DATA REPORT

Making Space for the Poor: Law, Rights, Regulation & Street-Trade in the 21st Century

ESRC DFID Joint Fund for Poverty Alleviation Research

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SECTION1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This report presents the main data findings from the research project entitled *Making Space for the Poor: Law, Rights, Regulation & Street-Trade in the 21st Century,* 2010-2014, funded by the *ESRC DFID Joint Fund for Poverty Alleviation Research, RES-167-25-0591,* awarded to Cardiff University.

The report presents quantitative data from 516 interviews with street traders in Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Ahmedabad as a series of cross tabulations for each city. Analytical findings are presented in the academic publications listed in the Bibliography. The report also includes sufficient background information to provide a context for the data presented.

1.2 Research Project Summary

In many cities of the global south, informal employment now provides 60-80% of urban jobs. Street trade is one of the informal economy's largest, most visible and contested domains. Legislation covering street trade is complex, poorly documented and erratically applied, and many traders face constant risk of devastating and unpredictable evictions.

The research explored the fragmented and plural regulatory environment facing street traders, and conflicts between formal and informal regulatory systems that deepen vulnerabilities for the working poor. The research drew on three core academic debates: the role of law in urban development; the paradigm of legal empowerment of the poor, and the potential of rights-based approaches in supporting fragile urban livelihoods.

The research found widespread politicisation of street trade, harassment, evictions and marginalisation of street traders that suggests an urgent need for legal review and 'rights regimes' that respect the right to work and strengthen access to justice. The research calls for a reconceptualisation of urban public space as a land resource with access rights for the working poor balanced with other space needs.

Researchers worked with grassroots trader associations to strengthen knowledge of urban regulations, and with global organisations, UN-Habitat and WIEGO[1], to ensure that research outputs contribute to improved policy development and support informal economy livelihoods.

1.3 Objectives

With a focus on street trade, the research sought to understand the risks and vulnerabilities to urban livelihoods of operating in plural and contradictory legal and regulatory environments. The research addresses a gap in the literature as, despite extensive debate on 'illegal cities', discussion of law and regulation for economies of the urban poor has been limited.

The research hypothesis was that the urban informal economy operates in a fragmented and plural regulatory environment, with conflicts between formal and informal regulatory systems that exacerbate risks, vulnerabilities and exclusions of the working poor that are hugely damaging to the security and stability of their livelihoods. Understanding and addressing the risks and conflicts is crucial to developing an enabling, pro-poor regulatory environment.

The objectives were of the research were to study the plural legal regulatory process in four case-study cities with contrasting legal traditions, Ahmedabad, Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Durban, in each examining: the dynamics of street trade; its formal and informal regulation; critical conflicts for street traders, eg: harassment and evictions, and how an understanding of these can strengthen pro-poor regulatory frameworks.

1.4 Methods

The research was based in cities with different legal traditions, and an uneven history of accommodating the informal economy. The four main case-study cities are major trading cities, each representing different economic and poverty scenarios, and different legal traditions.

[1] Women in Informal Employment, Globalizing and Organizing

- *Dakar:* In francophone Sénégal, neo-liberal reforms have weakened traditional trading power structures. Public opposition to extensive clearances in 2007/8 led to a more permissive policy on street trading.
- *Dar es Salaam:* Extensive support for street traders during the 1990s as part of the Sustainable Cities project was reversed since 2000. 60-70% of jobs in Dar es Salaam are informal (ILD 2005).
- *Ahmedabad:* In India fundamental rights are enshrined in the Constitution, but the 2004/9 National Policy on Urban Street Vendors has been unevenly implemented, and 2014 street vending legislation has not commenced. The Self-Employed Women's Association of Ahmedabad advocates for street traders.
- *Durban:* Since 1994 national policy has sought to balance neoliberal reforms and grassroots development. In Durban, despite pioneering physical and legal frameworks for formalizing street trade, tensions between the city government and traders continue.

Fieldwork was undertaken in Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Ahmedabad, and the data is presented in this report. Research in Durban was covered through academic publications supplemented by key informant interviews rather than large-scale fieldwork to avoid overlap with existing studies and because of an on-going court case in Durban involving street traders.

Four main data collection methods were employed:

1. *A Desk Review* of the literature on law and urban development, legal pluralism, human rights, and the street trading literature.

2. *A Legal Review* in each city of acts, bylaws and regulations affecting street trade, national data and newspaper reviews to explore formal regulation of street trade and the character of the informal economy.

3. *Semi-structured Trader Interviews* with traders in each city, sampled to cover different locations, sectors, levels of vulnerability, and gender differences in trading, with a focus on contested sites. These explored street trade management in practice including personal characteristics, business and employment characteristics, and challenges and responses.

4. *Key Informant Interviews* (with staff from national and municipal governments, the donor community, INGOs and CBOs, community elders, and trader associations) to establish the context for street trade and its formal and informal regulation.

Focussing on Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Ahmedabad, this report presents a short summary of the *Legal Review* for each city, and quantitative information from the *Semi-structured Trader Interviews*. The locations for the trader interviews were selected to illustrate contested sites, where street traders were generally insecure, for example in markets where there was a history of conflict, or in the street outside the confines of recognised markets. These are referred to as 'market areas' in the cross tabulations.

The sample of trader interviews was chosen to represent different categories of trader, by gender, goods sold, and type of facility, and different localities within each market area. Within each category, interviewees were randomly selected, although a formal stratified sample was not possible due to the shifting population of traders and impracticability of conducting a trader census. There are minor differences in the questionnaire used in each location to account for local context. Quantitative findings from the trader interviews were analysed through SPSS, with useful cross-tabulations presented here.

The research methods were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Cardiff University's School of Planning and Geography.

1.5 Key Findings

The research found politicisation of street trade and on-going exclusion that suggests an urgent need for legal review, for 'rights regimes' that respect rights to work and see urban public space as a land resource for the working poor, and for legal empowerment that strengthens access to justice.

In the four main cities studied, street trading is illegal across multiple domains. Despite constitutional rights to life and rights to work, legislation on urban planning, highways, land and business regulation criminalises street trading, and a municipal governments have many powers under police or public nuisance law to evict street traders. However street traders' responses to illegality are very different.

- In **Dakar**, traders found that direct action gave them more political sway than negotiating the law. In 2000 they lobbied the president to gain reprieve, but in 2007 Dakar's Governor sought to 'tidy' the streets and city-centre evictions ensued. Traders rioted in protest, paralysing the CBD, and again the president intervened; traders formed associations and dialogue with the city council ensued. Neverthteless, a third of traders interviewed had been evicted, and *les émeutes* were an ongoing fear.
- In Tanzania, informality remains rife, and in 2003 cancellation of the hawkers' licences made trading illegal. Although the government has a property and business formalisation programme, in 2006 a central direction to municipalities initiated widespread evictions, affecting perhaps a million street traders. Trader associations are weak and in **Dar es Salaam,** 71% of interviewees had suffered eviction. From 2011, the ruling party's fragile tenure created a partial truce, but street traders face continuing uncertainty.
- In **Ahmedabad** traders challenged existing legal frameworks, rather than ignoring the law. In 1985, a pavement dwellers' lawsuit argued that the constitutional 'right to life' includes a 'right to a livelihood'. Relevant state legislation rarely prohibits street trade but public space restrictions make its operation illegal. The federal government's *Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014* supports enabling approaches to street vending, but has to be implemented at state level. In Ahmedabad, the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) brought Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the municipal corporation to implement the policy. Of 200 interviewees, 80% had suffered evictions, but in an excellent pilot project SEWA has negotiated to create trading space under a flyover.
- In **Durban,** street traders also used legal processes to claim legitimacy. Municipal policy towards street traders fluctuated dramatically. Deregulation under the 1991 Business Act allowed trading to flourish but a 1993 amendment reinstated control. In 1999 the city council's Warwick Junction project initiated an exemplary capital programme to manage street trade, and in 2001 the new eThekwini Municipal Council adopted an Informal Economy Policy. Public realm management in 2005 and 2010 FIFA World Cup projects exacerbated repression, but traders have since won court cases opposing redevelopment of trading areas for a shopping mall.

Research Outputs have included publication of a toolkit for trader associations and activists, entitled ***Making Legal Space for Street Traders: Evaluation Toolkit***, in order to audit the strengths or weaknesses of the existing regulatory context of street trading and propose changes, which has been piloted with the Self-Employed Women's Association of India. This proposed a legal audit as a series of questions arising from the legal reviews (Box 1, Brown and Lyons 2012).

1.6 Structure of the Report

Section 2 of the report summarises the legal review in Dakar, and quantitative findings from 143 interviews in September 2010. Section 3 covers Dar es Salaam, with findings from 173 interviews in June 2011, and Section 4 Ahmedabad with 200 interviews in January 2011. Each section is introduced with a summary of the legal review, a description of the survey sites, and quantitative data from the semi-structured trader interviews is presented as a series of cross tabulations.

BOX 1: Making Legal Space for Street Traders: Evaluation Toolkit - EXTRACT

A. Constitutional Rights

Which Constitutional Rights affect street traders?

B. Access to Justice

Who has recourse to the justice system?
How effective is the justice system?
Are the routes through the system simple and accessible?
Is the legal system transparent and accountable?

C. Property Rights - Land

Who can own/occupy land?
How are land rights registered and recorded?
What land ownership provisions apply to urban public space?
What rights exist for collective use of land?
What rights exist for short-term/rental use of land?
What informal property rights for trading exist?
How are land disputes resolved?

D. Space Rights - Planning

Do planning laws and regulations allow for designation of street trading areas?
Do any proposed urban renewal/special projects affect street vending areas?
Do planning maps show the main trading areas?
Is the concept of *natural markets* defined?
Zoning regulations - how do these affect trading?
Public space - is mixed use allowed?

E. Space Rights - Highways

Does highways legislation prohibit structures on the sidewalk?
Are there exemptions for street trading?
Does highways legislation permit pedestrianisation or shared space?
Are there provisions for temporary road closures?
Is there a provision to including street trading at bus stands etc?

F. Business Rights

Who has to register, who is exempt, and who is disadvantaged by registration?
What occupations require a special license?
How do contract regulations affect street traders?
Is accounting accessible to street traders?
Has the need for a decent work agenda for street traders been recognised?
Is business training available?

G. Urban Management Rights

Which municipal powers affect street trading?
Are basic services provided in trading areas?
What use rights and property rights are given traders in markets/streets?
Do street traders have a say in decisions affecting them?
What powers are used to evict or prosecute street traders?

H. Avoiding Evictions - Improved Management and Design

Management - how can street traders organise to take on management functions?
Can street traders' organisations take on collective or cooperative space management?
Design — how and where is there scope for innovative design?
How can street traders' organisations lead the design process?

(Brown and Lyons 2012, http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/cplan/research/funded-projects/making-space-for-the-poor)

SECTION 2: DAKAR DATA

2.1 DAKAR – Legal Framework for Street Trading in Sénégal

This section gives a brief summary of key legislation affecting street traders in Sénegal, including the constitutional context, trading legislation, land law, and local government powers. The following is taken from a working paper prepared for this research (Dankoco 2011).

2.1.1 Constitution of the Republic of Sénégal

Article 8 of the *Constitution of the Republic of Sénégal* (*Loi 2001-03* of 22 January 2001 and subsequent amendments) guarantees to all citizens fundamental individual freedoms, economic and social rights and collective rights. Among other rights these include:

- Civil and political freedom, freedom of opinion, speech, association, movement and assembly; freedom of enterprise, the right to enterprise, and the right to work.

The right to work is elaborated in Article 25, which states that:

> *'Everyone has the right to work and the right to seek employment. No one may be impeded in their work for reason of their origins, of their sex, of their opinions, of their political choices or of their beliefs. The worker may affiliate with a union and defend their rights through union action'.*

2.1.2 Trade Legislation

National legislation affecting street trading has evolved through three main periods: centralised state socialism in the early post-independence period; the democratic deepening and economic liberalisation of the 1990s, and the post-2000 liberal period (Dancoko, 2011).

Trading and sale of goods in public places

Legislation governing street trading is primarily regulated by *Loi 67-50* of 29 November 1967 that covers trading in the public highway and in public space, as amended by *Loi 75-105* of 2 December 1975. This was further amended by *Loi 76-018* of 6 January 1976, relating to the sale of goods on the highway and in public space, and *Décret 87-817* of 25 June 1987. This legislation controls trading from a fixed location. Article 4 states that:

> '*No one may exercise the profession of* tablier (selling from a table) *without authorisation from the Minister of Commerce. Permitted zones for setting up stalls are fixed by order of the regional governor*' and that: '*authorisation results in the issuance of a business card of the form annexed to this order and must be presented on demand*'.
>
> Article 6 of the 1976 decree states that: '*it is also prohibited to solicit clients on the road and in public places not designated by order of the Regional Governor*'.

The legislation requires *tabliers* to have a business card but excludes mention of hawking: the practice of hawking is thus at best tolerated. Street trading is also subject to general trade legislation, which for example includes:

- *Loi 94-63* of 22 August 1994 regulates prices, competition and trade disputes; the law liberalises trade and gives the opportunity for all citizens to be involved in trade.
- *Loi 94-68* of 22 August 1994 sets up measures to safeguard national production from illicit commercial practices.Loi 94-69 of 22 August 1994 regulates economic activity.
- *Décret 95-817* of 20 September 1995 gives responsibilities to the Ministry of Commerce to implement national trade policy, undertake market surveillance, and promote consumer protection.

