26*	9	*47*	4	*21*	25	19
Parasnagar	12	*35*	2	*6*	2	*6*	2	*6*	4	*12*	22	34
Kodiyarnagar	1	*3*	3	*10*	6	*19*	1	*3*	10	*32*	21	31
IIM									3	*100*	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*									4	5
Vastrapur	1	*25*							2	*50*	3	4
CEPT Univ.	4	*80*	1	*20*							5	5
Total	**50**	***25***	**23**	***12***	**14**	***7***	**18**	***9***	**52**	***26***		**200**

Shocks and stresses

Table A3.2: Market by Type of Shocks and Stresses (Multiple Choice Question)

Market	Harass-ment	%	Confis-cation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	11	*29*	16	*42*	12	*32*	24	*63*	63	38
Delhi Darwaja	4	*13*	8	*27*	1	*3*	16	*53*	29	30
Kankaria Lake	4	*13*	2	*7*	6	*19*	13	*42*	25	31
Jamalpur	4	*21*	7	*37*			13	*68*	24	19
Parasnagar	9	*27*	8	*24*	2	*6*	11	*32*	30	34
Khodiyarnagar	6	*19*	4	*13*	2	*7*	15	*48*	27	31
IIM							2	*67*	2	3
Nehrunagar							5	*100*	5	5
Vastrapur							1	*25*	1	4
CEPT Univ.	3	*60*			1	*20*			4	5
Total	**41**	***21***	**45**	***23***	**24**	***12***	**100**	***50***		**200**

Table A3.3: Markets by Type of Conflict (Multiple Choice Question)

Market	Municipality	%	Market manager	%	Police	%	Formal shops	%	Other traders	%	Neighbours	%	No conflicts	%	Valid response	Total vendors
Bhadra	16	42	2	5	18	47	3	8	6	16	5	13	5	13	55	38
Delhi Darwaja	12	40	2	7	15	50	5	17	0	0	7	23	2	7	43	30
Kankaria Lake	15	48	1	3	20	65	0	0	2	7	8	26	4	13	50	31
Jamalpur	8	42	0	0	13	68	0	0	1	5	2	11	2	11	26	19
Parasnagar	11	32	0	0	12	35	0	0	4	12	16	47	3	9	46	34
Kodiyarnagar	11	36	0	0	16	52	3	10	4	13	13	42	1	3	48	31
IIM	1	33	0	0	2	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	33	4	3
Nehrunagar	0	0	0	0	3	60	0	0	0	0	3	60	1	20	7	5
Vastrapur	2	50	0	0	3	75	0	0	0	0	1	25	0	0	6	4
CEPT Univ.	0	0	0	0	3	60	0	0	0	0	1	20	1	20	5	5
Total	**76**	**38**	**5**	**3**	**105**	**53**	**11**	**6**	**17**	**9**	**56**	**28**	**20**	**10**		**200**

Vulnerabilities

Table A3.4: Vulnerability of Vendors by Type of Ration Card and Voting Card

	TOTAL REPSONSES	Harassment	%	Confiscations	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%
Ration card type * Shocks & Stresses											
APL	**98**	22	22	16	16	9	9	51	52	9	9
BPL	**23**	4	17	6	26	4	17	14	60	3	13
Total	**121**	**26**	**21**	**22**	**18**	**13**	**10**	**65**	**53**	**12**	**10**
Voting card * Shocks & Stresses											
Yes	**142**	31	21	27	19	13	9	74	52	15	10
No	**58**	10	17	18	31	11	19	26	44	5	8
Total	**200**	**41**	**20**	**45**	**22**	**24**	**12**	**100**	**50**	**20**	**10**

Table A3.5: Vulnerability of Vendors by Reported Caste and Religion

	TOTAL REPSONSES	Harassment	%	Confiscations	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%
Caste * Shocks & Stresses											
SC	**63**	16	25	14	22	2	3.2	37	58	5	7
ST	**3**	1	33					2	66		
OBC	**60**	10	16	12	20	14	23	21	35	7	11
Other	**70**	14	20	17	24	8	11	37	52	8	11
Total	**196**	**41**	**20**	**43**	**21**	**24**	**12**	**97**	**49**	**97**	**49**
Religion * Shocks & Stresses											
Hindu	**172**	37	21	33	19	14	8	85	49	18	10
Muslim	**26**	4	15	12	46	9	34	14	53	2	7
Christian	**1**					1	100				
Other	**1**							1	100		
Total	**200**	**41**		**45**		**24**		**100**		**20**	

Note: Overall percentages for different religious groups are not given as numbers are small

APPENDIX B - Maps

APPENDIX C - References

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