General Codebook

Policy variables

p1l: Agriculture – legislative
p1a: Agriculture – administrative
p2l: Citizenship and immigration – legislative
p2a: Citizenship and immigration – administrative
p3l: Culture – legislative
p3a: Culture – administrative
p4l: Currency and money supply – legislative
p4a: Currency and money supply – administrative
p5l: Defence – legislative
p5a: Defence – administrative
p6l: Economic activity – legislative
p6a: Economic activity – administrative
p7l: Pre-tertiary education – legislative
p7a: Pre-tertiary education – administrative
p8l: Tertiary education – legislative
p8a: Tertiary education – administrative
p9l: Elections and voting – legislative
p9a: Elections and voting – administrative
p10l: Employment relations – legislative
p10a: Employment relations – administrative
p11l: Environmental protection – legislative
p11a: Environmental protection – administrative
p12l: External affairs – legislative
p12a: External affairs – administrative
p13l: Finance and securities – legislative
p13a: Finance and securities – administrative
p14l: Health care – legislative
p14a: Health care – administrative
p15l: Language – legislative
p15a: Language – administrative
p16l: Civil law – legislative
p16a: Civil law – administrative
p17l: Criminal law – legislative
p17a: Criminal law – administrative
p18l: Law enforcement – legislative
p18a: Law enforcement – administrative
p19l: Media – legislative
p19a: Media – administrative
p20l: Natural resources – legislative
p20a: Natural resources – administrative
p21l: Social welfare – legislative
p21a: Social welfare – administrative
p22l: Transport – legislative
p22a: Transport – administrative

Policy codes: 1=exclusively central government; 2=almost exclusively central government; 3=predominantly central government; 4=equally central government and constituent units; 5=

predominantly constituent units; 6= almost exclusively constituent units; 7=exclusively constituent units; 88=not applicable; 99=no data available

Note: only one code per country/year is provided; in cases of asymmetry across constituent units, the code provided reflects the most prevalent situation; please see the sources listed below regarding the coding of asymmetry in each case.

Fiscal variables

f1: Proportion of own-source revenues out of total constituent unit revenues

f1 codes: 1=0-14%; 2=15-29%; 3=30-44%; 4=45-59%; 5=60-74%; 6=75-89%; 7=90-100%; 88=not applicable; 99=no data available

f2: Restrictions on constituent unit own-source revenues

f2 codes: 1=very high; 2=high; 3=quite high; 4=medium; 5=quite low; 6=low; 7=very low; 88=not applicable; 99=no data available

f3: Proportion of federal conditional transfers out of total constituent unit revenues

f3 codes: 1=86-100%; 2=71-85%; 3=56-70%; 4=41-55%; 5=26-40%; 6=11-25%; 7=0-10%; 88=not applicable; 99=no data available

f4: Degree of conditionality attached to federal conditional transfers

f4 codes: 1=very high; 2=high; 3=quite high; 4=medium; 5=quite low; 6=low; 7=very low; 88=not applicable; 99=no data available

f5: Constituent unit public sector borrowing autonomy

f5 codes: 1=very low; 2=low; 3=quite low; 4=medium; 5=quite high; 6=high; 7=very high; 88=not applicable; 99=no data available

Note: only one code per country/year is provided; in cases of asymmetry across constituent units, the code provided reflects an average or the most prevalent situation; please see the sources listed below regarding the coding of asymmetry in each case.

Further metadata

For detailed information on conceptualisation and measurement, see:

Dardanelli, Paolo, John Kincaid, André Kaiser, André Lecours and Ajay Kumar Singh. 2019. Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Theorizing Dynamic De/Centralization in Federations. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjy036

For detailed information on the coding of each case, see:

Fenna, Alan. 2019. The Centralization of Australian Federalism 1901–2010: Measurement and Interpretation. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjy042

Dardanelli, Kincaid, Fenna, Kaiser, Lecours, Singh, Mueller, Vogel – De/Centralisation Dataset (DcD)

Lecours, André. 2019. Dynamic De/Centralization in Canada, 1867-2010. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjx046

Kaiser, André and Stephan Vogel. 2019. Dynamic De/Centralization in Germany, 1949-2010. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjx054

Singh, Ajay Kumar. 2019. Dynamic De/Centralization in India, 1950-2010. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjy022

Dardanelli, Paolo and Sean Mueller. 2019. Dynamic De/Centralization in Switzerland, 1848-2010. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjx056

Kincaid, John. 2019. Dynamic De/Centralization in the United States, 1790-2010. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjy032

For a comparative perspective, see:

Dardanelli, Paolo, John Kincaid, André Kaiser, André Lecours, Ajay Kumar Singh, Sean Mueller and Stephan Vogel. 2019. Dynamic De/Centralization in Federations: Comparative Conclusions. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 49/1: doi: 10.1093/publius/pjy037