From 2000-2012 the political regime was relatively supportive of street trading. In November 2007, following evictions from central Sandaga, street-trader protests led to three days of rioting in the city centre, resulting a national focus on the problems of the young unemployed. This led to promulgation of:

- *Décret 2009-1410* of 23 December 2009, setting up the *commission nationale d'assistance aux jeunes marchands* (National Commission for the Support of Young Entrepreneurs) (CONAJEM).

2.1.3 Land Law

For many years Sénégal has had a dual system of land rights combining private and customary title. Legislation derived from the pre-independence French Civil Code still defines the legal system of land registration. Shortly before independence, a lands study recognized the problem of parallel property regimes and proposed a constitutional guarantee of property rights.

The main law governing land rights is now *Loi no. 64-46 relative au Domaine National* of 17 June 1964, amended by *Loi 76-66* of 2 July 1976, which reflected the ideology of Senegalese socialism and sought to harmonize formal and customary rights. The Act decreed that all land belongs to the state, with the exception of land with formal registered title. The law recognises three broad categories of land rights: *state domain; private domain* regulated by Decree in 1932 and registered in the *Livre Foncier* (Land Book), and *national domain* that covers all non-registered land – divided into urban zones, classified zones (protected areas), *zones de terroirs* (village land), and pioneer zones (undefined areas).

Three categories of land rights were prescribed. The *titre foncier* is a registered title which enables land to be bought and sold; the *permis d'occuper* is an occupancy right which can be revoked at any time by the state, and the *lease* retains land ownership with the state but allows use of land on a rental basis (Dankoco 2011). Village land is allocated to those who demonstrate productive use *(mise en valeur)*. Such rights are not extended to street traders.

Some land legislation operates against street traders. Recommendations from the 2006 national land commission resulted in *Loi 12-2010* on property registration, now adopted, but the law excludes property rights for urban land used for small-scale business and trade. *Décret 2009-1302 of 20 November 2009* set up a national agency for land management and its regulations include the mission of combatting: '*the diverse encumberances of the public highways (unauthorized hawkers, abandoned vehicles...)*' (Article 3).

There are thus no formal property rights for street traders, but a thriving informal land market exists in urban and peri-urban areas for housing land. The research suggests that socially accepted and informal rights also extend to trading sites.

2.1.4 Local Government Regulation

In practice, most street trade is regulated by local government. In Sénégal, *Loi 96-06* of 22 March 1996, sets up a local authority code, and the Loi 96-07 of 22 March 1996 decentralises powers to regions, local authorities, and rural authorities. This law defines the competencies of local authority in urban management, and urban planning, zoning for commercial and other activities and the management of space.

Décret 2009-622 of 30 June 2009 approving implementation of the *plan directeur d'urbanisme de Dakar,* which is reviewed regularly to take account of demographic, social, economic and environmental change.

2.2 DAKAR – Market Areas Surveyed

In Dakar, trader interviews were carried out around five markets:

- *Marché Sanadaga* is the main municipal market in the CBD. Built in 1933, the market building is in poor repair. Several thousand traders throng the streets outside selling clothing, shoes, electronics and tourist goods. Sandaga is an important centre for the Mouride brotherhood trade network.
- *Tilène* is a local market for food and household goods west of the CBD, with perhaps 700 traders in the market and surrounding streets.
- *Céntenaire* is loosely defined trading area located along the Boulevard de Général de Gaulle linking the city center and the Grande Mosquée de Dakar to the north; around 600 traders mainly sell Chinese imports of shoes and clothes.
- *HLM* (*habitations à loyer modéré*) is a planned area built from 1958 to 1972. Marché HLM is renowned for its fabrics and couture tailors, and trade spills well beyond the market confines
- *Grand Yof* – a low-income suburban market.

2.3 DAKAR – Survey Findings

2.3.1. The Traders – Interviewees, Products, and Type of Trading Facility

Dakar Table 2.1: Traders Interviewed by Market Area & Gender

Market Area	Male Traders	Female Traders	Total
Sandaga	23	2	25
Pétersen	15	5	20
HLM	18	12	30
Centenaire	22	3	25
Tiléne	24	1	25
Grand Yoff	16	2	18
Total	**118**	**25**	**143**

The sample reflected the broad gender characteristics of the Market Areas. There was a predominance of male traders in all Market Areas except HLM, which caters mainly for women's fashion.

Dakar Table 2.2: Traders by Market Area & Products Sold

Market Area	New clothes	%	Second hand clothes	%	Shoes Bags Belts	%	Fashion	%	Fresh food	%	Cooked food Drink	%	Books CD Stationery	%	Household	%	Electronics	%	Mixture	%	Other	%	Total
Sandaga	9	*36*	4	*16*	5	*20*	1	*4*	1	*4*	1	*4*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*4*	2	*8*	1	*4*	25
Pétersen	5	*25*	0	*0*	7	*35*	1	*5*	0	*0*	1	*5*	0	*0*	3	*15*	0	*0*	2	*10*	1	*5*	20
HLM	2	*7*	0	*0*	10	*33*	8	*27*	1	*3*	0	*0*	0	*0*	9	*30*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	30
Centenaire	1	*4*	0	*0*	17	*68*	4	*16*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*4*	0	*0*	1	*4*	1	*4*	25
Tiléne	4	*16*	1	*4*	3	*12*	5	*20*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	*16*	4	*16*	0	*0*	2	*8*	2	*8*	25
Grand Yoff	0	*0*	1	*6*	7	*39*	3	*17*	0	*0*	1	*6*	1	*6*	3	*17*	1	*6*	1	*6*	0	*0*	18
Total	**21**	***15***	**6**	***4***	**49**	***34***	**22**	***15***	**2**	***1***	**3**	***2***	**5**	***3***	**20**	***14***	**2**	***1***	**8**	***6***	**5**	***3***	**143**

Main products sold by interviewees: Sandaga, new clothes; Pétersen, shoes/bags/belts; HLM, fabric and fashion, shoes/bags/belts & household goods; Centenaire, shoes, bags & belts; Tiléne, fashion; Grand Yoff, shoes/bags/belts.

Dakar Table 2.3: Traders by Market Area & Fixed/Mobile Trading Facility

Market Area	Mobile	%	Fixed	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	11	*44*	14	*56*	25	25
Pétersen	7	*35*	13	*65*	20	20
HLM	11	*37*	19	*63*	30	30
Centenaire	7	*28*	18	*72*	25	25
Tiléne	3	*12*	22	*88*	25	25
Grand Yoff	3	*17*	15	*83*	18	18
Total	**42**	***29***	**101**	***71***	**143**	**143**

Most of the traders interviewed were trading from fixed locations, but 29% were hawkers

Dakar Table 2.4: Traders by Market Area & Type of Display (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Ground & Wall	Box	Table	Kiosk	Bicycle	Carrying goods	Cart*	Other	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	1	1	8	0	0	10	0	5	25	25
Pétersen	2	1	11	0	0	4	2	0	20	20
HLM	4	0	18	1	0	6	0	1	30	30
Centenaire	13	2	3	0	1	6	0	0	25	25
Tiléne	0	1	19	0	0	2	0	3	25	25
Grand Yoff	2	1	10	2	0	3	0	0	18	18
Total	**22**	**6**	**69**	**3**	**1**	**31**	**2**	**9**	**143**	**143**

Tables were the most common form of fixed locations; most hawkers carry their goods.

2.3.2. The Traders – Personal Characteristics

Dakar Table 2.5: Traders by Gender & Age

Gender	<18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid responses
Male	3	*3*	39	*33*	53	*45*	19	*16*	4	*3*	118
Female	0	*0*	3	*12*	8	*32*	14	*56*	0	*0*	25
Total	**3**	***2***	**42**	***29***	**61**	***43***	**33**	***23***	**4**	***3***	**143**

In general, women interviewees were older, with 56% aged 35 or over, compared to only 19% of men interviewees.

Dakar Table 2.6: Traders by Market Area & Age

Market Area	<18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	0	*0*	4	*16*	6	*24*	13	*52*	2	*8*	25	25
Pétersen	0	*0*	7	*35*	8	*40*	3	*15*	2	*10*	20	20
HLM	1	*3*	13	*43*	9	*30*	7	*23*	0	*0*	30	30
Centenaire	1	*4*	8	*32*	14	*56*	2	*8*	0	*0*	25	25
Tiléne	1	*4*	5	*20*	15	*60*	4	*16*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	0	*0*	5	*28*	9	*50*	4	*22*	0	*0*	18	18
Total	**3**	***2***	**42**	***29***	**61**	***43***	**33**	***23***	**4**	***3***	**143**	**143**

Sandaga had the highest proportion of older traders (aged over 35) indicating an established locality.

Dakar Table 2.7: Traders by Gender & Marital Status

Gender	Single	%	Married	%	Widowed	%	Divorced	%	Valid responses
Male	56	*47*	60	*51*	0	*0*	2	*2*	118
Female	8	*32*	12	*48*	3	*12*	2	*8*	25
Total	**64**	***45***	**72**	***50***	**3**	***2***	**4**	***3***	**143**

A higher proportion of women interviewees were widowed or divorced (20%) compared to men (2%), suggesting that trading provides an income for women heads of household.

Dakar Table 2.8: Traders by Market Area & Literacy

Market Area	Literacy	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	8	*68*	25	25
Pétersen	12	*40*	20	20
HLM	18	*40*	30	30
Centenaire	15	*40*	25	25
Tiléne	10	*60*	25	25
Grand Yoff	10	*44*	18	18
Total	**73**	***49***	**143**	**143**

About the half the interviewees said that they could read and write.

Dakar Table 2.9: Traders by Market Area & Religion

Market Area	Muslim	%	Christian	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	25	*100*	0	*0*	25	25
Pétersen	17	*89*	2	*11*	19	20
HLM	30	*100*	0	*0*	30	30
Centenaire	25	*100*	0	*0*	25	25
Tiléne	25	*100*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	18	*100*	0	*0*	18	18
Total	**140**	***99***	**2**	***1***	**142**	**143**

Most traders were Muslim, but the sample included two Christian traders.

Dakar Table 2.10: Traders by Market Area & Place of Birth

Market Area	Place of Birth				Nationality								Valid responses	Total traders
	Dakar	%	Elsewhere	%	Sénégal	%	Guinea Conakry	%	Mauritania	%	Other	%		
Sandaga	2	*8*	23	*92*	24	*96*	1	*4*	0	*0*	0	*0*	25	25
Pétersen	3	*15*	17	*85*	19	*95*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*5*	20	20
HLM	8	*27*	22	*73*	29	*97*	1	*3*	0	*0*	0	*0*	30	30
Centenaire	4	*16*	21	*84*	25	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	25	25
Tiléne	1	*4*	24	*96*	25	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	0	*0*	18	*100*	17	*94*	0	*0*	1	*6*	0	*0*	18	18
Total	**18**	***13***	**125**	***87***	**139**	***97***	**2**	***1***	**1**	***1***	**1**	***1***	**143**	**143**

The majority of traders were born outside Dakar (87%); there were only 3% of non-nationals in the survey.

Dakar Table 2.11: Traders by Market Area & Numbers of Children per Household

Market Area	Household with own children	Average children in household	Average children of school age	Average children in school	% of school age children in school	Households supporting other children	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	15	3.8	1.5	1.0	*70*	16	25	25
Pétersen	10	3.4	0.9	0.8	*94*	15	20	20
HLM	13	2.3	0.6	0.4	*67*	20	30	30
Centenaire	3	1.7	0.1	0.1	*100*	19	25	25
Tiléne	8	1.4	0.1	0.1	*100*	20	25	25
Grand Yoff	9	2.7	0.6	0.4	*70*	14	18	18
Total	**58**	**2.8**	**0.6**	**0.5**	***76***	**104**	**143**	**143**

A high proportion of interviewee households supported the children of other people (usually relatives).

2.3.3. Business and Employment Patterns

Dakar Table 2.12: Businesses by Market Area & Suppliers (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Local trading company	%	Lebanese trading company	%	Chinese trading company	%	Supermarket	%	Small shops	%	Other traders	%	Own manufacture	%	Family	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	11	*44*	4	*16*	3	*12*	0	*0*	10	*40*	1	*4*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	*20*	25	25
Pétersen	10	*50*	0	*0*	7	*35*	0	*0*	4	*20*	1	*5*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*5*	20	20
HLM	9	*31*	2	*7*	13	*45*	0	*0*	7	*24*	3	*10*	1	*3*	0	*0*	4	*14*	29	30
Centenaire	4	*16*	0	*0*	18	*72*	0	*0*	3	*12*	1	*4*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*12*	25	25
Tiléne	11	*44*	2	*8*	4	*16*	0	*0*	9	*36*	2	*8*	0	*0*	1	*4*	4	*16*	25	25
Grand Yoff	8	*47*	0	*0*	4	*24*	0	*0*	6	*35*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	6	*35*	17	18
Total	**53**	***38***	**8**	***6***	**49**	***35***	**0**	***0***	**39**	***28***	**8**	***6***	**1**	*1*	**1**	*1*	**23**	*16*	**141**	**143**

Street traders are often part of complex international or regional supply chains.

Dakar Table 2.13: Businesses by Market Area & Main Clients (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Other businesses	%	Passersby	%	Other traders	%	Family & Friends	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	2	*8*	21	*84*	0	*0*	1	*4*	1	*4*	25	25
Pétersen	0	*0*	17	*85*	2	*10*	1	*5*	0	*0*	20	20
HLM	1	*3*	23	*79*	0	*0*	2	*7*	2	*7*	29	30
Centenaire	0	*0*	14	*56*	7	*28*	2	*8*	1	*4*	25	25
Tiléne	1	*4*	21	*84*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*8*	25	25
Grand Yoff	0	*0*	14	*78*	1	*6*	0	*0*	3	*17*	18	18
Total	**4**	***3***	**110**	***77***	**10**	***7***	**6**	***4***	**9**	***6***	**142**	**143**

The majority of traders depend on passing trade (77%), so a trading location near customers is crucial.

Dakar Table 2.14: Businesses by Market Area & Use of Other Services (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Porter	%	Guard	%	Repairs	%	Storage	%	Food sellers	%	Other services	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	5	*20*	9	*36*	5	*20*	11	*44*	24	*96*	2	*8*	25	25
Pétersen	7	*35*	14	*70*	5	*25*	15	*75*	19	*95*	0	*0*	20	20
HLM	8	*27*	15	*50*	8	*27*	11	*37*	26	*87*	6	*20*	30	30
Centenaire	9	*36*	1	*4*	3	*12*	5	*20*	25	*100*	2	*8*	25	25
Tiléne	6	*24*	4	*16*	11	*44*	6	*24*	24	*96*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	2	*11*	7	*39*	2	*11*	6	*33*	15	*83*	6	*33*	18	18
Total	**37**	***26***	**50**	***35***	**34**	***24***	**54**	*38*	**133**	***93***	**16**	*11*	**143**	**143**

Traders also buy goods and services from a range of other small businesses, eg: food sellers, storage and guards.

Dakar Table 2.15: Businesses by Market Area & Access to Trading Space

Market Area	Informal arrangement	%	Permit	%	Come early	%	Guard	%	Do nothing	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	8	*50*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*13*	6	*38*	16	25
Pétersen	6	*38*	1	*6*	2	*13*	1	*6*	2	*13*	4	*25*	16	20
HLM	6	*26*	2	*9*	5	*22*	5	*22*	1	*4*	4	*17*	23	30
Centenaire	5	*24*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	*19*	12	*57*	21	25
Tiléne	5	*22*	0	*0*	5	*22*	0	*0*	5	*22*	8	*35*	23	25
Grand Yoff	6	*35*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	6	*35*	5	*29*	17	18
Total	**36**	***31***	**3**	***3***	**12**	***10***	**6**	***5***	**20**	***17***	**39**	***34***	**116**	**143**

Most traders used informal arrangements to retain access to trading spaces, eg: arrangements with friends or relatives.

Dakar Table 2.16: Businesses by Market Area & Access to Water and Toilet

	Access to water		Access to toilet	
Market Area	**Yes**	**%**	**Yes**	**%**
Sandaga	24	*96*	24	*100*
Pétersen	18	*90*	13	*65*
HLM	30	*100*	29	*97*
Centenaire	15	*60*	23	*92*
Tiléne	23	*92*	25	*100*
Grand Yoff	12	*67*	16	*89*
Total	122	*85*	130	*92*

Most traders had access to water and a toilet although the arrangements are often informal.

Dakar Table 2.17: Businesses by Market Area & Trading Costs

	Pay for tax or rent					Pay for bribes			
Market Area	**Tax**	**%**	**Rent**	**%**	**Valid responses**	**Yes**	**%**	**Valid responses**	**Total traders**
Sandaga	20	*80*	0	*0*	25	0	*0*	18	25
Pétersen	19	*95*	1	*5*	20	0	*0*	15	20
HLM	26	*87*	0	*0*	30	3	*16*	19	30
Centenaire	23	*92*	0	*0*	25	0	*0*	23	25
Tiléne	24	*100*	0	*0*	24	0	*0*	23	25
Grand Yoff	16	*89*	0	*0*	18	0	*0*	15	18
Total	**128**	***90***	1	*1*	**142**	**3**	***3***	**113**	**143**

A high proportion of traders interviewed said they paid tax. Notably, very few traders said they paid bribes (3%).

Dakar Table 2.18: Businesses by Market Area & Average Reported Costs (Purchases), Income & Profit

Market Area	**Reported Daily Costs (CFA)**	**Reported Daily Income (CFA)**	**Reported Daily Profit (CFA)**	**Valid responses**	**Total traders**
Sandaga	14,608	19,017	4,517	25	25
Pétersen	34,679	28,053	4,782	19	20
HLM	21,449	19,305	5,959	29	30
Centenaire	36,294	39,372	5,177	25	25
Tiléne	20,845	20,049	5,514	24	25
Grand Yoff	21,929	23,875	4,906	16	18
Total averages reported	**24,670**	**24,752**	**5,195**	**138**	**143**

Figures on costs, income and profit must be treated with caution, as some interviewees are reluctant to discuss income, and others may not keep records. The figures above suggest an order of magnitude, but need further verification.

Dakar Table 2.19: Businesses by Market Area & Changes in Business over 18 Months

Market Area	**Up**	**%**	**Down**	**%**	**None**	**%**	**Valid responses**	**Total traders**
Sandaga	5	*25*	8	*40*	7	*35*	20	25
Pétersen	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*100*	1	20
HLM	10	*43*	5	*22*	8	*35*	23	30
Centenaire	11	*52*	6	*29*	4	*19*	21	25
Tiléne	12	*52*	6	*26*	5	*22*	23	25
Grand Yoff	3	*18*	6	*35*	8	*47*	17	18
Total	**41**	***39***	**31**	***30***	**33**	***31***	**105**	**143**

The responses do not show any particular business trends.

Dakar Table 2.20: Traders by Market Area & Employment Status

Market Area	**Employer**	**%**	**Independent**	**%**	**Employee**	**%**	**Other**	**%**	**Valid responses**	**Total traders**
Sandaga	1	*4*	23	*92*	1	*4*	0	*0*	25	25
Pétersen	0	*0*	18	*90*	1	*5*	1	*5*	20	20
HLM	2	*7*	25	*89*	1	*4*	0	*0*	28	30
Centenaire	2	*8*	23	*92*	0	*0*	0	*0*	25	25
Tiléne	0	*0*	24	*96*	1	*4*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	0	*0*	16	*89*	2	*11*	0	*0*	18	18
Total	**5**	***4***	**129**	***91***	**6**	***4***	**1**	***1***	**141**	**143**

The majority of interviewees were own-account operators (91%).

Dakar Table 2.21: Traders by Working Days & Months

	Working days per week				
Market Area	< 6	6	7	Valid responses	Total traders
Total	**1**	**74**	**67**	**142**	**143**

For the majority of interviewees, trading was their main job, and they worked 6-7 days a week for most of the year.

Dakar Table 2.22: Traders by Market Area & Year Started

Market Area	<=1	2-3	4-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-30	31+	Valid response	Total traders
Sandaga	0	2	3	2	7	6	2	3	25	25
Pétersen	5	2	5	2	4	1	1	0	20	20
HLM	3	5	4	7	5	1	1	2	28	30
Centenaire	2	1	6	10	5	0	0	0	24	25
Tiléne	0	1	6	14	4	0	0	0	25	25
Grand Yoff	1	3	1	5	6	1	1	0	18	18
Total	**11**	**14**	**25**	**40**	**31**	**9**	**5**	**5**	**140**	**143**

The majority interviewees had been working in trade for more than 6 years.

2.3.4 Challenges and Responses

Dakar Table 2.23: Traders by Market Area & Associational Character

Market Area	Belong to associations	% of valid responses	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	13	*52*	25	25
Pétersen	5	*25*	20	20
HLM	11	*37*	30	30
Centenaire	13	*52*	25	25
Tiléne	20	*80*	25	25
Grand Yoff	6	*33*	18	18
Total	**68**	*48*	**143**	**143**

Around the half of the traders interviewed were members of associations.

Dakar Table 2.24: Traders by Market Area & Trading Permits

	Trading Permit					Access to Health and Social Security				
Market Area	Yes	%	No	%	Valid responses	Yes	%	No	%	Valid responses
Sandaga	0	*0*	25	*100*	25	0	*0*	25	*100*	25
Pétersen	1	*5*	18	*95*	19	0	*0*	19	*100*	19
HLM	3	*10*	26	*90*	29	0	*0*	29	*100*	29
Centenaire	1	*4*	23	*96*	24	0	*0*	25	*100*	25
Tiléne	0	*0*	25	*100*	25	2	*8*	23	*92*	25
Grand Yoff	0	*0*	18	*100*	18	0	*0*	18	*100*	18
Total	**5**	*4*	**135**	***96***	**140**	**2**	*1*	**139**	***99***	**141**

The majority of traders had neither a trading permit (96%), nor access to social insurance (99%)

Dakar Table 2.25: Traders by Market Area & Suffered Shocks & Stresses

Market Area	Yes	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	22	*92*	24	25
Pétersen	20	*100*	20	20
HLM	29	*100*	29	30
Centenaire	20	*87*	23	25
Tiléne	24	*100*	24	25
Grand Yoff	18	*100*	18	18
Total	**133**	*96*	**138**	**143**

The majority of traders interviewed reported problems with trading (96%)

Dakar Table 2.26: Traders by Market Area & Type of Shocks & Stresses (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Harassment	%	Confiscation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	17	*68*	17	*68*	10	*40*	9	*36*	7	*28*	24	25
Pétersen	11	*55*	11	*55*	6	*30*	8	*40*	2	*10*	20	20
HLM	13	*43*	14	*47*	8	*27*	6	*20*	5	*17*	29	30
Centenaire	15	*60*	15	*60*	10	*40*	6	*24*	1	*4*	23	25
Tiléne	14	*56*	15	*60*	7	*28*	11	*44*	1	*4*	24	25
Grand Yoff	10	*56*	8	*44*	3	*17*	7	*39*	5	*28*	18	18
Total	**80**	***56***	**80**	***56***	**44**	***31***	**47**	*33*	**21**	*15*	**138**	**143**

Harassment and confiscations were high across all sites, but reported evictions were most acute in Pétersen and Tiléne.

Dakar Table 2.27: Vulnerability of Traders by Gender & Type of Display

	Harassment	%	Confiscation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%	Valid responses
Gender * Shocks & Stresses											
Male	72	*63*	67	*59*	41	*36*	45	*39*	18	*16*	114
Female	8	*33*	13	*54*	3	*13*	2	*8*	3	*13*	24
Total	80	*58*	80	*58*	44	*32*	47	*34*	21	*15*	138
Type of display * Shocks & Stresses											
Temporary (1)	28	*56*	28	*56*	17	*34*	12	*24*	8	*16*	50
Equipment (2)	41	*56*	41	*56*	22	*30*	29	*40*	10	*14*	73
Total	**69**	***56***	**69**	***56***	**39**	***32***	**41**	*33*	**18**	*15*	**123**

(1) Traders selling from the ground & wall or carrying their goods
(2) Traders with equipment such as a table, bicycle, kiosk, and small and large carts

Male traders reported more frequent problems than women. Traders with more permanent facilities, such as a table, a bicycle, carts or a kiosk, were more vulnerable to eviction (40%) than those with a less established trading set-up (24%).

Dakar Table 2.28: Traders by Market Area & Sources of Conflicts (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Municipality	%	Market Area leader	%	Police	%	Formal shops	%	Other traders	%	Neighbours	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	7	*78*	0	*0*	7	*78*	9	*100*	5	*56*	1	*11*	1	*11*	9	25
Pétersen	2	*11*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*6*	0	*0*	0	*0*	18	20
HLM	10	*36*	0	*0*	13	*46*	11	*39*	10	*36*	4	*14*	1	*4*	28	30
Centenaire	13	*57*	0	*0*	6	*26*	4	*17*	10	*43*	0	*0*	0	*0*	23	25
Tiléne	22	*88*	1	*4*	4	*16*	3	*12*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	16	*94*	0	*0*	5	*29*	5	*29*	3	*18*	2	*12*	0	*0*	17	18
Total	**70**	***58***	**1**	***1***	**35**	***29***	**32**	***27***	**29**	***24***	**7**	***6***	**2**	***2***	**120**	**143**

Traders reported the source of conflicts were caused mainly by the relationship with municipalities (58%); these were particularly high in Tiléne (88%) and Grand Yoff (94%).

Dakar Table 2.29: Traders by Market Area & Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Market Area	Bribe	%	No bribe	%	Market Area authorities	%	Association	%	Other means	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	1	*8*	5	*38*	5	*38*	0	*0*	2	*15*	13	25
Pétersen	0	*0*	6	*43*	8	*57*	0	*0*	0	*0*	14	20
HLM	1	*6*	8	*44*	8	*44*	1	*6*	0	*0*	18	30
Centenaire	0	*0*	13	*72*	2	*11*	2	*11*	1	*6*	18	25
Tiléne	3	*13*	10	*43*	4	*17*	5	*22*	1	*4*	23	25
Grand Yoff	2	*13*	6	*40*	1	*7*	5	*33*	1	*7*	15	18
Total	**7**	***7***	**48**	***48***	**28**	*28*	**13**	***13***	**5**	***5***	**101**	**143**

Mainly issues could be solved by individual negotiation without bribes (especially in Centenaire), or by Market Area authorities (especially in Pétersen).

Dakar Table 2.30: Traders by Market Area & Knowledge of the Law

Market Area	No knowledge	%	Knows activity illegal but no details	%	Knows legislation	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Sandaga	15	*60*	10	*40*	0	*0*	25	25
Pétersen	7	*35*	13	*65*	0	*0*	20	20
HLM	15	*50*	13	*43*	2	*7*	30	30
Centenaire	18	*72*	7	*28*	0	*0*	25	25
Tiléne	12	*48*	13	*52*	0	*0*	25	25
Grand Yoff	10	*56*	8	*44*	0	*0*	18	18
Total	77	***54***	64	***45***	2	*1*	**143**	**143**

Only two traders said they knew what legislation affected them because of previous problems; 54% had no knowledge of the law, and the rest knew street trading was illegal but had no choice and did not know details (45%).

SECTION 3: DAR ES SALAAM DATA

3.1 DAR ES SALAAM – Legal Framework for Street Trading in Tanzania

In Tanzania the legal framework for street vending is established through the 1977 Constitution, at national level and through municipal bylaws. The section below is drawn from an unpublished research report produced for this study[2].

3.1.1 The United Republic of Tanzania Constitution of 1977

Several core rights in the 1977 Constitution affect street trading:

- *Right to life and work:* under the Constitution, the people of Tanzania are entitled to protection of their person, dignity, and property and guaranteed the right to life, right to work and other related rights.
- *Property rights:* Article 24 of the Constitution provides for the right to own property and guarantees protection of property, including real (landed) and personal (movable) properties. The 1994 case of *Attorney General Versus Lohay Akoonay and Joseph Lohay* argued that:

  > *... customary or deemed rights in land, though by their nature are nothing but rights to occupy and use the land, are nevertheless real property protected by the provisions of Art. 24 of the Constitution*[3].

- *Rights to livelihoods:* Livelihoods are provided for in the Constitution in the form of the right to work and the State's responsibility to protect the people's welfare (Art. 9(e)). These provisions, however, are Directive Principles of State Policy and are not enforceable in courts of law (Art 7(2)).
- *Protection of public property:* the Constitution also obliges everyone, including street traders, to protect public property against misuse, an obligation that ensures stewardship over public properties (Art. 27).

3.1.2 Land and Planning Laws

- *Land Laws:* two laws dealing with land management were enacted in 1999: the *Land Act, No.4, 1999,* which governs all land except village land, and the *Village Land* Act, *No. 5, 1999,* which governs village land. The *Land Act* covers urban areas and categorises land into three main types: general land, village land and reserved land. Reserved land includes lands designated under the *Urban Planning Act*, the *Highways Act*, and the *Public Recreation Grounds Act,* often where street trading takes place. The *Land Act* requires land to be utilised sustainably, with the implication that street traders should trade in permitted areas.
- *Planning Laws:* the *Land Use Planning Act, No. 6, 2007* provides for the preparation and administration of land use plans. Land-use plans do not consider street trading as a land-use category and few plans allocate space for street traders. Open space designations restrict land available to street traders. The *Urban Planning Act, No. 8, 2007* establishes a comprehensive planning system in urban areas, and although its' fundamental principles seek to facilitate employment creation and reduce poverty (section 3(c)), the Act restricts unlicensed business operations. The Act also seeks to facilitate orderly land management and promote sustainable land-use practices, which street trading is often considered to contravene.

Street traders are thus essentially on the periphery of the protection from the law which means they do not fully enjoy the rights that the Constitution has guaranteed them.

3.1.3 Legal Grounds for Evictions

Since independence, a number of legal instruments have been used to inhibit street trading in Tanzania. For instance, as part of a 'villagisation' policy, the *Penal Code, 1983, Cap 16* branded all self-employed people as 'unproductive, idle and disorderly', and street traders were forcibly relocated to villages. Although the policy is no longer pursued, street traders are still often considered as disorderly, a nuisance, and an obstruction to sustainable land management.

In practice street traders are often evicted under the *Highways Act* or local bylaws.

[2] Ackson, T. (2013) Street Vendors and the Law in Tanzania, School of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, unpublished report
[3] [1995] TLR 80, at p.90

- The *Highways Act, 1932, Cap 167, (amended*) restricts activities that may cause obstructions on the highway. Section 39, and explicitly makes illegal any activity that:
  - *(iii) obstructs the free passage on a public highway by exposing goods or merchandise of any description; and*
  - *(iv) in any other manner obstructs the safe or convenient passage along a public highway.*
- *The Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982, Cap.288* empowers the Minister to establish urban authorities in the form of a township, municipality or city. Urban authorities have statutory duties to regulate markets and food hygiene, and to issue of trading licenses, and must maintain peace and order, and further social and economic development (Section 60(1) (a-c)); they also have powers to impose penalties and fines for non-compliance.

Tanzanian law requires that an accused person must receive a fair trial prior to conviction. Under the Constitution, the judiciary has final authority in administration of justice, which means that every person who defaults the law must be brought before a court, with a presumption of innocence until proved guilty. However, fines can be imposed without recourse to a court of law, when the accused admits to an offence in writing and an official receipt for the fine is paid. Street traders' goods may also be confiscated or destroyed by order of the court[4].

However, it is thus argued that the evictions of street traders abrogate number of basic rights of the individuals involved particularly the right to life, right to work, right to own property, right to protection of the acquired property, and the presumption of innocence (Ackson 2013).

3.1.4 Municipal Regulation

Sections 88 and 89 of the *Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act* empower urban authorities to make bylaws with some variation throughout the country. Dar es Salaam is divided into three urban municipalities, and in each municipality the main bylaws affecting street traders are as follows:

- **Ilala Municipal By-Laws**
  - *Ilala Municipal Council (Market Levies) By-Laws, GN No.107 of 2011*
  - *Ilala Municipal Council (Road Use) By –Laws, GN No.108 of 2011*
  - *Ilala Municipal Council (Environmental Cleanliness) By-Laws GN No. 111 of 2011*
- **Kinondoni Municipal Bylaws**
  - *Kinondoni Municipal Council (Waste Management and Refuse Collection Fees) By-laws, 2000*
  - *Kinondoni Municipal Council (Environmental Management) By-laws, 2002*
  - *Kinondoni Municipal Council (Fees and Charges) By-laws, 2004*
- **Temeke Municipal Bylaws**
  - *Temeke Municipal (Markets Levies) Bylaws, GN 309 of 2010*
  - *Temeke Municipal (Environmental Pollution Control) Bylaws, GN 310 of 2010*
  - *Temeke Municipal (Road Usage/Traffic Control) Bylaws, GN 311 of 2010*

3.1.5 Business Regulation – the MKURABITA Reform Agenda

Business regulation is also an aspect of legislation that affects street trading and, in 2004, the Government initiated the Property and Business Formalization Programme (known by its Swahili acronym - MKURABITA) in 2004. The Government appointed the Institute for Law and Democracy (ILD) as consultants to help design a programme that would gradually move the businesses in the informal sector to the formal sector.

MKURABITA proposed three main property reforms: to facilitate tenure regularisation; to increase security of tenure; and to strengthen institutional arrangements, which were implemented through the *Business Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act*, 2011. The programme also proposed changes to the business registration and licensing regime including simplification and decentralisation of business registration, implemented through a series of legislative amendments. Many of the proposals are feasible, but will take time to come into effect.

[4]See *R v. Selemani Yasin & Others*, Resident Magistrate Court Dar es Salaam, Criminal Case No. 122 of 2010 (Unreported)

3.2 DAR ES SALAAM – Market Areas Surveyed

Surveys were carried out in five market areas, selected to include a variety of insecure trading environments:

- *Big Brother* market was set up in 2003 to accommodate traders relocated from Manzese. Its official name is *Urafiki* (but is known as Big Brother after the TV series because as traders said 'you can be shifted at any time'). It used to accommodate about 1,500 traders, but in 2011 evictions of traders in the road reserve and beyond reduced numbers by about half.
- *Mchikichini* market was set up on agricultural land between 2003 and 2006 as a relocation site for traders moved from Kariakoo (the Congo Street area). The site is owned by Ilala Municipal Council. Mchikichini Marketing Cooperative is an umbrella group for six product associations, and has been under contract to run the market. The market can accommodate about 10,000 traders.
- *The Machinga (Hawker) Complex* is a 6-storey market development near Mchikichini developed as a relocation market in 2010 by Dar es Salaam City Council, with 4,500 spaces. This has proved difficult to let.
- *Congo Street* is the main wholesale area of Dar es Salaam near Kariakoo, the main central market of the city. Many traders sell clothes and household goods from the street, and there have been periodic clearances. The area has a large turnover of goods, and is a centre for money lenders.
- *Mwenge market* lies at the bus stand terminus for *daladala* (mini-bus) routes, at the Bagamoyo Road and Sam Njoma Road junction, with about 500 traders at the bus stand and its surrounds. Kinondoni Council let a management contract to a private company which has not been renewed.

3.3 DAR ES SALAAM – Survey Findings

3.3.1 The Traders - Interviewees, Products, and Type of Trading Facility

Dar es Salaam Table 3.1: Traders Interviewed by Market Area & Gender

Market Area	Male Traders	Female Traders	Total
Big Brother	36	11	47
Mchikichini	27	18	45
Machinga Complex	12	10	22
Congo Street	22	11	33
Mwenge BS	20	6	26
Total	**117**	**56**	**173**

The sample reflected the broad gender characteristics of the Market Areas, with women well-represented amongst the trading communities in all areas.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.2: Traders by Market Area & Products Sold

Market Area	New clothes	%	Second hand clothes	%	Shoes Bags Belts	%	Fashion	%	Fresh food	%	Cooked food & drink	%	Toys Stationery	%	Utensils Linen	%	Electronics	%	Phone vouchers	%	Services	%	Mixture	%	Total
Big Brother	1	*2*	15	*32*	8	*17*	1	*2*	1	*2*	12	*26*	0	*0*	2	*4*	0	*0*	1	*2*	0	*0*	6	*13*	47
Mchikichini	22	*49*	5	*11*	5	*11*	3	*7*	0	*0*	2	*4*	4	*9*	1	*2*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*2*	2	*4*	45
Machinga Complex	7	*32*	8	*36*	4	*18*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*9*	0	*0*	1	*5*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	22
Congo St	8	*24*	0	*0*	5	*16*	1	*3*	11	*34*	2	*6*	1	*3*	2	*6*	0	*0*	1	*3*	0	*0*	2	*6*	33
Mwenge BS	5	*19*	1	*4*	5	*19*	3	*12*	0	*0*	5	*19*	1	*4*	0	*0*	2	*8*	1	*4*	1	*4*	2	*8*	26
Total	**43**	***25***	**29**	***17***	**27**	***16***	**8**	***5***	**12**	***7***	**23**	***13***	**6**	***3***	**6**	***3***	**2**	***1***	**3**	***2***	**2**	***1***	**12**	***7***	**173**

Main products sold by interviewees: Big Brother, second hand clothes, and cooked food and drink; Mchikichini, new clothes and tailoring; the Machinga (hawker) Complex, new and second hand clothes; Congo St, fresh food and new clothes, and Mwenge BS, new clothes, shoes/bags/belts and cooked food and drinks.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.3: Traders by Market Area & Fixed/Mobile Trading Facility

Market Area	Mobile	%	Fixed	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	10	*21*	37	*79*	47	47
Mchikichini	11	*24*	34	*76*	45	45
Machinga Complex	2	*9*	20	*91*	22	22
Congo St	26	*79*	7	*22*	33	33
Mwenge BS	15	*58*	11	*42*	26	26
Total	**64**	***37***	**109**	***63***	**173**	**173**

Most of the traders interviewed were trading from fixed locations (63%), but 37% were mobile.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.4: Traders by Market Area & Type of Display (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Ground & Wall	Box	Table	Kiosk	Bicycle	Carrying goods	Lari	Other	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	9	1	8	21	1	2	4	0	46	47
Mchikichini	5	0	20	18	1	0	1	0	45	45
Machinga Complex	4	0	5	9	0	0	0	2	20	22
Congo St	18	5	2	4	0	2	2	0	33	33
Mwenge BS	1	5	13	1	0	0	6	0	26	26
Total	**37**	**11**	**48**	**53**	**2**	**4**	**13**	**2**	**170**	**173**

Most of the traders interviewed were trading from a fixed site (from a table or kiosk).

3.3.2 The Traders – Personal Characteristics

Dar es Salaam Table 3.5: Traders by Gender & Age

Gender	<18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid responses
Male	1	*1*	22	*19*	65	*56*	29	*25*	0	*0*	117
Female	0	*0*	9	*16*	23	*41*	22	*39*	2	*4*	56
Total	**1**	***1***	**31**	***18***	**88**	***51***	**51**	***29***	**2**	***1***	**173**

Half of traders interviewed were in the 25-34 year age group (51%). Women in the survey seemed to be older than men with 43% aged 35 or over compared to 25% of male traders.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.6: Traders by Market Area & Age

Market Area	<18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	0	*0*	5	*11*	24	*51*	18	*38*	0	*0*	47	47
Mchikichini	1	*2*	6	*13*	17	*38*	20	*44*	1	*2*	45	45
Machinga Complex	0	*0*	6	*27*	9	*41*	7	*32*	0	*0*	22	22
Congo St	0	*0*	6	*19*	22	*67*	4	*13*	1	*3*	33	33
Mwenge BS	0	*0*	8	*31*	16	*62*	2	*8*	0	*0*	26	26
Total	**1**	***1***	**31**	***18***	**88**	***51***	**51**	***29***	**2**	***1***	**173**	**173**

All the Market Areas had a high proportion of workers in the 25-34 age group.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.7: Traders by Gender & Marital Status

Gender	Single	%	Married	%	Widowed	%	Divorced	%	Valid responses
Male	40	*34*	76	*65*	1	*1*	0	*0*	117
Female	17	*30*	27	*48*	3	*5*	9	*16*	56
Total	**57**	***33***	**103**	***60***	**4**	***2***	**9**	***5***	**173**

The majority of traders were married (60%). A higher proportion of women were either widowed or divorced (21%) compared to men (only 1%), suggesting that trading provides an income for women heads of household.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.8: Traders by Market Area & Literacy

Market Area	Literacy	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	47	*100*	47	47
Mchikichini	44	*100*	44	45
Machinga Complex	22	*100*	22	22
Congo St	32	*100*	32	33
Mwenge BS	25	*100*	25	26
Total	**170**	***100***	**170**	**173**

All traders who responded to the question said that they could read and write.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.9: Traders by Market Area & Religion

Market Area	Muslim	%	Christian	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	33	*70*	14	*30*	47	47
Mchikichini	29	*64*	16	*36*	45	45
Machinga Complex	9	*41*	13	*59*	22	22
Congo St	23	*70*	10	*31*	33	33
Mwenge BS	17	*65*	9	*35*	26	26
Total	**111**	***64***	**62**	***36***	**173**	**173**

About two thirds of the sample were Muslim and one third Christian.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.10: Traders by Market Area & Region of Origin

Market Area	Dar es Salaam	%	Other-East	%	Other-Central	%	Other-West	%	Other-North	%	Other-South	%	Other-Lakes	%	Other-Highlands	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	8	*17*	12	*26*	8	*17*	2	*4*	7	*15*	8	*17*	2	*4*	0	*0*	47	47
Mchikichini	3	*7*	6	*13*	3	*7*	1	*2*	8	*18*	20	*44*	1	*2*	3	*7*	45	45
Machinga C.	3	*14*	2	*9*	3	*14*	0	*0*	5	*23*	5	*23*	2	*9*	2	*9*	22	22
Congo St	8	*25*	3	*9*	1	*3*	0	*0*	6	*19*	10	*30*	4	*13*	1	*3*	33	33
Mwenge BS	2	*8*	11	*42*	1	*4*	0	*0*	2	*8*	7	*27*	2	*8*	1	*4*	26	26
Total	**24**	***14***	**34**	***20***	**16**	***9***	**3**	***2***	**28**	***16***	**50**	***29***	**11**	***6***	**7**	***4***	**173**	**173**

The majority of traders came from areas outside of Dar es Salaam (86%). There were no foreign traders in the sample.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.11: Traders by Market Area & Dependency

Market Area	Average people per household	Average worker per household	Dependency ratio	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	4.0	1.5	2.7	47	47
Mchikichini	4.0	1.6	2.5	45	45
Machinga Complex	4.8	1.7	2.8	22	22
Congo St	3.6	1.6	2.3	32	33
Mwenge BS	3.3	1.5	2.2	26	26
Total	**3.9**	**1.5**	**2.6**	**172**	**173**

Dependency ratios were highest amongst interviewees in Big Brother and the Machinga Complex.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.12: Traders by Market Area & Numbers of Children per Household

Market Area	Household with own children	Average children in household	Average children of school age	Average children in school	% of school age children in school	Households supporting other children	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	47	1.6	1.1	1	*91*	46	47	47
Mchikichini	45	1.6	1.3	1.2	*92*	45	45	45
Machinga Complex	22	1.9	1.2	1.1	*92*	22	22	22
Congo St	33	1.3	0.7	0.6	*86*	32	33	33
Mwenge BS	26	1	0.5	0.5	*100*	26	26	26
Total	**173**	**1.5**	**1**	**0.9**	***90***	**171**	**173**	**173**

A high proportion of interviewee households supported the children of other people (usually relatives).

3.3.3 Business and Employment Patterns

Dar es Salaam Table 3.13: Businesses by Market Area & Suppliers (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Local trading company	%	Asian trading company	%	Chinese trading company	%	Supermarket	%	Shops	%	Other traders	%	Other	%	Multiple sources	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	9	19	1	2	16	34	3	6	6	13	5	11	1	2	6	13	47	47
Mchikichini	10	22	2	4	6	13	8	18	5	11	1	2	1	2	12	27	45	45
Machinga C.	5	26	2	11	3	16	1	5	2	11	0	0	3	16	3	16	19	22
Congo St.	16	50	5	16	1	3	2	6	5	15	0	0	0	0	4	13	33	33
Mwenge BS	5	20	3	12	2	8	3	12	6	24	1	4	1	4	4	16	25	26
Total	**45**	**27**	**13**	**8**	**28**	**17**	**17**	**10**	**24**	**14**	**7**	**4**	**6**	**4**	**29**	**17**	**169**	**173**

Local trading companies were generally interviewees' main suppliers, although in Congo Street these handle imported goods. Interviewees in Big Brother relied more heavily on Chinese trading companies, and in Mwenge on local shops.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.14: Businesses by Market Area & Main Clients (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Businesses	%	Passersby	%	Other traders	%	Households	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	30	64	44	94	25	53	23	49	8	17	47	47
Mchikichini	10	22	44	98	10	22	21	47	4	9	45	45
Machinga Complex	2	10	16	76	6	29	9	43	0	0	21	22
Congo Street	15	45	32	97	7	22	10	30	1	3	33	33
Mwenge BS	5	19	26	100	7	27	8	31	1	4	26	26
Total	**62**	**36**	**162**	**94**	**55**	**32**	**71**	**41**	**14**	**8**	**172**	**173**

The majority of traders depend on passing trade (94%), so a trading location near customers is crucial.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.15: Businesses by Market Area & Use of Other Services (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Porter	%	Guard	%	Repair	%	Food & drink suppliers	%	Other services	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	35	76	24	52	15	33	37	80	11	24	46	47
Mchikichini	26	59	26	59	15	34	26	59	6	14	44	45
Machinga Complex	13	65	12	60	8	40	8	40	4	20	20	22
Congo Street	11	37	12	36	15	50	15	50	8	27	31	33
Mwenge BS	7	32	6	27	6	27	9	41	7	32	22	26
Total	**92**	**56**	**80**	**49**	**59**	**36**	**95**	**58**	**36**	**22**	**163**	**173**

Traders also buy goods and services from other small businesses, eg: porters, guards and food & drink suppliers.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.16: Businesses by Market Area & Access to Trading Space

Market Area	Informal arrangement	%	Pitch license	%	Come early	%	Pay someone	%	Do nothing	%	Shift	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	10	21	35	74	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	47	47
Mchikichini	19	43	23	52	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	44	45
Machinga Complex	2	9	20	91	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	22
Congo St	16	48	0	0	5	16	0	0	1	3	6	19	5	16	33	33
Mwenge BS	21	81	0	0	2	8	2	8	0	0	1	4	0	0	26	26
Total	**68**	**40**	**78**	**45**	**7**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**9**	**5**	**6**	**3**	**172**	**173**

Licenses are common near Big Brother & in the Machinga Complex; elsewhere informal arrangements predominated.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.17: Businesses by Market Area & Access to Water and Toilet

	Access to water		Access to toilet	
Market Area	**Yes**	**%**	**Yes**	**%**
Big Brother	8	*17*	47	*100*
Mchikichini	10	*23*	45	*100*
Machinga Complex	18	*82*	22	*100*
Congo St	6	*18*	31	*94*
Mwenge BS	9	*35*	26	*100*
Total	51	*30*	171	*99*

A surprisingly low number of traders had access to water near their place of work.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.18: Businesses by Market Area & Trading Costs

	Pay for storage		Pay for bribes (Baksheesh)		
Market Area	**Yes**	**%**	**Yes**	**%**	**Total traders**
Big Brother	40	*85*	1	*2*	47
Mchikichini	43	*96*	10	*22*	45
Machinga Complex	11	*50*	1	*5*	22
Congo St	28	*85*	24	*73*	33
Mwenge BS	22	*85*	8	*31*	26
Total	**144**	***83***	**44**	***25***	**173**

A high proportion of traders pay for storage; a quarter (25%) report paying regular bribes.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.19: Businesses by Market Area & Average Reported Costs (Purchases), Income & Profit

Market Area	Daily Costs (Tsh)	Daily Income (Tsh)	Reported Daily Profit (Tsh)	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	45,595	68,359	13,427	43	47
Mchikichini	93,929	51,401	15,213	40	45
Machinga Complex	50,242	90,319	16,627	12	22
Congo St	73,232	89,614	15,668	30	33
Mwenge BS	34,219	50,582	34,833	25	26
Total	**99,963**	**66,770**	**18,107**	**150**	**173**

Figures on costs, income and profit must be treated with caution, as some interviewees are reluctant to discuss income, and others may not keep records. The figures above suggest an order of magnitude, but need more study.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.20: Businesses by Market Area & Changes in Business over 18 Months

Market Area	Up	%	Down	%	None	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	2	*4*	29	*64*	14	*31*	45	47
Mchikichini	9	*22*	17	*41*	15	*37*	41	45
Machinga Complex	1	*5*	16	*80*	3	*15*	20	22
Congo St	6	*19*	16	*52*	10	*30*	32	33
Mwenge BS	5	*20*	10	*40*	10	*40*	25	26
Total	**23**	***14***	**88**	***54***	**52**	***32***	**163**	**173**

More traders who answered this question considered that their business had decreased over the last 18 months (54%), especially in Big Brother and the Machinga Complex.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.21: Traders by Market Area & Employment Status

Market Area	Employer	%	Independent	%	Paid employee	%	Unpaid or Family	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	15	*32*	29	*62*	1	*2*	0	*0*	2	*4*	47	47
Mchikichini	6	*13*	37	*82*	0	*0*	1	*2*	1	*2*	45	45
Machinga Complex	5	*23*	12	*55*	3	*14*	0	*0*	2	*9*	22	22
Congo St	2	*6*	26	*81*	2	*6*	0	*0*	2	*6*	32	33
Mwenge BS	1	*4*	22	*88*	1	*4*	0	*0*	1	*4*	25	26
Total	**29**	***17***	**126**	***74***	**7**	***4***	**1**	***1***	**8**	***5***	**171**	**173**

The majority of interviewees were own-account operators (74%).

*Dar es Salaam Table 3.22: Traders by Working Days & **Months***

	Working days per week				Working months per year				Other jobs			
Market Area	> 6	6	7	Valid responses	>11	11	12	Valid responses	Yes	No	Valid responses	Total traders
Total	**4**	**43**	**126**	**173**	**0**	**6**	**166**	**172**	**28**	**135**	**163**	**173**

The majority of interviewees worked 7 days a week, 12 months a year, indicating trading was their main livelihood.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.23: Traders by Market Area & Year Started

Market Area	<=1	2-3	4-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-30	Valid response	Total traders
Big Brother	5	3	3	13	13	5	5	47	47
Mchikichini	9	7	5	14	6	4	0	45	45
Machinga Complex	8	2	3	4	3	2	0	22	22
Congo St	8	2	4	10	4	4	1	33	33
Mwenge BS	8	10	3	2	1	1	1	26	26
Total	**38**	**24**	**18**	**43**	**27**	**16**	**7**	**173**	**173**

Significant numbers of traders had started trading 6 or more years ago, but there is also a large group of new entrants.

3.3.4 Challenges and Responses

Dar es Salaam Table 3.24: Traders by Market Area & Associational Character

Market Area	Belong to associations	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	6	*13*	47	47
Mchikichini	13	*29*	45	45
Machinga Complex	3	*14*	22	22
Congo St	6	*19*	33	33
Mwenge BS	6	*23*	26	26
Total	**34**	*20*	**173**	**173**

Only 20% of interviewees were members of associations, with the highest membership in Mchikichini. A weak associational structure in trading was corroborated by key informant interviews.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.25: Traders by Market Area & Trading License &Voting Card

	Trading license					Voting card				
Market Area	Yes	%	No	%	Valid responses	Yes	%	No	%	Valid responses
Big Brother	0	*0*	46	*100*	46	40	*87*	6	*13*	46
Mchikichini	1	*2*	44	*98*	45	41	*91*	4	*9*	45
Machinga Complex	2	*9*	20	*91*	22	22	*100*	0	*0*	22
Congo St	1	*3*	32	*97*	33	27	*81*	6	*19*	33
Mwenge BS	0	*0*	24	*100*	24	21	*81*	5	*19*	26
Total	**4**	***2***	**166**	***98***	**170**	**151**	***88***	**21**	***12***	**172**

The majority of traders had a voting card (88%), but only 2% had trading license.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.26: Traders by Market Area & Suffered Shocks & Stresses

Market Area	Yes	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	46	*98*	47	47
Mchikichini	31	*89*	35	45
Machinga Complex	17	*94*	18	22
Congo St	31	*97*	32	33
Mwenge BS	22	*100*	22	26
Total	**147**	*95*	**154**	**173**

The majority of traders interviewed reported problems with trading (95%).

Dar es Salaam Table 3.27: Traders by Market Area & Type of Shocks & Stresses (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Harassment	%	Confiscation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	34	*72*	22	*47*	47	*100*	31	*66*	1	*2*	47	47
Mchikichini	24	*69*	24	*69*	35	*100*	20	*57*	5	*14*	35	45
Machinga Complex	16	*89*	14	*78*	18	*100*	13	*72*	1	*6*	18	22
Congo St	30	*94*	30	*94*	32	*100*	25	*78*	0	*0*	32	33
Mwenge BS	18	*82*	14	*64*	22	*100*	18	*82*	0	*0*	22	26
Total	**122**	***79***	**104**	***68***	**154**	***100***	**107**	***69***	**7**	***5***	**154**	**173**

Harassment, confiscations and fines were high across all sites. Experience of evictions was high in all Market Areas.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.28: Vulnerability of Traders by Gender & Type of Display

	Harassment	%	Confiscation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%	Total responses
Gender * Shocks & Stresses											
Male	96	*82*	84	*72*	64	*55*	87	*74*	3	*3*	117
Female	26	*46*	20	*36*	18	*32*	21	*38*	4	*7*	56
Total	122	*71*	104	*60*	82	*47*	108	*62*	7	*4*	173
Type of display * Shocks & Stresses											
Temporary (1)	33	*80*	31	*76*	28	*68*	30	*73*	5	*12*	41
Equipment (2)	79	*68*	63	*54*	47	*41*	68	*59*	21	*18*	116
Total	**112**	***71***	**94**	***60***	**75**	***48***	**98**	***62***	**26**	***17***	**157**

(1) Traders selling from the ground & wall or carrying their goods
(2) Traders with equipment such as a table, bicycle, kiosk, and small and large carts

Male traders reported more frequent problems than women. Traders with more temporary facilities, such selling from the ground & wall or carrying their goods, were much more vulnerable across all dimensions of risk than those a more established trading set-up.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.29: Traders by Market Area & Sources of Conflict (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Municipalities	%	Market leader	%	Police	%	Formal shops	%	Other traders	%	Neighbours	%	Other	%	No conflicts	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	37	*84*	3	*7*	2	*5*	43	*98*	0	*0*	1	*2*	1	*2*	2	*5*	44	47
Mchikichini	24	*63*	5	*13*	8	*21*	38	*100*	1	*3*	0	*0*	10	*26*	0	*0*	38	45
Machinga Complex	11	*61*	1	*6*	3	*17*	18	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	*28*	1	*6*	18	22
Congo St	29	*91*	2	*6*	3	*9*	31	*97*	1	*3*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	32	33
Mwenge BS	20	*80*	0	*0*	4	*16*	25	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*8*	0	*0*	25	26
Total	**122**	***78***	**11**	***7***	**20**	***13***	**156**	***99***	**2**	***1***	**1**	***1***	**18**	***11***	**3**	***2***	**157**	**173**

Traders reported the source of conflicts were caused mainly by the relationship with formal shops (99%) and the municipalities (78%).

Dar es Salaam Table 3.30: Traders by Market Area & Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Market Area	Bribe	%	No bribe	%	Associ-ation	%	Other means	%	Valid respons es	Total traders
Big Brother	0	*0*	1	*3*	29	*83*	5	*14*	35	47
Mchikichini	3	*8*	1	*3*	33	*89*	0	*0*	37	45
Machinga Complex	1	*7*	3	*20*	10	*67*	1	*7*	15	22
Congo St	30	*97*	0	*0*	1	*3*	0	*0*	31	33
Mwenge BS	13	*65*	6	*30*	0	*0*	1	*5*	20	26
Total	**47**	***34***	**11**	***8***	**73**	***53***	**7**	***5***	**138**	**173**

Both market associations and paying a bribe had an important role in dispute resolution.

Dar es Salaam Table 3.31: Traders by Market Area & Knowledge of the Law

Market Area	No knowledge	%	Knows activity illegal but no details	%	Knows legislation	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Big Brother	27	*59*	19	*41*	0	*0*	46	47
Mchikichini	26	*67*	13	*33*	0	*0*	39	45
Machinga Complex	10	*53*	9	*47*	0	*0*	19	22
Congo St	7	*21*	26	*79*	0	*0*	33	33
Mwenge BS	7	*27*	19	*73*	0	*0*	26	26
Total	77	***47***	86	***53***	0	***0***	163	173

Of the traders who responded, 47% had no knowledge of the legislation that affects them, and 53% rest knew street trading was illegal but did not know details.

SECTION 4: AHMEDABAD DATA

4.1 AHMEDABAD – Legal Framework for Street Trading in Gujarat

The rights of street traders are framed by both the Constitution of India, federal and state legislation, and by local policy as summarised below. The term 'street vendors' is commonly used in India instead of street trader. Three areas of national and state legislation are important relating to: human rights; the duties of municipal government; and the protection of public rights of way. Details are taken from the research report (Mahadevia and Vyas, 2012).

4.1.1 The Constitution of India

The Constitution of India (as amended March 2011) establishes rights to life and personal liberty. The Constitution has two important sections:

- Part III: Fundamental Rights, which are non-negotiable principles for the functioning of the Indian state,
- Part IV: Directive Principles of State Policy, which direct policy but are not enforceable in a court of law.

The 'right to life' is a Fundamental Principle but the 'right to work' is a Directive Principle. A classic case, *Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985,* was brought by pavement and slum dwellers to challenge their eviction. The judge determined that the 'right to life' under Article 21 on *Protection of Life and Personal Liberty* should be expanded to include a 'right to shelter and livelihood', but that the 'right to life and livelihood' can be deprived by other procedures defined in law. He determined that no-one has the right to use public property for a private purpose and the pavement dwellers were therefore trespassers.

4.1.2 National and State Legislation

Several state laws also impact on traders. The Penal code is often the grounds for eviction of street traders and was the only legislation that traders in the survey were able to cite.

- *Indian Penal Code, 1860* prohibits any act that creates a danger within a public right of way (s.283);
- *Motor Vehicle Act, 1988* seeks to ensure the free-flow of traffic;
- *Criminal Procedure Code, 1973,* allows a police officer to arrest anyone about to commit any cognizable offence without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant;
- *Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949* still applies to Gujarat as it was enacted while Gujarat was still part of the old Province of Bombay, and sets out the duties, powers and responsibilities of municipalities. These include: improving streets and maintaining them free from obstruction (Ss. 209, 226, 229, 231 and 234); issuing licenses for selling in public places, markets and slaughterhouses (Ss. 384, 328, 377, 378, 379, and 383) and the avoidance of public nuisance
- *Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976* deals with the designation of land for development.

Thus street vendors can be charged on a number of counts, most frequently for causing an obstruction or not having a license, but at the time of the research no new licenses in Ahmedabad had been issued for many years.

A *National Policy on Urban Street Vendors,* (NPUSV) was first published in 2004 and updated in 2009, as a result of lobbying by the National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI). The policy is under the remit of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, but has to be implemented individually by State governments. The policy recognises street vending as a legitimate element of the urban retail distribution system, and recommends that vending is managed by a Town Vending Committee (TVC) representing the urban local body (municipality), the policy and vendors.

The *Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014* aimed at regulating street trader and protecting their rights was passed by the Lok Sabha (lower house) in September 2013, and Raiva Sabha (upper house) in February 2014, receiving presidential approval in March 2014. It has not yet been commenced, but will form model legislation that need to be adopted by State governments.

4.1.3 Public Interest Litigation

Public Interest Litigation: PIL was introduced in the 1980s and allows both the courts and any other private party to request review of matters of 'public interest'. PIL has become an important mechanism by which communities define their rights in relation to the state, and its use by street vendors' representatives provides some interesting legal precedents. It has usually been used by middle-class communities, but the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) has effectively used PIL litigation to protect street traders' rights.

In 2006 SEWA brought a PIL case against the State of Gujarat requiring the implementation of the NPUSV in Ahmedabad. The case was followed by a complex series of court orders, effectively resulting in policy making becoming the purview of the courts. The orders required Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) to draw up a street vending scheme. Despite submissions by SEWA that the scheme drawn up was inadequate as a result of inadequate consultation during its preparation and its design, it is now being implemented.

Ahmedabad Street Vendors' Scheme: As a result of the PILs discussed above, in 2010 AMC approved the Ahmedabad Street Vendor's Scheme, which determines the functions of the Ahmedabad TVC, and classified major streets in the city by the level of street vending permitted - 'red' (prohibited), 'amber' (restricted by time and products), and 'green' (permitted), and set up a Town Vending Committee, set up after this research.

4.2 AHMEDABAD – Market Areas Surveyed

Six areas were selected for survey demonstrating different characteristics:

Bhadra is the historic mainly Muslim trading area in central Ahmedabad near Bhadra Fort, with an estimated 3,000 vendors. The main commodities sold are new clothes, household goods, shoes and sandals, and fashion accessories. Access is often controlled by an *agewan* (informal landlord). Bhadra Fort to Teen Darwaja is part of the Bhadra Plaza Development Project, a major pedestrianisation scheme undertaken with JNNURM funding, started after the survey was undertaken.

Delhi Darwaja located to the east of the historic city, is around 50 years old, and accommodates around 150 traders, mainly women; many sell second hand clothes and household utensils from the ground. The clothes sourced from the city through a local distribution mechanism: in the morning, hawkers sell utensils in residential areas in exchange for old clothes, which are sold in Delhi Darwaja in the evening.

Kankaria Lake is an artificial lake, built in 1451 AD. In 2009, the Kankaria Lakefront Redevelopment project created a gated lakefront leisure precinct with a paved walkway round the lake. The project displaced several slum settlements and vending locations. Although some vendors have relocated outside the gates, their numbers have reduced.

Jamalpur Market is a vegetable market accommodating about 675 roadside vendors, at the eastern end of Sardar Bridge near a new flyover, outside the Sardar Patel Agricultural Produce Market Committee (the APMC market). Vendors at Jamalpur buy from the APMC market, paying a service charge of 10% on goods bought. Since our 2011 survey, SEWA has negotiated with Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation to relocate Jamalpur market under the flyover.

Parasnagar Market is a local market about 130 vendors, and is near the Ahmedabad Electricity Company Limited zonal office in Narapura Village, adjacent to the new BRTS route; before the BRTS opened vendors used to sit along the main road but have now moved to a side street surrounded by residential colonies.

Khodiyarnagar is a suburban market with about 250-300 vendors in the east of the city, on Narol Naroda Road. The market is the main vegetable market for the district of Khodiyarnagar and is about 20 years old. There are 200+ stalls selling vegetables, 24 stalls selling 'Amerika' (imported second-hand clothes), and about 10 food vendors selling snacks. The market was restricted when the adjacent BRTS route opened.

Small pilot surveys were undertaken in four other locations to explore newer market areas. Two markets serve student populations, outside the **IIM campus** (Indian Institute of Management) where 10-15 vendors sell cooked food and snacks; and at **CEPT University** where about 40 vendors sell new clothing. Two other locations were **Nehrunagar** a new evening clothing market, and **Vastrapur Market** near Vastrapur Lake.

4.3 AHMEDABAD – Survey Findings

4.3.1. The Traders - Interviewees, Products, and Type of Trading Facility

Ahmedabad Table 4.1 Traders Interviewed by Market Area & Gender

Market Area	Males	Females	Total
Bhadra	33	5	38
Delhi Darwaja	13	17	30
Kankaria Lake	21	10	31
Jamalpur	4	15	19
Parasnagar	26	8	34
Khodiyarnagar	18	13	31
IIM	3	0	3
Nehrunagar	4	1	5
Vastrapur	4	0	4
CEPT Univ.	4	1	5
Total	**130**	**70**	**200**

The sample reflected the broad gender characteristics of the Market Areas, with a predominance of men traders in Bhadra and Parasnagar, women traders in Delhi Darwaja and Jamalpur, and mixed populations elsewhere.

Ahmedabad Table 4.2: Traders by Market Area & Products Sold

Market Area	New clothes	%	Second hand clothes	%	Shoes bags belts	%	Fashion	%	Household	%	Fresh food	%	Cooked food, drink	%	Toys	%	Total
Bhadra	13	*34*	0	*0*	2	*5*	3	*8*	10	*26*	6	*16*	2	*5*	2	*5*	38
Delhi Darwaja	1	*3*	23	*77*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*3*	5	*17*	0	*0*	30
Kankaria Lake	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*6*	1	*3*	20	*65*	8	*26*	31
Jamalpur	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	19	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	19
Parasnagar	1	*3*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*9*	18	*53*	11	*32*	1	*3*	34
Khodiyarnagar	5	*16*	0	*0*	3	*10*	5	*16*	1	*3*	12	*39*	5	*16*	0	*0*	31
IIM	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*100*	0	*0*	3
Nehrunagar	2	*40*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*60*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	*100*	0	*0*	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	*100*	0	*0*	5
Total	**22**	***11***	**23**	***12***	**5**	***3***	**11**	***6***	**16**	***8***	**57**	***29***	**55**	***28***	**11**	***6***	**200**

Main products: Bhadra, new clothes, household items; Delhi Darwaja, second hand clothes; Kankaria Lake, tourist sales (cooked food and drink); Jamalpur, Parasnagar and Khodiyarnagar, fresh food; Nehrunagar, fashion items; IIM, Vastrapur and CEPT University, cooked food and drink.

Ahmedabad Table 4.3: Traders by Market Area & Fixed/Mobile Trading Facility

Market Area	Fixed	%	Mobile	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	19	*51*	18	*49*	37	38
Delhi Darwaja	12	*40*	18	*60*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	12	*40*	18	*60*	30	31
Jamalpur	10	*56*	8	*44*	18	19
Parasnagar	16	*48*	17	*52*	33	34
Khodiyarnagar	14	*45*	17	*55*	31	31
IIM	1	*33*	2	*67*	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur	2	*50*	2	*50*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	5	*100*	5	5
Total	**90**	***46***	**106**	***54***	**196**	**200**

About half the traders interviewed were trading from fixed locations. Most of the rest used *laris* (carts) (See Table 4.4)

Ahmedabad Table 4.4: Traders by Market Area & Type of Display (Multiple Choice Question)

	Ground, wall	Box	Table	Kiosk	Bicycle	Carrying goods	Lari (cart)	Other	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	11	5	5	2	2	3	16	0	36	38
Delhi Darwaja	13	0	0	1	1	0	13	0	30	30
Kankaria Lake	7	0	4	3	6	3	8	0	31	31
Jamalpur	18	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	19	19
Parasnagar	0	0	0	0	0	1	31	1	33	34
Khodiyarnagar	4	0	2	0	1	0	22	1	31	31
IIM	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	3
Nehrunagar	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	5	5
Vastrapur	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	5	5
TOTAL	**58**	**5**	**11**	**6**	**11**	**8**	**103**	**3**	**197**	**200**

Laris are widely used for trading; we recorded these as 'mobile', although some traders with *laris* return to fixed sites.

3.3.2. The Traders – Personal Characteristics

Ahmedabad Table 4.5: Traders by Gender & Age

	< 18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid responses
Male	2	*2*	15	*12*	41	*32*	56	*43*	16	*12*	130
Female	0	*0*	4	*6*	10	*14*	41	*59*	15	*21*	70
Total	**2**	***1***	**19**	***10***	**51**	***26***	**97**	***49***	**31**	***16***	**200**

Street trading in Ahmedabad is a very established profession, and 80% of women and 55% of men were 35 or over.

Ahmedabad Table 4.6: Traders by Market Area & Age

Market Area	< 18	%	18-24	%	25-34	%	35-54	%	55+	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	0	*0*	3	*8*	11	*29*	16	*42*	8	*21*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	0	*0*	1	*3*	3	*10*	19	*63*	7	*23*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	1	*3*	3	*10*	9	*29*	15	*48*	3	*10*	31	31
Jamalpur	0	*0*	1	*5*	1	*5*	14	*74*	3	*16*	19	19
Parasnagar	0	*0*	3	*9*	12	*35*	16	*47*	3	*9*	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	1	*3*	5	*16*	11	*35*	9	*29*	5	*16*	31	31
IIM	0	*0*	1	*33*	0	*0*	2	*67*	0	*0*	3	3
Nehrunagar	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*60*	2	*40*	0	*0*	5	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	1	*25*	1	*25*	1	*25*	1	*25*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	1	*20*	0	0	3	*60*	1	*20*	5	5
Total	**2**	***1***	**19**	***10***	**51**	***26***	**97**	***49***	**31**	***16***	**200**	**200**

The numbers of young traders aged 18-24 were smaller than the other markets surveyed (10% v. 42% in Dakar).

Ahmedabad Table 4.7: Traders by Gender & Marital Status

	Single	%	Married	%	Widowed	%	Divorced	%	Valid res-ponses
Male	23	*18*	104	*81*	2	*2*	0	*0*	129
Female	2	*3*	63	*90*	3	*4*	2	*3*	70
Total	**25**	***13***	**167**	***84***	**5**	***3***	**2**	***1***	**199**

Relatively few of the traders interviewed were widowed or divorced (3% in total).

Ahmedabad Table 4.8: Traders by Market Area & Literacy

Market Area	Illiter-ate	%	Sign-ature	%	Read	%	Read & Write	%	Total traders
Bhadra	10	26	0	0	5	13	23	61	38
Delhi Darwaja	13	43	3	10	1	3	13	43	30
Kankaria Lake	6	19	5	16	3	10	17	55	31
Jamalpur	12	63	3	16	1	5	3	16	19
Parasnagar	8	24	2	6	4	12	20	59	34
Khodiyarnagar	6	19	2	7	1	3	22	71	31
IIM	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	100	3
Nehrunagar	0	0	1	20	0	0	4	80	5
Vastrapur	1	25	0	0	0	0	3	75	4
CEPT Univ.	0	0	1	20	1	20	3	60	5
Total	**56**	**28**	**17**	**9**	**16**	**8**	**111**	**56**	**200**

Some 28% of the traders interviewed said they that could not read or write.

Ahmedabad Table 4.9: Traders by Market Area & Religion

Market Area	Hindu	%	Muslim	%	Chris-tian	%	Other	%	Valid res-ponse	Total traders
Bhadra	15	39	23	61	0	0	0	0	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	30	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	30
Kankaria Lake	29	94	2	6	0	0	0	0	31	31
Jamalpur	18	95	1	5	0	0	0	0	19	19
Parasnagar	34	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	31	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	31
IIM	3	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	80	0	0	0	0	1	20	5	5
Vastrapur	4	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
CEPT Univ.	4	80	0	0	1	20	0	0	5	5
Total	**172**	**86**	**26**	**13**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**200**	**200**

Traders in most of the trading areas were of Hindu faith, except in Bhadra where Muslims predominate.

Ahmedabad Table 4.10: Traders by Market Area & Region of Origin

Market Area	Ahmeda bad	%	Other - Gujarat	%	Other state/ country	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	29	81	6	17	1	3	36	38
Delhi Darwaja	22	73	2	7	6	20	30	30
Kankaria Lake	21	68	7	23	3	10	31	31
Jamalpur	16	84	2	11	1	5	19	19
Parasnagar	21	62	9	26	4	12	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	18	60	2	7	10	33	30	31
IIM	0	0	2	67	1	33	3	3
Nehrunagar	3	60	0	0	2	40	5	5
Vastrapur	3	75	1	25	0	0	4	4
CEPT Univ.	2	40	3	60	0	0	5	5
Total	**135**	**69**	**34**	**17**	**28**	**14**	**197**	**200**

Some 69% of interviewees came from Ahmedabad, and 17% from elsewhere in Gujarat. Those from outside the state mostly came from Rajasthan or Maharashtra.

Ahmedabad Table 4.11: Traders by Market Area & Reported Caste or Tribe

Market Area	Scheduled caste	%	Scheduled tribe	%	Other Backward Classes	%	Other	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Bhadra	6	*16*	1	*3*	13	*34*	18	*47*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	20	*67*	0	*0*	5	*17*	5	*16*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	4	*13*	1	*3*	14	*47*	11	*36*	30	31
Jamalpur	10	*56*	1	*6*	1	*6*	6	*33*	18	19
Parasnagar	9	*27*	0	*0*	14	*42*	10	*30*	33	34
Khodiyarnagar	13	*42*	0	*0*	10	*32*	8	*25*	31	31
IIM	1	*33*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*66*	3	3
Nehrunagar	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*50*	2	*50*	4	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	*100*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*20*	4	*80*	5	5
Total	**63**	***32***	**3**	***2***	**60**	***31***	**70**	***35***	**196**	**200**

Some 65% of traders were from disadvantaged groups: 34% from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes (recognised in the Indian Constitution as historically disadvantaged), and 35% from Other Backward Classes (a term used by the Government of India to identify other disadvantaged groups).

Ahmedabad Table 4.12: Traders by Market Area & Dependency

Market Area	Average people in household	Average workers in household	Dependency ratio	Valid responses	Total traders
Bhadra	6.9	1.8	3.7	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	5.7	2.2	2.6	30	30
Kankaria Lake	5.5	2.1	2.6	31	31
Jamalpur	9.1	2.3	3.9	19	19
Parasnagar	5.8	2.1	2.7	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	5.9	1.9	3.1	31	31
IIM	7.0	2.3	3.0	3	3
Nehrunagar	4.4	2.6	1.7	5	5
Vastrapur	7.3	3.5	2.1	4	4
CEPT Univ.	6.0	2.6	2.3	5	5
Total	**6.4**	**2.1**	**3.3**	**200**	**200**

Dependency ratios were particularly high in Bhadra and Jamalpur.

Ahmedabad Table 4.13: Traders by Market Area & Numbers of Children per Household

Market Area	Hhds with own children	Av no children (total hhds)	Av no school age children	% school age children in school	Hhd supporting other children	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	31	2.9	2.2	*89*	14	37	38
Delhi Darwaja	25	2.9	1.4	*88*	3	30	30
Kankaria Lake	27	2.2	1.4	*77*	2	31	31
Jamalpur	18	4.1	2.5	*83*	2	19	19
Parasnagar	30	2.5	1.1	*90*	5	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	28	2.7	2.0	*93*	2	31	31
IIM	2	1.0	0.7	*100*	0	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	0.8	0.6	*100*	0	5	5
Vastrapur	3	2.5	1.8	*100*	1	4	4
CEPT Univ.	4	2.8	2.8	*93*	1	5	5
Total	**172**	**2.7**	**1.7**	***88***	**30**	**199**	**200**

A relatively high percentage of children were in school.

4.3.3 Business and Employment Patterns

Ahmedabad Table 4.14: Businesses by Market Area & Suppliers (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Local trading company	%	Super-market	%	Small shops	%	Other traders	% of traders	Self	% of traders	Other	% of traders	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	27	*71*	1	*3*	1	*3*	5	*13*	1	*3*	6	*16*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	2	*7*	0	*0*	1	*3*	13	*45*	3	*10*	9	*31*	29	30
Kankaria Lake	18	*67*	0	*0*	2	*7*	1	*4*	7	*26*	1	*4*	27	31
Jamalpur	19	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	18	19
Parasnagar	23	*72*	5	*16*	0	*0*	0	*0*	7	*22*	0	*0*	32	34
Khodiyarnagar	24	*77*	2	*6*	1	*3*	1	*3*	4	*13*	1	*3*	31	31
IIM	2	*67*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*33*	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur	2	*50*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*50*	0	*0*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	*100*	0	*0*	5	5
Total	**121**	***63***	**8**	***4***	**7**	***4***	**21**	***11***	**29**	***15***	**15**	***8***	**192**	**200**

Supply chains in Ahmedabad cover Gujarat and neighbouring states, but are generally more local than in the other cities studied. Some 15% of traders were selling products made by themselves.

Ahmedabad Table 4.15: Businesses by Market Area & Main Clients (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Busi-nesses	%	Passers-by	%	Other traders	%	House-holds	%	Other	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	0	*0*	36	*95*	0	*0*	18	*47*	0	*0*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	7	*24*	17	*59*	14	*48*	8	*28*	2	*7*	29	30
Kankaria Lak e	0	*0*	25	*83*	3	*10*	4	*13*	6	*20*	30	31
Jamalpur	1	*6*	16	*89*	8	*44*	12	*67*	1	*6*	18	19
Parasnagar	0	*0*	34	*100*	1	*3*	28	*82*	0	*0*	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	0	*0*	29	*94*	0	*0*	25	*81*	0	*0*	31	31
IIM	0	*0*	3	*100*	0	*0*	3	*100*	0	*0*	3	3
Nehrunagar	0	*0*	5	*100*	0	*0*	1	*20*	0	*0*	5	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	4	*100*	0	*0*	1	*25*	0	*0*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	2	*40*	0	*0*	2	*40*	1	*20*	5	5
Total	**8**	***4***	**171**	***87***	**26**	*13*	**102**	***52***	**10**	***5***	**197**	**200**

The dependence on passing trade is very high (87%), so a trading location near customers is crucial.

Ahmedabad Table 4.16: Businesses by Market Area & Use of Other Services (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Porters	%	Guard	%	Repairs	%	Food & drink suppliers	%	Other services	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Bhadra	8	*21*	7	*18*	2	*5*	0	*0*	3	*8*	20	38
Delhi Darwaja	0	*0*	1	*3*	0	*0*	1	*3*	9	*30*	11	30
Kankaria Lake	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*7*	3	*10*	6	*19*	11	31
Jamalpur	0	*0*	1	*5*	0	*0*	3	*16*	4	*21*	8	19
Parasnagar	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	*15*	5	34
Kodiyarnagar	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*10*	3	31
Other Market Areas	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	17
Total	**8**	***4***	**9**	***5***	**4**	***2***	**7**	***4***	**30**	***15***	**58**	**200**

The use of other services was reportedly less than in the other cities.

Ahmedabad Table 4.17: Businesses by Market Area & Access to Trading Space

Market Area	Informal arrangement	%	Arrive early	%	Pay someone	%	Do nothing	%	Mobile trader	%	Other	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	22	*57*	3	*8*	0	*0*	8	*21*	0	*0*	5	*13*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	24	*80*	3	*10*	0	*0*	3	*10*	0	*0*	0	*0*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	22	*71*	0	*0*	0	*0*	7	*23*	2	*7*	0	*0*	31	31
Jamalpur	19	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	19	19
Parasnagar	30	*88*	1	*3*	0	*0*	1	*3*	0	*0*	2	*6*	34	34
Kodiyarnagar	27	*87*	2	*7*	0	*0*	2	*7*	0	*0*	0	*0*	31	31
IIM	2	*66*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*33*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	3
Nehrunagar	2	*40*	0	*0*	2	*40*	0	*0*	1	*20*	0	*0*	5	5
Vastrapur	4	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	5	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	5
Total	**157**	***79***	**9**	***5***	**2**	***1***	**22**	***11***	**3**	***2***	**7**	***4***	**200**	**200**

Most traders use informal arrangements to protect access to their trading space.

Ahmedabad Table 4.18: Businesses by Market Area & Access to Water and Toilet

	Access to water		Access to toilet	
Market Area	Yes	% of sample	Yes	% of sample
Bhadra	24	*63*	34	*90*
Delhi Darwaja	10	*33*	19	*63*
Kankaria Lake	18	*58*	19	*61*
Jamalpur	18	*95*	18	*95*
Parasnagar	11	*32*	3	*9*
Khodiyarnagar	11	*35*	2	*7*
IIM	3	*100*	3	*100*
Nehrunagar	n.a		n.a	
Vastrapur	2	*50*	2	*50*
CEPT Univ.	2	*40*	3	*60*
Total	**99**	***50***	**103**	***52***

Some areas had rather poor access water and sanitation, particularly Parasnagar and Khodiyarnagar. Access was best in Bhadra, Jamalpur and IIM.

Ahmedabad Table 4.19: Businesses by Market Area & Trading Costs

	Pay for storage		Pay for transport		Pay for bribes		Total traders
Market Area	Yes	% of sample	Yes	% of sample	Yes	% of sample	
Bhadra	23	*61*	25	*66*	19	*50*	38
Delhi Darwaja	6	*20*	23	*77*	7	*23*	30
Kankaria Lake	7	*23*	13	*42*	10	*32*	31
Jamalpur	14	*74*	15	*79*	4	*21*	19
Parasnagar	4	*12*	23	*68*	10	*29*	34
Kodiyarnagar	2	*7*	15	*48*	2	*7*	31
IIM	1	*33*	1	*33*	1	*33*	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	5	*100*	3	*60*	5
Vastrapur	1	*25*	1	*25*	1	*25*	4
CEPT Univ.	1	*20*	3	*60*	4	*80*	5
Total	**63**	***32***	**124**	***62***	**61**	***31***	**200**

There are many additional costs to trading, including payment for transport, storage, and bribes (baksheesh) – (the latter is often under-reported in surveys. Interviewees provided only limited information on the extent of costs.

Ahmedabad Table 4.20: Businesses by Market Area & Average Reported Costs (Purchases), Income & Profit

Market Area	Costs/ day Rs.	Income/ day Rs.	Reported profit/ day Rs.	Valid responses*	Total traders
Bhadra	1,481	1,878	362	25	38
Delhi Darwaja	870	1,073	230	20	30
Kankaria Lake	306	379	90	19	31
Jamalpur	1,532	1,616	222	8	19
Parasnagar	1,256	1,379	229	27	34
Kodiyarnagar	1,119	1,303	132	25	31
IIM	2,210	3,250	442	2	3
Nehrunagar	929	5,250	1000	4	5
Vastrapur	663	1,088	438	4	4
CEPT Univ.	2,600	3,520	920	5	5
Total	**1,143**	**1,453**	**263**	**139**	**200**

Figures on costs, income and profit must be treated with caution, as some interviewees are reluctant to discuss income, and others may not keep records. The results are drawn from interviews where all three relevant questions were completed. Data from other sources suggests that profits for traders in Delhi Darwaja is probably lower than findings here (around Rs.100-150 a day). The small samples from IIM, Nehrunagar, Vastrapur and CEPT University suggest that these sites should be discounted.

Ahmedabad Table 4.21: Businesses by Market Area & Changes in Business over 18 Months

Market Area	Up	%	Down	%	None	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	7	*18*	9	*24*	22	*58*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	1	*3*	8	*27*	21	*70*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	0	*0*	7	*23*	24	*77*	31	31
Jamalpur	1	*5*	9	*47*	9	*47*	19	19
Parasnagar	1	*3*	7	*21*	26	*77*	34	34
Khodiyarnagar	3	*10*	4	*13*	24	*77*	31	31
IIM	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*100*	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	0	*0*	1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	*100*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	2	*40*	1	*20*	2	*40*	5	5
Total	**19**	***10***	**45**	***23***	**136**	***68***	**200**	**200**

The majority of traders (68%) did not see any changes to trading and profits over the last 18 months.

Ahmedabad Table 4.22: Traders by Market Area & Employment Status

Market Area	Employer	%	Inde-pendent	%	Paid employee	%	Unpaid or family worker	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Bhadra	10	*26*	21	*55*	2	*5*	5	*13*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	3	*10*	19	*63*	1	*3*	7	*12*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	1	*3*	24	*77*	0	*0*	6	*19*	31	31
Jamalpur	0	*0*	9	*47*	0	*0*	10	*53*	19	19
Parasnagar	4	*12*	23	*68*	0	*0*	7	*21*	34	34
Kodiyarnagar	0	*0*	25	*81*	0	*0*	6	*19*	31	31
IIM	0	*0*	2	*67*	0	*0*	1	*33*	3	3
Nehrunagar	3	*60*	1	*20*	0	*0*	1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	4	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*40*	3	*60*	5	5
Total	**21**	***11***	**128**	***64***	**5**	***3***	**46**	***23***	**200**	**200**

Some 87% of interviewees were own-account workers or unpaid family members.

Ahmedabad Table 4.23: Traders by Working Days & Months

Market Area	>6 days/ week	6 days/ week	7 days/ week	Valid responses	>11 months/ year	11 months/ year	12 months/ year	Valid responses	Other jobs Yes	Other jobs No	Valid response	Total traders
Total	1	37	161	200	3	3	194	200	19	103	122	38

The majority of interviewees worked 7 days/week, 12 months a year, indicating that trading was their main livelihood.

Ahmedabad Table 4.24: Traders by Market Area & Year Started

Market Area	<=1	2-3	4-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-30	31+	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	1	7	10	11	6	2	1		38	38
Delhi Darwaja	1	5	12	4	1	5	1	1	30	30
Kankaria Lake	2	17	10	2	0	0	0	0	31	31
Jamalpur	0	4	6	7	1	1	0	0	19	19
Parasnagar	0	17	13	3	1	0	0	0	34	34
Kodiyarnagar	1	18	9	1	1	1	0	0	31	31
IIM	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Nehrunagar	1	4		0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Vastrapur	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	5
Total	**6**	**79**	**64**	**29**	**10**	**9**	**2**	**1**	**200**	**200**

A high proportion of traders had less than 5 years of business experience.

4.3.4 Challenges and Responses

Ahmedabad Table 4.25: Traders by Market Area & Associational Character

Market Area	Belong to associations	%	Total
Bhadra	17	*45*	38
Delhi Darwaja	9	*30*	30
Kankaria Lake	4	*13*	31
Jamalpur	13	*68*	19
Parasnagar	3	*9*	34
Khodiyarnagar	10	*32*	31
IIM	0	*0*	3
Nehrunagar	0	*0*	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	5
Total	**57**	***29***	**200**

A relatively a small number of traders belonged to associations; in Jamalpur many of the traders are members of SEWA

Ahmedabad Table 4.26: Traders by Market Area & Ration Cards, Voting Cards & Social Security

	Ration Card (APL and BPL)					Voting Card			Social Security		
Market Area	Ration card APL	%	Ration card BPL	%	Valid res-ponse	Yes	%	Valid res-ponse	Yes	%	Valid res-ponse
Bhadra	13	*87*	2	*13*	15	18	*47*	38	27	*75*	36
Delhi Darwaja	18	*90*	2	*10*	20	25	*83*	30	27	*90*	30
Kankaria Lake	12	*63*	7	*37*	19	21	*68*	31	29	*94*	31
Jamalpur	14	*88*	2	*13*	16	17	*90*	19	16	*89*	18
Parasnagar	16	*76*	5	*24*	21	28	*82*	34	26	*84*	31
Kodiyarnagar	14	*88*	2	*13*	16	19	*61*	31	26	*84*	31
IIM	2	*67*	1	*33*	3	3	*100*	3	2	*67*	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	1	*20*	5	5	*100*	5	5	*100*	5
Vastrapur	2	*67*	1	*33*	3	3	*75*	4	4	*100*	4
CEPT Univ.	3	*100*	0	*0*	3	3	*60*	5	1	*20*	5
Total	**98**	***81***	**23**	***19***	**121**	**142**	***71***	**200**	**163**	***84***	**194**

A high proportion of traders had an APL (above poverty line) ration cards (81% of valid responses), but only 20% had a BPL (below poverty line) ration card.

Ahmedabad Table 4.27: Traders by Market Area & Suffered Shocks and Stresses

Market Area	Yes	%	Total
Bhadra	37	*97*	38
Delhi Darwaja	27	*90*	30
Kankaria Lake	25	*81*	31
Jamalpur	18	*94*	19
Parasnagar	25	*74*	34
Kodiyarnagar	24	*77*	31
IIM	3	*100*	3
Nehrunagar	5	*100*	5
Vastrapur	3	*75*	4
CEPT Univ.	5	*100*	5
Total	**172**	***86***	**200**

High levels of trading problems were experienced in all markets.

Ahmedabad Table 4.28: Traders by Market Area &Type of Shocks & Stresses (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Harass-ment	%	Confis-cation	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	11	*29*	16	*42*	12	*32*	24	*63*	37	38
Delhi Darwaja	4	*13*	8	*27*	1	*3*	16	*53*	27	30
Kankaria Lake	4	*13*	2	*7*	6	*19*	13	*42*	25	31
Jamalpur	4	*21*	7	*37*	0	*0*	13	*68*	18	19
Parasnagar	9	*27*	8	*24*	2	*6*	11	*32*	25	34
Khodiyarnagar	6	*19*	4	*13*	2	*7*	15	*48*	24	31
IIM	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*67*	3	3
Nehrunagar	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	*100*	5	5
Vastrapur	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*25*	3	4
CEPT Univ.	3	*60*	0	*0*	1	*20*	0	*0*	5	5
Total	**41**	***21***	**45**	***23***	**24**	***12***	**100**	***50***	**172**	**200**

Reported experience of eviction was particularly high in Bhadra, Jamalpur, IIM and Nehrunagar.

Ahmedabad Table 4.29: Vulnerability of Traders by Gender & Type of Display

	Harassment	%	Confiscations	%	Fines	%	Eviction	%	Other problems	%	TOTAL REPSONSES
Gender * Shocks & Stresses											
Male	27	*20*	25	*19*	19	*14*	53	*40*	18	*13*	**130**
Female	14	*20*	20	*28*	5	*7*	47	*67*	2	*2*	**70**
Total	**41**	***20***	**45**	***22***	**24**	***12***	**100**	***50***	**20**	***10***	**200**
Type of display * Shocks & Stresses											
Temporary (1)	14	*21*	16	*25*	7	*10*	39	*60*	6	*9*	**64**
Equipment (2)	25	*18*	29	*22*	17	*12*	59	*44*	14	*10*	**132**
Total	**39**	***19***	**45**	***23***	**24**	***12***	**98**	***50***	**20**	***10***	**196**

1) Traders with temporary facilities ie: selling from the ground or carrying goods were classed vulnerable
2) Traders with equipment had a slightly higher degree of investment eg: a table, *lari* or bicycle.

Female traders and those with temporary facilities report higher rates of eviction than others.

Ahmedabad Table 4.30: Market Areas by Sources of Conflict (Multiple Choice Question)

Market Area	Municipality	%	Market Area manager	%	Police	%	Formal shops	%	Other traders	%	Neighbours	%	No conflicts	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	16	*42*	2	*5*	18	*47*	3	*8*	6	*16*	5	*13*	5	*13*	38	38
Delhi Darwaja	12	*40*	2	*7*	15	*50*	5	*17*	0	*0*	7	*23*	2	*7*	30	30
Kankaria Lake	15	*48*	1	*3*	20	*65*	0	*0*	2	*6*	8	*26*	4	*13*	31	31
Jamalpur	8	*42*	0	*0*	13	*68*	0	*0*	1	*5*	2	*11*	2	*11*	19	19
Parasnagar	11	*32*	0	*0*	12	*35*	0	*0*	4	*12*	16	*47*	3	*9*	34	34
Kodiyarnagar	11	*35*	0	*0*	16	*52*	3	*10*	4	*13*	13	*42*	1	*3*	31	31
IIM	1	*33*	0	*0*	2	*67*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*33*	3	3
Nehrunagar	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*60*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*60*	1	*20*	5	5
Vastrapur	2	*50*	0	*0*	3	*75*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*25*	0	*0*	4	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*60*	0	*0*	0	*0*	1	*20*	1	*20*	5	5
Total	**76**	***38***	**5**	***3***	**105**	***53***	**11**	***6***	**17**	***9***	**56**	***28***	**20**	***10***	**200**	**200**

The most frequent causes of conflict mentioned was with the police (53%) and municipality (38%).

Ahmedabad Table 4.31: Traders by Market Area & Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Market Area	Bribe	%	No bribe	%	Asso-ciation	%	Market Area manager	%	Other means	%	Valid response	Total traders
Bhadra	7	*19*	15	*41*	1	*3*	3	*8*	9	*24*	37	38
Delhi Darwaja	4	*17*	1	*4*	0	*0*	3	*13*	13	*57*	23	30
Kankaria Lake	10	*36*	1	*4*	0	*0*	0	*0*	7	*25*	28	31
Jamalpur	7	*44*	0	*0*	5	*31*	9	*56*	4	*25*	16	19
Parasnagar	12	*44*	2	*7*	2	*7*	2	*7*	4	*15*	27	34
Kodiyarnagar	1	*4*	3	*13*	6	*25*	1	*4*	10	*42*	24	31
IIM	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	3	*100*	3	3
Nehrunagar	4	*100*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	4	5
Vastrapur	1	*33*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	2	*67*	3	4
CEPT Univ.	4	*80*	1	*20*	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*	5	5
Total	**50**	***29***	**23**	***14***	**14**	***8***	**18**	***11***	**52**	***31***	**170**	**200**

Nearly a third of interviewees reporting using bribes to solve disputes.

Ahmedabad Table 4.32: Traders by Market Area & Knowledge of the Law

Market Area	No knowledge	%	Knows activity illegal but no details	%	Knows legislation	%	Valid responses	Total traders
Bhadra	18	*69*	**6**	*23*	**2**	8	26	38
Delhi Darwaja	14	*88*	2	*13*	0	0	16	30
Kankaria Lake	23	*100*	0	*0*	0	0	23	31
Jamalpur	8	*89*	1	*11*	0	0	9	19
Parasnagar	27	*100*	0	*0*	0	0	27	34
Kodiyarnagar	19	*90*	2	*10*	0	0	21	31
IIM	1	*100*	0	*0*	0	0	1	3
Nehrunagar	4	*80*	1	*20*	0	0	5	5
Vastrapur	2	*100*	0	*0*	0	0	2	4
CEPT Univ.	0	*0*	0	*0*	0	0	0	5
Total	116	***89***	12	***9***	2	**2**	130	**200**

A very high proportion of traders had no knowledge of legislation that affects them (89%).

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